

EDWARD M. ANSON

EUMENES OF CARDIA

A Greek among Macedonians



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EUMENES OF CARDIA

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BY

EDWARD M. ANSON



BRILL ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, INC.

BOSTON • LEIDEN

2004

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Anson, Edward.

Eumenes of Cardia : a Greek among Macedonians / by Edward M. Anson.
p. cm. — (Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean antiquity,
ISSN 1543-995X; v. 3)

Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.

ISBN 0-391-04209-2

1. Eumenes, of Cardia, ca. 361-316 B.C. 2. Greece—History—Macedonian
Hegemony, 323-281 B.C. 3. Macedonia—History—Diadochi, 323-276 B.C. 4.
Generals—Greece—Biography. I. Title. II. Studies in Philo of Alexandria and
Mediterranean antiquity (Brill Academic Publishers); v. 3.

DF235.48.E96A57 2004

938'.07'092—dc22

[B]

2003065289

ISSN 1543-995X
ISBN 0-391-04209-2

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PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

This work is dedicated to Jeanne for her patience, her help,
and most of all, for her love.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work has been long in the making, and there are many who have supplied encouragement and assistance over the years. I would like to single out a few for mention. Unfortunately Harry Dell is not alive to read and comment on this a project first conceived in his seminars. Waldemar Heckel, now some time ago, read an earlier edition of this manuscript and offered many helpful comments. To him in particular I apologize for the long wait. He, along with Lindsay Adams and Bill Greenwalt have discussed, challenged, and debated, both formally and informally on a number of occasions the ideas put forth here. I thank them all for their efforts and apologize in advance for not always following their advice. I would also like to thank Patrick Alexander and Renee Ricker of Brill Academic Publishers for their editing of the finished manuscript.

ABBREVIATIONS

Primary Sources

Ael. <i>NA</i>	Aelian. <i>De natura animalium</i>
— <i>VH</i>	— <i>Varia Historia</i>
Aeschin. 1	Aeschines. <i>Against Timarchus</i>
—2	<i>On the Embassy</i>
—3	<i>Against Ctesiphon</i>
Andoc. 3	Andocides. <i>On the Peace</i>
Apollod. <i>Bibl.</i>	Apollodorus. <i>Bibliotheca</i>
App. <i>Mith.</i>	Appian. <i>Mithridatic Wars</i>
— <i>Syr.</i>	— <i>Syrian Wars</i>
Ar. <i>Ach.</i>	Aristophanes. <i>Acharnians</i>
— <i>Birds</i>	— <i>Birds</i>
— <i>Lys.</i>	— <i>Lysistrata</i>
Arist. <i>Pol.</i>	Aristotle. <i>Politics</i>
Arr. <i>Anab.</i>	Arrian. <i>Anabasis</i>
— <i>Ind.</i>	— <i>Indica</i>
— <i>Succ.</i>	—Τὰ μετ' Ἀλέξανδρον.
Athen.	Athenaeus. Δειπνοσοφισταί (<i>Banqueters</i>)
Cic. <i>Brut.</i>	Cicero. <i>Brutus</i>
— <i>De Or.</i>	— <i>De Oratore</i>
Curt.	Curtius Rufus. <i>Historia Alexandri Magni</i>
Dem. 1	Demosthenes. <i>Olynthiac 1</i>
—2	— <i>Olynthiac 2</i>
—3	— <i>Olynthiac 3</i>
—4	— <i>Philippic 1</i>
—6	— <i>Philippic 2</i>
—8	— <i>On the Chersonese</i>
—9	— <i>Philippic 3</i>
—11	— <i>Reply to Philip's Letter</i>
—17	— <i>On the Accession of Alexander</i>
—18	— <i>On the Crown</i>
—19	— <i>On the False Embassy</i>
—21	— <i>Against Meidias</i>
—23	— <i>Against Aristocrates</i>

- 24 —*Against Timocrates*
 —42 —*Against Phaenippus*
 45 —*Against Stephanus 1*
 —48 —*Against Olympiodorus*
 —57 —*Against Eubulides*
 [Dem.] 7 —*On the Halonnesus*
 Diod. Diodorus of Sicily. *Bibliothèque historique*
 Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* Dionysius Haricarnassensis. *Roman Antiquities*
 —*Comp.* —*De Compositione Verborum*
 D. L. Diogenes Laertius. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*
Esther May, H. G., and Metzger, B. M. *The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha*. Expanded Edition. Revised Standard Version. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977
 Eur. *IA* Euripides *Iphigeneia in Aulis*
 —*Phoen* —*Phoenician Women*
Ezra May, H. G., and Metzger, B. M. *The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha*. Expanded Edition. Revised Standard Version. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977
FGH Jacoby, F. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, 3 vols. in 15. Berlin: Weidmann, 1923–58; reprint Berlin and Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963
GHI Tod, M. N. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1946–48
 Harp. s.v. Aristion, Harpocratican. s.v. Aristion
 —s.v. Galepsos
 —s.v. Lete
 Hdts. Herodotus. *History*
 Hes. *Sh.* Hesiod. *Shield of Heracles*
 —*Th.* —*Theogony*
 —*WD* —*Works and Days*
 [Hes.] *Catalogue* [Hesiod]. *Catalogue of Women of Women*
 Hom. *Il.* Homer. *Iliad*
 —*Od.* —*Odyssey*
 Hyp. 6 Hyperides *Funeral Oration*
IG F. Hiller von Gaertringen, J. E., Kirchner. Eds. *Inscriptiones Graecae, consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Borussiae editae*. Editio Minor.

	<i>Inscriptiones Atticae</i> 3 vols. in 2. Berlin: DeGruyter, 1913-40; reprint Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1974
Isae. 6	Isaeus. <i>Philoctemon</i>
—12	— <i>Euphiletus</i>
Isoc. 1	Isocrates. <i>To Demonicus</i>
—4	— <i>Panegyricus</i>
—5	— <i>To Philip</i>
—8	— <i>On the Peace</i>
—10	— <i>Helen</i>
—12	— <i>Panathenaicus</i>
—15	— <i>Antidosis</i>
—19	— <i>Aegineticus</i>
Joseph. <i>Ap.</i>	Josephus. <i>Against Apion</i>
— <i>AJ</i>	— <i>Jewish Antiquities</i>
Just.	Justin. <i>Epitome of Pompeius Trogus</i>
Lys. 6	Lysias <i>Against Andocides</i>
—33	— <i>Olympic Oration</i>
[Luc.] <i>Macr.</i>	[Lucian]. <i>Macrobius</i>
Nepos <i>Eum.</i>	Nepos. <i>Life of Eumenes</i>
Paus.	Pausanias. <i>Description of Greece</i>
Phot.	Photius. <i>Bibliotheca</i>
— <i>Cod.</i>	— <i>Codex</i>
Pind. <i>Ol.</i>	Pindar. <i>Olympian Odes</i>
Pliny <i>HN</i>	Pliny (the Elder). <i>Natural History</i>
Pl. <i>Ap.</i>	Plato. <i>Apology</i>
— <i>Cra.</i>	— <i>Cratylus</i>
— <i>Euthphr.</i>	— <i>Euthyphro</i>
— <i>Grg.</i>	— <i>Gorgias</i>
— <i>Lach.</i>	— <i>Laches</i>
— <i>Leg.</i>	— <i>Laws</i>
— <i>Menex.</i>	— <i>Menexenus</i>
— <i>Prt.</i>	— <i>Protagoras</i>
— <i>Rep.</i>	— <i>Republic</i>
— <i>Thaet.</i>	— <i>Theaetetus</i>
Plut. <i>Alex.</i>	Plutarch. <i>Alexander</i>
— <i>Ant.</i>	— <i>Antony</i>
— <i>Cim.</i>	— <i>Cimon</i>
— <i>Dem.</i>	— <i>Demosthenes</i>
— <i>Eum.</i>	— <i>Eumenes</i>
— <i>Demetr.</i>	— <i>Demetrius</i>

<i>Lys.</i>	— <i>Lysander</i>
— <i>Mor.</i>	— <i>Moralia</i>
<i>Nic.</i>	— <i>Nicias</i>
— <i>Per.</i>	— <i>Pericles</i>
— <i>Pyrrh.</i>	— <i>Pyrrhus</i>
— <i>Ser.</i>	— <i>Sertorius</i>
— <i>Sol.</i>	— <i>Solon</i>
— <i>Them.</i>	— <i>Themistocles</i>
— <i>Thes.</i>	— <i>Theseus</i>
Polyaen.	Polyaenus. <i>Strategems</i>
Polyb.	Polybius. <i>The Histories</i>
[Pompeius Trogus] <i>Prol.</i>	[Pompeius Trogus] <i>Prologues</i>
<i>PSI</i>	<i>Papiri greci e latini. Pubblicazioni della Società italiana per la ricerca dei papiri greci e latini in Egitto.</i> Florence: Tipografia E. Ariavi, 1912–
Quint. <i>Inst.</i>	Quintilian. <i>Institutio oratoria</i>
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.</i> Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1923–
Solinus	Solinus. <i>Collectanea Rerum Memorabilium</i>
Str.	Strabo. <i>Geography</i>
<i>Syll.</i> ³	W. Dittenberger. <i>Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum.</i> Third edition. Leipzig: S. Hirzelium, 1915–1924; reprint ed. Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1999
Tac. <i>Agr.</i>	Tacitus. <i>Agricola</i>
Thuc.	Thucydides. <i>Histories</i>
Xen.	Xenophon. <i>Anabasis</i>
— <i>Cyn.</i>	— <i>Cynegeticus</i>
— <i>Cyr.</i>	— <i>Cyropaedia</i>
— <i>Hell.</i>	— <i>Hellenica</i>
— <i>Mem.</i>	— <i>Memorabilia</i>
[Xen.] <i>Ath. Pol.</i>	Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία

Secondary Sources

<i>Acta Classica</i>	<i>Acta Classica.</i> Kaapstad, South Africa: A. A. Balkema
<i>AHB</i>	<i>The Ancient History Bulletin.</i> Calgary: Department of Classics, University of Calgary

<i>AHR</i>	<i>American Historical Review</i> . Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association
<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i> . New York: Archaeological Institute of America
<i>AJAH</i>	<i>American Journal of Ancient History</i> . Cambridge, Mass.: s.n.
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i> . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
<i>Ancient Society</i>	<i>Ancient Society</i> . Louvain, Belgium: Katholieke Universiteit
<i>AncW</i>	<i>The Ancient World</i> . Chicago: Ares Publishers
<i>AntCl</i>	<i>L'Antiquité classique</i> . Brussels: De Meester
<i>BalkSt</i>	<i>Balkan Studies: Biannual publication of the Institute for Balkan Studies</i> . Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies
<i>BCH</i>	<i>Bulletin de correspondance hellénique</i> . Athens and Paris: Thorin et fils
<i>BICS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London</i> . London: Institute of Classical Studies
<i>BmusBeyr</i>	<i>Bulletin du Musée de Beyrouth</i> . Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, Adrien Maisonneuve
<i>CahArch</i>	<i>Cahiers archéologiques</i> . Paris: Vanoest
<i>CAJ</i>	<i>Cambridge Archaeological Journal</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
<i>Chiron</i>	<i>Chiron. Mitteilungen der Kommission für alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</i> . Munich: C. H. Beck
<i>ChrEg</i>	<i>Chronique d'Égypte; bulletin périodique de la Fondation égyptologique reine Élisabeth</i> . Brussels: Musées royaux d'art et d'histoire
<i>CJ</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i> . Gainesville, Florida: Classical Association of Middle West and South
<i>CW</i>	<i>Classical World</i> . Pittsburgh: Classical Association of the Atlantic States
<i>CP</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i> . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i> . Oxford: Clarendon Press
<i>Eranos</i>	<i>Eranos. Acta philologica suecana</i> . Uppsala: Eranos förlag.
<i>GaR</i>	<i>Greece and Rome</i> . Oxford: Clarendon Press
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i> . Durham, North Carolina: Duke University
<i>Helikon</i>	<i>Helikon. Rivista di tradizione e cultura classica</i> . Rome: Università di Messina

<i>Hermes</i>	<i>Hermes. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie.</i> Berlin: F. Steiner
<i>Historia</i>	<i>Historia. Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte.</i> Wiesbaden: F. Steiner
<i>HSCP</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.</i> Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
<i>Iran</i>	<i>Iran. Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies.</i> London: British Institute of Persian Studies
<i>IrAnt</i>	<i>Iranica antiqua.</i> Leiden: E. J. Brill
<i>JCS</i>	<i>Journal of Cuneiform Studies.</i> Cambridge, Mass.: American Schools of Oriental Research
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies.</i> London: Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies.</i> London: Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies
<i>Klio</i>	<i>Klio. Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.</i> Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung
<i>Makedonika</i>	<i>Makedonika.</i> Thessaloniki: 'Εταιρία Μακεδονικῶν Σπουδῶν
<i>MusHelv</i>	<i>Museum Helveticum.</i> Basel: B. Schwabe
<i>Philologus</i>	<i>Philologus. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie.</i> Berlin: Akademie-Verlag
<i>Phoenix</i>	<i>Phoenix.</i> Toronto: Classical Association of Canada
<i>RA</i>	<i>Revue archéologique.</i> Paris: E. Leroux
<i>RBPhil</i>	<i>Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire.</i> Brussels: Fondation universitaire
<i>RE</i>	<i>Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.</i> Edited by Wissowa, G., Kroll, W., and Mittelhaus, K. Munich: Alfred Druckenmüller, 1950
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des études anciennes.</i> Paris: Société d'Édition "Les belles lettres"
<i>REG</i>	<i>Revue des études grecques.</i> Paris: E. Leroux
<i>RhM</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie.</i> Bonn: E. Weber
<i>RivFil</i>	<i>Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica.</i> Turin: E. Loescher
<i>RPhil</i>	<i>Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes.</i> Paris: Éditions Klincksieck
<i>SymbOslo</i>	<i>Symbolae osloenses.</i> Oslo: Universitetsforlaget
<i>Verbum</i>	<i>Verbum: Revue de linguistique publiée par l'Université de Nancy II.</i> Nancy: Université de Nancy II
<i>YCS</i>	<i>Yale Classical Studies.</i> New Haven: Department of Classics, Yale University
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik.</i> Bonn: Habelt

PREFACE

Eumenes of Cardia is a remarkable figure even by the standards of his age. He was a royal secretary turned successful general and a Cardian Greek in a period dominated by native-born Macedonians. The surviving sources for the early years following the death of Alexander the Great track his career more closely than that of any of Alexander's other successors. Both Plutarch and Nepos prepared biographies of his career, while ignoring more prominent and ultimately more important contemporaries. Moreover, in general, the sources treat him very favorably. In most respects he is presented as a brilliant military leader, contending with and most often defeating those who had commanded under Alexander.¹ He is cited as one of the last loyalists to the monarchy, a model of fidelity to the family of Alexander,² and with his death the last hope of the Argead dynasty is lost (Nepos *Eum.* 13. 3). The picture painted by the sources is, indeed, a most sympathetic one. While often successful in battle, Eumenes' brilliance is doomed to failure before the all-consuming prejudice of the Macedonian officers and common soldiers with whom he fought and served.³ It is a most compelling story, but a fictional one nonetheless.

Eumenes was not ultimately the victim of prejudice. The new age ushered in by Alexander's conquests was one of opportunity for Greeks and Macedonians alike. While a sense of Macedonian nationalism was introduced by Philip and Alexander, it counted for little outside of Macedonia proper, and even there was more muted than would be typical in the *poleis* of southern Greece. Elsewhere in the Hellenistic world the term "Macedonian" came very quickly to represent a fighting style or a political status, not a true ethnicity. Moreover, in Asia and Africa the old Greek/barbarian dichotomy dominated,

¹ See E. M. Anson, "Discrimination and Eumenes of Cardia," *AncW* 3 (1980): 55-9; "Eumenes of Cardia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1975), 176-202.

² Diod. 18. 53. 7, 57. 4, 58. 2-4; 19. 44. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 1.4, 3. 14; Nepos *Eum.* 6. 5, 13.

³ Diod. 18. 60. 1-3, 62. 7; 19. 13. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 1; 20. 3-9; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 2-3.

unifying those whose origins were Greece or Macedonia against Asiatics and Egyptians. The great change in ethnic perspective brought by the reigns of Philip and Alexander was that Macedonians long seen as at best semi-Greeks came to be viewed as brother Greeks by those whose Hellenism was long established.⁴

⁴ This is clearly seen in the second century B.C.E. author Polybius: Polyb. 5. 104. 1, 105. 5; 7. 9. 3, 5, 7; 9. 37. 7; 38. 3. 8; cf. Livy 31. 29. 15; Str. 10. 2. 23.

CHAPTER ONE

THE SOURCES

As noted in the Preface, the surviving sources are remarkably consistent in their presentation of Eumenes' career. These include the *Library* of Diodorus of Sicily, the most complete and detailed surviving historical narrative of the events from Alexander's death to the Battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C.E., written in the second half of the first century B.C.E.; biographies written by Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch in the first century B.C.E. and early second century C.E. respectively; a severely abridged version of the *Philippic History* by the Augustan historian, Pompeius Trogus, epitomated, perhaps, in the early third century C.E. by an otherwise unknown Marcus Junianus Justinus; a collection of military anecdotes by the second-century C.E. rhetorician, Polyaeus; and the briefest remains of the second century C.E. work, *A History of the Successors*, by Flavius Arrianus, along with fragments of a third century abridgement and a Byzantine epitome of Arrian's history. The consistency with respect to Eumenes in these varied authors is present not only in their overall presentations, but even in the details of his career, and in their assessment of his actions and those of his allies and opponents. In 320, it is Eumenes' skill which led to his victory in two separate battles over two of Alexander's former commanders,¹ but his successes were undermined by the defeat of his patron, Perdiccas, in Egypt.² In 319, due to the treasonous actions of a subordinate, Eumenes suffered defeat at the hands of Antigonos, the then royal general in Asia,³ and only Eumenes' brilliant retreat saved him from capture.⁴ Finally, having fought for almost a decade to uphold the birthright of Alexander's son, Eumenes was mercilessly surrendered to his arch foe, Antigonos,

¹ Diod. 18. 29. 4, 30-32. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 4-5, 7. 5-8.1; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 1-3; Just. 13. 8. 3-9.

² Diod. 18. 36. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2-4; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 29; Just. 13. 8. 10.

³ Diod. 18. 40. 5-8; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3; Just. 14. 2. 2.

⁴ Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3-10. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 2-3; Diod. 18. 41. 1; Just. 14. 2. 2.

by his own troops, who were more concerned for their possessions than for their "own commander and victory."⁵

The sources consistently present Eumenes' enemies as "rapacious and faithless."⁶ Such uniformity is also the case with his erstwhile allies. Eumenes' successes are most often the direct result of his abilities;⁷ his defeats and setbacks are the consequence of others' betrayal, incompetence, or prejudice. Prejudice is repeatedly emphasized in Diodorus, Plutarch, and Nepos, as the chief cause for Eumenes' ultimate defeat and death.⁸ He is depicted as a foreigner whose achievements are resented by the Macedonians.⁹ Nepos (*Eum.* 1. 3) finds Eumenes in a disadvantageous position because of his foreign birth, and a similar opinion is shared by Plutarch (*Eum.* 20. 1, 9).¹⁰ So favorable generally is the description of Eumenes across the spectrum of surviving sources that it has been postulated that they have all used a now lost source whose initial purpose was to eulogize the Cardian, and only later broadened into a general history.¹¹

⁵ Diod. 19. 43. 7-9; Plut. *Eum.* 17-18. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 10. 1-2; Just. 14. 3. 4-4. 17; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13.

⁶ Diod. 18. 7. 4, 41. 4-5, 58. 4; 19. 90. 4; Plut. *Sert.* 1. 7; *Eum.* 3. 5; Just. 13. 8. 3; 14. 3. 11; Nepos *Eum.* 10. 2; 13. 1-3; so uniform is the picture of Eumenes' opponents in the surviving sources that the few favorable remarks made concerning one such adversary, Ptolemy, in the major surviving source, Diodorus, are seen by many as indicating the use by that historian of a particularly pro-Ptolemaic source for these particular passages (J. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981] 40-3, 51; J. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemäos' I. Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und Antiken Rechtsgeschichte*. Vol. 56 [Munich: C. H. Beck, 1969] 64-83).

⁷ Diod. 18. 29. 4-5, 32. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 20. 8-9; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 3, 10. 1, 13. 1; Just. 13. 8. 4-9. The one great exception is that at the battle of Paraetacene the victory is attributed to the valor of the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 30. 5).

⁸ Neither Justin or Polyænus mention this handicap, nor do either ever refer to Eumenes as a Cardian. While the fragments of Arrian's *Successors* do not directly refer to any prejudice regarding Eumenes, Eumenes is called the "Cardian" (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 2, 5; 1. 21).

⁹ Diod. 18. 60. 1, 3; 62. 7; 19. 13. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1; 8. 1; 20. 2-3; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 2-3, 7. 1.

¹⁰ In modern scholarship this view is generally accepted as well. Most recently by P. Green, *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990) 17; see also, A. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* (Münster: Druck und Verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1907) 125-6; H. D. Westlake, "Eumenes of Cardia," in *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History*, ed. H. D. Westlake, 313-30 (Manchester: Manchester University Press; New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969) 321; E. Badian, "A King's Notebooks," *HSCP* 72 (1967): 203; Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 9.

¹¹ Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 162-3; Robert Hadley ("A possible lost source for the career of Eumenes of Cardia," *Historia* 50 [2001]: 3-33) has suggested that the

The consistency of our sources with respect to this period and especially with regard to Eumenes does suggest a common origin for much of their material, and indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the surviving works regarding the early Hellenistic age can be traced back to just such a common source, Hieronymus of Cardia, the companion and fellow-countryman of Eumenes (*FGH* 154. T-1; F-8, F-9, F-15).¹² In fact, the basic question today is not whether Hieronymus was the major source, that is assumed, but how much additional material from other sources may have been added, and whether Hieronymus's history was used directly or by way of intermediates.¹³ During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this opinion was not so pervasive with several scholars arguing for different origins for the bulk of the surviving material.¹⁴ Today the burden of proof rests rather with those who would claim that a particular passage does not derive from Hieronymus.¹⁵ This is a very curious situation when our actual knowledge of the work of Hieronymus is considered, all eighteen fragments of it.¹⁶

So meager are the fragments that neither the number of Hieronymus's works, nor the exact content, nor the number of books, nor even the exact title(s) is known. According to the *Suda*, Hieronymus

encomiastic qualities of much of the portrait of Eumenes in the surviving sources derive from an entirely different source than does the general historical narrative, even though Hadley believes that both are from a common author. In short, the eulogy remained a separate work, even though the material was broadened into a general history of the period.

¹² For example, see, M. J. Fontana, *Le lotte per la successione di Alessandro Magno dal 323 al 315* (Palermo: Presso l'Accademia, 1960) 151-237; Anson, *Eumenes*, 1-75; J. Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 2-3; K. S. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 21, 40, 41, cf. 99, 158; the most extreme position was maintained by F. Reuss, *Hieronymos von Kardia; Studien zur Geschichte der Diodochenzzeit* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1876). Reuss declared that all the surviving sources for this period used Hieronymus directly.

¹³ Most follow F. Jacoby's ("Hieronymos," *RE* 8, col. 1556) moderate addition theory, Hieronymus was the primary source, but not the only one.

¹⁴ For example, see G. F. Unger, "Die Winternemeen," *Philologus* 37 (1877): 524-44; W. Schwahn, "Dyillos," *Philologus* 86 (1931): 145-68; É. Cavaignac, "Réflexions sur Ephore," in *Mélanges Gustave Glotz*, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1932) 143-161; A. Haake, *De Duride Samio Diodori auctore* (Bonn: Georgi, 1874).

¹⁵ See R. M. Errington, "From Babylon to Tripuradeisos: 323-320 B.C.E.," *JHS* 90 (1970): 75; K. Rosen, "Political Documents in Hieronymus of Cardia (323-302 B.C.E.)," *Acta Classica* 10 (1967): 125-33.

¹⁶ F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1923-58; reprinted Berlin and Leiden: E. J. Brill) 2B, no. 154. There are in addition one doubtful fragment and twelve testimonia.

wrote "Concerning the deeds after Alexander."¹⁷ Diodorus¹⁸ and Josephus¹⁹ refer to a work titled *Concerning the Diadochi* (Successors), while Dionysius of Halicarnassus cites a history entitled *Concerning the Epigoni* (Offspring).²⁰ Through a form of scholarly syncretism many arrive at a title for a single work, *History of the Diadochi and the Epigoni*.²¹ The suggestion is not without foundation, for a perusal of the fragments demonstrates that Hieronymus wrote a work or works covering both periods. But these titles could easily represent two distinct works, and there is nothing to decide conclusively between the two positions.²² It is also possible, although once again without any clear evidence, that Hieronymus's work included an introduction concerning the early history of Macedonia up to and including the death of Alexander and the division of his empire.²³

Other conclusions based on the surviving fragments and *testimonia* are equally speculative. It has been suggested that Hieronymus's writings were quite detailed and extensive, for Dionysius of Halicarnassus states that they were so long and dull that no one could read them to completion.²⁴ The date Hieronymus began writing is, likewise, open to conjecture, although his continued political activity at least to 293 (Plut. *Demetr.* 39. 3–7) would most probably have delayed composition until rather late in his life. If his historical writing was but a single work, he certainly had not completed his history by 272, since one of his fragments makes reference to the death of Pyrrhus in that year (Paus. 1. 13. 7). This is the last known event recorded by Hieronymus, and may indicate the terminal point of his writing.²⁵ A case can certainly be made that Pyrrhus represents

¹⁷ *FGrH* 154 T-1.

¹⁸ 18. 42. 1 = *FGrH* 154 T-3.

¹⁹ *Ap.* 1. 213–214 = *FGrH* 154 F-6.

²⁰ *Ant. Rom.* 1. 5. 4 = *FGrH* 154 F-13.

²¹ For example, Jacoby, "Hieronymos," 1547. This syncretism is suggested by Diodorus 1. 3. 3, "for while some have closed their accounts with the deeds of Philip, others with those of Alexander, and some with the Diadochi or the Epigoni..." This passage with no justification is included by Jacoby among the *testimonia* on Hieronymus (*FGrH* 154 T-10).

²² O. Müller (*Antigonos Monophthalmos und "das Jahr der Könige"* [Bonn: R. Habelt, 1973] 7–12); Hornblower (*Hieronymus*, 79) suggests that what was in conception a single work may have been produced in installments.

²³ See Jacoby, "Hieronymos," 1547; *Fragmente*, 2B suppl., 544; cf. Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 238.

²⁴ Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 4. 30 = *FGrH* 154 T-12.

²⁵ Pseudo-Lucian (*Macr.* 13) could be taken as evidence that Hieronymus was

the last of the *Epigoni* and, consequently, his death makes a fitting terminus.

Our information concerning Hieronymus's life is again limited.²⁶ He served Eumenes of Cardia from at least the campaign against Ariarathes in 322 until the former's death in 315.²⁷ He was Eumenes' "friend and fellow citizen,"²⁸ and may have been his kinsman as well.²⁹ After Eumenes' execution Hieronymus entered the service of Antigonos Monophthalmus.³⁰ Henceforth, Hieronymus was a loyal adherent of the Antigonid family, serving after Antigonos both Demetrius and Antigonos Gonatas.³¹ The nature of his service varied. He was employed as an envoy by both Eumenes and the elder Antigonos,³² and placed in charge of the collection of bitumen from the Dead Sea by the latter.³³ It is assumed by Jacoby and others that Hieronymus did not serve any of his superiors in a military capacity.³⁴ As evidence the absence of any references to Hieronymus in connection to specific military operations is cited. But the fact is there are few references to Hieronymus in any capacity, and there

writing as late as 266, but the text suggests that the author has confused two different individuals (see Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 244).

²⁶ The *Suda* contained a life of Hieronymus, but unfortunately only a title remains (*FGrH* 154 T-1).

²⁷ *FGrH* 154 F-3 = App. *Mith.* 8; *FGrH* 154 T-3 = Diod. 18. 42. 1; *FGrH* 154 T-4 = Diod. 18. 50. 4; *FGrH* 154 T-5 = Diod. 19. 44. 3.

²⁸ *FGrH* 154 T-4 = Diod. 18. 50. 4.

²⁹ Hornblower (*Hieronymus*, 8) and R. A. Billows (*Antigonos the One-eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990] 390) both suggest that Hieronymus was Eumenes' nephew. The argument for a familial relationship is based on Arrian, *Indica*, 18. 7, where it is learned that Eumenes' father was named Hieronymus. Hornblower and Billows argue that often grandsons are named for their grandfathers. While it is possible that Eumenes and Hieronymus, the historian, were related, it must remain a supposition. Hieronymus's readiness to join Antigonos after Eumenes' execution (Diod. 19. 44. 3 = *FGrH* 154 T-5; Diod. 19. 100. 1-3 = *FGrH* 154 T-6) would tell against this assumption, but certainly not invalidate it.

³⁰ *FGrH* 154 T-5 = Diod. 19. 44. 3; *FGrH* 154 T-6 = Diod. 19. 100. 1-3; Antigonos had earlier unsuccessfully tried to recruit Hieronymus (Diod. 18. 50. 4 = *FGrH* 154 T-4).

³¹ *FGrH* 154 T-6 = Diod. 19. 100. 1; *FGrH* 154 T-8 = Plut. *Demetr.* 39. 3-7; *FGrH* 154 T-11 = Paus. 1. 9. 8; *FGrH* 154 F-15 = Paus. 1. 13. 9; *FGrH* 154 T-9 = Theon. *Vit. Arat.* p. 147.

³² *FGrH* 154 T-3 = Diod. 18. 42. 1; *FGrH* 154 T-4 = Diod. 18. 50. 4.

³³ *FGrH* 154 T-6 = Diod. 19. 100. 1.

³⁴ F. Jacoby, "Hieronymos," 1541; T. S. Brown, "Hieronymus of Cardia," *AHR* 52 (1947): 690. Hornblower (*Hieronymus*, 10) sees him as having only very limited military roles, and primarily as a "civil servant."

are passages which suggest that he had an active, albeit unspectacular, military career. Pseudo-Lucian refers to Hieronymus as Antigonus's "fellow-soldier,"³⁵ and in a separate passage, citing Agatharchides, states that Hieronymus participated in the warfare of his age and survived many wounds.³⁶ Diodorus confirms that he was wounded at the battle of Gabene.³⁷ Moreover, Hieronymus was appointed by Demetrius as *epimeletes* and harmost of Thebes with charge of the local garrison.³⁸ Such military experience, even if limited, would make Hieronymus not only an eyewitness, but in many ways an expert eyewitness, fully capable of assessing and describing the personalities and events of his time.

His contemporary knowledge would have made him then ideally suited to write history. It is with this in mind that the inability to bring any of his fragments into direct, uncontested, relation with the surviving works is so frustrating.³⁹ Indeed, none of the extant fragments is a direct quotation. Despite this paucity of fragments and testimonia, there are indications that Hieronymus was a careful and scholarly historian. Clearly, Hieronymus's history, or histories, was not just the memoirs of an old man. He took pains to acquire precise information. This is shown by his use of Pyrrhus's *Commentaries* for that part of his history dealing with that commander.⁴⁰ Further indications of Hieronymus's reliability are provided by Plutarch, according to whom Hieronymus cited more reasonable figures for the casualties in the battle of Heraclea than did Dionysius of Halicarnassus,⁴¹ and more plausible dimensions for a trench than appeared in Phylarchus.⁴² While these comments are all suggestive of a competent historian, they are hardly proof. More importantly, nothing in the extant accounts unequivocally points to Hieronymus as a source, let alone the major source for these surviving histories, biographies, and exempla, depicting the individuals and events of the early Hellenistic Age.

³⁵ [Luc.] *Macr.* 11 = *FGrH* 154 T-7, F-8.

³⁶ [Luc.] *Macr.* 22 = *FGrH* 154 T-2.

³⁷ 19. 44. 3 = *FGrH* 154 T-5.

³⁸ *FGrH* 154 T-8 = Plut. *Demetr.* 39. 3-7.

³⁹ See Anson (*Eumenes*, 4-7), Jacoby (*Fragmente*, 2B suppl., 546) and J. Seibert (*Untersuchungen*, 67) for objections to the most often claimed correspondences.

⁴⁰ *FGrH* 154 F-12 Plut. *Pyrrh.* 21. 12.

⁴¹ *FGrH* 154 F-11 = Plut. *Pyrrh.* 17. 7.

⁴² *FGrH* 154 F-14 = Plut. *Pyrrh.* 27. 8.

Indeed, the argument for the use of Hieronymus by our surviving sources is based on other considerations. It rests in part on a comparison of Hieronymus and what we know of his work with that of contemporary alternatives. While it might be argued that the true source for the surviving material has been lost altogether, it is an unlikely possibility. It is doubtful that such a major author and work would remain unknown; the *Suda* and other anthologies would almost certainly have made reference to such an alternative. Excluding the argument from silence, there are only a very few alternatives: Marsyas of Philippi,⁴³ Euphantus of Olynthus,⁴⁴ Duris of Samos,⁴⁵ Nymphis of Heracleia,⁴⁶ Demochares,⁴⁷ and Diyllus of Athens.⁴⁸ As with Hieronymus, all of these authors survive only in fragments.

When compared with these alternatives, certain aspects of the surviving sources fit more closely with what is known of Hieronymus's career. These extant histories and biographies follow most closely the careers of Eumenes, Antigonus, and Demetrius, the three commanders whom Hieronymus served in turn. Diodorus, the major surviving narrative source for this period, when describing events in Greece and Asia, concentrates almost exclusively on the careers of these three. Plutarch wrote lives of Eumenes and Demetrius; Cornelius Nepos composed a biography of Eumenes in his lives of *Great Generals of Foreign Nations*. In particular, none of the alternatives to Hieronymus can be personally associated with Eumenes.

Even though Euphantus was connected with the Antigonid house, it was as tutor to Antigonus Gonatas,⁴⁹ and neither Duris of Samos, nor

⁴³ His fragments and testimonia have been collected by Jacoby (*FGrH* 136).

⁴⁴ *FGrH* 74.

⁴⁵ *FGrH* 76.

⁴⁶ *FGrH* 432.

⁴⁷ *FGrH* 75.

⁴⁸ *FGrH* 73.

⁴⁹ *FGrH* 74 T-1 = D. L. 2. 110; while the passage simply states that he taught "Antigonus the King," the general consensus is that Gonatas is meant (see W. W. Tarn, *Antigonus Gonatas* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913] 25 and n. 40; Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 252–3), and not Doson (as R. D. Hicks, trans. and ed., *Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, with an English Translation by R. D. Hicks*. Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1925; reprinted Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1958–1959] 1: 239 n. b). The determination for which king is meant is ultimately based on whether Mallet's emendation of *πρώτου* for *τρίτου* in a passage taken from Euphantus's work and referring to a King Ptolemy of Egypt (*FGrH* 74 F-1). His work was apparently a "history of his own time" (*FGrH* 74 T-1 = D. L. 2. 110; cf. *FGrH* 74 F-2 = D. L. 2. 141). If the third Ptolemy is

Marsyas of Philippi, had any apparent connection to either Eumenes or the Antigonids.⁵⁰ While Nymphis wrote histories covering the period from Alexander, including both the “Diadochoi” and the “Epigonoι,” only two references to these survive, neither of which is enlightening.⁵¹ Nymphis in all likelihood was not born by the time of Eumenes’ death, and, if alive, probably only a child when Antigonus the One-eyed died.⁵² Demochares and Diyllus evidently focused on their native Athens.⁵³ While it is unlikely that any of these alternatives would have been the initial source in particular for the material con-

meant, then obviously the Antigonus must be Doson, but if the first, Gonatas. No title other than *Histories* (*FGrH* 74 F-1 = Athen. 6. 251D) is known. His *testimonia* and fragments are so meager that any evaluation of this work is severely limited.

⁵⁰ Marsyas’s fragments and *testimonia* offer no clear evidence that dates his work. All that can be stated with any degree of certainty is that he probably lived and wrote in the third century B.C.E. This argument is based on our knowledge of another historian named Marsyas. This individual was from Pella and was the half-brother of Antigonus Monophthalmus (Plut. *Mor.* 182C; *FGrH* 135 T-1 = *Suda* s.v. *Marsyas Periandrou Pellaios*; H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich aus prosopographischer Grundlage* [Munich: Beck, 1926; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1973] 2: 247 [#489]; Jacoby, *Fragmente*, 2B suppl., 482; W. Heckel, “Marsyas of Pella, *Historian of Macedon*” *Hermes* 108 [1980]: 446). He wrote a *Makedonika* in ten books beginning with the first Macedonian king and continuing to 331 B.C.E. (*FGrH* 135 T-1 = *Suda* s.v. *Marsyas Periandrou Pellaios*), which puts him out of consideration as the possible source for the early Hellenistic material. Marsyas of Philippi was younger than Marsyas of Pella (*FGrH* 136 T-2 = *Suda* s.v. *Marsyas Kritophemou Philippeus*; cf. *FGrH* 135 F-1 = Harp. s.v. *Aristion*; *FGrH* 136 F-4 = Schol. Eurip. *Hipp.* 671; *FGrH* 136 F-5 = Harp. s.v. *Galepsos*; *FGrH* 136 F-6 = Harp. s.v. *Lete*; *FGrH* 136 F-7 = Schol. Eurip. *Rhes.* 346; *FGrH* 136 F-8 = Schol. Plat. *Symp.* 172A; *FGrH* 136 F-9 = Athen. 2. 69D). The elder Marsyas participated in the battle of Salamis in 306 (*FGrH* 135 T-3 = Diod. 20. 50. 4) and Heckel (“Marsyas of Pella,” 448) postulates that he may have produced his *Makedonika* “some time after 294.” Jacoby (*FGrH*, 2B suppl., 481) simply dates the younger Marsyas to the Hellenistic period prior to 168 B.C.E. Little is known of Marsyas of Philippi’s *Makedonika* (*FGrH* 136 F-4). Neither its beginning or ending points is known.

⁵¹ *FGrH* 432, T-1 (*Suda*). Aelian writes (*FGrH* 432 F-17 = Ael. *NA* 17. 3) that Nymphis wrote a history of the Ptolemies, which could suggest many things, but there is insufficient information to draw any conclusions other than confirmation that he was not a contemporary of Eumenes. For the argumentation for Nymphis’ dates see *FGrH*, IIIB, 269; Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 78–9.

⁵² See previous note; *FGrH*, 3B, 259.

⁵³ Demochares: *FGrH* 75 T-1 = [Plut] *Mor.* 847C–D; *FGrH* 75 T-2 = Polyb. 12. 13. 4; *FGrH* 75 T-3 = Cic. *Brut.* 286; *FGrH* 75 T-4 = Cic. *de Or.* 2; Diyllus: While his history was purportedly universal (Diod. 16. 14. 5; 21. 5), it probably focused on Athens (Fontana, *lotte*, 153); all three of the surviving fragments concern Athens. Moreover, concluding with the death of Cassander’s son would show an Athenian perspective. As noted by W. S. Ferguson (*Hellenistic Athens: An Historical Essay* [New York: Macmillan and Co., 1911] 131–5; cf. Fontana’s *lotte*, 155), the death of Cassander followed shortly by that of his son Philip immediately affected two places, Athens and Syria.

cerning Eumenes, it might be possible that Hieronymus's facts were transmitted through their works to our current surviving sources. But it is not facts alone that suggest Hieronymus as that source, it is also the general tone and consistent characterizations of the Successors.

The portrayals of Eumenes, his allies, and opponents, are not only consistent, but fit a pattern that would be most easily understood if Hieronymus were their source. As noted, Eumenes is presented usually in exemplary terms.⁵⁴ He is loyal, clever, and militarily skillful;⁵⁵ consistently the victim of prejudice, a foreigner whose success was resented by the Macedonians.⁵⁶ His great patron after Alexander's death, Perdiccas, is described as ambitious, ruthless and arrogant, a "murderous usurper of others' authority,"⁵⁷ whose failures in Egypt led to his own assassination and serious troubles for Eumenes.⁵⁸ The treatment of Antigonus is especially telling. While that commander possessed certain of the traits that are criticized in Perdiccas,⁵⁹ he is not portrayed hostilely. Indeed, Antigonus is praised as energetic, intelligent, daring, and as a skillful general.⁶⁰ These are not qualities assigned to Perdiccas. In fact, it is most often Eumenes' erstwhile allies who come in for the greatest criticism. Alcetas and Neoptolemus are "jealous and traitorous";⁶¹ Teutamus and Antigones, "arrogant, ambitious and envious";⁶² Peucestas, "contentious and cowardly,"⁶³

⁵⁴ The extent of this praise varies. It is most consistently presented by Diodorus and Plutarch. Justin's Book 14 praises Eumenes' intelligence (1. 1-5, 9-12, 2. 12), but his supposed loyalty is ignored. The fragments of Arrian are too brief and break off before Eumenes' great confrontation with Antigonus, and, consequently, present little evidence of Arrian's original evaluation of Eumenes.

⁵⁵ Diod. 18. 29. 2, 42. 2, 53. 7, 57. 4, 58. 4; 19. 24. 5, 27. 2, 44. 2, 4; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4, 5. 8, 16. 1; 20. 2-4; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 1-3, 2. 3, 3. 1, 6. 5, 13. 3; his defeats and setbacks are the result of others' betrayal or incompetence, his successes the direct outcome of his abilities (Diod. 18. 40. 5-6, 53. 3; 19. 17. 4, 18. 4-5, 26. 9, 31. 3-4, 39. 1, 43. 3, 6-9, 44. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 3, 7. 1-4, 8. 1, 9. 3, 15. 13, 17. 1-4, 20. 8-9; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 1-3, 5. 1, 10. 2, 11. 4, 13. 1; Just. 14. 3. 1-2).

⁵⁶ Diod. 18. 60. 1, 3-4; 62. 7; 19. 13. 1-2; Plut. *Ser.* 1. 5; *Eum.* 3. 1, 8. 1, 18. 1, 20. 2, 9; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 2-3, 7. 1-2. As noted earlier, Justin does not even mention that Eumenes is from Cardia, let alone handicapped by his foreign birth.

⁵⁷ Diod. 18. 33. 3; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 28; Nepos *Eum.* 2. 3; Just. 13. 8. 2.

⁵⁸ Diod. 18. 36. 1-37. 2; cf. Diod. 18. 23. 2-3, 25. 3, 5.

⁵⁹ Diod. 18. 41. 4-5, 47. 3, 50. 1-4, 52. 4; 19. 44. 1-3, 56. 2, 57. 2; 20. 82. 3, 75. 3, 106. 3-4.

⁶⁰ Diod. 18. 23. 3-4, 72. 5, 73. 1; 19. 30. 7; Just. 14. 3. 2.

⁶¹ Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 3, 5. 3-4, 8. 8; Just. 13. 8. 3.

⁶² Diod. 18. 60. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 4, 16. 1-2, 17. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 7. 1; Polyae. 4. 8. 2.

⁶³ Diod. 19. 15. 1, 17. 5, 23. 1, 38. 1-2, 42. 2, 4, 43. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 14. 5, 16. 9;

Polyperchon, "lethargic and witless,"⁶⁴ and Olynpias, "cruel and savage."⁶⁵ Both Eudamus and Phaedimus remained loyal to Eumenes only to safeguard their financial investment in him.⁶⁶ The soldiers making up the best fighting unit in Eumenes' army are "treacherous," "impious and bestial."⁶⁷

This animosity towards Eumenes' allies would most easily be explained by assuming that Hieronymus was the source. Hieronymus, the "friend and fellow-citizen," and possible relative, was attempting to blame others for Eumenes' defeat and death.⁶⁸ Eumenes won two great victories only to have these completely undermined; the first by Perdiccas's assassination in Egypt;⁶⁹ and the second, at Gabene, by his own victorious phalanx.⁷⁰ Eumenes' allies repeatedly blunder. Polyperchon's offer of an alliance had in part caused Eumenes to dissolve his association with Antigonus.⁷¹ Virtually from the moment of its creation Polyperchon's power declined. Similar criticisms can be leveled against another of Eumenes' allies, Olympias, Alexander's mother. It was in part at her urging that Eumenes had broken his agreement with Antigonus and had allied himself with Polyperchon.⁷² In 318, she became the regent for the Kingdom of Macedon; she was the effective ruler of the country.⁷³ Her subsequent murders of King Philip Arrhidaeus, his wife Eurydice, and many others turned the people against her.⁷⁴ Her actions like those of Perdiccas and

Nepos *Eum.* 7. 1; the charge of cowardice is interesting, since Peucestas had secured his standing with Alexander through his bravery (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 10. 1-2, 11. 7, 28. 4; Plut. *Alex.* 63. 7-8; Curt. 9. 5. 14-15). However, his actions at Gabiene in 315 would suggest insubordination at the least, if not outright cowardice (Diod. 19. 42. 4, 43. 2, 5).

⁶⁴ Diod. 18. 75. 2; 19. 36. 6; cf. 20. 28. 1-2.

⁶⁵ Diod. 19. 11. 4-9; Nepos *Eum.* 6. 3.

⁶⁶ Plut. *Eum.* 16. 3; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 13. 12; Diod. 19. 24. 2-3.

⁶⁷ Diod. 19. 43. 8, 48. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 17. 1-4, 19. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 8. 2-3, 10. 2; Just. 14. 2. 7-11, 3. 11, 13.

⁶⁸ Hornblower (*Hieronymus*, 154-156, 164) describes the portrait of Eumenes found in Diodorus as an apologia.

⁶⁹ Diod. 18. 36. 1-37. 2; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 29-30.

⁷⁰ Diod. 19. 42. 6-9; Plut. *Eum.* 17. 1-18. 1; Just. 14. 3. 11; Polyae. 4. 6. 13; Nepos *Eum.* 10. 1-2.

⁷¹ For Eumenes' alliance with Antigonus in 318, see Chapter 5, and E. M. Anson, "The Siege of Nora: A Source Conflict," *GRBS* 18 (1977): 251-6.

⁷² Diod. 18. 58. 2-4; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 1.

⁷³ Diod. 18. 49. 4, 57. 2; Just. 14. 5. 10-6. 1 On the nature of Olympias' position in Macedonia in 318, see E. M. Anson, "Craterus and the Prostaia," *CP* 87 (1992): 40.

⁷⁴ Diod. 19. 11. 2-8; Just. 14. 5. 10-6. 1.

Polyperchon were seen as harming Eumenes. Indeed, both Perdikkas and Olympias at critical moments are depicted as having gone against Eumenes' advice (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21; Diod. 18. 58. 4).

In the case of Diodorus, in particular, the evidence that Hieronymus was his primary source for events immediately following Alexander's death down at least to 301 B.C.E. is convincing.⁷⁵ Diodorus wrote a universal history in forty books (Diod. 1. 4. 6–7) from mythical times (Diod. 1. 4. 5) down to 59 B.C.E. (Diod. 1. 4. 7). While only part of his work survives, his books eighteen through twenty are the fullest account of the period from Alexander's death to the battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C.E. Moreover, he along with the Roman biographer Cornelius Nepos is the earliest of our surviving sources.⁷⁶ While Diodorus's introduction to his work emphasizes his qualifications and abilities, these have been called into serious question by most modern commentators. Diodorus proclaims that despite the general superiority of universal history over all other varieties (Diod. 1. 3. 8), no such work existed which was both universal and extended beyond "the Macedonian period" due to the inherent difficulty in writing such a work (Diod. 1. 3. 3). Indeed, Diodorus declares that he himself took thirty years to complete his history (Diod. 1. 4. 1). He states that he had traveled widely in Europe and Asia gathering information (Diod. 1. 4. 1), and had used an abundance of literary sources (Diod. 1. 4. 2–4).

Diodorus's proclamation of his diligence has received mixed reviews from modern commentators.⁷⁷ In the past he was most often attacked as a slavish copier of his sources,⁷⁸ but more recent descriptions have

⁷⁵ The question, however, remains and probably will never be answered definitively, whether Hieronymus's history was used directly or through some intermediary source. However, Hornblower (*Hieronymus*, 62–63) sums up the basic case for the direct use of Hieronymus. "The theory of an intermediary cannot actually be substantiated, and it solves no problems relating to the source criticism of Diodorus xviii–xx."

⁷⁶ Pliny the Elder twice refers to Nepos as a contemporary of Augustus (*NH* 9. 137, 10. 60), and Diodorus is thought to have lived at roughly the same time (E. Schwartz, "Diodoros," *RE* V, col. 663).

⁷⁷ The most favorable views are expressed by Billows (*Antigonos*, 343–344), who believes that Diodorus was widely read and capable of synthesizing this material, and by Sacks (*Diodorus*, 5–7, 90; "Diodorus and his Sources," in *Greek Historiography*, ed. S. Hornblower [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994] 231), who argues that the *Bibliothèque* possesses a degree of "intellectual unity."

⁷⁸ See for example, Schwartz, "Diodoros," 663–669. Amongst more recent commentators P. J. Stylianou (*A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15* [Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998] 15, 49, 137–9) portrays Diodorus as "a mere epitomizer and an incompetent one at that."

tempered this view. J. Palm has shown conclusively that Diodorus's style and language are basically his own,⁷⁹ and R. Drews has pointed out that a common moralistic theme pervades Diodorus's work.⁸⁰ More recently Kenneth Sacks has suggested that the *Bibliothēke* reflects Diodorus's own "philosophy of history," which includes the role of "tyche" and "moral utility."⁸¹ This philosophy of history is, however, rather banal. Diodorus (1. 2. 2) pompously states that history, "constitutes the guardian of the high achievements of illustrious men and the witness which testifies to the evil deeds of the wicked." By praising good and censuring evil Diodorus hoped to influence posterity.⁸² Moreover, for Diodorus evil-doers suffer divine punishment for their actions. This retribution is handed down not in a next world, but in this one. *Tyche* invariably brings such individuals to task.⁸³ Πλεονεξία, ἀσέβεια, and ὕβρις in particular result in destruction.⁸⁴ On the other hand, εὐεργεσία, ἐπιείκεια, and ἐσέβεια are qualities consistently applied to those whom Diodorus approves.⁸⁵

These indications of some independence on the part of Diodorus merely demonstrate that he was capable of editing his sources. Even

⁷⁹ J. Palm, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien: Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der hellenistischen Prosa* (Lund: Gleerup, 1955) 140 n. 1, 194, passim.

⁸⁰ R. Drews, "The Historical Objectives and Procedures of Diodorus Siculus" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1960) 15-24.

⁸¹ Sacks, *Diodorus*, esp. 24-35, 42-54; "Sources," 213-232. For Diodorus, with respect to the rise and fall of empires, clement behavior creates them and arrogance brings their destruction (Sacks, *Diodorus*, 54).

⁸² See Diod. 10. 12. 1-3; 11. 3. 1, 38. 6, 46. 1; 14. 1. 1-3; 15. 1. 1, 88. 1; 23. 15; 31. 15. 1; 37. 4. 1.

⁸³ For extensive citation of Diodorus's references to the intervention of *tyche* see, Palm, *Sprache*, 162; Drews, "Diodorus," 29, 52; Sacks, *Diodorus*, 36-41. Sacks in particular sees these references as being almost entirely of Diodorus's creation; the great exception being the discussion of fortune and Eumenes, which Sacks attributes in the main to Hieronymus (pp. 40-41).

⁸⁴ Πλεονεξία: Diod. 3. 14. 4, 47. 1, 3, 8; 14. 2. 1; 21. 1. 4a; 23. 19. 1; 25. 2. 1; 33. 18. 2; 33. 23-24; 34/35. 14. 1; 37. 30. 1-3; 38/39. 6; ἀσέβεια: Diod. 1. 59. 2-4; 4. 50. 2, 68. 2; 6. 6. 2, 7. 3; 7. 5. 11, 7. 7; 9. 89. 5; 15. 24. 3, 48. 1-4, 49. 3-6; 16. 38. 5; 19. 48. 4; 20. 65. 2; 22. 11. 2; 25. 5. 1-2; 27. 12; 28. 3. 1, 7. 1; 29. 15. 1; 31. 18a. 35, 45; 34/35. 9, 28. 2; ὕβρις: Diod. 5. 11. 4, 50. 5; 9. 18. 1, 23. 1; 10. 16. 2, 22. 1; 11. 48. 6, 53. 2-3, 67-68, 70. 3-4, 86. 4; 13. 33. 2-3, 53. 1-3; 14. 2. 1, 37. 7, 46. 4, 52. 2, 53. 1; 15. 1. 4, 61. 2; 17. 5. 3, 49. 2; 19. 89. 3, 110. 3-4; 20. 65. 101. 1-4; 21. 16. 4-5; 22. 1. 2-3, 2. 3; 25. 5. 3; 28. 4. 1, 14; 29. 14, 25; 33. 4. 4, 12; 34/35. 3. 1, 28. 2.

⁸⁵ Diod. 3. 47. 1; 7. 12. 7; 8. 15. 1-4; 11. 26. 1, 4, 67. 2; 15. 39. 2-3, 57. 1, 88. 1-4; 16. 1. 4, 3. 1, 4. 6, 8. 1, 35. 2, 38. 1-2, 60. 4-5, 64. 2-3, 86. 6, 91. 2, 4; 17. 24. 2, 66. 6, 69. 4, 9, 73. 1, 76. 1, 91. 7; 19. 30. 23. 1-2; 31. 11. 1-3, 26. 2.

if he were merely abbreviating the source, the selection of material would reflect his particular interests.⁸⁶ The evidence is overwhelming that his editorial abilities did not extend to synthesis of different materials or to the development of more than the most rudimentary theses.⁸⁷ Even the title of his work puts the claims made in his preface in question. Hornblower points out that the curious title, *Bibliothēke historike*, indicates that the work was “intended as a handbook for the general reading public.”⁸⁸ Certainly Diodorus (1. 3. 7–8) does emphasize that “everyone will be able readily to take what is useful just as from a great fountain” from his history. A. D. Nock calls Diodorus’s preface “the proem style of a small man with pretensions.”⁸⁹ Even Sacks, arguing that Diodorus is responsible for the majority of the nonnarrative material, often defends Diodorus’s independence by demonstrating his incompetence. “No one would want to claim credit for the proem to [Book] xii. In introducing a book that covers the *Pentecontaetia*, the author [Diodorus] includes among the most illustrious men of that extraordinary half-century Aristotle, Isocrates, and his students.”⁹⁰ Errors in the narrative are often attributed by Sacks to Diodorus’s “laziness.”⁹¹ Indeed, Sacks supports the traditional view that the main narrative for Diodorus’s history is taken from the various historians usually proposed as his main sources, i.e. Ephorus for Books 11–15, Hieronymus for the material on Greece and the Near East in Books 18–20.⁹²

⁸⁶ See P. A. Brunt, “On Historical Fragments and Epitomes,” *CQ* 30 (1980): 487.

⁸⁷ It is commonly assumed that the unevenness of Book Sixteen is due to Diodorus’s attempt to conflate at least two sources (see Drews, “Diodorus,” 126; N. G. L. Hammond, “The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI, I: The Macedonian, Greek, and Persian Narrative,” *CQ* 31 [1937]: 77–91). Sacks (*Diodorus*, 5, 19), while claiming that much of the “nonnarrative” material derives from Diodorus, believes that most of the narrative is taken wholesale from Diodorus’s respective sources.

⁸⁸ Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 23, cf. 22–24.

⁸⁹ A. D. Nock, “Posidonius,” *JRS* 49 (1959): 5.

⁹⁰ Sacks, *Diodorus*, 19. For a critical assessment of Sacks’s optimism with respect to Diodorus’s independence, see P. J. Stylianou’s “Review of Kenneth F. Sack’s *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century*,” *Bryn Mawr Classical Review*, 2, no. 6 (1991): 19. Stylianou does not see the Proem to Book 12 as evidence for Diodorus’s originality, but rather “the sad remnants of an Ephoran preface.” Stylianou concludes his review stating, “study of D. over an extended period of time leads me to endorse the ‘traditional’ view of D. The peculiarities of the *Bibliothēke* are best explained as the result of the fitful methods of a careless epitomizer with a moralizing bent, who produced, working in considerable haste, a historical compilation.”

⁹¹ Sacks, *Diodorus*, 91.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 21, 41, 158.

While Diodorus does add his moralizing philosophy wherever possible, he is not, as claimed by Sacks,⁹³ so proficient a craftsman as to create a work centered on this or other themes.⁹⁴ The evidence suggests that in this as in all things Diodorus was constrained by his sources. He might embellish an incident, but he apparently was unable to alter his source's overall focus. Diodorus was constrained to accomplish his objectives solely through abbreviation and enhancement. For Diodorus the successful are those who have lived in accordance with divine and human law. Philip, the son of Amyntas, is described as having achieved great success because of his valor and through his reverence for the gods.⁹⁵ In general, Philip is throughout described favorably. Indeed, at the conclusion of Book Sixteen, Diodorus presents a virtual encomium to the dead king (16. 95. 1–4). Philip's destruction of Olynthus is not reproached, even though such actions by others are.⁹⁶ Nowhere is Philip charged with *πλεονεξία*, *ἀσέβεια*, and *ὑβρις*; the latter is not claimed despite Philip's display of himself enthroned among the twelve Olympians (Diod. 16. 92. 5). Philip conquered Thrace for the benefit of Greece (Diod. 16. 71. 2). In fact, Diodorus only reproaches Philip for "corrupting character" through his "bribes" (16. 54. 4). However, elsewhere these "bribes" are called "gifts" (Diod. 16. 55. 2), and, indeed, at the end of Book Sixteen, Philip's claim that "cleverness" and "friendliness" accomplished more than warfare is treated favorably (95. 2–3, cf. 16. 53. 3).

Diodorus's handling of Philip's son and successor, Alexander, is in many ways similar to his treatment of the father. Alexander's "kind and good nature" is praised,⁹⁷ and, as with Philip, actions capable of censure receive none. Neither Alexander's destruction of Thebes (17. 14. 4), nor his burning of Persepolis is questioned (17. 72. 6). There is no rebuke for Alexander's actions following the fall of Tyre (17. 46. 4–5), nor for his acceptance of himself as the son of Ammon (17. 51. 3–4, cf. 108. 3). It is especially curious that the death of Cleitus is nowhere mentioned in Diodorus's account. Perhaps, Diodorus believed that this episode was better left unreported or his general theme of virtue rewarded would be compromised.

⁹³ Sacks, *Diodorus*, 5–7, 90; "Sources," 213, 231.

⁹⁴ Stylianou, *Commentary*, passim.

⁹⁵ Diod. 16. 1. 4, 3. 1, 4. 6, 8. 1, 35. 2, 38. 2, 60. 4–5, 64. 3.

⁹⁶ Diod. 16. 53. 3; for censure of similar acts by others, see: Diod. 12. 55. 8; 20. 72. 4–5.

⁹⁷ Diod. 17. 24. 1, 37. 6–38. 7, 69. 3–9, 79. 1, 91. 7.

While Diodorus is fairly consistent in presenting his rather naive view of history, it needs to be noted that his treatment is far from uniform. A comparison between his respective accounts of Philip and Alexander is a case in point. With regard to Philip there are far more passages of outright praise, and, as noted, Book Sixteen concludes with a most favorable summary of that king's career. Alexander is nowhere so extravagantly praised, nor is there a concluding eulogy. Instead, Book Seventeen closes with a discussion of the various cited causes for Alexander's death. The most obvious conclusion to be reached from this comparison is that Diodorus used a source in Book Sixteen which included a very favorable view of Philip most likely with a concluding summary of his career, and whose conclusions were echoed by Diodorus and on occasion amplified. With respect to Book Seventeen and Alexander, Diodorus's source either presented little beyond a factual account or awarded Alexander little praise, leaving Diodorus to fulfill his purpose by eliminating unfavorable comments and thus making his account seemingly more factual in its orientation. Throughout the *Bibliothēke* there is a marked disparity in the extent of the assigning of praise or censure to important personages.⁹⁸ Certainly Books Sixteen and Seventeen are not unique in this respect. Within Books Nineteen and Twenty there is likewise a clear dichotomy in tenor.⁹⁹ Those sections treating Sicily differ markedly from those dealing with Greece and Asia. While the narrative describing activities in the East presents a sober account of unfolding events, those dealing with the West record oracles (19. 2. 3), divine signs,¹⁰⁰ prodigies,¹⁰¹ love affairs (19. 3. 1; 20. 33. 5), impersonations (19. 5. 2-3), the exotic,¹⁰² and myths (20. 41. 3-6). In particular, those sections dealing with matters east of the Adriatic do not touch on impiety or the supernatural as progenitors of events. Moreover, while the style and language of Diodorus, as Palm has shown, are uniform, in Book Eighteen there does occur the word "ἰδιοπραγεῖν," which is found only in this Book, and only in the sections treating Greece and the East. Palm concludes, "dass das Wort

⁹⁸ This would seem to negate Drews's argument ("Diodorus and his sources," *AJP* 83 [1962]: 385-6, 392) that Diodorus routinely used secondary sources "to enhance" the "ethical instruction" of his original source.

⁹⁹ Events in Sicily and Italy are not presented in Book 18.

¹⁰⁰ 19. 103. 5; 20. 29. 3, 30. 2, 65. 2, 70. 3.

¹⁰¹ 19. 2. 8-9, 3. 2; 20. 11. 3-5, 13. 2-3, 101. 2-3.

¹⁰² 19. 108. 1; 20. 14. 6, 42. 2, 58. 4, 71. 3.

aus der Quelle übernommen ist.”¹⁰³ This term is normally used to describe the various intrigues of the *Diadochoi*,¹⁰⁴ but in Diodorus 18. 9. 2, it is applied to the activities of Leosthenes, the Athenian commander in the Lamian War.

The greatest problem in evaluating Diodorus’s methodology is that most of the postulated sources for the various parts of his *Bibliothēke* have not survived except in fragments. Nevertheless, certain of these fragments can be brought into direct relation to passages in Diodorus. Diodorus, Book Three, sections 12–48, can be compared with a section of Photius’s epitome of Agatharchides where the similarities are quite remarkable.¹⁰⁵ While the prose style is clearly Diodorus’s own, the facts and the opinions are Agatharchides’. Diodorus even includes his source’s references to previous material (3. 41. 1), even though these earlier references are found nowhere in Diodorus. In Book Nineteen (3. 3, 10. 3), Diodorus, likewise, makes a reference to material in his “previous book.” Nowhere is this referenced material found in Diodorus’s Book Eighteen, or anywhere else in his work. While Sacks suggests that Diodorus may simply have forgotten that he had omitted this material prior to publication,¹⁰⁶ Diodorus 3. 41. 1 is most often believed to be a case of repeating the cross-reference of his source, Agatharchides (Phot. *cod.* 250, 84. 257a).¹⁰⁷ Diodorus also comments that he is using “royal records preserved in Alexandria”;

¹⁰³ Palm, *Sprache*, 109, cf. 193.

¹⁰⁴ Diod. 18. 7. 4, 9. 2, 39. 7, 42. 2, 50. 1, 52. 8, 62. 7, 64. 6.

¹⁰⁵ The parallel passages are collected and juxtaposed by K. Müller in *Geographi Graeci Minores. E codicibus recognovit prolegomenis, annotatione, indicibus instruxit, tabulis aeri incisus illustravit Carolus Müllerus*. (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1855; reprinted Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1965) 1: 123–93; cf. S. M. Burstein, trans. and ed., *Agatharchides of Cnidus: On the Erythraean Sea* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1989) 37–8; Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 27–8. Agatharchides is also postulated as a possible intermediary source for the early Hellenistic period (C. Bottin, “Les sources de Diodore de Sicile pour l’histoire de Pyrrhus, des successeurs d’Alexandre-le-Grand et d’Agathocle,” *RBPhil* 7 [1928]: 1307–27). However, see Irwin Merker, “Diodorus and Hieronymus of Cardia,” *AHB* 2 (1988): 90–3, especially 93) for a refutation of this possibility.

¹⁰⁶ Sacks, *Diodorus*, 89 and n. 20.

¹⁰⁷ Sacks’s argument (*Diodorus*, 84–85) that an earlier reference in Diodorus (3. 18. 4) to Ptolemy vitiates the passage is hardly convincing. The reference taken from Agatharchides by Diodorus mentions a previous account of Ptolemy’s Red Sea voyage; the passage Sacks claims as fulfilling Diodorus’s reference is only a brief reference to Ptolemy’s exploration of the lands bordering the Red Sea. See Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 27; F. W. Walbank, “Review of K. S. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century*,” *JHS* 110 (1990): 251; C. Rubincam, “Did Diodorus Siculus take over cross-references from his sources?” *AJP* 119 (1998): 79–80.

Diodorus includes the reference verbatim (3. 38. 1). Of course, Diodorus may also have used these records and, therefore, retained the passage. It is more likely that he is here again quoting his source. While it has been argued that rarely does Diodorus copy a reference "without thought," "updating," "changing the perspective," and "frequent confusion," hardly define a conscientious historian's use of his sources.¹⁰⁸ That he, however infrequently, included references from his sources, suggests that his dependence on these authors was near complete.

Further evidence of Diodorus's basic methodology is found in a comparison of the fragments of Diodorus's Books 28–32 with his source for these books, Polybius.¹⁰⁹ Although the respective sections of these two authors survive only in a fragmentary form, most of the corresponding material in both authors comes from a tenth century anthology, compiled for Constantine VII (Porphyrogenitus), whose fidelity to the originals is thought to be quite good.¹¹⁰ The reliance of Diodorus on Polybius is confirmed by the large number of passages which can be brought into direct relation.¹¹¹ A comparison of these again shows that Diodorus accomplished his purposes by copying and close paraphrasing; his abridgments involve the exclusion of sections of Polybius, not just a synopsis of them.¹¹² Where Diodorus does summarize he is apt to distort or misrepresent the original.¹¹³ For example, Polybius (22. 9. 13) states that a gift of a fleet of ships was rejected; Diodorus (29. 17) has the Achaeans accepting the gift. While Polybius praises Aemilius Paullus for his humility, restraint, and simplicity, Diodorus repeats the passage almost exactly,

¹⁰⁸ Sacks, *Diodorus*, 88–91; cf. 17–18, 88–91; C. Rubincam, "Cross-references in the *Bibliothèque Historique* of Diodorus," *Phoenix* 43 (1989): 54–61; "Diodorus," 80.

¹⁰⁹ See Sacks, *Diodorus*, 121.

¹¹⁰ See F. R. Walton, trans. and ed., *Fragments of Books XXI–XXIII*, in *Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes*. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1968) 11: viii–ix; K. S. Sacks, *Polybius on the Writing of History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981) 1–20; *Diodorus*, 47, 144.

¹¹¹ For a full listing of the correspondences, see Schwartz, "Diodoros," 689–690.

¹¹² Polyb. 27. 6 = Diod. 31. 1; Polyb. 27. 12 = Diod. 30. 3; Polyb. 28. 21 = Diod. 30. 17; Polyb. 28. 18 = Diod. 30. 18. 1; Polyb. 29. 21. 7–8 = Diod. 31. 10. 2; Polyb. 29. 22 = Diod. 31. 12; Polyb. 30. 4 = Diod. 30. 5; Polyb. 31. 22–30 = Diod. 31. 26–27; Polyb. 31. 31 = Diod. 31. 36; Polyb. 32. 7–9 = Diod. 29. 17; Polyb. 36. 15 = Diod. 32. 19.

¹¹³ As admitted by Sacks (*Diodorus*, 98–99), but the large number of errors Sacks attributes to "outside contamination" (*ibid.*, 99 n. 63), not to carelessness.

but adds a comment on the greed of "present-day Romans".¹¹⁴ Again, Diodorus relates that Prusias' troops became afflicted with dysentery because of the sacrilege of their commander; Polybius is far from so emphatic.¹¹⁵

One area where Diodorus's limitations are most apparent is that of chronology. Frequently in his own narrative seasonal references refute his placement of events. Diodorus often equated events occurring spring-winter to an archon year. While Diodorus shows a predilection for seasonal errors of this nature, on occasion, he does begin his archon year in the fall or winter. He begins his narration of the events of 479/8 with the Persian fleet still "in winter quarters" (11. 27. 1). Diodorus also has difficulty in determining time intervals in his abridgement. Most often he solves this problem by using phrases such as "after this," "after some time," "after a little time," and "at the same time."¹¹⁶ Exact time references then are in all likelihood copied directly from his sources.

It is clear that despite the attempts to habilitate Diodorus, he remains little more than an often imperfect cipher for the material of his sources. The general unevenness of his work shows that, while the language is most often his own and on occasion the moral emphasis, the general tenor and opinions of his sources are preserved. Nor is it likely that Diodorus has routinely added details from other sources to enhance his material.¹¹⁷ This is not to say that Diodorus

¹¹⁴ Polyb. 31. 22 = Diod. 31. 26.

¹¹⁵ Polyb. 32. 15. 13-14 = Diod. 31. 35.

¹¹⁶ For a review of Diodorus's chronological shortcomings, see E. M. Anson, "Diodorus and the date of Triparadeisus," *AJP* 107 (1986): 208-17.

¹¹⁷ So Drews, "Diodorus," 92, 98, 102-109, and "Sources," 385-391. Hadley's ("Lost source," 32) hypothesis of an unknown encomiastic source for much of the material favorable to Eumenes ultimately fails to convince for two reasons. Diodorus presents no material on Eumenes' life prior to Alexander's death. Any eulogistic source would likely have included such material which Diodorus would surely at some point have included. That the earlier part of Eumenes' life is omitted suggests that Diodorus was relying on a narrative history of the period following Alexander's death. Secondly, while certainly, these passages found principally in Diodorus are rhetorical in nature and taken collectively do amount to a eulogy, but given Diodorus's inability to deal successfully with multiple sources and his propensity to editorialize, it is more likely that these passages collected by Hadley are the result of both Hieronymus's bias in favor of Eumenes in his narrative history and Diodorus's own embellishments. If these passages praising Eumenes were collected in a single location, similar to the eulogy for the Macedonian monarch Philip II found at the conclusion of Diodorus's Book Sixteen (95. 1-4), then it would be more likely that Diodorus might have used a separate source.

never interpolated information from other historians, only that this was not done as a regular procedure, nor, perhaps, even as a conscious one. If this were the case, Books Nineteen and Twenty would not contain such divergent emphases with respect to Sicily and the East. But it is certain that on occasion Diodorus has interspersed sections from other sources to highlight particular elements of interest to him, but not deemed significant or interesting to his main source. For example, in Book Nineteen, section 98, Diodorus repeats almost verbatim a description of the Dead Sea he included in his Book Two (48. 6–9). The evidence makes it apparent that Diodorus follows one source for a given subject, and only changes sources when he wished to turn to different topics. It is, therefore, possible, even though Diodorus does not identify his source or sources for Books Eighteen through Twenty, given his methodology, to distinguish that source's general traits.

Those sections of Books Eighteen through Twenty which cover the Greek East present more detail than is present either in the other sections of these books or in Diodorus's other books. Chronology is given special attention. The passage of time measured in days is referenced, as are the times of day.¹¹⁸ Seasons and even references to the solstice and the rising and setting of fixed stars are recorded.¹¹⁹ Campaign figures are, likewise, very precise.¹²⁰ Battle and

¹¹⁸ Days: Diod. 18. 13. 5, 15. 5, 17. 6, 22. 2, 4; 36. 6, 37. 1, 44. 2, 47. 3, 51. 4, 59. 2, 71. 2; 19. 11. 5, 13. 3, 19. 2, 8, 20. 1, 21. 2, 24. 5, 25. 2, 37. 3, 5, 38. 2, 39. 6, 50. 7, 55. 2, 64. 7, 74. 6, 75. 2, 6, 80. 2, 95. 2, 96. 4, 97. 3, 100. 7; 20. 23. 5, 45. 4, 7, 73. 3, 83. 4, 86. 4, 87. 1, 88. 1, 110. 5; time of day: Diod. 18. 21. 7, 22. 4, 23. 4, 32. 3, 33. 6, 34. 6, 40. 3, 46. 4, 64. 2, 4, 70. 6, 72. 8, 73. 3; 19. 18. 1, 26. 3, 26. 1, 6, 31. 2, 32. 1, 2, 37. 5, 38. 3, 47. 2, 63. 1, 93. 2, 95. 3, 5, 96. 4; 20. 49. 5, 50. 5, 86. 1, 96. 4, 98. 4, 102. 2, 103. 1, 108. 6, 109. 2.

¹¹⁹ Diod. 18. 25. 1, 40. 1; 19. 12. 1, 15. 6, 17. 3, 18. 2, 34. 8, 37. 1, 3, 38. 1, 39. 1, 44. 4, 45. 2, 46. 1, 49. 1, 50. 1, 56. 5, 58. 6, 68. 5, 6, 69. 2, 77. 7, 79. 1, 80. 5, 89. 2; 20. 28. 4, 73. 3, 74. 1, 3, 109. 2, 4, 111. 3, 112. 4, 113. 3, 4, 5.

¹²⁰ Diod. 18. 4. 1, 4, 7, 7. 2, 3, 5, 9. 1, 5, 10. 2, 11. 3, 12. 1, 2, 14. 2, 5, 15. 2, 8, 16. 2, 4, 5, 17. 2, 5, 18. 5, 19. 2, 20. 2, 21. 1, 4, 24. 1, 2, 29. 6, 30. 4, 5, 36. 1, 3, 4, 37. 2, 38. 1, 3, 40. 2, 7, 8, 41. 3, 44. 4, 45. 1, 5, 50. 3, 51. 1, 52. 1, 7, 53. 7, 58. 1, 59. 1, 3, 61. 5, 68. 1, 3, 70. 1, 72. 3, 4, 8, 73. 1, 4; 19. 11. 8, 13. 3, 14. 5–8, 16. 1, 2, 3, 17. 6, 18. 4, 7, 20. 3, 27. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 28. 1, 2, 3, 4, 29. 2, 3, 4, 5, 31. 5, 39. 2, 3, 4, 40. 1, 3, 4, 42. 4, 43. 1, 46. 5, 47. 1, 50. 7, 54. 4, 55. 5, 58. 2, 5, 59. 2, 60. 1, 62. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 63. 2, 67. 2, 68. 1, 3, 6, 69. 1, 3, 74. 1, 4, 75. 7, 8, 77. 2, 3, 4, 80. 4, 82. 1, 2, 3, 4, 83. 1, 85. 3, 90. 1, 92. 1, 94. 1, 95. 5, 96. 4, 100. 2, 4, 7; 20. 19. 1, 20. 3, 22. 4, 25. 1, 28. 3, 47. 1, 3, 49. 2, 50. 1, 2, 6, 53. 1, 75. 2, 74. 5, 76. 2, 82. 3, 84. 2, 86. 1, 88. 4, 6, 8, 9, 91. 7, 93. 2, 3, 4, 5, 95. 1, 97. 5, 98. 1, 2, 5, 99. 2, 103. 6, 107. 2, 4, 110. 4, 111. 3, 112. 1, 4, 113. 3, 4.

siege descriptions, including their planning and ordering, are quite detailed.¹²¹ Note is even taken of the provisioning of armies.¹²² Nor is it only the attention to detail which demonstrates the quality of Diodorus's source. There are numerous references to documentary materials.¹²³ The sober tone excludes as possible sources Marsyas of Philippi, whose *Makedonika* dealt primarily with legend and myth,¹²⁴ and Duris of Samos. Duris, who, in addition to many other works, wrote a *Makedonika*,¹²⁵ but Duris was often criticized in antiquity for his lack of accuracy.¹²⁶ In modern times Duris is seen as best fulfilling the methodology of "tragic history," a sensationalizing of the narrative.¹²⁷ Certainly this emphasis is responsible for the relative plethora of fragments of Duris's works that have been preserved by writers of symposia, biographies, and lexicons. More than one fourth of Duris's ninety-six surviving fragments including fourteen of the thirty-six from his *Makedonika*, collected by Felix Jacoby, derive from Athenaeus' *The Banqueters*; seven of the *Makedonika* fragments are from Plutarch.¹²⁸ Indeed, Duris criticized both Ephorus and Theopompus

¹²¹ Diod. 18. 13. 3, 25. 6, 29. 6, 30–32, 33. 3, 6, 34, 35. 1, 41. 6, 44, 45. 2, 70. 2, 4–7, 71. 3, 72; 19. 13. 6, 17. 4, 18. 4, 19. 4, 21. 1, 25. 2, 27–29, 36. 1, 37. 2, 38–39. 4, 40. 1–2, 42–43. 5, 49. 1, 58, 64. 6, 77. 5, 82–83, 84. 1–5, 93. 3, 5; 20. 22. 3, 22. 6, 23. 4, 45. 5–6, 47. 2, 7, 48, 49. 4, 50–52, 81–89, 91–99, 102. 2, 103, 107. 2, 108. 4, 7, 109. 1, 112. 3.

¹²² Diod. 18. 12. 4, 13. 2, 41. 3, 51. 1, 68. 3, 70. 1, 2; 19. 16. 2, 20. 1, 35. 5, 37. 3, 49. 2, 58. 2, 96. 4; 20. 37. 2, 45. 1, 46. 4, 73. 3, 96. 1, 3.

¹²³ See Rosen, "Documents," 41–94.

¹²⁴ See Heckel, "Marsyas," 449–450.

¹²⁵ *FGrH* 76 F-4 = Athen. 4. 167C. In general see, R. B. Kebric, *In the Shadow of Macedon: Duris of Samos* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1977) 9, although Billows (*Antigonos*, 333–4) councils caution given the paucity and source of most Duris's fragments, he does conclude, as does Kebric, that Duris's history probably tended towards the "marvellous and the sensational."

¹²⁶ Plutarch in particular was often critical of Duris's information (*FGrH* 76 F-38 = Plut. *Dem.* 19; *FGrH* 76 F-39 = Plut. *Dem.* 23; *FGrH* 76 F-53 = Plut. *Eum.* 1). His most telling criticism is found in the *Life of Pericles*, chapter 28 (*FGrH* 76 T-8, F-67), where he states, "it is not possible for Duris even where he has no private or personal interest to keep his narration near the truth."

¹²⁷ See Kebric, *Shadow*, 15–18, 37–42; Fontana, *lotte*, 156, and F. W. Walbank, "Tragic History: A Reconsideration," *BICS* 2 (1955): 4–14; cf. Walbank, "History and Tragedy," *Historia* 9 (1960): 216–234. Kebric believes that Duris's style was "dramatic and sensational," but that he was still writing history, not tragedy. Kebric points to a couple of occasions where Duris eschews the marvelous for the mundane (he rejects the claim that Alexander met the Amazons [*FGrH* 76 F-46 = Plut. *Alex.* 46] and Ctesias's fantastic account of the death of Sardapalus [*FGrH* 76 F-42 = Athen. 12. 529A]), but in the main the evidence suggests more acceptance than rejection of such material.

¹²⁸ Jacoby, *Fragmente*, 2A, 138–43, 148–51.

for neglecting the emotional treatment of their topics.¹²⁹ Most of Duris's fragments provide anecdotes of a fantastic or marvellous nature. There are tales of extravagant kings who sell their kingdoms because of their enormous debts,¹³⁰ fabulous drinking cups,¹³¹ and rags-to-riches metamorphoses. These latter accounts of transformations are especially telling with respect to Duris's reliability. Socrates was not the son of a slave, as claimed by Duris (*FGrH* 76 F-78 = D.L. 2. 19), but the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, of the Antiochid tribe and the deme Alopece;¹³² Eumenes of Cardia was not the son of a wagoner (*FGrH* 76 F-53 = Plut. *Eum.* 1.1), but of a Cardian nobleman.¹³³

In Books Eighteen through Twenty the main line of Diodorus's narrative, excluding the events in the West, follows the careers of three men: Eumenes, Antigonus and Demetrius. Although this is not as dramatic in Book Eighteen as in the other two, still twenty-seven of the seventy-five chapters concentrate on events in the lives of Eumenes and Antigonus. Of the remaining thirty-one, eleven concern the Lamian War, in which neither Eumenes, nor Antigonus, were directly involved.¹³⁴ Book Nineteen, on the other hand, of its eighty-five sections dealing with Greece and the East, sixty-six concentrate on the activities of Eumenes, Antigonus, and Demetrius. In addition, the sections devoted to mainland Greek affairs exhibit a definite pro-Macedonian bias, a quality that Diodorus has obviously taken from his source. In particular, Diodorus praises those actions that limited both Athenian independence and Athens' democratic traditions. Antipater is praised for his treatment of the defeated Athenians in spite of the fact that he abolished the democracy, disenfranchised Twelve thousand Athenians, and forced the migration of a sizable portion of these to Thrace (Diod. 18. 18. 4-6), referred Athenian possession of Samos to the kings, who proclaimed it independent, and established a garrison in Munychia.¹³⁵ Following his settlement

¹²⁹ *FGrH* 76 F-1 = Phot. *Bibl.* 176, 121a41.

¹³⁰ *FGrH* 76 F-4 = Athen. 4. 167C-D.

¹³¹ *FGrH* 76 F-12 = Athen. 4. 155D.

¹³² Plat. *Lach.* 180D-181A, 187D-E; *Euthphr.* 297E, 298B; *Grg.* 495D.

¹³³ Nepos (*Eum.* 1. 3) states that "he was of the highest birth." This coincides with Plutarch's (*Eum.* 1. 3) claim that Eumenes' father had a tie of guest-friendship with Philip II of Macedon. See Chapter 2.

¹³⁴ Diod. 18. 8-13, 14. 14-15, 16. 4-18. 9.

¹³⁵ Diod. 18. 18. 4-6; cf. D. L. 10. 1.

of Athenian affairs, Antipater then proceeded to reform “wisely” the other Greek cities, reducing their citizen bodies as well (Diod. 18. 18. 8). Eumenes and Hieronymus both came from the city of Cardia, which had long been hostile to Athenian interests (cf. Dem. 23. 169), and for most of their careers they had been closely allied with the rulers of Macedonia.¹³⁶ There was probably little support for the southern Greek position amongst the Cardians.¹³⁷ This pro-Macedonian emphasis would eliminate Demochares, and probably Diyllus, as Diodorus’s sources even for his information relating to the mainland Greek world. Demochares was Demosthenes’s nephew,¹³⁸ and a pro-Athenian, pro-democratic politician.¹³⁹ This pro-Macedonian bias also makes it unlikely that Diyllus was the source for the Greek material. While too little is known of the latter, to draw definite conclusions, his fragments all concern Athens, and, as noted earlier, Diyllus ended his history with the death of Cassander’s eldest son Philip. This death was quickly followed by the end to even a semblance of Athenian autonomy (Diod. 16. 76. 6).¹⁴⁰

Again, indicative of a pro-Macedonian source, Diodorus condemns the democratic forces in Athens for the trial and death of Phocion (18. 67. 3–6).¹⁴¹ While this criticism might suggest a member of the

¹³⁶ See chapter 2.

¹³⁷ See chapter 2; Cardia had even been closely allied with the Persians prior to the Persian War (W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928; reprinted Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975] 2: 75).

¹³⁸ *FGrH* 75 T-1 = [Plut.] *Mor.* 847C–D; *FGrH* 75 T-2 = Polyb. 12. 13. 4; *FGrH* 75 T-3 = Cic. *Brut.* 286; *FGrH* 75 T-4 = Cic. *de Or.* 2.

¹³⁹ *FGrH* 75 T-1 = [Plut.] *Mor.* 847D; *FGrH* 75 T-4 = Cic. *De orat.* 2. He opposed both Cassander and his Athenian puppet Demetrius of Phalerum (*FGrH* 75 T-2 = Polyb. 12. 13. 8). He was exiled in 303 but recalled in 288/287 (*FGrH* 75 T-1 = [Plut.] *Mor.* 851D–F; see L. C. Smith, “Demochares of Leuconoe and the dates of his exile,” *Historia* 11 [1962]: 115.). Back in Athens he showed himself adept at taking advantage of the rivalries of the various Macedonian leaders. To block any attempt by Demetrius to reestablish himself in Athens he went as an envoy and obtained subsidies from both Lysimachus and Cassander’s son Antipater; he was responsible for the dispatch of an embassy to Ptolemy which likewise brought financial support to Athens (*FGrH* 75 T-1 = [Plut.] *Mor.* 851E). His actions suggest that he was a practical politician as well as a committed Athenian patriot and democrat. While his fragments are few they do show a disdain for those Athenians who would abandon their independence and their system of government to appease the “Kings” (*FGrH* 75 F-4 = Polyb. 12. 13. 8–9; *FGrH* 75 F-1, 2 = Athen. 6. 252F–253D).

¹⁴⁰ Billows’ (*Antigonos*, 337 n. 20) suggestion of pro-Cassander bias is to be rejected.

¹⁴¹ Phocion was one of the oligarchic leaders of Athens after Antipater overthrew the democracy (Plut. *Phoc.* 9. 8, 30. 4, 32. 1–3; Nepos *Phoc.* 3. 1; Diod. 18. 65. 6). See L. Tritle, *Phocion the Good* (London and New York: Croom Helm, 1988).

Athenian propertied classes as Diodorus's source for his material on the Greek mainland, it possesses elements which dispute such an identification. In his *Life of Phocion*, Plutarch credits Phocion after the Lamian War with getting Antipater to exempt many from exile, and also with speaking against the imposition of a garrison (27. 6-7, 29. 4). All of this information is absent from Diodorus's admittedly abbreviated account. Diodorus's narrative, however, does record that Phocion and others later went to Alexander, the son of Polyperchon, and secretly urged him to retain the Macedonian garrisons (18. 65. 4). Diodorus states as reason Phocion's "fear of punishment due according to the laws" (18. 65. 4). Plutarch mentions none of this. Indeed, Plutarch is exceedingly favorable to Phocion. In contrast, Diodorus's narrative with respect to Phocion can be described as disinterested.¹⁴² Indeed, this attitude is apparent with regard to Athens in general. The sea battle which destroyed Athenian naval power forever is only briefly and unemotionally mentioned (18. 15. 9). Diodorus's treatment of Athenian affairs in general is abbreviated. If an Athenian source is present, it is remarkable for its complete lack of partisanship and total disinterest in Athenian independence, possessions, or even history.¹⁴³ More indicative of the concentration of Diodorus's source is the narrative's focus on Macedonian interests.¹⁴⁴ Diodorus, and hence his source, clearly reflects a pro-Macedonian position.

Jacob Seibert and Jane Hornblower have argued that Diodorus, while following in the main one source for the eastern material in

¹⁴² In Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*, Phocion is not out for his own personal gain (18. 1-4, 7-8, 19. 1-4, 21. 3-5, 30. 1-5) but always for Athens' good (10. 7, 16. 1-4, 23. 1-6). Plutarch is at pains to document Phocion's patriotism. Where he has acceded to Macedonian interests he has done so out of necessity (9. 8-10, 16. 1-4, 21. 1, 23. 1); on other occasions he opposed Macedonian interests (12-14, 16. 3). In Plutarch's opinion Phocion's ultimate fate recalled that of Socrates and "the sin and misfortune of Athens were alike in both cases" (38. 5). Certainly, Diodorus nowhere describes Phocion in such glowing terms. While he does regard Phocion's condemnation as a travesty of justice, Diodorus's account of Phocion's trial and death is factual in its presentation. It clearly does not exhibit any tragic tendencies or recall Phocion's career in encomiastic terms (contrary to Tritle, *Phocion*, 147).

¹⁴³ Even Demetrius of Phalerum's rule is but briefly, albeit favorably, related (18. 74. 3; 19. 78. 3; 20. 45. 5).

¹⁴⁴ Indicative of the attitude of Diodorus's source is the assessment of another Athenian politician, Demades. Diodorus describes Demades as serving Athens well in her relations with Macedon (18. 48. 1); Plutarch calls his behavior "outrageous" (*Phoc.* 1. 1-3). Plutarch's account is in general vehemently hostile to Demades. Whereas Phocion is frugal and above bribery, Plutarch sees Demades as just the reverse (*Phoc.* 30. 4).

these three books, has used an Alexandrian source for the sections describing Ptolemy.¹⁴⁵ Beyond a doubt Ptolemy is described mostly favorably.¹⁴⁶ However, in spite of these approving references Ptolemy hardly occupies a central position in the narrative. He is mentioned summarily except in connection with Perdiccas, Antigonus, or Demetrius, and these sections of the narrative follow the activities of these three, rather than those of Ptolemy. Even in the account of Perdiccas's invasion of Egypt, the main line of narration follows the activities of Perdiccas (Diod. 18. 29. 1–2, 33. 1–36. 7). It would be expected that an Alexandrian source would have centered the narrative on Ptolemy. The favorable attitude probably reflects at least in part Diodorus's source, but the vocabulary appears to be Diodorus's own.¹⁴⁷ Εὐεργασία, ἐπιείκεια, and εὐσέβεια are qualities Diodorus consistently applies to those individuals of whom he approves.¹⁴⁸ Diodorus in these books repeatedly criticizes many of Alexander's Successors for πλεονεξία.¹⁴⁹ Ptolemy, however, is not so criticized and is consistently described as εὐεργέτης and ἐπιεικής.¹⁵⁰ Ptolemy was content with his satrapy and harbored no ambition to govern a unified empire. In 320, when offered the regency for the kings, a clear invitation to govern Alexander's legacy, he rejected the proposal (Diod. 18. 36. 6). This endorsement of more limited objectives may have impressed Hieronymus. While certainly not conclusive evidence, it is of interest that Pausanias charged Hieronymus with bias in reference to the last of the latter's patrons, Antigonus Gonatas.¹⁵¹ Antigonus Gonatas, like Ptolemy, differed from most of his predeces-

¹⁴⁵ Seibert, *Untersuchungen*, 64–83; Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 40–43, 51.

¹⁴⁶ Diod. 18. 14. 1, 28. 6, 33. 3, 34. 2–4, 36. 1, 39. 5, 86. 3; 19. 55. 5, 56. 1, 86. 2, 6; 20. 27. 3.

¹⁴⁷ Diodorus had visited Egypt (1. 44. 1; cf. 1. 10. 6–7, 22. 2, 61. 4) and may have been impressed by the official accounts. Diodorus is most certainly responsible for the statement in Book Nineteen (1. 7) describing his homeland Sicily as, “the greatest and most beautiful of all the islands.” Similar impressions may have remained from what may have been, despite his inflated claims to be a world traveler (1. 4. 1), his trip to Egypt was his only actual excursion outside of Sicily and Italy (see Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 25).

¹⁴⁸ See note 85.

¹⁴⁹ Diod. 18. 23. 3, 33. 3, 41. 4–5, 47. 5, 50. 2, 54. 4, 62. 3, 6–7; 19. 55. 4; 20. 106. 2, 4.

¹⁵⁰ Diod. 18. 14. 1, 28. 4–6, 33. 3, 34. 2–4, 36. 1, 39. 5, 86. 3; 19. 55. 5, 56. 1, 86. 2, 6. Ptolemy is, however, accused by Diodorus of seizing Phoenicia “unjustly” (18. 73. 2).

¹⁵¹ Paus. 1. 9. 8 = *FGrH* 154 T-11, F-9; 1. 13. 7–9 = *FGrH* 154 F-15.

sors and contemporaries in his more circumscribed ambitions.¹⁵² It needs also to be emphasized that Ptolemy was never directly in conflict with Eumenes. While he was regularly allied with Eumenes' enemies,¹⁵³ and on one occasion did unsuccessfully encourage Eumenes' forces to desert him (Diod. 18. 62. 1–2), he never engaged Eumenes in battle. Moreover, his encounters with Demetrius, another of those served by Hieronymus, had been conducted by both parties with almost chivalrous behavior.¹⁵⁴ It is also very possible that what may have been mild praise in Hieronymus, became extravagant praise in Diodorus.¹⁵⁵ Neither Nepos, nor Plutarch do more than relate Perdiccas's death in Egypt (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 1), but Justin's *Epitome of Pompeius Trogus* highlights Ptolemy's industry, moderation, and kindness (13. 6. 18–19).¹⁵⁶ These qualities, however, are all set forth to demonstrate that commander's shrewdness in his preparation for the coming struggle with Perdiccas (13. 8. 1). By contrast, Perdiccas's arrogance is listed as the major cause for that commander's failure in Egypt (Just. 13. 8. 2; cf. Ael. *VH* 12. 16). These are just the points that would be emphasized by a factual historian, and exaggerated by an historian with a didactic agenda.

While Diodorus's source for the career of Eumenes can be postulated with probable accuracy as Hieronymus, such confidence does not attach itself to such determinations for the other surviving works describing the early Hellenistic Age. These sources' methodologies and conditions of survival are quite different from those of Diodorus. Nepos and Plutarch wrote biographies of certain key figures from this time period. Neither's work is regarded as ultimately deriving from a single source. Claims with respect to Nepos range from descriptions of him as a pioneer in establishing a biographical tradition¹⁵⁷ to a copier

¹⁵² Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, 203–5; Jacoby, "Hieronymos," 1543–6; Brown, "Hieronymus," 694–5.

¹⁵³ Diod. 18. 25. 4, 6, 29. 1, 33. 1–36. 4, 49. 3, 54. 1–55. 3.

¹⁵⁴ Diod. 19. 85. 3; Plut. *Demetr.* 5. 3; 17. 1; Just. 15. 1. 6–8; 2. 6–8.

¹⁵⁵ Westlake ("Eumenes," 315 n. 8, 325 n. 50) believed that such was the case with those passages in Diodorus (18. 42. 1–2, 53. 1–5, 59. 4–6) that were especially flattering of Eumenes. Polybius' surviving work has only three allusions to divine punishment for impiety (Polyb. 1. 84. 10; 31. 9. 4; 32. 15. 14), but Diodorus's derivative account is replete with them (28. 3. 1, 7. 1; 29. 15. 1; 31. 35, 45; 32. 18).

¹⁵⁶ Polyaeus (4. 19) in his only "strategem" regarding Ptolemy I offers no especial praise of him.

¹⁵⁷ Such a claim is made by Tritle (*Phocion*, 7) with respect to Nepos's *Life of Phocion*. See in general J. R. Bradley, *The Sources of Cornelius Nepos* (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1967).

of earlier Alexandrine biographies.¹⁵⁸ While some scholars attribute Plutarch's material to Hellenistic biographies,¹⁵⁹ most commentators argue that Plutarch relied on primary sources.¹⁶⁰ Certainly Plutarch does assert that he selects his material from a great number of sources.¹⁶¹ Despite the use of multiple or secondary sources, Nepos and Plutarch's respective *Lives of Eumenes* accord well with Diodorus's history. As noted earlier, the characterizations of Eumenes,¹⁶² his enemies, and erstwhile allies are remarkably similar.¹⁶³ Moreover, various parts of the narrative also correspond closely. The descriptions of the personal combat between Neoptolemus and Eumenes,¹⁶⁴ Eumenes's ingenious device for exercising horses while besieged in Nora,¹⁶⁵ the respective accounts of the Alexander Tent,¹⁶⁶ are all

¹⁵⁸ See F. Leo, *Die griechisch-romische Biographie nach ihrer literarischen Form* (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1901; reprinted Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1965) 217.

¹⁵⁹ E. Meyer, "Die Biographie Kimons," in *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, edited by E. Meyer (Halle: M. Niemeyer: 1899) 2: 67–9; J. E. Powell, "The Sources of Plutarch's Alexander," *JHS* 59 (1939): 229–40; W. E. Sweet, "The Sources of Plutarch's Demetrius," *CW* 44 (1951): 177.

¹⁶⁰ K. Ziegler (*Plutarchos von Chaironeia* [Stuttgart: A. Druckenmüller, 1949; reprinted Stuttgart: A. Druckenmüller, 1964], C. Theander (*Plutarch und die Geschichte* [Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1951]) and P. Stadter (*Plutarch's Historical Methods: An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965]) make strong cases for Plutarch's wide knowledge and use of sources. Even though Plutarch's biographies are anecdotal in character, this is not reflective of the use of an anthology, but rather indicative of Plutarch's purpose. "For it is not histories that I am writing, but lives; and in the most illustrious deeds there is not always a manifestation of virtue or vice, nay, a slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of character than battles where thousands fall. . . ." (Plut. *Alex.* 1. 2–3; cf. *Mor.* 243D).

¹⁶¹ Plut. *Nic.* 1; *Alex.* 1; *Dem.* 2.

¹⁶² See note 56.

¹⁶³ See notes 57, 58, 61–3, 65–7; Nepos gives no characterizations of Alcetas, Neoptolemus, or Peucestas, while Plutarch's depictions of these individuals corresponds well with those of Diodorus (see notes 62 and 64); Plutarch in his *Life of Eumenes* gives no characterization of Olympias, Alexander's mother, but his comments in his *Life of Alexander* (9. 5, 10. 7, 77. 8) do agree with those in both Diodorus and Nepos (note 66).

¹⁶⁴ Plut. *Eum.* 7. 7–12 and Nepos *Eum.* 4. 2 = Diod. 18. 31; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 3 = Diod. 18. 32. 3.

¹⁶⁵ Plut. *Eum.* 11. 4–8 and Nepos *Eum.* 5. 4–6 = Diod. 18. 42. 3–4. While Nepos's parallel accounts are briefer, they conform exactly with respect to the main points found in both Plutarch and Diodorus. There can be little doubt that a common source is ultimately the origin for this material in all three. Even though it is clear that Nepos could not have been the major source for Plutarch, given the more extensive nature of Plutarch's biography, it should still be noted that Plutarch was familiar with Nepos biographies (Theander, *Plutarch*, 69).

¹⁶⁶ Plut. *Eum.* 13. 4–8 = Diod. 18. 60. 4–61. 3; cf. 19. 15. 3–5; Nepos 7. 2–3 =

remarkably similar in the three accounts. But the three sources each include material not found in one or in both of the others.¹⁶⁷

While most of these respective omissions can be explained as the result of different criteria for material selection or abbreviation, there is present in Plutarch's second chapter a tradition hostile to the Cardian. Eumenes hoards and conceals his wealth (4-6), shows himself capable of pettiness (2, 8) and obsequious behavior (9-10). In addition to omissions, there are a few conflicts. Plutarch (*Eum.* 12. 2-4) and Nepos (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7) have Eumenes escaping from his entrapment in Nora through trickery by altering an oath of allegiance to Antigonus.¹⁶⁸ Diodorus (18. 57. 3-4, 58. 1; 19. 44. 2) states that Eumenes formed an alliance with Antigonus and was released.¹⁶⁹ Clearly, Plutarch, and to a lesser degree Nepos, are using sources not utilized by Diodorus and hostile to Eumenes.

When the different methodologies and objectives are taken into account, the three narratives bear a remarkable similarity.¹⁷⁰ There

Diod. 19. 15. 3-5. While the actual descriptions of the Tent are in the main the same in Nepos, Diodorus and Plutarch, Nepos places its institution in Susiane, Plutarch in Cilicia, and Diodorus has it originating in Cilicia, but renewed in Susiane.

¹⁶⁷ Material present in Nepos, but not found in Diodorus: Nepos *Eum.* 1, 2. 4-5, 3. 5-6, 4. 4, 11. 1-2. Present in Diodorus, but absent in Plutarch: Diod. 18. 22-23, 26-28, 44-49, 51-52, 54-56, 62-75; 19. 11-14, 16, 17. 5-7, 18. 1, 19-21, 23. 2-4, 25. 2-36. 6, 44. 1; present in Plutarch, but absent in Diodorus: *Eum.* 1-2, 3. 4-11, 6. 7-10, 8. 5-12, 9. 4-12, 11. 1-3, 12. 2-7, 15. 1-3, 16. 1-6, 18. 7-9, 19. 1. Many of the passages found in Plutarch but not in Diodorus are also present in Nepos's biography of Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 2 = Nepos *Eum.* 1. 4-6; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 4-11 = Nepos *Eum.* 2. 4-5 [Nepos mentions an attempt on Eumenes' life which does not appear in Plutarch]; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 2-7 = Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 7-9 = Nepos *Eum.* 11. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 7-19. 1 = Nepos *Eum.* 11. 3-5, 12. 3-4. None of the material on Eumenes' early life prior to Alexander's death is found in Diodorus. There are also many passages approximately equivalent but distorted through abbreviation. For example, Plutarch simply notes that Eumenes was defeated in Cappadocia through treachery (Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3); Diodorus gives the details (18. 40. 5-8). Peucestas's great feast in Persis is sparingly made reference to by Plutarch (*Eum.* 14. 5), and again it is necessary to turn to Diodorus for a full description (19. 22-23. 1).

¹⁶⁸ Nepos gives no details, but says Eumenes escaped from Nora by "pretending to surrender."

¹⁶⁹ For a full review of this conflict, see Anson, "Nora," 251-6. This particular discrepancy probably results from Plutarch's use of Duris at this point (*ibid.*, 254-5). He was clearly familiar with Duris's *Makedonika*. He quotes, but rejects, Duris's claim that Eumenes was the son of a poor wagoner (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 1). Much of the material which differs in tenor from Diodorus's narrative may derive from Duris. There is, however, no good evidence to prove such an ascription.

¹⁷⁰ In another case where Plutarch and Diodorus can be compared with respect

is, nevertheless, an important distinction between Plutarch and Diodorus's evaluations of Eumenes. While Plutarch praises Eumenes as loyal, clever, skilful,¹⁷¹ and laments the effects of Macedonian prejudice,¹⁷² in virtually the same terms used by Diodorus,¹⁷³ the latter also emphasizes Eumenes' lack of ambition (18. 60. 1, 62. 7, 63. 4). Plutarch (*Eum.* 21. 2–5; cf. *Eum.* 2. 1), however, criticizes Eumenes for his personal aspirations. The likely explanation for this conflict lies in Plutarch's ability to see through Hieronymus's rhetoric to a basic truth about Eumenes, that the Cardian was ambitious. Diodorus, as he did so often in his *Bibliothēke*, blindly followed his source's assessment.

Book Four of Polyaeus's *Stratagems of War* includes anecdotes relating to various individuals connected with Macedonian history, ranging from Argaeus to Perseus, but most being associated with Philip II, Alexander III, the *Diadochi*, and the *Epigoni*. Of these "stratagems" twenty-one are collected regarding Antigonus, five, for Eumenes, and twelve, for Demetrius. While many of these anecdotes concerning these three recount almost exactly events found in Diodorus,¹⁷⁴ and others do so but in greater detail,¹⁷⁵ many exhibit significant differences.¹⁷⁶ There are also a large number of incidents not found in Diodorus.¹⁷⁷ Of the stratagems associated with Eumenes three are

to an individual's career, that of Demetrius, the son of Antigonus Monophthalmus, the similarities are far less prevalent. This is especially true with respect to Demetrius' occupation of Athens. In Plutarch (*Demetr.* 8) Antigonus decides "to free" the city to win the goodwill of the Greeks and for his and his son's greater glory. Diodorus (20. 45. 1–2) describes the operation in purely political and strategic terms. Plutarch's description is tinged throughout with "tragic" qualities, all of which are absent from Diodorus's admittedly abbreviated narrative (Plut. *Demetr.* 8–14).

¹⁷¹ Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4, 4. 1, 5. 8, 9. 4, 11. 14, 2. 11, 15. 13, 16. 1; 20. 2–4.

¹⁷² Plut. *Ser.* 1. 5; *Eum.* 3. 1, 8. 1, 18. 1, 20. 2, 9.

¹⁷³ Diod. 18. 29. 2, 42. 2, 53. 7, 57. 4, 58. 4, 60. 1, 3–4, 62. 3, 7, 63. 4; 19. 13. 1–2, 24. 5, 27. 2, 26. 9, 44. 2, 4; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 1. 1–3, 2. 3, 3. 1, 6. 5, 13. 3.

¹⁷⁴ Polyaeus 4. 6. 8 = Diod. 18. 72. 3–8; Polyaeus. 4. 6. 13 = Diod. 19. 42–43; Polyaeus 4. 6. 14 = Diod. 19. 46. 1–4 (Diodorus, however, records a trial before a *synedrium*; Polyaeus says assembly); Polyaeus. 4. 6. 15 = Diod. 19. 48. 3; Polyaeus. 4. 8. 2 = Diod. 18. 60–61. 3; Polyaeus. 4. 8. 3 = Diod. 19. 23; Polyaeus. 4. 8. 4 = Diod. 19. 38.

¹⁷⁵ Polyaeus. 4. 6. 9 (Diod. 18. 63. 6); Polyaeus. 4. 7. 8 (Diod. 20. 103. 1).

¹⁷⁶ Polyaeus. 4. 6. 4 (Diod. 18. 39. 3–4); Polyaeus. 4. 6. 7 (Diod. 18. 44. 2–3); Polyaeus. 4. 6. 10 (Diod. 19. 32. 2); Polyaeus. 4. 6. 11 (Diod. 19. 37); Polyaeus. 4. 6. 16 (Diod. 19. 82. 3); Polyaeus. 4. 7. 3 (Diod. 20. 102. 2); Polyaeus. 4. 7. 5 (Diod. 20. 45. 2–3); Polyaeus. 4. 7. 7 (Diod. 20. 49. 1–50. 6).

¹⁷⁷ Polyaeus. 4. 6. 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20; 7. 4 (for much of Demetrius's career Diodorus exists only in fragments), 8. 1, 5.

virtually identical to those in Diodorus. Despite an apparently limited period of research and writing, Polyænus still may have used actual histories, and not simply consulted previously published collections of military stratagems.¹⁷⁸ In any case, while arguments may be made for individual passages being extracted from Hieronymus, it is impossible to decide whether Polyænus derived them directly, or through an intermediary source.

For the two remaining major surviving sources relevant to the career of Eumenes, both survive only as epitomes, the briefest fragments, and fragments of epitomes. Arrian of Nicomedia's *Τὰ μελὶ Ἀλέξανδρον*, commonly titled in modern literature as *The Successors*, covered the years from Alexander's death down to 320/319 in ten books.¹⁷⁹ Unfortunately now only a few pages of fragments and epitome remain.¹⁸⁰ The most extensive of these is found in the ninth century Byzantine compendium, the *Bibliotheca*, by Photius (*Succ.* 1a–45). Despite the obvious limitations on arriving at any conclusions regarding Arrian's sources, there are indications that he was in the main following Hieronymus. In the first place, Arrian in his work on Alexander, the *Anabasis*, lists his major sources and further explains his reasons for their selection. Here he demonstrates a preference for knowledgeable eyewitnesses (Arr. *Anab.* 1. pref.). Such a predilection would naturally attract him to Hieronymus. Secondly, Arrian's surviving fragments and those of Photius's epitome show a striking resemblance to Diodorus's account of this same period. Certainly the use of a chronological system based on campaigning years is consistent with Diodorus's practices in Book 18,¹⁸¹ and the arrangement of the material with respect to events in Asia is also similar.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ Peter Krentz and Everett L. Wheeler, eds. and trans., *Polyænus, Stratagems of War* (Chicago: Ares Press, 1994) 1: xi–xvi.

¹⁷⁹ *FGH* 156 F-1 = Phot. *Bibl.* 92. 69. a1 = Arr. *Succ.* 1a (Roos edition, Teubner). See Jacoby, *Fragmente*, 2B Suppl., 553.

¹⁸⁰ With one notable exception these are collected in A. G. Roos, *Scripta Minora et Fragmenta*, in *Flavius Arrianus*, vol. 2, *Bibliotheca Teubneriana* (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1967). The exception is the Gothenbourg palimpsest (see B. Dreyer, "Zum ersten Diadochenkrieg," *ΣPE* 125 [1999]: 39–60; J. Noret, "Un Fragment du dixième livre de la succession d'Alexandre par Arrien retrouvé dans un palimpseste de Gothenbourg," *AntCl* [1983]: 235–42).

¹⁸¹ L. C. Smith, "The Chronology of Books XVIII–XX of Diodorus Siculus," *AJP* 82 (1961): 283; cf. Anson, "Tripuradeisus," 211.

¹⁸² Arrian, *Successors*, 1a. 13–15, while corresponding in some respects with Diodorus, 18. 18, 48. 1–4, has a greater affinity for Plutarch's *Lives of Demosthenes* (28–30) and *Phocion* (26–9).

Omitting sections not found in both Diodorus and in the remains of Arrian's *Successors*, only at two points are there differences in the sequence of events.¹⁸³ Photius's *Epitome* places an account of Leonnatus's death (*Succ.* 1. 9) before Lysimachus's operations in Thrace (*Succ.* 1. 10), while Diodorus reverses the order (Lysimachus, 18. 14. 2-4; Leonnatus, 18. 14. 5-15. 3). The second discrepancy has Photius placing Perdiccas's moves against Antigonus (*Succ.* 1. 20) before Perdiccas's marriage to Nicaea (*Succ.* 1. 21); Diodorus again exchanges the order of the two events (18. 23. 1-3). In the final analysis little can be determined with respect to sources for the surviving material from Arrian's history. Additionally, Arrian was not an historian who either limited himself to one source or found it in anyway difficult to blend different sources into one smoothly connected narrative.¹⁸⁴ In his *Anabasis*, while claiming in the main to follow Ptolemy of Lagus and Aristobulus, he has included material "not wholly untrustworthy" from other sources (*Arr. Anab.* 1. pref.).¹⁸⁵

In the case of Justin's epitome of Pompeius Trogus's *Historiae Philippicae*, any determination of the ultimate source or sources of Pompeius Trogus's history is even more difficult than for that of Arrian's *Successors*. This is true even though Justin is not the only surviving work based on Trogus. At some time subsequent to its publication, an unknown hand wrote summaries of Trogus's chapters; these are

¹⁸³ It is unfortunate that fragments of Arrian's actual work cannot be more closely connected especially to Diodorus's narrative. The Gothenbourg Palimpsest (Noret, "Fragment," 236-40; Dreyer, "Diadochenkrieg," 45-8), however, while having no counterpart in Diodorus, closely parallels Plutarch (*Eum.* 8. 7-8). The papyrus discovered near Oxyrhynchus in 1932, *PSI*, no. 1284 (see G. Wirth, "Zur Grossen Schlacht des Eumenes 321 (*PSI* 1284)," *Klio* 46 [1965]: 283-88, and A. B. Bosworth, "Eumenes, Neoptolemus and *PSI* XII 1284," *GRBS* 19 (1978): 227; W. E. Thompson, "*PSI* 1284: Eumenes of Cardia vs. The Phalanx," *ChrEg* 59 [1984]: 113-20), presents material related to a battle fought by Eumenes in 320, but this particular passage, even though there is no conflict with material in other surviving sources, cannot be brought into direct accordance with any other source. This is also the case with the Vatican palimpsest (*FGrH* 156 F-10 = *Arr. Succ.* 24-25). It describes events associated with the invasion of Antipater and Craterus that do not appear in the other sources. Again, there is no conflict.

¹⁸⁴ P. Stadter (*Arrian of Nicomedia* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980] 148-9) postulates that Arrian may have been using in addition to Hieronymus another eyewitness, Ptolemy, son of Lagus. Stadter believes that Ptolemy's history ended in 320, not in 323.

¹⁸⁵ A. B. Bosworth (*A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980] 1: 1-34) suggests that Arrian was far more artful than his preface might indicate.

known as the *Prologues*.¹⁸⁶ If Trogus had in any way indicated his sources, neither Justin nor the author of the *Prologues* retains those references. Even though Justin's surviving epitome of Trogus is relatively extensive when compared with the fragments remaining of Arrian's work,¹⁸⁷ this epitome presents great difficulties with respect to source identification. Trogus wrote his history in the first century B.C.E., and Justin, whose exact dates are debated, anywhere from the second to fourth century C.E.¹⁸⁸ While Justin in epitomizing Trogus apparently added little except emphasis and language,¹⁸⁹ Trogus did not follow a single author, but apparently synthesized the material from many sources (Just. Praef. 3). Unfortunately, Trogus's sources are unnamed either in his prologues or in the epitome itself. Their identification, therefore, becomes next to impossible. Nor is it possible to draw many conclusions about the original based on Justin's abridgement. While Justin apparently did not add new material to Trogus's history, his "brief anthology" (Praef. 4) has radically truncated the original, and on occasion he has not even reproduced these parts with great accuracy. Justin confuses Perdiccas's campaign against Ariarathes in Cappadocia with a later one in Pisidia (13. 6. 1–3; cf. Diod. 18. 22); he inaccurately reports the death of Polyperchon in 320 (13. 8. 7), later referring to him as alive and well (14. 5. 1). Justin has here confused Polyperchon with Craterus (Diod. 18. 30. 5–6). He reports that Philip Arrhidaeus, the king, was placed in

¹⁸⁶ O. Seel, ed., *M. Iuniani Iustini Epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi* (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1935; reprinted Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1972) xiii–xiv, 305–24.

¹⁸⁷ Seel, *Epitoma*, 1–302. J. C. Yardley and W. Heckel (*Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, Books 11–12: Alexander the Great, translation and appendices by J. C. Yardley; introduction and commentary by Waldemar Heckel* [New York and Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997] 9) suggest that Justin's work should be more properly titled an *Anthology of Pompeius Trogus*.

¹⁸⁸ R. Syme ("The Date of Justin and the Discovery of Trogus," *Historia* 37 [1988]: 358–71; "Trogus and the H. A., Some Consequences," in *Institutions, société et vie politique dans l'empire romain au IV^e ap. J.-C.: actes de la Table ronde autour de l'œuvre d'André Chastagnol, Paris, 20–21 janvier 1989*, edited by M. Christol, et al., *Collection de l'école française de Rome* 159 (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1992) 11–20) holds for the fourth century; most recently Yardley and Heckel (*Justin*, 10–13; see also R. B. Steele, "Pompeius Trogus and Justinus," *AJP* 38 [1917]: 19, 24–5, 41) support the second century dating.

¹⁸⁹ O. Seel, *Die Praefatio des Pompeius Trogus* (Erlangen: Universitätsbund Erlangen, 1955) 34; J. S. Pendergast, *The Philosophy of History of Pompeius Trogus* (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1961) 20; J. C. Yardley, "The Literary Background to Justin/Trogus," *AHB* 8 (1994): 70.

charge of the transportation of Alexander's body from Babylon (13. 4. 6), when in fact another individual named Arrhidaeus actually performed the deed (Diod. 18. 26. 1). Thessalonike is called the daughter of King Philip Arrhidaeus (14. 6. 13); she is actually the daughter of Philip, the son of Amyntas (Diod. 18. 23. 5). Perdiccas's troops in Egypt are reported to be deserting to Antipater (13. 8. 2), who was not physically present. It is very clear that these discrepancies are due to the epitomator and not to Trogus. Justin's narrative incorrectly centers the Lamian War on Heracleia (13. 5. 8), yet the *Prologue* for Book Thirteen clearly places the theater of operations before the walls of Lamia.¹⁹⁰ Given the paucity of information, little can be concluded with respect to Trogus's sources.

From the analysis of the surviving sources, it appears likely that Hieronymus was the ultimate origin for much of the material regarding the years following Alexander's death, and for most of the narrative concerning Eumenes. The prominence of Eumenes in our surviving sources is doubtless the best argument that can be made for Hieronymus's use. Eumenes did not create a kingdom or a dynasty, and while a competent commander, defeating two generals in 320 who had led significant elements of the great Alexander's army, he lost crucial battles to Antigonos in 319, and, again, in early 315. His career after Alexander's death spanned less than eight years, and ended in defeat and death. Yet, Diodorus centers these years of his Asian narrative on Eumenes, and both Plutarch and Nepos composed biographies of the Cardian. Given Diodorus's methodology, that author obviously was abbreviating a source who centered his history from 323 to 315 on Eumenes. That so much information regarding Eumenes was available for these biographers, and that much of it mirrored that found in Diodorus, suggests that the ultimate source of their information was the same as that for Diodorus, Hieronymus. It is unlikely that any contemporary historian without a personal interest or firsthand knowledge would have centered these seven and a half years on Eumenes. Moreover, it is with respect to Eumenes that the surviving sources demonstrate the most uniformity. While the evidence for Hieronymus as the primary source of the information for the period of the Successors is circumstantial, it does appear compelling. This would make Hieronymus responsible, not

¹⁹⁰ See Seel, *Epitoma*, xiii–xiv.

only for the description of events, but also for the focus of the narrative, the selection of materials, and the characterizations of the principle individuals. Given the likelihood that Diodorus has abbreviated Hieronymus's work with little addition, it can be concluded that Hieronymus provided a detailed and a factually accurate work, but one with definite biases, especially with regard to his fellow-countryman Eumenes. In many respects that section of his history would have been an *apologia*.¹⁹¹

¹⁹¹ Hadley ("Lost source," 3–33) has collected those passages in the surviving sources that suggest just such a purpose.

CHAPTER TWO

FROM CARDIA TO BABYLON

Eumenes, the son of Hieronymus (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 7), was born in 361 B.C.E. in Cardia in the Thracian Chersonese.¹ Beyond this little is known of his life prior to the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C.E. Our major source for this latter period, Hieronymus, was not writing biography, but a history of post-Alexandrine events,² and this is reflected in Diodorus, Nepos, and Plutarch, where little of Eumenes' activities before 323 is mentioned. The information that does survive is found principally in Plutarch's *Life of Eumenes*.³

Plutarch presents two accounts of the origin of Eumenes' association with the Macedonian court, one of which comes from Duris of Samos and relates that Eumenes was the son of a poor carter whose athletic prowess so impressed the Macedonian king that he was immediately taken into Philip's entourage (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 1-2).⁴

¹ Eumenes died in the winter of 315 (see chapter 6), having served the Macedonian royal house since he was 19; he served Alexander for 13 years (Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 13. 1); Philip for seven (Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 13. 1).

² See chapter 1.

³ Nepos offers nothing additional. It is possible that Plutarch used Nepos's *Life of Eumenes* as one of his sources (C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971] 106).

⁴ There was even a tradition that Eumenes was the son of an impoverished funeral-musician (Ael. *VH* 12. 43). Ptolemy, also, is described as having risen from the ranks of the infantry (Just. 13. 4. 10); Antigonos, born of a laborer (Ael. *VH* 12. 43), and Lysimachus, the son of a Thessalian (*FGrH* 260 F-3). Certainly in the case of Ptolemy the evidence is clear that he came from the upper echelons of Macedonian society (cf. Curt. 9. 8. 22; Paus. 1. 6. 2). Many of these rags-to-riches metamorphoses most likely derive from Duris of Samos (see chapter 1). Certain modern historians have combined a number of sources to urge that the description of Lysimachus as a Thessalian is correct, even though both Pausanias (1. 9. 5) and Justin (15. 3. 1) describe him as Macedonian by birth, and Plutarch implies the same (cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 44. 6) (see H. S. Lund, *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship* [London and New York: Routledge, 1992] 2). Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F-81 = Athen. 6. 259F-261A) in a general account of the depravity of Philip II's "friends" states that a certain Agathocles who commanded troops under Philip was formerly a Thessalian slave. Lysimachus's father's and son's names were Agathocles (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 3; Plut. *Demetr.* 31. 4, 46. 9). However, neither Theopompus, nor any other author, makes a connection between the former Thessalian slave and Agathocles, the father of Lysimachus. Further, Lysimachus in

Plutarch, however, to his credit, rejects Duris's fanciful anecdote for the more reasonable report that the connection was the result of a tie of guest-friendship between Eumenes' father, Hieronymus, a prominent Cardian, and Philip (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 3; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 1. 4).⁵

Other information concerning Eumenes' background must come from an analysis of the history of his home city, Cardia, in the fourth century B.C.E. The friendship between Philip and Eumenes' father probably indicates that the latter was one who early came to see the Macedonian king as the ascendant force in the north. These attachments to the Macedonian monarch were predicated on Cardian fear of Athenian power in the region. While Cardia's early history was closely linked to Athens, most of her history since the Peloponnesian War had been as an independent state. Cardia, established originally in the seventh century B.C.E., jointly by Miletus and Clazomenae (Str. 7. fig. 51), was refounded in 560 by Miltiades and the Athenians (Hdts. 6. 34–36), but this new foundation included many Thracian settlers (Hdts. 6. 36, cf. 41). In 493, the city became tributary to the Persians (Hdts. 9. 115; cf. Hdts. 6. 41),⁶ but fell back under Athenian domination in 466 (Plut. *Cim.* 14. 1). Cardia gained its complete independence with the collapse of the Athenian Empire at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War,⁷ and even though the Chersonese was granted to the Athenians in the King's Peace of 371 (Dem. 9. 16), this was done in name only. Cardia maintained her independence against Athenian encroachment primarily by establishing alliances with various Thracian dynasts, the last of whom was Cersobleptes, the king of the Odrysian Thracians. But in 353, Cersobleptes formed an alliance with the Athenians, ceding the Chersonese to them, excepting Cardia,⁸ which remained his inde-

his struggle against Pyrrhus described the latter as a "foreigner, whose ancestors had always been subject to Macedonia" (Plut. *Pyrr.* 12. 6). On the correctness of identifying Lysimachus's ancestors as noble Macedonians, see I. L. Merker, "Lysimachus—Macedonian or Thessalian," *Chiron* 9 (1979): 31–5.

⁵ Nepos (*Eum.* 1. 2–3) states that Eumenes "was of the highest birth" in his native Cardia.

⁶ See E. Oberhummer, "Kardia," *RE* 10, col. 1932; W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928; reprinted Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 2:75.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 2; 3. 2. 8–10; Andoc. 3. 15.

⁸ Dem. 9. 16; Diod. 16. 34. 4; see T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece* (London and New York: Published for the University of Hull by the Oxford University Press, 1965) 128.

pendent ally, and Athenian cleruchs were dispatched to the region.⁹ Cardian fear of and hostility towards Athens had forged this alliance with the Thracians. Now, dreading that, even though they were still independent, their Thracian protector might no longer be willing or able to safeguard their interests, they allied themselves with Philip of Macedonia.¹⁰ Philip's Thracian campaign of 352 had established him as a force in eastern Thrace primarily at the expense of Cersobleptes,¹¹ and had led to the alliance between himself and Cardia.¹² It may have been during this campaign that Eumenes' father established his friendship with Philip. In the Peace of Philocrates in 346, Cardia was recognized as an ally of the Macedonian king, and this allied status apparently continued through the reign of Alexander the Great.¹³

In 342, the then nineteen-year old Eumenes (Nepos *Eum.* 13. 1) passed into Philip's service either shortly before, or during the latter's Thracian campaign of that year.¹⁴ While the exact circumstances of this attachment are unknown, there are certain indications. Probably by 342 Cardia was in the hands of a tyrant, Eumenes' father was deceased, and Eumenes himself had been exiled. The exact date for the establishment of the tyranny is unknown. But in 323, despite Eumenes' prominence at the Macedonian court, Hecataeus, an old foe of the former's family, is found ruling Cardia as "tyrant" (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3; cf. Diod. 18. 14. 4). While the date for the creation of the tyranny can only be guessed, it must have come into being sometime after 346, but before 338. In Philip's and Demosthenes' letters

⁹ Diod. 16. 34. 4; Dem. 23. 181-2, cf. 168, 175.

¹⁰ The Cardians and the Athenian cleruchs were engaged in violent clashes as late as 342 ([Dem.] 7. 41-44).

¹¹ On this campaign, see J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976) 80, 87.

¹² Diod. 16. 34. 4; Dem. 23. 181; N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 2:264-6; Ellis, *Philip II*, 80-1; N. G. L. Hammond, *Philip of Macedon* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) 50.

¹³ Dem. 5. 25; 19. 158, 174; [Dem.] 12. 11.

¹⁴ By Philip's death in 336, Eumenes had served the Macedonian monarch for seven years (Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 13. 1). By counting inclusively, Eumenes would have begun his service with the Macedonian king in 342. Philip's Thracian campaign began in May or early June (G. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* [London and Boston: Faber & Faber, 1978] 187). Philip also sent troops to defend Cardia from Athenian action in the spring of 341 (Dem. 8. 58; 10. 60). On this campaign: Dem. 5. 25; 8. 2-3, 7-9, 58; 9. 16; [Dem.] 7. 43; [Philip] 12. 3. Ellis (*Philip II*, 284 n. 39) believes that it was during the 342 campaign that Philip first met Eumenes in Cardia.

prior to 346 there are references to the Cardian people in a decision making capacity,¹⁵ and Demosthenes, while discussing various provisions of the Peace of Philocrates, refers to the “Cardians,” not to Hecataeus, as Philip’s allies (Dem. 19. 174). These indications suggest that Hecataeus had not come to power prior to the Peace of Philocrates. The *terminus post quem* derives from a provision of the League of Corinth, which stated that the governments in place in the respective Greek states at the time of the peace were to be retained ([Dem.] 17. 7, 10).¹⁶ Alexander himself cited this provision in reestablishing the tyranny in Messene ([Dem.] 17. 7, cf. 17. 4).¹⁷ While this was apparently not always the case, it is likely that the author of *On the Treaty with Alexander* would have alluded to such a transgression committed by Philip in his listing of Alexander’s violations ([Dem.] 17. 7–8, 10). It is, therefore, likely that the tyranny was established before the establishment of the League of Corinth.¹⁸ A date for the beginning of Hecataeus’ rule within this range would also explain why Eumenes’ would not have been able to use his influence, which during the latter part of Philip’s reign and throughout that of Alexander’s was considerable, to prevent Hecataeus from coming to power. In the late 340s, with increasing Persian interest in the area and discontent appearing in the ranks of Philip’s Hellenistic allies,¹⁹ Philip would not have been displeased if a Macedonian puppet came to power in Cardia. Typical polis gov-

¹⁵ Dem. 7. 41, 43–44; 10. 18; 19. 174; 23. 175, 183; [Dem.] 12. 11.

¹⁶ Cf. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 625.

¹⁷ Even though tyrannies were overthrown in Asia by Alexander, these represented different situations in that the tyrannies were established by and gave their support to the Persians (see A. J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks: The Epigraphic Evidence* [Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1980] 58–71).

¹⁸ J. Hornblower (*Hieronymus of Cardia* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981] 8–9) suggests that Hecataeus seized power “in the period of uncertainty following the assassination of Philip.” While as shown, this is unlikely, a certain Hecateus was dispatched by Alexander soon after Philip’s death to secure the assassination of Attalus (Diod. 17. 2. 5–6, 5. 2). While H. Berve (*Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* [Munich: Beck, 1926; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1973] 2:148 [#292]) dismisses the possibility that this is the later tyrant, there is no real evidence one way or the other. The name Hecateus, however, is not unknown amongst native Macedonians (see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:149 [#293], and W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire* [London and New York: Routledge, 1992], 292; M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings* [Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity, National Hellenic Research Foundation; Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1996] 2:105 [#91, line 3]).

¹⁹ See Ellis, *Philip II*, 168–179.

ernment was always a dangerous proposition in a dependent ally, and given Philip's future plans, he required control of the entire Chersonese along with as much of the opposite Asiatic coast as possible.²⁰ By 346, Philip was already treating Cardia as under his personal control, granting all of the land north of Agora to one Apollonides of Cardia ([Dem.] 7. 39; cf. 7. 44; Dem. 8. 64). It is very possible that the association of Eumenes with the Macedonian court and the creation of the Cardian tyranny are both to be dated in 342.

As to the other suppositions regarding the circumstances surrounding Eumenes' association with the Macedonian court, i.e. his being in exile and his father dead, Plutarch in his *Life of Sertorius* (1. 5) states that Eumenes, like the Roman Sertorius, had been exiled from his home country. Exile would be very plausible, if Hecataeus, a family enemy, were in power. Given that Eumenes' father was a prominent Cardian and the guest-friend of Philip himself, the most probable explanation for Eumenes' exile and the tyranny is that Hieromymus was dead. As an exile, Eumenes would have availed himself of his father's friendship with the Macedonian king to seek refuge at the Macedonian court (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 1. 3).

Eumenes joined Philip and soon became that monarch's personal secretary (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 5). This position was apparently a new one created by Philip.²¹ While an argument from silence, there is no record of any earlier royal secretary prior to Eumenes. Not a great deal is known of the infrastructure of the Macedonian state either before or during Philip's reign, but there does not appear to have been much governmental structure present. Indeed, the evidence suggests that there was little Macedonian bureaucracy in any period of Macedonian history. Macedonian communities were apparently granted great autonomy with respect to local affairs.²²

²⁰ Given the dominance of the Persian fleet in the Aegean, Philip needed to control as much of the coasts on both sides of the Hellespont as possible, if he wished to cross to Asia successfully. Contemporary warships were not able to stand off a coast in blockade; they would remain on land or in harbor until enemy action was observed, then they would attempt to intercept their adversaries. Obviously, for a blockade to be successful the blockading fleet had to control the land close to the point of embarkation or landing (in general, see E. M. Anson, "The Persian Fleet in 334," *Classical Philology* 84 [1989]: 45-9).

²¹ Hammond (in N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988] 3:18) states that Eumenes came to Macedonia as "a junior secretary." This premise is based on the belief that Macedonia had long had a royal secretariat, but see note 24.

²² At one time it was believed that Macedonia had an elaborate bureaucracy in

Taxes and state monopolies, such as timber exports, harbor dues, and mining, were farmed out to individuals.²³ Philip evidently adopted the idea for a formal secretariat and an archive from the Persian court.²⁴ As Philip's power grew, so did Eumenes' importance. From his position in Philip's court, he created a Macedonian chancellery which carried on an extensive correspondence with the Greek states.²⁵ During the reign of Philip's son Alexander, Eumenes was the head of an imperial chancellery which operated as the nerve center for the growing domains under the control of that Macedonian monarch.²⁶

While Eumenes' position in the Macedonian court lacked the prestige of a military command, it possessed a great deal of inherent power. As contemporaries emphasize, in Macedonia the king was the kingdom.²⁷ Isocrates (5. 107-108) notes that Macedonia was subject to the rule of "one man," and Demosthenes (1. 4) comments that Philip is the sole director of his policy, "uniting the roles of general,

place in the cities of the realm (M. Holleaux, "Remarques sur une inscription de Thessalonique," in *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques*, edited by M. Holleaux, and L. Robert [Paris: E. de Boccard, 1939] 1:270), but Hatzopoulos (*Institutions*, 1:66-9, 101-3, 381-93, 411, 426-29) has shown that the cities both in Lower and Upper Macedonia were governed by local officials under the general authority of the king. See Chapter 7.

²³ Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 1:434-5; E. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 54-7, 237-8.

²⁴ See D. Kienast, *Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden* (Munich: Wilhem Fink Publisher, 1973) 7-37. N. G. L. Hammond's claim ("The Royal Journal of Alexander," *Historia* 37 [1988]: 134; Hammond and Walbank, *Macedonia*, 3:18) that a sophisticated chancellery and archive was in place at least as early as the reign of Alexander I, is highly doubtful; the Athenian state only created a state archive some time between 409 and 405 (A. L. Boegehold, "The Establishment of a Central Archive at Athens," *AJA* 76 [1972]: 23-30).

²⁵ See P. Goukowsky, *Essai sur les origines des mythes d'Alexandre: 336-270 av. J.C.* (Nancy: Université de Nancy, 1978) 13.

²⁶ In general, see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 1:43.

²⁷ While the evidence for autocracy would appear to be overwhelming, many argue that it was compromised by the power of a Macedonian national assembly to elect kings and judge cases of treason. First put forth by F. Granier (*Die makedonische Heeresversammlung: Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht* [Munich: Beck, 1931] 18-19, 25-31), the position has in recent years been supported with modifications by N. G. L. Hammond (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:161-2; cf. L. Mooren, "The Nature of the Hellenistic Monarchy," *Studia Hellenistica* 27 [1983]: 205-240; Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 261-322). For the position that no such assembly existed, see P. Goukowsky, "Antigone, Alexandre et l'assemblée macédonienne (336-270 av. J.-C.)," *RPhil* 49 (1975): 263-77; R. M. Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," *Chiron* 8 (1978): 77-133; E. M. Anson, "Macedonia's Alleged Constitutionalism," *CJ* 80 (1985): 303-16; "The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly," *Historia* 40 (1991): 230-47.

ruler, and treasurer.” Indeed, as G. T. Griffith, in *A History of Macedonia* explains, there was simply no government apart from the king.²⁸ The king on his own authority determined what taxes and services were owed; controlled foreign policy; formed alliances with foreign states; declared war and made peace,²⁹ was commander-in-chief of the armies,³⁰ controlled the mines and forests,³¹ served as the chief religious official,³² transferred populations from one place to another;³³ including adding to the population of existing cities,³⁴ and founded cities.³⁵ Even a king’s regent appears to have had such broad authority.³⁶ Yet, as noted, there was hardly any governmental bureaucracy. A king’s personal secretary was, consequently, secretary for the entire realm. He was privy to all written communications and probably

²⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:384.

²⁹ See Anson, “Constitutionism,” 304.

³⁰ Borza, *Shadow*, 238.

³¹ See *Ibid.*, 56–7, 238. Hatzopoulos (*Institutions*, 1:431–435) argues that the king was only the trustee of the “people’s” money. Even if this were technically true, there is no evidence of any regulatory body overseeing or disciplining the king.

³² Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:155–6.

³³ J. R. Ellis, “Population-transplants under Philip II,” *Makedonika* 9 (1969): 9–12. Apparently, kings made these movements without consulting the populations concerned. While Justin (8. 5. 7–13) records the general dissatisfaction of those forced to move from their homes and the “tombs of their ancestors,” he also notes that no protest formal or otherwise was forthcoming from the people. In fact, Justin emphasizes that the desolation of the population was expressed by “silent dejection” only, for fear that any outward sign of displeasure might show displeasure and risk reprisal. Similar sentiments were expressed with respect to the movement of the population from the “chief cities” to Emathia and their replacement by Thracians and “barbarians” during the reign of Philip V (Polyb. 23. 10. 4–7).

³⁴ Philip II did this frequently with recently conquered cities (Dem. 18. 182), but he also dramatically increased the population of Pella (Str. 7. frg. 20), a long-standing Macedonian city. Justin (8. 6. 1) relates that Philip even supplemented the population of the cities with prisoners of war.

³⁵ When Philip captured the city of Crenides in 356 (Diod. 16. 8. 6), he refounded it as Philippi (See Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:358). He founded other cities elsewhere in Thrace, in western Lyncestis and Pelagonia, and in Bisaltia (see N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972] 1:143, 173, 199–200, 204; *Macedonia*, 2:652–7; A. B. West, *The History of the Chalcidic League* [Chicago, 1973, repr. Madison, Wis., 1912 ed.] 131 n. 37, and 134). Alexander, according to Plutarch (*Mor.* 328E), founded 70 cities. Even by Fraser’s pruning of supposed foundations, still after Alexandria in Egypt, Alexander created Alexandrias in Aria, Susiane, in Sogdiana, and two in the territory of the Oreitaeans (P. M. Fraser, *Cities of Alexander the Great* [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996] 201).

³⁶ As heir and regent for his father, Alexander in 340 crushed a rebellion by the Thracian Maedians, expelled them from their city, and refounded it as Alexandropolis and settled it with a “mixed population” (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 1).

possessed the right to screen all incoming correspondence. Certainly after Alexander's conquests in Asia much of the day-to-day running of this vast empire was directly in Eumenes' hands. Many noble-born Macedonians learned the necessity of obtaining his favor, even though they thought such a bureaucratic position personally beneath them.³⁷ Eumenes was also connected personally to both Philip and Alexander. In Macedonia most of the government was formed from the king's *hetairoi*, his companions.³⁸ They acted as the king's ambassadors, military commanders, governors, religious representatives, and personal advisers. These *hetairoi* formed, apart from the king, the basic political institution of the Macedonian state. Their relationship, however, with the king was regarded by them as personal, not institutional. The *hetairoi* were formally tied to the monarch by religious and social bonds; they sacrificed, hunted, drank, and fought with the king. While the vast majority of these individuals were native Macedonians from prominent families, many were not, but rather foreigners attracted to Macedonia by the direct invitation of the king (*FGrH* 115 F-224). Foreign *hetairoi* would be given large tracts of land by the king (cf. *Athen.* 6. 77 [261A]). Of the 84 individuals identified as members of Alexander the Great's *hetairoi*, nine were Greeks.³⁹ Eumenes was an *hetairos* of both Philip and Alexander.⁴⁰

In addition to his ties to Philip, Eumenes was closely associated

³⁷ Nepos *Eum.* 1. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6; 20. 6. Eumenes "friends" included Craterus (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 4), Peucestas (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 9), Antigonus (Diod. 18. 41. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 5), Leonnatus (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3. 10) and Olympias, Alexander's mother (Diod. 18. 58. 2).

³⁸ In general, see G. J. Stagakis, *Institutional Aspects of the Hetairos Relation* (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1962) 53–67; Berve, *Alexanderreich* 1:30–7, 104–12. On the nature of the Macedonian state, see chapter 7.

³⁹ Stagakis, *Aspects*, 79–87.

⁴⁰ While the exact meaning of terms φίλος, φίλια, *amicus*, *amicitia*, used by our sources is not always clear, it is fairly certain when the *hetairos* relationship is meant or simply the colloquial meaning of friend and friendship. Nepos (*Eum.* 1. 6) states that Eumenes had a "friendship" (*amicitia*) with Philip, a "friendship" which was continued with Alexander. While Nepos in his use of the terms *amicitia* and *amicus* does not always use them in the technical sense of *hetairos*, or always accurately (in his *On Kings* 3. 1, Demetrius, the son of Antigonos, is called an *amicus* of Alexander's, when clearly he was not), in the case of Eumenes, *hetairos* is the correct meaning. In general, Nepos uses the terms to refer to more than a mere acquaintance (*Eum.* 3. 1, 4. 4, 11. 2, 12. 3). Moreover, Nepos (*Eum.* 1. 6) states that this was a relationship which Eumenes also possessed with Alexander, and Eumenes was clearly one of Alexander's *hetairoi* (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 4. 4–6; Diod. 17. 107. 6; 20. 109. 7; in general see G. S. Stagakis, "Observations on the *Hetairoi* of Alexander the Great," *Ancient Macedonia. Papers read at the first international symposium held in Thessaloniki, August*

with Alexander's mother Olympias (Diod. 18. 58. 2).⁴¹ Macedonian royal women, at least beginning with Eurydice, Philip's mother, often played influential roles at court.⁴² Olympias like Eumenes was an emigre to Macedonia, having come from Epirus.⁴³ In 337, she had left Macedonia due to a family rift occasioned by Philip's marriage to a noble Macedonian girl.⁴⁴ While royal polygamy was customary and Philip had several other wives primarily to cement alliances with Macedonia's neighbors,⁴⁵ this new marriage had serious political overtones. The bride, Cleopatra, was the niece of Attalus, a prominent member of the Macedonian nobility.⁴⁶ At the marriage feast, a drunken Attalus prayed "... that from Philip and Cleopatra there

26-29, 1968, edited by B. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1970) 98 n. 40.

⁴¹ Even though the evidence for this association comes from the period after Alexander's death, where the information on Eumenes is more plentiful, still the origins of this friendship are to be found during Philip's reign. After 334 Olympias and Eumenes were separated by considerable distance, and the friendship, then, could only have arisen by correspondence. While this is not impossible, it is unlikely. It is also possible, though again doubtful, that the closeness developed in the less than two-year period between Philip's assassination in 336 and the departure of Alexander's expedition for Asia in 334, Olympias having been in self-imposed exile for the year prior to Philip's death (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 11).

⁴² See E. Carney, "Foreign Influence and the Changing Role of Royal Macedonian Women," in *Ancient Macedonia V. Papers read at the Fifth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, October 10-15, 1989* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993) 313-15, 322-3; on the role of Macedonian royal women in general, see Carney, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000).

⁴³ In general, see E. Carney, "Olympias," *Ancient Society* 18 (1987): 35-62.

⁴⁴ On the date of this marriage see M. B. Hatzopoulos, "A Reconsideration of the Pixodaras Affair," *Studies in the History of Art* 10 (1982): 61-2. Ellis (*Philip II*, 212-13) is quite correct when he argues that this new marriage occasioned no divorce from Olympias, or change in Alexander's status. Olympias was "queen" only in the sense that she was the mother of Philip's recognized heir (see Carney, "Olympias," 42-3). Her status had come initially from the importance of the Epirote alliance, but then Philip's other wives cemented political alliances as well. While the Larisan Philinna had given Philip a son prior to the birth of Alexander (Ellis, *Philip II*, 61), this son, Arrhidaeus, was unfit for rule, either because of genetic malformation or through deliberate injury (Plut. *Alex.* 77. 8; *Mor.* 337D). Olympias' position in Macedonia was dictated in the final analysis by her son's position and her son's concern for her. As Grace Macurdy (*Hellenistic Queens: A Study of Woman-power in Macedonia, Seleucid Syria, and Ptolemaic Egypt* [Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press; Oxford and London: Oxford University Press, 1932] 13) long ago recognized, Macedonia proper was patriarchal; a woman's position here, unlike in later Hellenistic Egypt, was dependent on her male relations.

⁴⁵ Philip was also married to Phila from the upper Macedonian canton of Elimiotis, Audata from Illyria, Philinna and Nicesipolis from Thessaly, and Meda from the Getae, a people on Macedonia's northern border (Athen. 13. 557B-E).

⁴⁶ Diod. 16. 93. 7, 9; 17. 2. 3; Plut. *Alex.* 9. 7.

might be born a legitimate successor to the kingdom" (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 7–8; Athen. 13. 557D). The inference is either that Philip was not Alexander's father, or that, since Alexander's mother was from Epirus, Alexander was not truly Macedonian.⁴⁷ In any case, this remark led to an altercation between Alexander and his father with Alexander and Olympias subsequently leaving Macedonia for Illyria and Epirus respectively (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 10–11); Alexander's voluntary exile was brief, but Olympias did not return during Philip's lifetime (Plut. *Alex.* 9. 14). She only came back upon her son's accession to the throne. Once again in Macedonia she moved quickly against her enemies, murdering Cleopatra and her infant daughter by Philip (Paus. 8. 7. 7; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 10. 7). Olympias would correspondingly have rewarded her friends. Her later reference to Eumenes as "the most faithful of my friends" (Diod. 18. 58. 2) probably reflects her response to Eumenes' loyalty during this period of difficulty. Alexander, also, eliminated those who might threaten his position. In particular, he had Attalus murdered.⁴⁸ It is doubtful that Eumenes would have enjoyed Alexander's confidence, if he had not proven his loyalty to Alexander during this episode. Eumenes would certainly have supported the more cosmopolitan Alexander, as opposed to a traditional Macedonian noble. But his support was muted; his position at the Macedonian court was entirely dependent on Philip's continued trust. Eumenes from later evidence was very capable of straddling both sides of a dispute. In the civil strife that arose in Babylon after Alexander's death, Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 1) reports that Eumenes was of one opinion, but served as a "friend" to both sides. His acceptance of Alexander as Philip's heir on the latter's death would have been immediate.

While Eumenes was careful in his relationship with the monarch and cultivated many powerful friends at court, he also incurred the enmity of others. It was during Philip's reign that Eumenes aroused the hostility of Antipater (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 8),⁴⁹ one of Philip's generals

⁴⁷ Olympias was rumored to have been guilty of infidelity (Plut. *Alex.* 2. 5–7). If the comment referred to Olympias' ethnicity, it would be a peculiar remark, since Philip's mother Eurydice was Illyrian (Ellis, *Philip II*, 42, and especially his discussion in note 98). A. B. Bosworth (*Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988] 21) suggests that the comment referred both to Olympias' Epirote origins and her alleged infidelity.

⁴⁸ Diod. 17. 2. 4–6, 5. 1–2; Curt. 7. 1. 3.

⁴⁹ In this passage Eumenes states that Antipater "had long hated him." As noted

and later Alexander's Macedonian regent.⁵⁰ While the cause of this enmity is unstated, it may have arisen directly from Eumenes' ties to Olympias. It is obvious from later evidence that Antipater and Olympias were hostile to one another.⁵¹ But it is equally possible that the rift developed over Antipater's support for Hecataeus in Cardia. Antipater had campaigned often in Thrace and may have in some way been responsible for Hecataeus coming to power.⁵² Hecataeus later served as an emissary for Antipater (Diod. 18. 14. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 6–8). It is unlikely that this disagreement extended much beyond that of clashing personalities. As will be seen, among the inner circle rifts were personal in nature. Antipater had friends in Cardia, who were rivals to Eumenes' faction; Eumenes supported Olympias, who hated Antipater.

On Philip's death Eumenes passed smoothly into Alexander's service (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6). The ease of the transition came both from Alexander's need to maintain Philip's chancellery without interruption, and undoubtedly from Alexander's recognition of Eumenes' loyalty to himself and his mother. This loyalty, a theme so prominent in the sources,⁵³ was, as shown,⁵⁴ based entirely on self-interest. Apart from the monarch Eumenes was without a power base. Eumenes did not possess hereditary lands and the family powers which went with such possession.⁵⁵ While Eumenes probably received land in Lower Macedonia from Philip, there was no way the king could manufacture blood ties for him.⁵⁶ Native-born Macedonian nobles were *hetairoi* because of their inherited position and power;

earlier with respect to Eumenes' friendship with Olympias, it is doubtful that such passions could have been kindled during Eumenes' time in Asia with Alexander.

⁵⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 3; Diod. 17. 17. 5, 118. 1; 18. 12. 1; Curt. 4. 1. 39; Just. 11. 7. 1.

⁵¹ Plut. *Alex.* 68. 4, 77. 1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 5.

⁵² See Ellis, *Philip II*, 103, 110.

⁵³ Diod. 18. 53. 7, 58. 4, 60. 3; 19. 42. 5, 44. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4, 3. 14, 12. 3, 13. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 6. 3, 13. 3.

⁵⁴ See Chapter 1.

⁵⁵ cf. W. K. Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968) 25–32, 47–8, 53–68. In general, see Chapter 8.

⁵⁶ Both foreign and native *hetairoi* were typically endowed with large tracts of land in Lower Macedonia (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:352–3, 409–10). While this is not specifically stated with regard to Eumenes, it is likely. Granting estates was also a common practice of the Hellenistic monarchs (see R. A. Billows, *Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism*, *Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition*, vol. 22 [Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1995] 111–45).

Greeks became powerful in Macedonia because of their being made *hetairoi* of the king.

Eumenes remained in Alexander's service for thirteen years; his position terminated only on the latter's death in 323 (Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 13. 1). During most of Alexander's reign Eumenes' responsibilities were, as they had been with Philip, those of royal secretary (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4), but as Alexander's expedition moved ever deeper into the Persian Empire, the complexity and sophistication of the chancellery grew. Certainly after the deaths of first Darius and then the usurper Bessus, when Alexander as the "Great King" began to implement Persian practices into his court, it is likely that the chancellery became increasingly Persian in its sophistication. Eumenes was now clearly in charge of a large and growing department. It was probably at this time that the custom of recording the daily activities of Alexander was introduced. The chronicles of the Persian kings had been kept from perhaps as early as the reign of the founder of the Persian Empire, Cyrus the Great.⁵⁷ This daily diary, or *Ephemerides*, was edited and published after both Alexander's and Eumenes' deaths probably by an otherwise unknown Diodotus.⁵⁸ While the *Ephemerides* do not survive, parts of the published version were used by the surviving Alexander historians primarily in their accounts of the king's last days.⁵⁹

Eumenes' influence with Alexander went well beyond that of his position as head of the royal secretariat. At Susa in 324, Eumenes with 100 other *hetairoi* was married in a joint ceremony along with Alexander to a noble Persian woman.⁶⁰ Moreover, his prominence at court can easily be seen in his rivalries. Eumenes and Hephaestion were constantly in collision. Their disagreements were again not based on differences in policy, but rather reflect personal antagonisms with their recorded quarrels stemming from trivial causes. Two specific controversies are mentioned in the sources. The first concerns Hephaestion's assignment to another of quarters already taken

⁵⁷ Esther 2:23, 6. 1, 10. 2; Ezra 4:15; cf. Hdts. 8. 85. 3, 90. 4.

⁵⁸ On this contentious issue, see E. M. Anson, "The Ephemerides of Alexander the Great," *Historia* 45 (1996): 501–504, for the full argumentation of the above position and a bibliography of the controversy.

⁵⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 7. 25. 1–26. 3 = *FGrH* 117 F-3a; Plut. *Alex.* 76 = *FGrH* 117 F-3b; Ael. *VH* 3. 23 = *FGrH* 117 F-2a.

⁶⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 7. 4. 4–8; Diod. 17. 107. 6; Curt. 10. 3. 11–12; Just. 12. 10. 10; Plut. *Mor.* 329 E-F.

up for Eumenes.⁶¹ The second was an argument about a gift (Plut. *Eum.* 2. 8). Eumenes was always careful not to permit these animosities to become so severe as to threaten his relationship with Alexander. Hephaestion after all was Alexander's closest companion, his proclaimed "second-self."⁶² Arrian (*Anab.* 7. 13. 1) relates that Eumenes was willing to patch up his disagreements with Hephaestion, even though the latter was reluctant to do the same. It should be mentioned that Eumenes' problems with Hephaestion were not unique. Craterus, likewise, often found himself at odds with Hephaestion (Plut. *Alex.* 47. 9–12). When Hephaestion died, Eumenes to counteract any possible hostile reaction from Alexander on account of the earlier problems, lavished praise and honor on the dead Hephaestion. He even freely contributed to the construction of the latter's tomb.⁶³

There is little evidence that these struggles among the leaders were based on policy. They appear to be almost entirely personal in nature. Even though Hephaestion and Craterus took opposite sides with regard to the Persianization of Alexander's court, Plutarch emphasizes that the two clashed primarily due to their jealousy of one another's closeness to Alexander (Plut. *Alex.* 47. 11). Indeed, they acted in concert in bringing about the downfall of another insider, Philotas (Curt. 6. 8. 2–9; 11. 11). While Eumenes' "friendship" with Craterus (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 4) coupled with his difficulties with Hephaestion might be seen as evidence for Eumenes' support for Craterus's position on Persianization, it must be noted that Eumenes was also Peucestas's "friend" (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 9), and Peucestas was one of the strongest supporters of Persianization (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 30. 2–3). Indeed, Philotas, whose death was brought about chiefly by Craterus, was, like Craterus himself, opposed to Persianization.⁶⁴ Eumenes and Antigonus are listed as friends,⁶⁵ but Antigonus and Antipater, Eumenes' adversary, were φίλοι as well (Diod. 18. 23. 3). Yet, while Craterus and Antipater were friends and connected by marriage, the evidence suggests that the relationship between Craterus and Antipater's "friend" Antigonus was not close.⁶⁶ Plutarch's statement

⁶¹ Plut. *Eum.* 2. 1–2; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 13. 1, 14. 9.

⁶² Arr. *Anab.* 2. 12. 7; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 47. 10.

⁶³ Arr. *Anab.* 7. 14. 8–9; Plut. *Eum.* 2. 9–10.

⁶⁴ See G. J. Stagakis, "Observations," 98.

⁶⁵ Diod. 18. 41. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 5; Just. 14. 4. 21.

⁶⁶ P. Briant, *Antigone le Borgne: Les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'Assemblée*

that in 320, Craterus wished to make Eumenes Antipater's friend instead of the old regent's enemy, and not himself become Eumenes' enemy (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6), coupled with Eumenes' grief at Craterus's death (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 13; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 4), certainly demonstrates that "friendship" could indicate a strong personal bond.

However, there is also a formal and ceremonial aspect present as well. In 319, Eumenes and Antigonus "renewed their friendship," with outward and physical signs of affection (Diod. 18. 41. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 5). Thus a "friendship" could also be another name for a political alliance. This latter aspect of "friendship" is clear in this incident, for Eumenes required that Antigonus's nephew Ptolemy be given up as a hostage to ensure Eumenes' safe return from this conference with "his old friend" (Plut. *Eum.* 10. 5). These relationships were then multi-faceted and often predicated on self-interest. They most often do not represent differences of policy, nor do they always represent clear-cut rivalries tied to particular personalities. While alliances did periodically come into existence to further particular policies, and certainly among junior officers there probably was a tendency to form attachments to individual leaders, with those referred to by Quintus Curtius in his *History of Alexander* as *principes*, these alliances were often temporary and self-serving.

While Eumenes' primary duties for Alexander were those of royal secretary, it is apparent that Eumenes' position as adviser and confidant had expanded considerably after Alexander's victory at Gaugamela in 331. He now on occasion undertook minor military and diplomatic missions. Nothing, however, in the sources suggests that during this period these activities were exceptional, either in their military or diplomatic importance, or in their performance. After the capture of the Indian city of Sangala in 326, Eumenes was placed in command of three hundred cavalry and sent to announce the capture to two other rebellious cities.⁶⁷ This expedition was clearly more diplomatic than military in nature.⁶⁸ Eumenes' appointment as commander of Perdikkas's former hipparchy of the companion cavalry,

macédonienne, *Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon* 152. Centre de recherches d'histoire ancienne 10 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973) 184-5.

⁶⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 5. 24. 6-7; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5; Curt. 9. 1. 19.

⁶⁸ Curtius (8. 11. 5) does relate that a "scriba regis" led a light-armed troop against Aornus in India. However, the name of the secretary is given as Myllinas and Arrian (*Anab.* 4. 29. 1) gives the command to Ptolemy.

when that officer was made chiliarch (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6), however, may indicate that Eumenes participated more in the actual warfare than is indicated in the sources. He was later to demonstrate great skill as a cavalry commander. In 322, Eumenes had raised a force of sixty-three hundred Cappadocian cavalry for campaigning in Armenia, where he was most successful (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3-4). In 320, after his infantry had been defeated, Eumenes led his cavalry to victory over Neoptolemus (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5), and his cavalry was responsible for his later triumph over Craterus as well (Diod. 18. 30. 5-32. 1). While in overall command of his forces, Eumenes had personally led a cavalry wing both at Paraetacene (Diod. 19. 28. 3-4) and at Gabene (Diod. 19. 40. 2).

Alexander's death on June 10, 323 B.C.E.⁶⁹ was a major crisis for Eumenes. He still commanded the hipparchy of the companion cavalry, a high honor, but not a command which strengthened his hand during this crisis. The companion cavalry consisted of Macedonian nobles, many of whom would echo Neoptolemus's sentiments regarding Eumenes, expressed after Alexander's death, that the latter was a mere secretary (Plut. *Eum.* 1.6). Eumenes' rise to power was directly tied to his close relations with first Philip and then with Alexander. He had not been one of the battalion commanders with troops accustomed to loyalty and reliance on him. He did not even possess a satrapy. When Alexander was alive, a governorship was not desired, since it meant to be away from court and, consequently, away from the real center of power, but now in the changed circumstances of Alexander's death, a satrapy represented a tangible base of authority. If Eumenes was to retain a measure of his former standing, he would have to follow a very different and opportunistic path. It would be through his political skills that Eumenes would emerge as a major force in the early years of this new age.

⁶⁹ A. J. Sachs, *Late Babylonian Astronomical and related Texts*, copied by T. G. Pinches and J. N. Strassmaier, prepared for publication by A. J. Sachs with the co-operation of J. Schaumberger (Providence: Brown University Press, 1955) no. 209; A. E. Samuel, *Ptolemaic Chronology* (Munich: Beck, 1962) 46-7; L. Schober, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Babyloniens und der Oberen Satrapien von 323-303 v. Chr.* (Frankfurt and Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1981) 48, 50-1. While R. A. Parker and W. H. Dubberstein (*Babylonian Chronology, 626 B.C.E.-C.E.* 75 [Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1956] 19 n. 4) list Alexander's death as occurring on June 13, this is based on their assumption that he died on the first of Simanu, not 29 Aiuru, as Sachs' publication indicates.

CHAPTER THREE

FROM BABYLON TO CAPPADOCIA

Eumenes' opportunity to rectify his difficulties came in the dissension which arose after Alexander's death. Alexander had not provided for a successor. This was not an unusual circumstance in Macedonian history. Disputed successions and civil war had often followed a monarch's death.¹ However, this particular succession crisis possessed a number of features not seen in the earlier struggles. On the death of a monarch Macedonian custom demanded that the notables, the *principes*, or a significant segment of them, meet to select a successor from among the surviving male members of the royal family.² If there was a prominent male member of the family available, and especially present, that individual most often succeeded to the throne.³ The successful candidate would then be produced for a formal public acclamation, which could be before the army, or any important population of Macedonians, such as the inhabitants of Aegae or Pella, the former and the current capitals respectively.⁴ This acclamation was a mere formality.⁵ In Babylon the scene had been set for the conclave of Alexander's senior officers to be followed by an army acclamation.⁶

¹ In general on disputed Macedonian successions, see N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 2:115, 168–71, 180–4, 206, 208.

² That the ruler was to be connected to the Argead family was a given. The religious responsibilities of the monarch and the foreign and mythic origins of the royal family dictated this necessity.

³ See E. M. Anson, "Macedonia's Alleged Constitutionalism," *CJ* 80 (1985): 312. Reigning monarchs could secure the succession for their chosen heir. Antigonos Doson not only selected the future Philip V as his heir, but even preselected his principal advisors (Polyb. 4. 87. 7–8). However, Philip V later attempted to disenfranchise his son Perseus in favor of his nephew Antigonos, but the king died before he was able to acquire sufficient support for his choice, and Perseus, not Antigonos, arrived on the scene first and secured the throne (Livy 40. 54. 3–4, 56. 11, 57. 1).

⁴ Anson, "Constitutionalism," 307–8; R. M. Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," *Chiron* 8 (1978): 99–100.

⁵ Anson, "Constitutionalism," 307–308; "The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330–315 B.C.E.)," *Historia* 40 (1991): 236–7.

⁶ Curtius makes it clear that the meeting to select Alexander's successor was solely for the "principes amicorum ducesque copiarum"; the soldiers assembled, not

Two circumstances, however, intervened to create a very different selection process.

First, there was not an abundance of male members of the Argead royal family available. Alexander had a half-brother, Arrhidaeus, who was mentally deficient,⁷ a three or four-year old son, Heracles, the result of an informal liaison with Barsine, the former wife of Memnon of Rhodes, and the daughter of Artabazus, advisor to Darius and Alexander's former satrap of Bactria;⁸ and the king's Sogdian wife Roxane was pregnant, perhaps, and in fact, as it turned out, with Alexander's son.⁹ Prior to the meeting it seems clear that the commanders had made up their minds to await the birth. There was, however, disagreement concerning the nature of the regency that would rule until the birth and subsequently through the child's minority (cf. Curt. 10. 6. 9, 7. 8–9).¹⁰ Little thought was apparently given to the possibility that the child might not be male, perhaps, because the infant would be male either naturally or otherwise (cf. Curt. 10. 6. 21). The problem with respect to the regency was not insurmountable and probably could have been resolved in conclave. However, before a resolution could be achieved the second factor which made this selection process unique in Macedonian history intervened.

The army in Babylon was not the old Macedonian levy tied solely to the traditions of Macedonia; it was the army that had conquered the Persian Empire. It was now a force more professional than

to select a king, but "cupientium scire in quem Alexandri fortuna esset transitura" (10. 6. 1). Indeed, access was limited to those summoned by name (Curt. 10. 6. 2).

⁷ Diod. 18. 2. 2.; Plut. *Mor.* 337D; Just. 13. 2. 11; 14. 5. 2; App. *Syr.* 52; cf. E. Badian, "The Struggle for the Succession to Alexander the Great," in *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, edited by E. Badian (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964) 264; Arrhidaeus throughout his life is found being led, never leading; for a more favorable view of Arrhidaeus, see W. S. Greenwalt, "The Search for Arrhidaeus," *AncW* 10 (1984): 69–77.

⁸ Barsine had been captured in Damascus by Parmenio and subsequently had become intimate with Alexander (Curt. 3. 13. 14; Plut. *Alex.* 21. 7; Just. 11. 10. 2). Heracles had been the result of this liaison (Curt. 10. 6. 11; Diod. 20. 20. 1). Diodorus lists his age in 310 as seventeen (Justin [15. 2. 3] says fifteen). Tarn ("Heracles, Son of Barsine," *JHS* 41 [1921]: 18–28) rejected Alexander's fatherhood, but see P. A. Brunt, "Alexander, Barsine and Heracles," *RivFil* 103 (1975): 22–34.

⁹ Curt. 10. 6. 9; Just. 13. 2. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 8.

¹⁰ Perdicas is found in charge of the proceedings and his desire was to await the birth of Roxane's child (Curt. 10. 6. 4–9).

national,¹¹ and, as noted by H. W. Parke, "all mercenaries in an emergency [become] a democracy."¹² In the chaos attendant on Alexander's death the soldiers, desirous of information, burst into the meeting and showed a disinclination to leave (Curt. 10. 6. 1-3). Many of these same troops had failed to obey Alexander on the Hyphasis¹³ and had jeered him at Opis,¹⁴ they would not be intimidated by his lieutenants. The deliberations now had to be carried out before an audience possessed of a very vested interest in the outcome. Disagreements about the nature of the regency which were meant to be settled quietly behind closed doors by hard bargaining now had to be played out before this very attentive audience. Nearchus was the first to test the waters with a suggestion, in opposition to the wishes of the *principes*, that Heracles, Alexander's son by Barsine, be given the throne. The troops reacted vocally and angrily (Curt. 10. 6. 12). They were not pleased with Alexander's Persianization of the court;¹⁵ they would not be pleased with a king part Asiatic. Ptolemy next proposed that neither a king nor a specific regent be appointed, but that Alexander's old council be retained and rule collectively (Curt. 10. 6. 15);¹⁶ this was followed by Aristonous's call for Perdiccas to be made king, since Alexander had given him his ring before dying (Curt. 10. 6. 16-17). All suggestions were actively and openly debated by the troops (Curt. 10. 6. 16-18). Indeed, Aristonous's suggestion was widely approved, but Perdiccas hesitated to act and the moment was lost (Curt. 10. 6. 18-20), with the meeting quickly degenerating "in seditionem ac discordiam" (Curt. 10. 7. 1).

In this emerging chaos a virtually unknown individual proposed that the crown be given to Arrhidaeus; this suggestion was soon taken up by Meleager, one of the battalion commanders (Curt. 10.

¹¹ See Chapter 8, and Anson, "Evolution," 230-47; "Discrimination and Eumenes of Cardia," *AncW* 3 (1980): 56-7.

¹² Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933) 119.

¹³ Arr. *Anab.* 5. 25. 1-29. 1; Diod. 17. 93. 2-95. 2; Curt. 9. 2. 1-3. 19; Plut. *Alex.* 62.

¹⁴ Curt. 10. 2. 12-4. 3; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 1-11. 9; Diod. 17. 109. 1-3; Just. 12. 11. 1-12. 12; Plut. *Alex.* 71. 2-9.

¹⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 1-2, 23. 1; Plut. *Alex.* 71.

¹⁶ Ptolemy had probably favored a joint regency prior to the open meeting, but now seeing the reaction of the troops to Nearchus's suggestion of Heracles, decided to forego the regency completely, declaring it would be disgraceful for Macedonians and Greeks to be ruled by Asiatics (Curt. 10. 6. 13-14).

7. 1–2).¹⁷ While this was certainly not the wish of the officers, it quickly became the desire of the massed troops who hailed Arrhidaeus as king under the name of Philip.¹⁸ At this point whatever order that had existed broke down and a riot ensued with the cavalry ranged with the *principes* and the infantry with Meleager and Arrhidaeus.¹⁹ In the chaos which followed the cavalry fled the city and camped outside in the plain (Curt. 10. 7. 16–20).²⁰ In the next few days Eumenes ensured his position in the new order.

Unlike the other *principes*,²¹ excepting Meleager, Eumenes remained

¹⁷ Justin (13. 2. 6–8) associates the introduction of Arrhidaeus solely with Meleager, but his account is a summary of the meeting and not a narrative. Certainly after the “ignotus” made the proposal it was Meleager who dominated the scene (cf. Curt. 10. 7. 7). T. Martin (“Quintus Curtius’ Presentation of Philip Arrhidaeus and Josephus’ Accounts of the Accession of Claudius,” *AJAH* 8 [1983]: 163) argues, however, that Curtius invented the “ignotus.” His position, however, is not convincing. Martin states that it is “inconceivable” that none of the *principes* had previously mentioned Arrhidaeus. However, the reaction of the Macedonian leaders suggests that this omission was quite deliberate (cf. Curt. 10. 7. 4–5); except for Meleager, none of the *principes* subsequently supported Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10. 7. 8; Diod. 18. 2. 1–2; Just. 13. 3. 1). Secondly, Martin believes that an unknown would not have spoken up before the Macedonian leadership. However, in the open proceedings against Philotas, Bolon (Curt. 6. 11. 1), an otherwise unknown individual (H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* [Munich: Beck, 1926; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1973] 2:110 [#218]) addressed the *contio* of soldiers. Moreover, the troops at Opis (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 3) became unruly and spoke out against Alexander himself (Curt. 10. 7. 1), and the soldiers here in Babylon had already shown their boldness by breaking into the meeting and reacting to the various proposals. Under these circumstances certainly an “ignotus” might find the courage to speak up.

¹⁸ Curt. 10. 7. 3–4, 7–15; Just. 13. 2. 6–8; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 1–3.

¹⁹ Curt. 10. 7. 16–19; Just. 13. 3. 3–4.

²⁰ Diodorus (18. 2. 2; cf. 18. 4. 7), in his brief reference to the events which followed Alexander’s death, suggests that Meleager did not intervene at this point and, in fact, initially supported the conclave leaders. According to Diodorus, after the rupture between the cavalry and the infantry, but before the cavalry left Babylon, Meleager was sent as an ambassador by the cavalry leaders to the infantry; he then joined the infantry as their leader. Unfortunately, there is no possibility of reconciling this statement with the replete Curtian description of events. To attempt to do so would necessitate the refutation of Curtius’ whole account of Meleager’s actions in the first riot (Curt. 10. 6. 20–7. 1). It is likely that Diodorus in changing from one source to another and abbreviating radically has become confused (cf. J. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981] 92–3). In Curtius’ account Meleager is initially part of the conclave of *principes*; it was not Meleager who initially brought up Arrhidaeus name, but after the “ignotus” makes the suggestion, it is Meleager who apparently leaves and then returns with Arrhidaeus, who was not initially present (Curt. 10. 7. 7). Diodorus has probably conflated these events into something that never happened (see chapter 1, for a discussion of Diodorus’s methodology).

²¹ Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 2) lists Eumenes as one of the cavalry leaders during this time.

in the city throughout the disorder (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1–2). He stayed ostensibly to mediate, but in actuality to undermine Meleager's control of the infantry. Eumenes' efforts are not made reference to directly, but Diodorus (18. 2. 4) does say that "men most inclined toward conciliation persuaded the parties to come to an agreement." From Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 2) it is known that Eumenes was one such individual.²² Indeed, this latter passage emphasizes Eumenes' role in calming those in the city and making them more disposed to a reconciliation. Eumenes likely used his influence to subvert the infantry's support for Meleager.²³ From later events it would appear that Eumenes was working for Perdiccas. The latter had initially remained in the city when the cavalry left (Curt. 10. 7. 21–8. 4). It may have been while both Eumenes and Perdiccas were in the city that Eumenes proposed to stay and work for Perdiccas's interests.

It is curious that Eumenes verbally based his proclaimed neutrality in the dispute between the infantry and the cavalry on his Cardian birth; "it was not business of his, since he was a stranger, to meddle in disputes of Macedonians" (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1). This was a peculiar position to take, since many others of non-Macedonian origin thought nothing of involving themselves in the quarrel. Nearchus, as indicated, had proposed to the assembled army that Heracles be recognized as Alexander's successor (Curt. 10. 6. 11), and Pasias the Thessalian and Amissus of Megalopolis served as two of the three negotiators for the infantry in the discussions with the cavalry (Curt. 10. 8. 15). The prominence of these latter two individuals, who were most likely commanders of mercenaries,²⁴ indicates that perhaps many

²² Cf. R. M. Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos," *JHS* 90 (1970): 54.

²³ It has been claimed (see E. Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," in *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, edited by B. Barr-Sharrar and E. Borza, *Studies in the History of Art* 10 [Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1982] 41) that Eumenes "could not directly communicate with Macedonian soldiers," since he did not speak "Macedonian." However, Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 1–2, 17. 4–18. 1) and Diodorus (18. 63. 1–5; 19. 25. 2–7) show Eumenes on many different occasions addressing Macedonian troops and being clearly understood by them. Even if there was such a thing as a "Macedonian" language, distinct from a Macedonian dialect of Greek, which is doubtful (see discussion in Chapter 7), Eumenes was obviously fluent in it.

²⁴ Waldemar Heckel in the penguin translation of Curtius (*Quantus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander*; translated by John Yardley; with an introduction and notes by Waldemar Heckel [Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1984] 299 n. 43) suggests that Amissus may be an error for Damis, who was a Megalopolitan veteran of Alexander's campaigns and who conducted the defense of Megalopolis during

Greek mercenaries had joined their Macedonian counterparts and been involved in the initial rioting. Eumenes' statement was an argument which was just sufficiently plausible to permit him to maintain his supposed and very precarious neutrality. After all the leaders of the two opposing camps were members of the native Macedonian aristocracy. While Alexander had many foreign *hetairoi*, his military commanders were almost exclusively native-born aristocrats.²⁵

Eumenes' claim of inferiority was generally accepted by the hereditary Macedonian nobility on the grounds that he neither shared their birth nor their military expertise and experience.²⁶ The regular infantrymen, however, saw these supposed handicaps as without significance when compared with Eumenes' former standing with Philip and Alexander.²⁷ While the great talisman of the first years after the conqueror's death was the name of Alexander,²⁸ the Argead mystique was also very powerful. It led to the raising of Arrhidaeus to the throne, and was responsible for the subsequent attempts by many of the contenders for power to marry Alexander's sister, and Philip's daughter, Cleopatra.²⁹ Antigonos, indeed, later had her mur-

Poliperchon's siege in 318 (Diod. 18. 71. 2). These two Greek negotiators could be from the ranks of the Greek courtiers, but it would appear unlikely. The courtiers were the individuals most supportive of Alexander's Persianization policies (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 10. 5; Plut. *Alex.* 51. 4; 53. 4-6); the very policies the infantry most abhorred (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 2-3). Mercenary units, however, would be led in most cases by their recruiters (see P. Briant, "D'Alexandre le grand aux Diadoques; le cas d'Eumene de Kardia (Suite et fin.)," *REA* 75 [1973]: 56), and these Greek negotiators were probably mercenary commanders.

²⁵ While Eumenes had led cavalry (Arr. *Anab.* 5. 24. 6-7; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5; Curt. 9. 1. 19), including the companion cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6), Erigyios of Mytilene had commanded the allied cavalry (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 6), and Nearchus had led light-armed troops in India (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 30. 6), the great commands were, with the exception of Eumenes' command of the companion cavalry, held during Alexander's reign by native Macedonian aristocrats. Macedonian infantry units were entirely commanded by native Macedonian nobles.

²⁶ See Chapter 8, and Anson, "Discrimination," 58.

²⁷ This attitude is best expressed in Plutarch, *Eumenes*, 1. 6. After Alexander's death Neoptolemus ridiculed Eumenes' lack of military experience. The troops were unimpressed for "they knew that Eumenes had been deemed by Alexander worthy of being related to him by marriage."

²⁸ The political effectiveness of the use of Alexander's name, however, lasted less than a generation (R. M. Errington, "Alexander in the Hellenistic World," in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité: 7 exposés suivis de discussions/par A. B. Bosworth . . . [et al.], avec la participation de Denis van Berchem . . . [et al.]; entretiens préparés par E. Badian, présidés par Denis van Berchem, Vanduvres-Genève, 25-30 août 1975*, edited by E. Badian, *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 22 [Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1976] 157-8).

²⁹ Leonnatus (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 9), Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1-3, 25.

dered to prevent her union with his rival Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 37. 5–6).³⁰ Eumenes quickly realized the power of his connection both to Alexander and to the Argead family, and directed his subsequent policies with full cognizance of this fact.

With the city surrounded, supplies interdicted by the forces outside the city (Curt. 10. 8. 11), and Eumenes and unnamed others working within the city, the resolve of the infantry began to disintegrate. The troops demanded that their leaders either come to terms with the cavalry or immediately lead them against the latter (Curt. 10. 8. 12–14). Neither Meleager, nor Arrhidaeus, could gain effective control of the infantry and their officers.³¹ Under these circumstances envoys were sent to the leaders outside the city and a compromise was reached (Curt. 10. 8. 14–22). Arrhidaeus would remain as king (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3). The key to the compromise was that Craterus, who was in Cilicia with the veterans that Alexander had dismissed at Opis and enroute to Macedonia to replace Antipater (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 4), would be recognized as second in authority only to the king and thereby superior to all other officers. Craterus would become “*prostates* of Arrhidaeus’s kingdom,”³² or regent for the king.³³ Perdicas would retain his title of chiliarch (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3; 1b. 4), and thus become the second in command to the king’s *prostates*.³⁴ Meleager, who had

3; Just. 13. 6. 4–7), Cassander, Lysimachus, Antigonus and Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 37. 4) all had sought her hand in marriage.

³⁰ Pierre Briant (*Antigone le Borgne: Les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'Assemblée macédonienne*, *Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon* 152, Centre de recherches d'histoire ancienne 10 [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973] 130–1) believes that Antigonus’s lack of a close connection to Alexander was for him an almost insurmountable obstacle. Later, when Antigonus had reversed his earlier weakness, he removed from command those who had been close to Alexander (Diod. 19. 46. 2; 48. 5; 56. 1).

³¹ Arrhidaeus in this crisis showed no capacity to lead. It was Meleager who had “dragged” him initially before the assembled soldiers (Curt. 10. 7. 10), and Arrhidaeus had soon fled “terrified by the authority of the *principes*” (Curt. 10. 7. 13). Much later, this same Arrhidaeus, now called Philip, was compelled by Perdicas to order the execution of the very men whose leadership had secured him the throne (Curt. 10. 9. 17–19). Nor was Meleager able to assert control over the army. His attempt to have Perdicas executed prior to that commander’s exit from Babylon failed when the assassins were overawed by the intended victim (Curt. 10. 8. 3).

³² Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3; Arr. *Succ.* 1b. 4.

³³ Diodorus never mentions any office for Craterus, but it is also true that in his abridgement he omits much information. On the nature of the *prostasia*, see E. M. Anson, “Craterus and the *Prostasia*,” *CP* 87 (1992): 38–43.

³⁴ See W. Heckel, *The Last Day and Testament of Alexander the Great: A Prosopographic Study* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1988) 19–20. Since the office of chiliarch was Persian in origin, having been adopted by Alexander during his con-

withdrawn an earlier demand that he share equally in the command of the combined forces with Perdiccas and Craterus (Curt. 10. 8. 22–23), would become Perdiccas's lieutenant (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 3).³⁵ In this way both sides would accede to the authority of a third party. Meleager, in particular, was pleased with this agreement; he had served under Craterus (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 17. 3), and hoped to enhance his position through his association with the absent but popular commander.³⁶ Since neither Arrhidaeus, nor Meleager, was able to control the infantry in their own names, that of the most popular commander (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 6. 3) would be invoked. In Meleager's own mind he had emerged from the crisis with a new and more powerful role in the new order. However, in reality Perdiccas and the other *principes* had no intention of abiding by this agreement. As Errington states, "the Perdiccans made the compromise only to get control of the king and to eliminate Meleager."³⁷ While Curtius' statement (10. 9. 7) that Perdiccas rested his only hope for survival on Meleager's death is an exaggeration, it does point to the perceived need to separate Meleager from Philip. It was for this reason that the *principes* were willing to grant the *prostasia* to the absent Craterus. For them this agreement with Meleager was never meant to come into effect (cf. Curt. 10. 8. 22). It is clear that Perdiccas would not be bound by agreements that were not made according to Macedonian tradition. Decisions regarding kingship and regency were to be made

quests (F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon und die Reichsordnung nach seinem Tode* [Vienna, Cologne, Graz: Böhlau, 1970] 31–4), it is very likely that in this context Perdiccas's power was to be confined to Asia (K. Rosen, "Die Reichsordnung von Babylon," *Acta Classica* 10 [1967]: 108–9; N. G. L. Hammond, "Some Macedonian Offices: c. 336–309 B.C.E.," *JHS* 105 [1985]: 157). This would explain why there is no evidence of Antipater's position in the new order being changed from *strategos* for Macedonia.

³⁵ Curtius (10. 8. 22–23; cf. Just. 13. 4. 5) states that Meleager was granted a full share in the leadership with Craterus and Perdiccas as the basis for the reconciliation, but Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 3) is to be preferred. The most reasonable explanation for this seeming contradiction is that the two sources reflect different stages in the negotiations. Meleager had initially demanded to be an equal partner in power with Perdiccas and Craterus, but ultimately acquired only the promise of the subordinate position.

³⁶ Rosen ("Reichsordnung," 97–8) suggests that the impetus for this aspect of the compromise came from Eumenes. It must be emphasized, however, that the evidence is far from clear with regard to the initiation of the *prostasia* for Craterus, and Errington's ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 55) caution in assigning it to either party is well taken.

³⁷ Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisos," 56.

by the *principes* meeting in council, not through compromises with rebellious soldiers.³⁸

As part of the agreement with Meleager, a formal reconciliation was to be staged; the period of strife had lasted a week (Curt. 10. 10. 9). The treachery was planned around a formal purification of the Macedonian forces (Curt. 10. 9. 11). According to Curtius (10. 9. 8–11), Meleager was tricked by Perdiccas into agreeing to use the purification as a means to eliminate those supposedly working against the agreement. Therefore, with the infantry outside the walls of the city and the cavalry commanding the plain, the surrender of three hundred infantry leaders was demanded and obtained (Curt. 10. 9. 13–18).³⁹ These men were then trampled to death before the whole army by the elephants. The *principes* wished to demonstrate to their formerly rebellious soldiers that such defiance would not be tolerated. As with Alexander at Opis, the leaders of the insurrection would pay with their lives.⁴⁰ While Meleager was not among the three hundred, he was subsequently assassinated.⁴¹

The cavalry leaders then returned to Babylon and held the conclave they had tried to hold previously to decide the fate of Alexander's empire. This time there were no soldiers present (Curt. 10. 10. 1–4). As mentioned, the compromise worked out between Meleager and Perdiccas was not to be the final settlement. At this meeting Philip

³⁸ Anson, "Constitutionalism," 306–8.

³⁹ Diodorus 18. 4. 7 says only 30 were put to death. There is no way to decide who may be correct.

⁴⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 3; Curt. 10. 2. 30; at Opis only thirteen were executed, but then there had only been verbal abuse of traditional authority, and such speech had in the past been a Macedonian prerogative, part of the customary relationship between the king and his people (see Anson, "Constitutionalism," 314–5). In Babylon after Alexander's death, there had been not just the violation of the authority of the *principes* to choose a king, but also actual insurrection.

⁴¹ Curt. 10. 9. 21; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 4; Diod. 18. 4. 7. Both Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 4–5) and Curtius (10. 9. 7–21) place Meleager's death soon after the "reconciliation," and before the *principes* met a second time in Babylon to hammer out a final settlement. Diodorus (18. 3–4), however, places this meeting before the deaths of Meleager and the ringleaders of the infantry. Errington ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 57 n. 59) correctly notes, "D[iodorus] is a mess chronologically, even though his information is from Hieronymus, and it seems unnecessary to see more than his own inaccuracy in the variation." I would add that Diodorus has obviously distilled a very sizable selection of material from his source down to four brief sections. Arrian's *Tὰ μετ' Ἀλέξανδρον*, probably based on Hieronymus's history (see Chapter 1), described the events from Alexander's death to that of Meleager's in the better part of a book. Given the radical nature of his abridgement of such complex material, Errington's comments gain additional weight.

was confirmed as king with the understanding that if Roxane's child were male, he would also be king (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 8; cf. Diod. 18. 18. 6). Later, when a boy was born,⁴² he was presented to the army who in accordance with Macedonian tradition acclaimed him king as Alexander IV (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 8).⁴³ In this final settlement Perdikkas emerged as the *prostates* of the kingdom.⁴⁴ His practical authority as regent for Arrhidaeus as well as later for Alexander IV is assumed (cf. Diod. 18. 2. 4, 3. 1, 23. 2). Neither a shared overall military command, nor the *prostasia* in the final analysis is mentioned for Craterus, instead Craterus was to share power in Europe with Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7),⁴⁵ as had been originally proposed by

⁴² On the time of his birth, Curtius (10. 6. 9) states that Roxane was six months pregnant when Alexander died, but Justin (13. 2. 5) claims that she was eight. With no way to decide between Curtius and Justin the birth could have occurred as early as the final settlement in Babylon or as late as September (Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisos," 58). Arrian's context would seem to place the birth after the division of the satrapies in Babylon and possibly before the outbreak of the Lamian War. However, since our major sources (Diodorus, Arrian, and Justin) are fairly uniform in narrating events in Europe separate from those in Asia, perhaps, reflecting Hieronymus's arrangement, that the birth comes in Photius's epitome before the narration of the Lamian War is probably without significance.

⁴³ There is a great deal of disagreement on the actual status of Alexander IV despite the reference to his kingship in Arrian (*Succ.* 1a. 8) and the constant mention of "kings" in our other literary sources. M. J. Fontana (*Le lotte per la successione di Alessandro Magno dal 323 al 315* [Palermo: Presso l'Accademia, 1960] 127) argues that the phrase "the kings" originates with Hieronymus and that while Philip (Arrhidaeus) was alive, only he possessed the royal title (*ibid.*, 124–5). Even though the documentary evidence would appear to support Fontana (*ibid.*, 124–7), it is difficult to argue away Arrian's (*Succ.* 1a. 8) statement that "the throng proclaimed the newborn (Alexander IV) king." Moreover, W. Heckel ("IG II² 561 and the Status of Alexander IV," *ZPE* 40 [1980]: 249–50) has argued on the basis of IG II² 561 that at least after the army assembly meeting at Triparadeisos in 320, Philip III and Alexander IV shared the monarchy, with Philip, on account of his age, being the active member of the tandem. The best solution to the whole situation is probably still the one suggested by W. Schwahn ("Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen," *Klio* 24 [1931]: 313; cf. Rosen, "Reichsordnung," 99) that while both were royal, Philip was to rule until Alexander came of age. This would appear to follow from Diodorus 18. 57. 2, where Polyperchon invites Olympias to return to Macedonia "to take charge of the son of Alexander, and to assume responsibility for him until he should become of age and receive his father's kingdom."

⁴⁴ While Diodorus 18. 23. 2 could be taken to mean that Perdikkas had seized the *prostasia* of the kings from the absent Craterus (cf. Rosen, "Reichsordnung," 104), this passage clearly refers back to those confusing days in Babylon before the final settlement was reached. Diodorus 18. 2. 4, 3. 1 is very clear that Perdikkas from the time of the final settlement held the regency alone. Throughout this period the actual power remained with those physically present in Babylon (Anson, "Prostasia," 42–3; Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisos," 54, 56–7; Heckel, *Testament*, 20–1).

⁴⁵ Specifically Antipater and Craterus were assigned Illyria, Triballia, Greece, and

Pithon during the initial stages of the meeting in Babylon (Curt. 10. 7. 9). For those in Babylon this was an ideal way to deal with the two powerful, but absent, *principes*; let them battle it out for control of Europe.⁴⁶ Perdikkas with the consent of the army had revoked Alexander's command that Craterus replace Antipater in Macedonia (Diod. 18. 4. 1-6), and substituted the more amorphous sharing of power between the two (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7). Justin (13. 4. 5), perhaps reflecting the reality of the situation, as opposed to the final settlement's official position, states that Craterus was given control of the royal treasury. He was in Cilicia with the Macedonian returnees and thereby probably in control of the treasury at Cyinda. As to Antipater's reaction to the events in Babylon, it should be noted that even before the final settlement was reached, he was already preparing for what became the Lamian War, the great revolt of the Greek states against Macedonian authority, which saw Antipater and a Macedonian force besieged in Lamia in the winter of 323/322 (Diod. 18. 9. 1-4, 12. 1).

At this second meeting in Babylon, additionally, the satrapies were divided amongst the *principes* (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5; 1b. 2-7; Diod. 18. 3. 1-2).⁴⁷ While the dominant figure was Perdikkas, he clearly did not control the proceedings.⁴⁸ Ptolemy, who had opposed the appointment

Macedonia; Thrace, the Chersonese, and the Pontic regions were assigned to Lysimachus. The exact relationship between Antipater and Lysimachus can only be surmised, but there is no sign of hostility between the two, in part, because each had a war to fight; Lysimachus against Seuthes and the Thracians (Diod. 18. 14. 2-4), and Antipater faced a Greek coalition in the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 9. 1-13. 6). Diodorus (17. 118. 2) states that Antipater held "most power in Europe"; he probably retained his title of "General of Europe" given him by Alexander (Diod. 17. 118. 1; 18. 12. 1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 3; Diod. 17. 17. 5; Curt. 4. 1. 39; Just. 11. 7. 1). There is no indication that it was revoked. Theoretically, this would have made Lysimachus subject to Antipater's authority.

⁴⁶ See Badian, "Struggle," 266.

⁴⁷ F. Granier (*Die makedonische Heersversammlung: Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht* [Munich: Beck, 1931] 65-6) incorrectly concludes that the division of the satrapies was made by an "army assembly." The sources are clear that only the *principes* met and arranged this division (Curt. 10. 10. 1-4; cf. Diod. 18. 3. 1; Just. 13. 5. 9).

⁴⁸ Certain of the sources appear to indicate that Perdikkas alone was responsible for the division of the satrapies (Arr. *Succ.* 1b. 7; App. *Syr.* 52; Just. 13. 5. 9), but G. Wirth ("Zur Politik des Perdikkas 323," *Helikon* 7 [1967]: 316-17), Briant (*Antigone*, 137-9, 146) and Errington ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 57) are correct that the actual assignment of the satrapies was the result of a compromise between the conflicting claims of the *principes*. These sources merely attest to Perdikkas's official action as regent; he was, however, carrying out the desires of the council of *principes*. This is very clear in Diodorus 18. 3. 1. Here it states that "having taken the advice of the *principes*" Perdikkas assigned the satrapies. For Curtius (10. 10. 1) likewise the

of Perdiccas as regent in the first abortive meeting in Babylon (Curt. 10. 6. 15) got what he desired, the satrapy of Egypt. Perdiccas, if he could have done so, would have blocked this assignment. He did try to limit the grant by insisting that the council make Cleomenes, the previous satrap of Egypt,⁴⁹ Ptolemy's lieutenant (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5). Likewise, certain powerful individuals who were not physically present in Babylon had to be taken into account. As noted, Antipater was confirmed in his possession of Macedonia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7; Diod. 18. 3. 2), but was theoretically to share his power with Craterus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7).

Errington is certainly correct that the final settlement was the work of the *principes* in Babylon, and that, whatever the initial compromise had included for Craterus, it evaporated with the death of Meleager and his supporters. While the compromise settlement was ignored by the *principes* bargaining in Babylon, its memory lived on, certainly in the minds of the soldiers. This may, in part, explain the great precautions Eumenes took in Cappadocia in 320 to keep his soldiers ignorant of the fact that the commander of the opposing force was Craterus (Plut. *Eum.* 6. 6–7);⁵⁰ it could also explain the fury of the troops in Egypt when they learned of Craterus's death (Diod. 18. 37. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 3–4). Moreover, Craterus would remember that at one point he had appeared as an integral part in the power structure of the new regime. He would, however, also know that his role had been significantly diminished in the definitive settlement. Rosen and Schachermeyr are right to see a connection between the *prostasia* and Antipater's efforts toward preparing Craterus's return to Asia,⁵¹ but not as an attempt to regain usurped authority. Since the final settlement only gave Craterus power in Europe, Craterus and Antipater must have based the legitimacy of the former's claim for a position in Asia on the compromise agreement. Besides, Alexander had dispatched Craterus and the ten thousand veterans

division is the result of the deliberations of the *principes*. J. Seibert (*Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios I, Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und Antiken Rechtsgeschichte*. 56 [Munich: C. H. Beck, 1969] 37–8) and Fontana (*lotte*, 140, 149) are incorrect in claiming otherwise. Indeed, Diodorus (18. 23. 2) states that early in Perdiccas's regency his position was "not firmly established."

⁴⁹ There is considerable disagreement with regard to Cleomenes' actual title and powers in Egypt during Alexander's lifetime, but for a convincing argument that he was appointed satrap by Alexander, see Seibert, *Untersuchungen*, 43–4, 50.

⁵⁰ For the date see Chapter 4.

⁵¹ Rosen, "Reichsordnung," 103; Schachermeyr, *Alexander*, 170.

to Macedonia to replace Antipater (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 3-4; cf. Diod. 18. 4. 1); Craterus had no claim in Asia unless it was based on the compromise settlement.

Consequently, Craterus and Antipater remained friendly with Perdicas hoping to achieve a position in Asia for the former through negotiation (cf. Diod. 18. 18. 7).⁵² It is interesting to note that in 320, when Antipater and Craterus had successfully invaded Asia Minor and opened negotiations with Eumenes, the latter offered to reconcile Craterus and Perdicas (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 7-8). Also, while Antigonus later accused Perdicas of many things, he never accused him of usurping Craterus's *prostasia* (cf. Diod. 18. 23. 2-3, 25. 3);⁵³ the bestowal of the *prostasia* on Craterus was never part of the final agreement made by the *principes*.⁵⁴ Craterus at no time brought forward this charge. Indeed, Diodorus 18. 25. 3 states that Perdicas planned to invade Macedonia and deprive "them" of their hegemony, clearly referring to their assigned joint rule in Europe.

While Perdicas was the dominant figure in the final settlement, his position was not unassailable. Of those clearly his partisans only Eumenes emerged as a newly created satrap;⁵⁵ Perdicas's own brother Alcetas, a distinguished battalion commander, did not secure a province, nor did Aristonous, who had proposed in the initial meeting that Perdicas be made king (Curt. 10. 6. 16).⁵⁶ Indeed, most of

⁵² See Errington, "Babylon to Tripuradeisos," 61-2.

⁵³ So H. Bengtson, *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit: Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht* (Munich: Beck, 1937) 1; 73.

⁵⁴ While P. Goukowsky (*Essai sur les origines des mythes d'Alexandre: 336-270 av. J.C.* [Nancy: Université de Nancy, 1978] 197) states that Perdicas received the *prostasia* from the army, nowhere is this stated in the sources, nor is it likely that this office came to Perdicas as part of his *koinopragia* with Antipater (so W. Schwahn, "Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Grossen," *Klio* 24 [1931]: 328-9). The sources make it clear that it is in the meeting of the *principes* that the affairs of the empire were arranged (Curt. 10. 10. 1-4; Diod. 18. 3. 1). It is, however, likely that all of these decisions were formally ratified by King Philip (cf. W. Schur, "Das Alexanderreich nach Alexanders Tod," *RhM* 83 [1934]: 146).

⁵⁵ Diod. 18. 3. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3.

⁵⁶ Seibert (*Untersuchungen*, 37) suggests that Aristonous may not have wanted a satrapy, or, perhaps, Perdicas did not trust him. Neither of these suppositions appears likely. Aristonous had shown his loyalty to Perdicas in the meeting in Babylon and later commanded his expedition against the kings of Cyprus (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6). Moreover, the possession of a satrapy would not necessarily mean his separation from the court. Pithon was satrap of Media Major (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5), but continued west with Perdicas (cf. Diod. 18. 7. 9, 36. 5). With regard to the other satrapies which were reassigned in Babylon, while their governors' later actions with regard to Perdicas cannot be taken as proof of their attitudes in 323, it is instructive

the satrapies were simply reassigned to those already in possession.⁵⁷ Antigonos was maintained in his satrapy of Greater Phrygia, Lycia, Pamphylia and Pisidia. In the first place, it would have been difficult to dislodge him,⁵⁸ and secondly, he was a “friend” of Antipater’s (Diod. 18. 23. 3). At this time Perdiccas wished to cooperate fully with Antipater and at some point soon after the “reconciliation” had requested the hand of Antipater’s daughter, Nicaea (Diod. 18. 23. 2).⁵⁹ Perdiccas was clearly feeling his way carefully. His immediate ambition was to solidify his hold on the regency and to gain control of the royal army. These considerations may explain why more of his supporters were not made satraps; Perdiccas needed them in Babylon.⁶⁰ While controlling the army was all important, the actual administration of the empire was only of secondary importance. This emphasis is

that Ptolemy, Leonnatus, Pithon (Diod. 18. 36. 5), Laomedon (cf. Diod. 18. 39. 6), and Asander (cf. Diod. 18. 39. 6), all ultimately proved disloyal to Perdiccas.

⁵⁷ Diod. 18. 3. 2; cf. Diod. 18. 3. 1–3; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; Just. 13. 4. 9–15; App. *Syr.* 52–53. Of the eight provinces which were reassigned, Hellespontine Phrygia, Cilicia, Caria, Cappadocia, Syria, Egypt, Media Major, and Thrace, three most likely were vacant at the time of their assignment and two were replacements or partial replacements of non Graeco-Macedonian officials. It is unlikely that Sabiktas, the satrap of Cappadocia, survived the Persian counter-offensive after Issus (Curt. 4. 1. 34–35, 5. 13). After that campaign, he disappears from the record and Ariarathes appears in total control of Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 16. 1). Lycaonia had apparently been divided between Antigonos and Ariarathes (Curt. 4. 5. 13; Str. 12. 1. 2). It is likely that Sabiktas’ satrapy had included Lycaonia and little else; Alexander did not cross the Halys into Cappadocia proper, but had only marched “to the Halys River” (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 4. 2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; cf. App. *Mith.* 8). Balacrus, the satrap of Cilicia, had been slain by the Larandians and the Isaurians prior to Alexander’s death (Diod. 18. 22. 1). A similar fate probably also befell Demarchus in Hellespontine Phrygia (see Briant, *Antigone*, 80). Media was divided into two provinces (Just. 13. 4. 13) with Atropates, Perdiccas’s father-in-law (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 4. 5; Just. 13. 4. 13), retaining Media Minor, and Media Major being assigned to Pithon (see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:91–92 [#180]); Lysimachus was to replace Seuthes in Thrace (Diod. 18. 3. 2; Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 1:227–8). It is unknown who Laomedon replaced in Syria, but Appian (*Syr.* 52) is clear that he was first appointed by “Perdiccas.” Despite Justin’s statement (13. 4. 14–15) that Lycia and Pamphylia went to Nearchus, these territories remained with Antigonos. Nearchus had held these areas until 329 (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 6; 4. 7. 2), when they were transferred to Antigonos; this fact obviously is responsible for Justin’s confusion. Babylonia may also have been reassigned (see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:86–87 [#163]). If it was, then it would have represented the replacement of a Persian satrap (see *ibid.*, 2:361 [#718]).

⁵⁸ Briant, *Antigone*, 74–80.

⁵⁹ Perdiccas may have approached Antipater regarding the marriage prior to the distribution of the satrapies, perhaps while the negotiations with Meleager were still in progress (Errington, “Babylon to Triparadeisos,” 58–9).

⁶⁰ So R. Billows, *Antigonos the One-eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990) 55.

clearly seen with respect to Perdiccas's use of the head of the royal chancellery.

Even though Eumenes still saw his position in the new order as tied directly to his presence at court (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3. 14), Perdiccas had other plans. Perdiccas wanted to remove from power in Asia Minor those native rulers who had resisted or rebelled against Macedonian authority.⁶¹ In consequence, Eumenes was assigned the territories of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia,⁶² an assignment, Curtius (10. 10. 3) reports, Eumenes initially rejected. Although Perdiccas overcame Eumenes' reluctance, this was not to be an easy assignment. Neither Cappadocia nor Paphlagonia were currently under Macedonian control. While Alexander had formally annexed the southern portion of Cappadocia (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 4. 1-2), Ariarathes, the then ruler of northern Cappadocia, had never submitted to Macedonian control (Curt. 10. 10. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 4).⁶³ Indeed, in

⁶¹ Perdiccas later defeated the Isaurians and the Larandians who had killed Balacrus, the satrap of Cilicia appointed by Alexander (Diod. 18. 22. 1). In the east, however, many loyal non Graeco-Macedonians were left in charge of kingdoms and satrapies. Taxiles, Porus, Oxyartes, Phrataphernes and Atropates, for example (Diod. 18. 3. 2-3).

⁶² Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5; 1b. 2; *FGH* 100 F-8.2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; Curt. 10. 10. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3; Just. 13. 4. 16; Briant (*Antigone*, 141 n. 6) argues that Pisidia was given to Eumenes. He bases this claim on Diodorus 18. 3. 1 where it is stated that Eumenes received all those territories bordering Paphlagonia and Cappadocia which "Alexander had not attacked." However, Pisidia had been invaded and many of its tribes had formally submitted to Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 27. 5-29. 1; Str. 12. 7. 3), and the area had been attached to the province of Lycia-Pamphylia (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 6; cf. Polyæn. 5. 35; see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 1: 256). Pisidia had not been subject to the Persians (A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980] 1:169), and, while Nearchus may have gained a measure of control over it, it probably regained its independence during the Persian counter-offensive in Asia Minor which occurred after Issus (Curt. 4. 1. 34-35). The inhabitants maintained this independence from Antigonus after the area was technically attached to that commander. Given their later loyalty to Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, it is unlikely that Antigonus maintained good relations with the Pisidians (Diod. 18. 46. 3-47. 2).

⁶³ Ariarathes had only been nominally under the authority of the Persians (Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:59-60 [#113]). Strabo (12. 1. 4) claims that Cappadocia had been divided into two provinces prior to the Macedonian invasion, Cappadocia Proper and Cappadocia near Taurus. The northern part, Cappadocia near Taurus, was under the control of Ariarathes (A. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948] 409-22, 425-29; J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire*, first American edition [New York: Schocken Books, 1983] 221-3). Appian (*Mith.* 8), claiming to be quoting from Hieronymus (*FGH* 154 F-3), states that Alexander never came into contact with the peoples of Cappadocia. Therefore, Alexander acquired Lycaonia but at most only the southern part of Cappadocia, and this not

the chaos that followed the battle of Issus, when many Cappadocians and Paphlagonians together with remnants of Darius' army had invaded Phrygia (Curt. 4. 1. 34–35; cf. Diod. 17. 48. 5–6), Ariarathes apparently annexed all of southern Cappadocia (cf. Str. 12. 1. 3).⁶⁴ Paphlagonia, likewise, was not under Macedonian authority. While the Paphlagonian tribes had submitted to Alexander and been put under the jurisdiction of the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 4. 1–2; Curt. 3. 1. 22–23), they early renounced their allegiance (cf. Curt. 4. 5. 13). Consequently, while Eumenes was allocated these territories, they would first have to be conquered.

The creation of this new satrapy would also limit the power of Antigonus in Asia Minor, as the association of Cleomenes to Ptolemy was hoped to do with respect to the latter in Egypt.⁶⁵ During the period from the battle of Issus and the Persian attempt to retake Asia Minor in 333 and Alexander's death in 323, Antigonus and Ariarathes maintained at least a *de facto* peace. There is no record of open hostilities between them, and the two may have simply agreed to leave one another alone.⁶⁶ The creation of Eumenes' satrapy would certainly upset what had been for ten years the status quo in Asia Minor.

With these purposes in mind, Perdiccas in the name of the kings ordered both Leonnatus and Antigonus to aid Eumenes in the acquisition of his satrapy (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3–4). The command to Antigonus to participate would test his loyalty to the new order. In the late summer of 323 Eumenes departed Babylon.⁶⁷ With Eumenes went

by conquest, but by formal surrender (*FGH* 154 F-3). Consequently, Arrian, *Anabasis*, 2. 4. 2 (cf. 5. 25. 4), "Alexander conquered all the territory on this side of the Halys River and much beyond it," cannot be relied on. According to Strabo (12. 1. 4) the Macedonians let the northern part of Cappadocia become a kingdom. In any case after the events following Issus Ariarathes was clearly in charge of all of Cappadocia. Moreover, Diodorus 18. 16. 1, states that Ariarathes "never took orders from the Macedonians."

⁶⁴ Ariarathes in 322 is found in total control of Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 16. 1–3; 22. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 11; Just. 13. 6. 1–3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 4).

⁶⁵ E. M. Anson, "Antigonus, the Satrap of Greater Phrygia," *Historia* 37 (1988): 476; Billows, *Antigonos*, 57.

⁶⁶ See Anson, "Antigonus," 471–7, for an assessment of Antigonus's power in 322.

⁶⁷ Alexander died on June 10 (see chapter 2, note 69); the dispute between the infantry and the cavalry had taken 7 days (Curt. 10. 10. 9). Eumenes and Leonnatus probably did not begin their journey west much before July. The journey to Hellespontine Phrygia from Babylon would have taken approximately 70 days. Xenophon's (*Anab.* 1. 2. 20–7. 1) itinerary for Cyrus's army shows that Cyrus took

Leonnatus and together they journeyed from Babylon to Hellespontine Phrygia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 5). Briant argues that a sizable force of Macedonians left Babylon and that these were the same troops who later under Leonnatus relieved the siege of Lamia.⁶⁸ Furthermore, Briant claims that these troops were under Eumenes' command, and were subsequently subverted by Leonnatus.⁶⁹ Neither of these claims is borne out by the sources. While Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 4) does state that a "great number" of soldiers were to conduct Eumenes to his satrapy, there is no evidence that these were Macedonians. On the contrary, given the few remaining Macedonian troops with Perdikkas, the army that relieved Lamia must have included mercenaries contracted in Asia and Macedonians acquired in Macedonia after Leonnatus crossed to Europe. The actual number of Macedonians in the grand army at this time was relatively small, perhaps less than ten thousand men.⁷⁰ Perdikkas had already dispatched Pithon and thirty-eight hundred Macedonians to the east (Diod. 18. 7. 3),⁷¹ thus

90 days to cover the distance from Babylon to Cappadocia. The twenty days spent by Cyrus in Tarsus were excessive (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 3. 1), but the other halts were only for "necessary purposes" (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 5. 9). Fifty-three days were spent in actual travel. Given the heat of July and August in Iraq the journey probably was not accomplished rapidly. Leonnatus and Eumenes would have arrived in Hellespontine Phrygia probably in September by this reckoning. It is also possible, again because of the heat, that Eumenes proceeded north across the Tigris, following the route Alexander had taken to Babylon (see D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978] 68-70), which would have added over two hundred miles to the journey.

⁶⁸ Briant, *Antigone*, 166.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 148, 166-7.

⁷⁰ Alexander had crossed to Asia with 13,800 "Macedonians" (Diod. 17. 17. 3-5). In addition there were other Macedonians who had earlier crossed to Asia with Philip's advance force (Diod. 16. 91. 1; Polyae. 5. 44. 4), but most of these troops were undoubtedly mercenaries (Parke, *Soldiers*, 178; Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 1:145). At Gordium another 3,300 Macedonians had joined him (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 29. 4), and near Babylon a further 6550 (Diod. 17. 65. 1). However, before crossing the Oxus Alexander sent nine hundred Macedonians home (Curt. 7. 5. 27) and later ten thousand more with Craterus (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 1). Discounting casualties and those left in garrisons, this would have left a total of under thirteen thousand in Babylon on Alexander's death (see G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935; reprinted Chicago: Ares Press, 1975] 41). N. G. L. Hammond estimates the number at less than ten thousand (*Alexander the Great, King, Commander and Statesman* [Park Ridge, N.J.: Noyes Press, 1980] 245), and A. B. Bosworth (*Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988] 267) suggests maybe as few as eight thousand. Mercenaries (see Griffith, *ibid.*, 39) and Asiatic troops, however, there were in abundance.

⁷¹ See below.

further reducing his forces. Leonnatus and Eumenes had received five thousand talents from Perdiccas for the Cappadocian campaign to hire mercenaries (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 3. 11). Craterus prior to returning to Macedonia in 322 enlisted four thousand mercenaries (Diod. 18. 16. 4), and in 318, Arrhidaeus, the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, raised ten thousand (Diod. 18. 51. 1). Whatever Macedonians were in Leonnatus's relieving force of twenty thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry at Lamia (Diod. 18. 14. 5) were recruited in Macedonia after that commander had crossed from Asia. When Antipater initially had marched against the Greeks, he had left Sippas behind in Macedonia with an army (Diod. 18. 12. 2). Leonnatus had in addition to these Macedonians recruited others (Diod. 18. 14. 5).⁷² Perdiccas was not about to apportion out Alexander's grand army, his key to power.⁷³ To the new satraps Perdiccas provided contingents of mercenaries and foreign troops, along with money with which to hire additional forces from the large numbers left in the wake of the collapse of the Persian Empire.⁷⁴

Another contemporaneous campaign with similarities to the proposed invasion of Cappadocia is the one mentioned earlier, undertaken by Pithon against the Greek rebels in the eastern satrapies in 323.⁷⁵ This revolt had its origins in an earlier revolt in 326/325 (Curt. 9.

⁷² Basic Macedonian policy was to leave behind sufficient forces to protect Macedonia from its more barbarous neighbors. Alexander had left roughly half his native Macedonian forces behind when he crossed to Asia (Diod. 17. 17. 5), and in 320, when Antipater and Craterus crossed to Asia, a sizable force was left behind in Macedonia (Diod. 18. 38. 6). A. B. Bosworth ("Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon," *JHS* 106 [1986]: 9) states that Macedonia was virtually depleted of manpower by 323 B.C.E. due to the Asian expedition, but see R. A. Billows (*Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism, Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition* 22 [Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1995] 196), who argues that Alexander's campaigns affected Macedonia demographically "very little."

⁷³ Craterus journeyed to Macedonia in 322 with, in addition to six thousand Macedonian veterans dismissed by Alexander, five thousand troops taken on by Alexander in Asia, including one thousand Persian bowmen and slingers (Diod. 18. 16. 4).

⁷⁴ Ptolemy put together an army of mercenaries (Diod. 18. 14. 1), and Eumenes later was able to enlist twelve thousand mercenaries (Diod. 18. 61. 5). Griffith (*Mercenaries*, 39) estimates that one hundred thousand mercenaries had seen service with Alexander.

⁷⁵ On this whole episode, see L. Schober, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Babyloniens und der Oberen Satrapien von 323–303 V. Chr.* (Frankfurt and Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1981) 28–37; F. L. Holt, *Alexander the Great and Bactria. The Formation of a Greek Frontier in Central Asia, Mnemosyne* 104, *Supplementum* (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1988) 81–5; and chapter 8.

7. 1–11; Diod. 17. 99. 5–6).⁷⁶ For Pithon's expedition a credible Macedonian force of three thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry was deployed, but the bulk of the army, ten thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry, was to be supplied by the satraps in the area (Diod. 18. 7. 3), and the Macedonian troops were to return to the grand army after the suppression of the revolt (Diod. 18. 7. 9). There is no indication that the troops with Leonnatus and Eumenes were to be restored to Perdiccas.

With regard to Briant's claim that the forces for the invasion of Cappadocia were under Eumenes' command, Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 4) expressly states that Leonnatus and Antigonus were to supply the troops. Also, in light of Perdiccas's later confidence in Eumenes, placing him in overall command in Asia Minor in 320 (Diod. 18. 25. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 1), it is doubtful that Eumenes had an army subverted from him in 322. Finally, on the analogy of Pithon's campaign, contrary to Briant, Antigonus's proposed contribution for the Cappadocian campaign was not to be minimal.⁷⁷ Against Eumenes at Gabene, Antigonus deployed one thousand Phrygian and Lydian cavalry, and three thousand Lycian and Pamphylian infantry (Diod. 19. 29. 2–3); these would have been the best of the forces from these regions, since in the winter 316/315, Antigonus was not just the satrap of Phrygia, but one of the major contenders for power and possessed of the largest Macedonian force fighting in Asia.⁷⁸ In 323, it is unknown how many native troops he could have raised, or how many mercenary forces were also in his employ. Most likely Antigonus was to supply a significant part of the force, since he, unlike Leonnatus, was already, and had been for more than ten years, in possession of his satrapy and its resources.⁷⁹ Leonnatus was to supply the professional mercenary core for the operation.

⁷⁶ Sparked by a false report of Alexander's death (Diod. 17. 99. 5) and fueled by the desire to return to Greece (Curt 9. 7. 3; Diod. 17. 99. 5), three thousand Greek colonists marched out of Asia and did eventually return home to Greece (Curt. 9. 7. 11). For a full discussion of both revolts with bibliography, see chapter 8.

⁷⁷ Briant, *Antigone*, 148.

⁷⁸ Prior to the battle of Paraetacene, Antigonus's army included eight thousand Macedonians (the remnants of eighty-five hundred acquired in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 43; see chapter 4) and eight thousand mixed troops in Macedonian equipment (Diod. 19. 29. 3). Of the latter many may have been Macedonians as well. Antigonus had acquired additional Macedonians prior to 316 (cf. Diod. 18. 41. 1, 45. 4).

⁷⁹ For Phrygia's resources, see Briant, *Antigone*, 60, 78–84.

Lysimachus faced circumstances similar to those confronting Eumenes and Leonnatus. His assigned satrapy, Thrace, was occupied by a hostile and powerful opponent.⁸⁰ Yet, Lysimachus successfully invaded Thrace with but four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry against a force of twenty thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 14. 2–3; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 10).⁸¹ While the status of his forces is nowhere articulated, it is likely that they were mercenaries. Perdiccas probably did not realize the extent of the resistance that Seuthes or Ariarathes would be able to mount; Antigonus must have known the actual difficulty of the campaign and his reluctance to participate may derive in part from this knowledge.

Eumenes and Leonnatus left Babylon probably with considerably less than ten thousand troops. Very quickly the proposed Cappadocian campaign fell apart. Antigonus failed to provide assistance. The exact reasons for this refusal can only be surmised. Antigonus may not have accepted the decisions in Babylon as binding;⁸² he may not have wished to help establish a potential rival in Asia Minor, or, as mentioned earlier, he may have believed that Ariarathes' power had been seriously underestimated. Ariarathes in 322 was able to field an army of thirty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 16. 2), and in the final analysis it took Perdiccas and the grand army two battles to defeat this force (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 11). Perdiccas had assumed that Antigonus would have no choice but to participate. After all, even though Perdiccas was responsible for the order, the formal command came from King Philip.⁸³

In spite of Antigonus's non appearance Eumenes and Leonnatus prepared to invade Cappadocia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 5–6). They did have

⁸⁰ Diod. 18. 14. 2; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 10; cf. Diod. 18. 3. 2.

⁸¹ While Lysimachus apparently defeated the Thracian leader Seuthes, the initial battle was a draw (Diod. 18. 14. 4). Lysimachus did eventually force Seuthes into a dependent alliance (cf. Diod. 19. 73. 8).

⁸² Suggested by Billows, *Antigonos*, 57.

⁸³ Briant (*Antigone*, 150) believes that Antigonus refused to follow Perdiccas's order, because he would be "humiliated," if he subordinated himself to Eumenes. There is no indication that either Leonnatus or Antigonus were in any way to be under Eumenes' authority. Moreover, if this fear of humiliation did exist, it clearly had no effect on Leonnatus who until the invitation arrived from Cleopatra was prepared to aid the Cardian. Also, nowhere is it stated that Eumenes was to be in command of either Leonnatus's or Antigonus's troops. Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 4) gives the impression that the army would be commanded by Antigonus and Leonnatus. Undoubtedly part of the reason for Perdiccas's appeal to both men to aid Eumenes was Eumenes' lack of experience commanding infantry.

sufficient funds with which to hire additional mercenaries (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 11). These preparations then proceeded through the autumn and into the winter months. But before the campaign could commence, Hecataeus, the tyrant of Cardia and Eumenes' hereditary enemy, arrived and requested that Leonnatus come to Greece to relieve the siege of Lamia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 6). Prior to the outbreak of the Lamian War, Antipater had sought Leonnatus's aid for the impending crisis, offering to cement the alliance by marrying Leonnatus to one of his daughters (Diod. 18. 12. 1). More recently Leonnatus had received letters from Alexander's sister Cleopatra proposing that he cross to Macedonia, marry her, and seize the throne (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 9). Alexander's mother Olympias was likely behind this proposal; she was no supporter of Antipater (Diod. 17. 118. 1).

At this point it is interesting to note the vicissitudes in Leonnatus's career. In the initial meeting in Babylon following Alexander's death, Pithon had proposed that Leonnatus and Perdiccas be *tutores*, or regents, for Roxane's unborn child (Curt. 10. 7. 8–9). During the consequent mutiny, Curtius (10.7.20) states that the leaders of the cavalry, although it is clear that Perdiccas was the more dominant figure (Curt. 10. 8. 1–2, 6), were Perdiccas and Leonnatus. But in the settlement following the army's reconciliation Leonnatus did not emerge as a major figure, but rather as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.⁸⁴ Indeed, while Alexander had associated Paphlagonia with Hellespontine Phrygia,⁸⁵ the former territory now had been attached to Cappadocia and awarded to Eumenes.⁸⁶ Intrinsically Hellespontine Phrygia was of great strategic importance, controlling as it did the Asian side of the strait, but much of this significance had been negated by the peaceful relations then in existence between Antipater and Perdiccas. In the early summer of 323, Antipater was firmly in control of Macedonia; soon Lysimachus would be in place in nearby Thrace. Craterus with ten thousand veterans and an acknowledged right to interfere in Macedonian affairs was already in Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7).

While Leonnatus had not responded to Antipater's earlier call for assistance, the new circumstances—Antipater trapped in Lamia and the offer from Cleopatra—made him decide to cross to Europe and

⁸⁴ Briant, *Antigone*, 164; Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisos," 60.

⁸⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 2. 4. 2; Curt. 3. 1. 22–4; 4. 5. 13.

⁸⁶ Diod. 18. 3. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3.

lay claim to Macedonia.⁸⁷ Antigonus's failure to aid in the conquest of Cappadocia may also have helped Leonnatus in reaching this decision. Leonnatus asked Eumenes to join him and even tried to reconcile the latter with Hecataeus (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 6). Eumenes replied that he had long been the enemy of Antipater and that he feared that Macedonian leader would kill him. It was at this point that Leonnatus informed Eumenes of the correspondence from Cleopatra and of his plans to seize the Macedonian throne (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 7–8). Eumenes, however, was not willing to abandon his standing with Perdiccas for a mad and dangerous dash on Macedonia. To avoid difficulties Eumenes delayed his reply to Leonnatus's offer and surreptitiously with his men and equipment returned to Babylon (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 10–11). According to Nepos (*Eum.* 2. 4–5), Eumenes formally refused Leonnatus's request and subsequently the latter made an attempt on his life, an attempt which would have succeeded had Eumenes not eluded his guards and escaped. Fontana more plausibly argues that Eumenes returned to Babylon without incident.⁸⁸ To bring Nepos's account of the attempted assassination into agreement with Plutarch's narrative of Eumenes' departure for Babylon would require that Eumenes, three hundred horsemen, two hundred armed servants, and a large quantity of treasure escape from some form of house arrest ("ex praesidiis eius effugisset" [*Eum.* 2. 5]) and evade pursuit. Most likely the reality of the situation was that Eumenes felt threatened and left. Somewhere in the transmission of the material the implied threat became for some writer, probably Duris,⁸⁹ an actual attempt on Eumenes' life.

Eumenes returned to Babylon in the spring of 322, with Leonnatus crossing to Europe in March/April of that year.⁹⁰ In Macedonia,

⁸⁷ Plut. *Eum.* 3. 9–10; Nepos *Eum.* 2. 4; Fontana (*lotte*, 328–9) disputes Plutarch's attribution of this ambition to Leonnatus. She believes that he was loyal to Antipater and that the passage claiming otherwise derives not from Hieronymus, but from Duris. While Plutarch is using many sources, Duris included, the evidence suggests that whatever the origin of the passage there is nothing in the evidence to call it into question. If Leonnatus was so anxious to aid Antipater, why hadn't he responded to Antipater's earlier request for assistance? It is, also, very unlikely that Cleopatra, given her mother's prejudices and her own later actions, would solicit aid for Antipater.

⁸⁸ Fontana, *lotte*, 329.

⁸⁹ See Chapter 1.

⁹⁰ Leonnatus's crossing was preceded by a Macedonian naval victory over the Athenian navy near Abydos, in March of 322 (See T. Walek, "Les opérations

Leonnatus spent some time in recruitment (Diod. 18. 14. 5), and in the early summer raised the siege of Lamia, but died on the battlefield (Diod. 18. 15. 1). Once in Babylon, Eumenes informed Perdiccas of Leonnatus's plans; Perdiccas already knew of Antigonus's refusal to provide assistance. With his trust in Eumenes confirmed, the would be satrap became a member of Perdiccas's ruling council (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 12). Perdiccas now knew that the accomplishment of his goals in Asia Minor would require his presence. Therefore, early in the summer, Perdiccas with the royal army left Babylon for Asia Minor.⁹¹

In Cappadocia, Ariarathes waited with thirty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry; many of these troops were mercenaries (Diod. 18. 16. 2), perhaps Greeks who had served Darius and who had escaped from the defeat at Issus and staged the unsuccessful counterattack on Asia Minor (cf. Curt. 4. 1. 34–35). The presence of these mercenaries certainly made the task more difficult than Perdiccas had imagined, for it took two battles before the Cappadocian king was defeated (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 11).⁹² Ariarathes was captured and along with numbers of his relatives, tortured, and executed (Diod. 18. 16. 3; App. *Mith.* 2. 8).⁹³ After the victory Neoptolemus was dispatched with part of the grand army to pursue the escaping Cappadocians and to put down disturbances in western Armenia (cf. Diod. 18. 29. 4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1).

navales pendant la guerre lamiaque," *RPhil* 48 [1924]: 28; W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* [London and New York: Routledge, 1992] 373–7).

⁹¹ Diod. 18. 16. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 11; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 12; App. *Mith.* 2. 2; Just. 13. 6. 1. Clearly this campaign took place in 322. Diodorus (18. 16. 4) states that Perdiccas's invasion of Cappadocia and Craterus's crossing to Europe, which occurred shortly before the battle of Crannon (cf. Diod. 18. 16. 4–17. 8; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 28. 1), were roughly contemporaneous. The battle of Crannon, which brought the Lamian War to an end, took place on 7 Metageitnion or July/August (Schöber, *Untersuchungen*, 54, 66–8), not August/September (as L. C. Smith, "The Chronology of Books XVIII–XX of Diodorus Siculus," *AJP* 82 [1961]: 285 n. 8, 286 n. 9). Leaving in April/May, and taking approximately three months for the journey, Perdiccas probably arrived in Cappadocia in time to take advantage of the harvest which occurred there in late July and August (Engels, *Logistics*, 37). His rate of travel was slowed by the presence of elephants to between nine and twelve miles per day (Ibid. 155; D. Proctor, *Hannibal's March in History* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971] 34). That elephants were present is not definite, but they were part of Alexander's army and are found later with Perdiccas in Egypt (Diod. 18. 35. 1, 4), making their presence on the regent's march to Cappadocia likely.

⁹² While Diodorus 18. 16. 2 suggests that only one battle took place, Diodorus's abbreviation has compressed two battles into one.

⁹³ Photius's statement (*Bibl.* 382–388B = Diod. 31. 19. 4) that Ariarathes fell in battle is in error (cf. J. Hornblower, *Hieronimus*, 40–3).

While Perdiccas and Eumenes were enroute to Cappadocia, Craterus crossed to Europe (Diod. 18. 16. 4). Antipater had requested his assistance along with that of Leonnatus as soon as he had heard of Alexander's death (Diod. 18. 12. 1). Like Leonnatus, Craterus had not responded immediately. He may have been assisting Cleitus in preparing a fleet to aid Antipater in the war. Cleitus, who subsequently defeated the Athenians in the north Aegean (Diod. 18. 15. 8–9), had been associated with Craterus by Alexander at Opis and was likely still with him in Cilicia when the Lamian War broke out (Just. 12. 12. 8; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 1, 4). While a Macedonian naval victory in the Hellespont had facilitated Leonnatus's crossing, the Athenian navy still remained a formidable force (cf. Diod. 18. 15. 8).⁹⁴ In any case, Craterus had waited on events, with the result that Leonnatus had responded first. It was Leonnatus's death early in 322 that apparently decided Craterus to accept Antipater's invitation.⁹⁵ Leaving an adequate force behind to guard the royal treasury there in Cilicia, he proceeded along the coast towards the Hellespont with six thousand Macedonian veterans, four thousand mercenaries, one thousand Persian bowmen and slingers, and fifteen hundred cavalry (Diod. 18. 16. 4), accompanied by the Macedonian fleet under the command of Cleitus.⁹⁶ With Craterus's arrival the balance in Europe was quickly altered. Craterus willingly placed himself under Antipater's command (Diod. 18. 16. 4–5). This united force overwhelmed the opposing Greeks. The decisive battle was fought at Crannon in July/August of 322 (Plut. *Dem.* 28. 1) and Athens was garrisoned in early October (Plut. *Phoc.* 28. 2; *Dem.* 28. 1).⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Peter Green (*Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990] 11) suggests that Craterus delayed until he was certain of the security of his crossing. On the series of naval battles preceding both Leonnatus's and Craterus's crossings, see Heckel, *Marshals*, 185–7, 373–7.

⁹⁵ Errington ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 60–1) is probably correct that Craterus's departure was hastened by Perdiccas's approaching Cappadocian campaign. Craterus's position in Asia was ambiguous; Alexander had assigned him to Macedonia, and the decisions taken in Babylon had done the same. But, as noted above, Craterus may have been preparing since the initial invitation to go to Antipater's aid, his delay merely the result of caution.

⁹⁶ On the association of Cleitus with Craterus in the march to Macedonia, see Heckel, *Marshals*, 185–6.

⁹⁷ See note 91.

After Cappadocia was subjugated, Eumenes appointed his friends to positions of authority, as judges, garrison commanders and administrators (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 14). The administration of the satrapies under the successors continued many of the practices of Persian administration which had likewise been followed in the main by Alexander.⁹⁸ A typical example of Alexander's policy is seen in the case of Lydia. Alexander assigned the satrapy to Asander, while Pausanias was left in charge of the citadel of Sardis with a garrison, and Nicias was to supervise the finances and the collection of tribute (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 17. 7-8). This practice of divided responsibilities is also found in Persia where Persepolis was garrisoned by Nicarchides with three thousand men (Curt. 5. 6. 11) and Susa and its citadel were each separately assigned (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 9; Curt. 5. 2. 16). In Caria, Ptolemaeus was in charge of Halicarnassus with a garrison of thirty two hundred (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 23. 6), and in Bactria Nicanor had charge of the city of Alexandria (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 22. 5). In Babylonia, Mazaeus was appointed satrap, but Apollodorus was general, Asclepiodorus collected the taxes (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 4-5), and Agathon with one thousand troops commanded the citadel of Babylon (Curt. 5. 1. 43). It is clear that Perdiccas most often retained these separate jurisdictions established by Alexander.⁹⁹ While he may have had little choice, the practice certainly would work to his advantage. These individuals would be answerable to the central government not to the local satrap, making them a virtual fifth column. Perdiccas tried to establish such a situation in Egypt by appointing Cleomenes as Ptolemy's second-in-command (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5).¹⁰⁰ If Perdiccas had wished, he would have created a similar division of authority in Cappadocia. After all, the province had just been conquered by his army; he was in a position to work his will in Cappadocia. The fact that Eumenes was given such broad discretionary powers was a measure of Perdiccas's confidence in Eumenes' loyalty to him personally.

⁹⁸ See Olmstead, *Persian Empire*, 498, and P. Briant, "D'Alexandre le Grand aux diadoques: le cas d'Eumene de Kardia (1^{er} article)," *REA* 74 (1972): 44-5.

⁹⁹ Xenophilos was appointed commander of the citadel of Susa by Alexander (Curt. 5. 2. 16), and he was still in command of the citadel in 316 (Diod. 19. 17. 3).

¹⁰⁰ See Seibert, *Untersuchungen*, 37, 51. Pausanias (1. 6. 3) mentions that Cleomenes was Perdiccas's "friend."

In one short year Eumenes had reversed the eclipse he had suffered with Alexander's death; he was satrap of a large and powerful province, but more importantly he was the trusted confidant of the apparent heir to Alexander's fortunes.

CHAPTER FOUR

FROM CAPPADOCIA TO TRIPARADEISUS

The invasion of Cappadocia took place in the summer of 322.¹ Eumenes, with Perdiccas and the royal army present, then proceeded to organize his satrapy (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 14). The two victories over Ariarathes (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 11) and the reorganization of Cappadocia would have taken time. The difficulty of the pacification is emphasized by the need to send Neoptolemus to western Armenia partially in pursuit of remnants of Ariarathes' army. Therefore, it would have been fall before Perdiccas, accompanied by Eumenes, left Cappadocia for Cilicia (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 14–4. 1; Diod. 18. 22. 1).² He was now,

¹ See chapter 3.

² There is a great deal of controversy concerning the dating of the early Hellenistic period. Diodorus omits any reference to the archon years 321/320 or 320/319. The only clearly dated event in this period would appear to be Perdiccas's invasion of Egypt in May/June 320 (R. M. Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323 B.C.–320 B.C.," *JHS* 80 [1970]: 75–7; L. Schober, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Babyloniens und der Oberen Satrapien von 323–303 v. Chr.* [Frankfurt and Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1981] 52; B. Gullath and L. Schober, "Zur Chronologie der frühen Diadochenzeit die Jahre 320 bis 315 v. Chr.," in *Studien zur alten Geschichte. Siegfried Lauffer zum 70. Geburtstag am 4. August 1981 dargebracht von Freunden, Kollegen und Schülern*, edited by H. Kalcyk, B. Gullath, A. Graeber [Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider Editore, 1986] 1:333; E. M. Anson, "Diodorus and the Date of Triparadeisos," *AJP* 107 [1986]: 212–13; see also notes 63 and 118). The Parian Marble (*FGIh* 239B F-11) puts Perdiccas's expedition to Egypt and his death in the year 321/320, and the *Babylonian Chronicle* places these events in the fourth year of the reign of Philip III (A. K. Grayson, *Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles* [Locust Valley, N.Y.: J. J. Augustin Publisher, 1975] 115–6, lines 4–7; S. Smith, *Babylonian Historical Texts Relating to the Capture and Downfall of Babylon* [London: Methuen & Company, 1924] 140, 142, lines 3–4, 6). The *Chronicle* dates 323 as the first year of Philip's reign (R. A. Parker and W. H. Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology, 626 B.C.–A.D. 75* [Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1956] 20). Diodorus (18. 36. 7) states that Perdiccas's death occurred after he had held power for 3 years (ἄρξας ἔτη τρία), i.e. 320. Indications in Diodorus are that the Nile had begun to flood during Perdiccas's invasion (18. 33. 2, 34. 7, 35. 3). All of this evidence then would fix Perdiccas's death no later than early July (on the timing of the Nile flood in antiquity, see A. Gardiner, *Egypt of the Pharaohs: an Introduction* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961; reprinted London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969] 27–8). A. B. Bosworth ("History and Artifice in Plutarch's *Eumenes*," in *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition*, edited by P. A. Stadter [London and New York, 1992] 75–8; "Philip III Arrhidaeus and the Chronology of the Successors," *Chiron* 22 [1992]: 60–1), however, argues that the events in

in addition to being satrap of Cappadocia, one of Perdiccas's chief advisers (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 12). While in Cilicia, Perdiccas secured the allegiance of Alexander's former infantry guard, the three thousand hypaspists. These troops had been separated by Alexander from the main force at Opis and sent west with Craterus in 324.³ When Craterus had departed Cilicia to join Antipater in Macedonia (Diod. 18. 16. 4), he had left these troops behind to maintain order and to guard the treasury at Cyinda.⁴ Eumenes did not long remain with

Egypt took place in the summer of 321. Bosworth's argument is based primarily on an analysis of the events that intervened between Perdiccas's death in Egypt and Antipater's crossing back to Europe in the following winter. He argues that it is difficult to fit the various events into a matter of months. Bosworth ("Chronology," 61) further proposes that the first year of Philip Arrhidaeus's reign as recorded by *Babylonian Chronicle* was 324/323, and, therefore, the date for Perdiccas's expedition was really 321. He notes that the *Babylonian Chronicle* gives Philip III an eighth regnal year and places Antipater's crossing to Europe in Philip's fifth (Parker and Dubberstein, *Chronology*, 142–3). Rejecting post dating or misdating as explanations, Bosworth (*ibid.*, 75–9), then, postulates that Philip was appointed the "ceremonial" king of Babylon by his brother in 324. For a refutation of this claim, see G. F. Del Monte, *Testi Cronografici*, vol. 1, *Testi dalla Babilonia Ellenistica* (Pisa and Rome: Istituti Editoriali Poligrafici Internazionali, 1997) 184–6; T. Boiy, "Dating methods during the early Hellenistic period," *JCS* 52 (2000): 118 and n. 15. There is no reason not to accept the dating supported by the statements in Diodorus, the Parian Marble, and in the *Chronicle*. Certainly, as will be shown, all the activities between Perdiccas's death and the departure of Antipater for Europe can be placed into the remaining half year.

³ While it is not definitely stated that the hypaspists were included in the ten thousand, Antigenes, the commander of Alexander's hypaspists, left Opis with Craterus (Just. 12. 12. 8; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 4) and later in Egypt is found in command of the hypaspists/argyraspids (for the identification of Alexander's hypaspists with the argyraspids, see W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948] 1:151–3; E. M. Anson, "Alexander's Hypaspists and the Argyraspids," *Historia* 30 [1981]: 117–20; "Hypaspists and Argyraspids after 323," *AHB* [1988]: 131–3). Moreover, since Alexander was discharging older veterans (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 1) and many of the hypaspists had been with him since the initial invasion, it appears certain that the hypaspists accompanied Antigenes west (On the career of the argyraspids prior to their association with Perdiccas, see W. Heckel, "The Career of Antigenes," *SymbOslo* 57 [1982]: 60–2).

⁴ Heckel ("Antigenes," 60–2) argues convincingly that the hypaspists remained in Cilicia and later joined Perdiccas. Craterus, while leaving Opis with ten thousand veterans, left Cilicia with only six thousand (Diod. 18. 16. 4). Heckel's claim that these troops joined the regent just prior to his invasion of Egypt in 320 ("Antigenes," 62) is doubtful. It is more likely that they would have joined him on his first entry into Cilicia. They were the royal guards and the kings were with Perdiccas. What is interesting is that Craterus chose not to bring the argyraspids with him to Macedonia. Surely the most experienced and best trained unit in Asia would have been useful in aiding Antipater against the rebellious Greeks. Perhaps, they were already exhibiting the independence that was later to characterize them, and Craterus decided to leave this particular problem behind. It is also very possible that, despite claims to the contrary, these troops did not wish to leave Asia.

Perdiccas; he was soon ordered by the regent to return to Cappadocia (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1). Eumenes' return to his satrapy was due primarily to troubles arising in Armenia. Neoptolemus had been sent to western Armenia with a sizable force by Perdiccas.⁵ The pacification of Armenia was critical to the security of Cappadocia, controlling as it did the main lines of communication, including the Royal Road, to the east.⁶

While the sources do not make clear the exact reason for the campaign, the most likely explanation is that it was to pursue the remnants of Ariarathes' defeated forces which had fled eastward to Armenia.⁷ Even though Diodorus emphasizes the meager numbers of the survivors, Ariarathes' descendants were able to maintain their independence in Armenia well into the next century (Diod. 31. 19. 5). Additionally, it is possible that residual Persian forces loyal to the memory of Darius were resident in western Armenia. Prior to becoming King of Persia, Darius had been satrap of Armenia (Just. 10. 3. 4), which, given the noted hereditary control of Greater Armenia by Orontes' family, the Hydarnids, doubtless refers to the western area of that satrapy.⁸ It is possible that the tribesmen and

⁵ While an emended Dexippus (Arr. *Succ.* 1b. 6) would make Neoptolemus satrap of Armenia, no other source supports this contention. Diodorus (18. 29. 2) in 320 calls Neoptolemus *hegemon*, not satrap. P. Briant (*Antigone le Borgne: Les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'Assemblée macédonienne, Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon* 152. *Centre de recherches d'histoire ancienne* 10 [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973] 152-3 n. 8) is likely correct that Neoptolemus's official title in Armenia was that of *strategos*. Moreover, there is little doubt that the actual satrap at this time was Orontes (see E. M. Anson, "Neoptolemus and Armenia," *Ancient History Bulletin* [1990]: 125-6). Alexander had initially assigned the area to Mithrenes in 331 (Curt. 5. 1. 44; Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 5; Diod. 17. 64. 6). Possibly Mithrenes never took possession of the area, since after the notice of his appointment he disappears from the record. He may have died in the attempt. Indeed, it appears that at some point after Alexander's victory at Gaugamela, Orontes made his submission to Alexander, who later re-assigned him to Armenia (A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980] 1:315; Anson, "Neoptolemus," 125-6). Western Armenia, however, may have remained outside of both Orontes' and Macedonian control (see *ibid.*, 127).

⁶ J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire*, First American edition (New York: Schocken Books, 1983) 26, 108.

⁷ Diod. 31. 19. 5; cf. Diod. 18. 16. 2-3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 12-13; Just. 13. 6. 1-3; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 12.

⁸ Western Armenia had been a separate area of jurisdiction (a hyparchy) during the reign of Artaxerxes II (Xen. *Anab.* 4. 4. 4; the division probably dates from the reign of Darius I (Cook, *Empire*, 82). During the Roman Empire Armenia was divided into Lesser (western) and Greater Armenia (Str. 11. 12. 3-4; 14. 1,5; Joseph. *AJ* 2. 252). Lesser Armenia was always in the possession of various warlords (Str.

Persian fief holders here retained a high degree of loyalty to the memory of their former satrap and king. It is also possible that the difficulties in Armenia were caused by the survivors of the failed Persian counter offensive in Asia Minor after the battle of Issus (cf. Curt. 4. 1. 34–35; 5. 13). Whatever the source of the problems, Neoptolemus's assigned task was a formidable one. In general, campaigning in Armenia could be brutal,⁹ especially for an army deficient in cavalry. "The ten thousand" in 401 B.C.E. had experienced difficulties with the Armenian cavalry (Xen. *Anab.* 4. 3. 3, 17, 20–21). Armenia had long been known for its fine horses and had supplied the Persians with twenty thousand foals each year.¹⁰ The nature of warfare in Armenia would explain Neoptolemus's need for cavalry (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3–4). It is also apparent that Orontes, the satrap of Greater Armenia, provided no material aid to Neoptolemus. Indeed, Orontes later maintained a remarkable neutrality in the wars that were soon to arise between Alexander's former commanders.¹¹

Eumenes' assigned task in Armenia was to restore order in the ranks of the Macedonian forces. According to Plutarch, the soldiers had become "arrogant and insolent" (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3),¹² and their commander Neoptolemus had ceased to carry out directives from the regent (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1–2). The exact nature of the "confusion" that Neoptolemus had caused is unknown. Given the inherently difficult nature of the campaign, Plutarch's statements could easily indicate that the troops had balked at further fighting and their commander had proven powerless to persuade them to continue. Clearly this was not a case of Neoptolemus's insubordination. Perdikkas did

12. 3. 28). Orontes' family appears to have held Greater Armenia virtually as an hereditary fief since the time of Darius I (see Cook, *Empire*, 170–1). According to Curtius (4. 12. 10, 12; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 3. 8. 5), there were two contingents of Armenians at the battle of Gaugamela, "Armenii quos Minores appellant" and the "natio Maioris Armeniae."

⁹ Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 4. 3–5; Plut. *Luc.* 32; Tac. *Ann.* 13. 35. 5–6.

¹⁰ Str. 11. 13. 7, 14. 9; Xen. *Anab.* 4. 5. 24, 35–36.

¹¹ H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, (Munich: Beck, 1926; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1973) 2:295 [#593].

¹² Briant ("D'Alexandre le Grand aux diadoques: le cas d'Eumène de Kardia (1^{er} article.)," *REA* 74 [1972]: 58–9) believes that the troubles were with Eumenes' Macedonians. While the exact reference (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 2) is unclear, later in 320 Neoptolemus had under his command "a considerable number of Macedonians" (Diod. 18. 29. 4). These would likely be the very same troops responsible for the problems in Armenia. See A. B. Bosworth, "Eumenes, Neoptolemus, and PSI XII 1284," *GRBS* 19 (1978): 233 n. 26.

not remove him from Armenia and, indeed, later even put a degree of trust in him (cf. Diod. 18. 29. 2), but this Armenian situation did lead the regent subsequently to limit Neoptolemus's authority. He had proven ineffectual as a leader.

At first, Eumenes made little headway with either the troops or their commander (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3); indeed, it was probably during this operation that Neoptolemus uttered the statement, found in Plutarch (*Eum.* 1. 6), that while he, Neoptolemus, "followed Alexander with shield and spear, Eumenes had followed the king with pen and paper." Eumenes soon dealt with the situation by raising a force of sixty-three hundred Cappadocian cavalry through the use of outright gifts and the promise of immunity from taxation (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3-4).¹³ Darius had used Cappadocian cavalry against Alexander,¹⁴ and Ariarathes had possessed fifteen thousand cavalry in 322 (Diod. 18. 16. 2). The addition of Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry "emboldened the Macedonians" (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 4), and rekindled their enthusiasm for the campaign. There is no further word of difficulties in Armenia, and Perdiccas left Neoptolemus in command (cf. Diod. 18. 29. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2). However, it seems apparent that Eumenes was intermittently involved in this operation perhaps until 320, campaigning in 322 and 321.¹⁵ It is also likely that Eumenes spent at least part of his time with Perdiccas. He was by 321 one of Perdiccas's chief advisors (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21).

In Cilicia Perdiccas and the royal army spent the winter of 322/321.¹⁶ In winter quarters Perdiccas and his advisers began to make

¹³ Eumenes' concessions to the Cappadocians and his confidence in their military ability secured him a very loyal province. At the time of his death, even though Eumenes hadn't been in the area for almost three years, his mother, wife, and children were still resident in Cappadocia (Nepos *Eum.* 13. 4). The loyalty of the native populations to those of Alexander's successors who treated them with favor could be great, as was the case with the Pisidians and Alcetas (Diod. 18. 46. 2-47. 3).

¹⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 8. 5, 11. 7; Curt. 4. 12. 12.

¹⁵ Eumenes' campaigning in Armenia, although not attested in the sources seems probable (see Bosworth, "*PSI* XII 1284," 233). Eumenes had recruited the Cappadocian cavalry force (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3-4), and it is unlikely that he would have turned this force over to Neoptolemus. In 320, while battling Eumenes, it is clear that Neoptolemus lost primarily because of his great deficiency in cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 3; *PSI* XII 1284). He clearly did not have sixty-three hundred Cappadocian horsemen in 320.

¹⁶ No source gives any indication of the ending of 322; there is no reference to seasonal changes, nor to the army retiring into camp. With respect to the location of Perdiccas's winter quarters there are two possibilities. According to Diodorus (18. 22. 1), Perdiccas departed for Pisidia, where he subsequently laid siege to the cities of the Larandians and the Isaurians. Prior to this campaign Eumenes was sent back

plans for the coming year. At this time Perdiccas's intentions were to secure unquestioned control of Asia Minor, and maintain peaceful relations with Antipater in Macedonia and Ptolemy in Egypt. Neoptolemus and Eumenes were campaigning in Armenia; the regent's presence in Cilicia gave him access to the royal treasury and a prosperous land in which to refresh his troops (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1. 2. 22). While Perdiccas certainly wished to achieve greater cohesion in the empire, there is no evidence that he contemplated challenging Ptolemy in Egypt or Antipater in Europe. Indeed, Perdiccas demonstrated no apparent interest in the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia. If he were expecting to invade Macedonia or to be attacked from Europe, he would have paid closer attention to this province. Since the departure of Leonnatus for Macedonia, there had not been a satrap in this region.

Perdiccas, as part of his general campaign in Asia Minor, in the spring moved into Pisidia for a campaign against two recalcitrant cities, those of the Larandians and of the Isaurians (Diod. 18. 22. 1). These peoples had murdered the Cilician satrap Balacrus sometime late in Alexander's reign (Diod. 18. 22. 1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 2. 12. 2).¹⁷ Both cities fell after short and brutal campaigns (Diod. 18. 22. 2–7).¹⁸ With their capture Perdiccas and his forces settled in Pisidia and took up the question of Antigonus. The latter had shown a reluc-

to Cappadocia from Cilicia by Perdiccas (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1). These passages suggest that Perdiccas either continued on to Pisidia and entered winter quarters there, or wintered in Cilicia. The latter appears to be the most likely. Perdiccas clearly had entered Cilicia and with this area only having been recently abandoned by Craterus it was certainly in Perdiccas's interest to ensure the loyalty of the forces left there. Spending the winter would have given him the opportunity to accomplish this goal. Diodorus has collapsed events, omitting the wintering in Cilicia. In fact, Diodorus leaves out all mention of Cilicia, including the acquisition of the hypaspists/argyraspids.

¹⁷ On the campaign against the Larandians and the Isaurians, see Diodorus 18. 22; for the previous history of Pisidia, see A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971; reprinted Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1983) 124–6; for Balacrus, see W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* [London and New York: Routledge, 1992], 260–1.

¹⁸ While most assume this campaign against the Pisidians occurred in the following spring (Schober, *Untersuchungen*, 58; R. A. Billows, *Antigonus the One-eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990], 58), Bosworth argues that it occurred in the fall of 322 ("Perdiccas and the Kings," *CQ* 43 [1993]: 427 n. 45). Nothing in the sources makes this impossible, but Perdiccas left Pisidia early in 320 (Diod. 18. 25. 6), having spent the winter of 322/321 in Cilicia. There is no apparent reason for him to have moved into Pisidia, if he had during the previous fall taken the two cities and subsequently moved back to Cilicia.

tance to follow the regent's lead, and it was decided to deal harshly with him for his refusal to aid Eumenes.¹⁹ The Phrygian satrap was summoned to answer charges formally before the king and his council (Diod. 18. 23. 4). The invitation was issued probably in the late spring of 321 (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 20; Diod. 18. 23. 3).²⁰ Perdiccas's purpose was to force Antigonos to flee, since Antigonos would be difficult to move against militarily.²¹ The regent was obviously in no hurry; it had been well over a year since Eumenes abortive campaign. In the final analysis he hoped to accomplish his purpose without having to invade Phrygia. Consequently, Antigonos was given time in which to respond (cf. Diod. 18. 23. 4). The regent's campaign in Pisidia must have alarmed Antigonos, since the main military road from the coast passed through Pisidia and continued to Celaenae. Also, Pisidia had been ostensibly under Antigonos's control, but in the aftermath of the battle of Issus, the area had gained complete independence.²²

Also, in the spring of 321, one of Antipater's daughters, Nicaea, accompanied by her brother Iolaos, arrived in Perdiccas's camp.²³ Perdiccas had requested her hand in marriage shortly after the settlement was reached in Babylon.²⁴ Antipater's preoccupation with the

¹⁹ While Billows (*Antigonos*, 58–9) correctly points out that the actual charges are never specified (Diodorus [18. 23. 4] only states that the charges were "false and unjust"; Arrian *Succ.* 1. 20, gives no specifics or characterizations), and that this allegation comes approximately a year and a half after the event, still Antigonos's only known offense was his lack of response to the call to help Eumenes (see Briant, *Antigone*, 155–6). M. J. Fontana (*Le lotte per la successione di Alessandro Magno dal 323 al 315* [Palermo: Presso l'Accademia, 1960] 328–9), however, claims that Antigonos was not charged with refusing to help Eumenes, but rather refusing to aid Antipater during the Lamian War, but no source indicates that Antigonos was ever asked to send aid to Europe.

²⁰ Diodorus (18. 23. 1–3) places the charges against Antigonos after Perdiccas's marriage to Antipater's daughter which must have occurred in the late spring or summer. Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 20–21), however, places the call to answer charges before her arrival in Asia. Arrian is to be preferred. Diodorus in this same passage states that Perdiccas moved against Antigonos because the latter had become aware of the intriguing with Alexander's sister, Cleopatra. Clearly when Antigonos fled to Europe late in 321 he carried this knowledge with him (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26, cf. 25. 1–2). Billows (*Antigonos the One-eyed*, 59 n. 16) is correct that Diodorus through his radical abridging has confused the initial call to Antigonos to answer charges with the later report to Antipater. The campaigns in Pisidia were of short duration (Diod. 18. 22. 2–4).

²¹ E. M. Anson, "Antigonos, the Satrap of Phrygia," *Historia* 37 (1988): 471–7.

²² Billows (*Antigonos*, 46) suggests that Antigonos was only assigned western Pisidia by Alexander.

²³ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1; Just 13. 6. 6.

²⁴ Errington ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 61–2) states that the purpose of Perdiccas's

Lamian War had initially delayed his response to Perdiccas's request.²⁵ As part of Antipater's strategy for the new era without Alexander, he wished to create alliances with various *principes* through marriages to his daughters.²⁶ Eurydice was married to Ptolemy (Paus. 1. 6. 8);²⁷ and Phila married Craterus after the completion of the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 18. 7). Antipater and Craterus had returned to Macedonia late in the winter of 322/21, and had begun to make plans of their own. A full scale invasion of Aetolia was to begin in the spring (Diod. 18. 24. 1–25. 2). Further, it was decided that Craterus would eventually return to Asia (Diod. 18. 18. 7). Clearly it was determined to try to reach an accommodation with Perdiccas to accomplish this purpose.

From the time of the settlement in Babylon, Antipater had been scrupulously correct in his dealings with the central government as represented by the kings and their regent. Shortly after the surrender of Athens at the close of the Lamian War he had referred the question of Athenian possession of Samos to the kings (Diod. 18. 18. 6), i.e. to Perdiccas. The Samian exiles were subsequently restored and the island freed on "Perdiccas's order" (Diod. 18. 18. 9). Antipater had been, however, in communication with Ptolemy and these communications had led to an "understanding" (Diod. 18. 14. 2; cf. 18. 25. 4), and, perhaps, as noted, a marriage. The nature of the understanding is not made clear. Perdiccas was himself preparing for a time when relations with Antipater might sour. He was in contact with the Aetolians and in receipt of letters from the Athenian

request for the marriage was to form an alliance against Craterus. While Errington is right to point out the possible threat that Craterus posed to the settlement and Perdiccas's authority, Craterus showed himself to be surprisingly accommodating to both the settlement reached in Babylon and the regent. When he departed Cilicia, he left the treasury intact and well-guarded, thus acting as a loyal subject of the new regime. Given these actions, there is no evidence that Craterus wished to challenge Perdiccas.

²⁵ There is no evidence for Errington's claim ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 59) that the delay resulted from Antipater's dissatisfaction with the settlement reached in Babylon. There were ample concerns to keep Antipater occupied until 321, nor is there any evidence of dissatisfaction. Antipater despite his assigned joint command with Craterus (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7), should have been pleased. After all Alexander had ordered Craterus to replace him in Macedonia (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 4).

²⁶ Antipater had four daughters: Phila, Nicaea, Eurydice, and one whose name is unknown (see Heckel, *Marshals*, 39).

²⁷ There is no indication when this marriage took place, but most likely Eurydice was sent to Egypt about the same time Nicaea was sent to Asia.

leader Demades which invited intervention in Europe.²⁸ Antipater only found out about these communications after Perdiccas's death (Diod. 18. 48. 2).

Concurrent with Nicaea's arrival, Alexander's sister, Cleopatra, appeared offering herself in marriage to the regent.²⁹ It is possible that Eumenes was responsible for Cleopatra's appearance at this time.³⁰ The instigation for the proposal came from Olympias (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21; cf. Just. 13. 6. 4), and she and Eumenes had close relations.³¹ Moreover, after her arrival it was Eumenes who championed her proposal (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21). Between Eumenes and Antipater there was long-standing enmity.³² It was in Eumenes' interests to discourage an alliance between his new patron and Antipater. The presence of two potential marriage partners for the regent brought into the open a rift which had developed within the ranks of Perdiccas's counselors. Alcetas supported the marriage with Nicaea and thereby the alliance with Antipater; Eumenes advocated the union with Cleopatra and the creation of a bond with the royal family (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21).

The council apparently was in agreement on the policies being implemented in Asia. There is no mention in the sources of any opposition to the Cappadocian or Pisidian campaigns, nor to the steps being taken to remove Antigonus from Phrygia. Other issues were, however, being discussed. Ptolemy was apparently the object of some unspecified hostile activity (Diod. 18. 25. 4; 14. 2). But factional lines were being drawn principally over the relationship to Alexander's old regent in Macedonia. One group, led by Alcetas, clearly saw a division between the European and non-European areas of the empire, at least, while Antipater lived. Outside of Europe the regent's power was to be absolute, but in Europe he should recognize Antipater's authority. These advisers would have opposed the concealment from Antipater of the overtures from the Aetolians and

²⁸ Diodorus 18. 38. 1 states that at the start of hostilities between Perdiccas and Antipater there was already in existence a pact between the Aetolians and Perdiccas, but neither he, nor any source indicates a date when these communications began. Errington ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 62-3) believes that negotiations were initiated in 322. As noted earlier, Errington argues that Antipater became a threat to Perdiccas through his association with Craterus.

²⁹ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1; Just. 13. 6. 4.

³⁰ See Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisos," 62-3.

³¹ Cf. Plut. *Eum.* 13. 1; Diod. 18. 58. 2-3; Nepos *Eum.* 6.

³² See Chapter 2.

the letters from Demades. They saw no need for the marriage alliance with Alexander's family. Perdiccas, they believed, had already secured the loyalty of the royal army through his successful campaigns in Cappadocia and Pisidia. Further, he controlled the persons of the kings and the royal treasuries.

The other faction, that headed by Eumenes (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21),³³ wished to make Perdiccas master of Alexander's entire empire; a marriage to Cleopatra would lay the groundwork for Perdiccas eventually to move from regent to king in his own right. To Eumenes and his faction, the current monarchy was a farce. The reality was that as regent and commander of the majority of Alexander's former army, Perdiccas was the actual ruler in Asia. Marriage to Cleopatra would enhance his standing with these troops whose respect for the Argead family had made the slow-witted Arrhidaeus king. In any case, in Babylon the troops had shown themselves not at all adverse to the prospect of Perdiccas's kingship (Curt. 10. 6. 18). It was Perdiccas's hesitation to accept such a role that, in part, led to the call for the enthronement of Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10. 6. 16-19).³⁴ These same troops subsequently expressed their indignation over Meleager's plot to kill Alexander's former chiliarch (Curt. 10. 8. 5). Of course, the problem now with any attempt to make Perdiccas king was that, unlike in Babylon, when Aristonous had made his

³³ It is curious that Eumenes and Alcetas are the respective spokesmen for these two positions. There were associated with Perdiccas many commanders with more prominence, such as Seleucus (on his position with Perdiccas, see A. Mehl, *Seleukos Nikator und sein Reich*, Vol. 1, *Studia Hellenistica* 28 [Louvain, 1986] 23-4), Antigenes, and Pithon (Diod. 18. 39. 6). These commanders are omitted from our sources' accounts of the debate entirely. With respect to Eumenes in particular, his role in this controversy may reflect Hieronymus's efforts to heighten Eumenes' importance, but, given the later actions of Seleucus, Antigenes, Pithon, Eumenes probably was, in fact, the leader of the faction seeking the marriage and the break with Antipater. His rise to prominence amongst the regent's advisers was then very swift. Initially he was separated from the court and sent to occupy a distant province. Despite his attempt to continue on with Perdiccas after the conquest of Cappadocia he had been sent back to his satrapy. The change in his importance must be directly related to his campaigning in Armenia and his prominence in the eyes of the rank-and-file soldiers (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6). These troops approved of Eumenes both for his former connection to the dead Alexander and for his redeeming of the situation in Armenia.

³⁴ Perdiccas may already have had a familial connection to the royal family (Curt. 10. 7. 8). This passage, however, is ambiguous; "stirpe regia genitos" could refer either to the royal family of Macedonia or to the royal family of Orestes which only lost its independence in the reign of Philip II (N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979] 2:17-18).

proposal, there were currently kings raised to the throne by these very same troops. Moreover, these soldiers would remember Perdiccas's betrayal of the infantry leaders in Babylon.³⁵ Claiming the monarchy now would be an entirely different proposition from what it would have been in 323.

For Eumenes the risk would be well worth it. In his view, while Perdiccas was preeminent in Asia, both Ptolemy and Antipater held significant parts of Alexander's empire in virtual independence. In Egypt, Ptolemy's power had increased rapidly after 323. Ptolemy had found eight thousand talents in the Egyptian treasury which he had used to hire mercenaries (Diod. 18. 14. 1). Besides the mercenaries, Ptolemy also inherited the four thousand troops and 30 triremes which Alexander had left behind in Egypt (Curt. 4. 8. 4; Arr. *Anab.* 3. 5. 3-5). The satrap had subsequently murdered Cleomenes who had been appointed in Babylon as the former's second-in-command (Paus. 1. 6. 3),³⁶ annexed Cyrene without the consent of the kings (Diod. 18. 19-21; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 16-19),³⁷ and may have already begun negotiations with the Cypriot kings (Just. 13. 6. 19).³⁸ Additionally, even though no formal alliance between Ptolemy and Antipater was concluded until the winter of 321/320 (Diod. 18. 25. 4), they had corresponded earlier and some sort of understanding had been reached (Diod. 18. 14. 2).³⁹ These actions taken along with the

³⁵ Curt. 10. 9. 7-21; Diod. 18. 4. 7; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 4; Just. 13. 4. 8.

³⁶ The exact date and circumstances of Cleomenes' death are unknown (see J. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I*, *Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und Antiken Rechtsgeschichte* 56 [Munich: C. H. Beck, 1969] 112). All that can be said is that it occurred sometime after Ptolemy's arrival in Egypt and the new satrap was responsible.

³⁷ The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239B F-10) places the acquisition in the archon year 322/21. Seibert (*Untersuchungen*, 110) does not see Ptolemy's actions in Cyrene as a cause for war. He points out that the sources do not mention it as a cause, but the specific charges brought against Ptolemy by Perdiccas are not clearly stated. There are just references to unspecified transgressions (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 28). Diodorus (18. 29. 1; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 28), however, makes it clear that Perdiccas was alarmed at Ptolemy's "growing power," and the acquisition of Cyrene certainly was a demonstrable element in that growth.

³⁸ See Briant, *Antigone*, 183 n. 2.

³⁹ K. Rosen, "Die Bündnisformen der Diadochen und der Zerfall des Alexanderreiches," *Acta Classica* 11 (1968): 182-210. It is certain that a formal alliance was quickly concluded after Perdiccas's hostile intent towards both parties became obvious. Some such arrangement was also made between Lysimachus and Antipater. Antipater and Craterus were apparently granted safe passage across Thrace on their way to Asia. No interference is noted and subsequently at Triparadeisos Lysimachus was confirmed in his satrapy (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 45).

possibility of Craterus's return to Asia, in the view of Eumenes' faction, made conflict with Antipater and Ptolemy inevitable. For such a contest Perdiccas would need every advantage, if he were to win. In an age when the names of Philip and Alexander were talismans, a marital connection to the Argead family would enhance the chances of, if not insure, Perdiccas's success. In this crisis, as in the one in Babylon, Perdiccas wavered. He apparently wished to marry Cleopatra and claim the kingship, but feared incurring Antipater's wrath (Diod. 18. 23. 3; cf. Just. 13. 6. 6). He may have wanted to await more favorable circumstances, and in the interim forestall Antipater. Errington has suggested that Perdiccas had determined to accompany Alexander's body, which was still in Babylon, to Aegae and with this psychological advantage then confront Antipater.⁴⁰ Errington anticipates subsequent events. At this time there is no suggestion in the sources that Perdiccas planned to confront Antipater in Macedonia. As seen earlier, no concern had been shown with respect to Hellespontine Phrygia. However, while in the end Perdiccas did marry Nicaea,⁴¹ it is interesting to note that Cleopatra did not return to Europe but remained in Asia Minor, settling in Sardis (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26).

Eumenes' arguments for the immediate marriage to Cleopatra were strengthened by subsequent events. Sometime after Perdiccas's union with Nicaea, Cynane, a daughter of Philip II and the widow of Amyntas Perdicca, Philip II's nephew and Alexander's cousin, arrived in Asia demanding that her own daughter Adeia be married to King Philip.⁴² Cynane had raised a troop of her own and had forced her way out of Macedonia despite Antipater's attempt to block her departure (Polyaen. 8. 60). Perdiccas sent Alcetas north to intercept her. When her determination proved unshakeable, Cynane was murdered by Alcetas probably on Perdiccas's orders.⁴³ The result

⁴⁰ See R. M. Errington, "Alexander in the Hellenistic World," in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité: 7 exposés suivis de discussions/par A. B. Bosworth... [et al.], avec la participation de Denis van Berchem... [et al.]; entretiens préparés par E. Badian, présidés par Denis van Berchem, Vanduvres-Genève, 25-30 août 1975*, edited by E. Badian, *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 22 (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1976) 142-3; cf. P. Goukowsky, *Essai sur les origines des mythes d'Alexandre: 336-270 av. J.C.* (Nancy: Université de Nancy, 1978) 87; Goukowsky (*ibid.*, 300 n. 25), despite his arguments that Perdiccas had designs on Macedonia, denies that Perdiccas wanted to be king in his own right.

⁴¹ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21, 26; Diod. 18. 23. 3; Justin (13. 6. 6-7) inaccurately states that they were never married.

⁴² Arr. *Succ.* 1. 22; Polyaen. 8. 60; cf. Diod. 19. 52. 5.

⁴³ Diod. 19. 52. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 22-23; Polyaen. 8. 60; see Errington, "Babylon

was a riot by the royal army which forced Perdiccas to agree to the marriage. Adea now changed her name to Eurydice.⁴⁴

The Cynnane episode was a major turning point for Perdiccas and his allies. It was now very clear to Perdiccas that his control of the army was not as total as Alcetas had insisted or as he himself had supposed. His authority over the troops, gained in hard campaigning, was now undermined. Certainly Adea/Eurydice compromised Perdiccas's control over King Philip. The incident with Cynnane demonstrated that the marriage to Cleopatra, despite the risks involved, was essential (cf. Just. 13. 6. 4). Eumenes, who had remained in contact with Cleopatra, was ordered secretly to reopen negotiations concerning a marriage.⁴⁵ Plans were now made for an invasion of Macedonia (Diod. 18. 23. 3, 25. 3, 6).

That spring Alexander's body was to have completed its long journey from Babylon to Aegae, to be buried in the former capital as required by Macedonian custom (Paus. 1. 6. 3).⁴⁶ Perdiccas now determined to accompany the dead king to Macedonia.⁴⁷ The

to Triparadeisos," 64; contra: Briant (*Antigone*, 261), who claims Perdiccas's orders were to intimidate her, not to murder her. All indications are that Perdiccas did order her death. Soon after Alexander's death, in league with Roxane, Perdiccas had arranged the assassination of Stateira, Darius' daughter and Alexander's pregnant Persian wife, and her sister Drypetis (Plut. *Alex.* 77. 6). Indeed, the two murders are strikingly similar. In the first Perdiccas did not wish to risk his alliance with Roxane and thereby his control over her potential heir by the possible birth of a rival; in the second he was unwilling to share his control of Philip. There was no obvious objection to the marriage between Adea and Philip apart from Perdiccas's own interests.

⁴⁴ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 23; Polyæn. 8. 60; Diod. 19. 52. 5.

⁴⁵ Eumenes' continued contact with Cleopatra is nowhere stated in the sources, but circumstantial evidence would appear conclusive. Cleopatra had remained in Asia; Eumenes was the chief supporter of her marriage proposal in 321 (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21), and in 320 he was sent to her with a formal offer of marriage from Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 25).

⁴⁶ See E. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 167, 256–60.

⁴⁷ Diodorus (18. 3. 5; cf. 18. 28. 3) states that it was decided in the conclave of the *principes* in Babylon following the reconciliation of the cavalry and infantry that the body was to be transported to Siwah for burial (accepted by E. Badian, "A King's Notebooks," *HSCP* 72 [1967]: 187–8). Here Diodorus is, perhaps, reflecting Alexander's personal wish (Curt. 10. 5. 4), one of those *hypomnemata* rejected by the army in Babylon (Diod. 18. 4; on the *hypomnemata*, see A. B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) 185–211), or remembering a detail from his source for Alexander's campaign, or something he may have heard on his own visit to Egypt (Diod. 1. 44. 1; cf. 1. 10. 6–7, 22. 2, 61. 4), and may have been impressed by the official Egyptian accounts. Perdiccas, argues Badian ("Notebooks," 188), had ordered the

propaganda value of returning Alexander's body to Macedonia is obvious.⁴⁸ To arrive in Macedonia conveying the dead king, in the company of the kings, as Cleopatra's husband, and likely met by Alexander's mother, would have made Perdiccas invincible. With this change in policy, Perdiccas now likely responded to the earlier overtures from the Aetolians and the Athenian leader Demades (Diod. 18. 48. 2; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 14). It was at this time that Eumenes began his ascendancy to the position of chief adviser to the regent. Eumenes' arguments for the inevitability of hostilities and the importance of the marriage to Cleopatra now seemed proven.

In the winter of 321/320, Antigonus fled to Macedonia.⁴⁹ Since being initially summoned, Antigonus had given every indication that he meant to defend himself before the king, but all the while he clandestinely had planned his flight to Europe (Diod. 18. 23. 3–4). Additionally, he had prepared for his eventual return to Asia by cementing his ties with Menander, the satrap in Lydia,⁵⁰ and possibly with Asander in Caria.⁵¹ While Briant argues that Asander and Menander remained loyal to Perdiccas until the successful crossing to Asia by Antipater and Craterus,⁵² there is evidence which suggests

body to Aegae in the spring, since his relations with Antipater were good. But when this relationship likewise deteriorated, Arrhidaeus was ordered to remain in Babylon. But if the body was not to leave Babylon, why did Perdiccas wait so long before attempting to stop its journey. The departure from Babylon was hardly secret. The cortege drew large crowds in every city along its route (Diod. 18. 28. 1). Moreover, a carriage drawn by 64 mules, all outfitted with gilded crowns and jewel-studded yokes (Diod. 18. 27. 5) would have moved very slowly (see Anson, "Triparadeisus," 212). If Arrhidaeus had violated his instructions by leaving Babylon, Perdiccas would certainly have had sufficient time to intercept the cortege long before it left Mesopotamia and entered Syria. The body was from the beginning meant to go to Aegae; Arrhidaeus violated his instructions by turning south and heading to Egypt (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 25).

⁴⁸ In 318, Eumenes and his forces formally worshiped the dead Alexander (see chapter 6).

⁴⁹ Diod. 18. 25. 3–5; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 24; *FGrH* 230 B10–11; Antigonus found Antipater and Craterus in the midst of a winter campaign in Aetolia (Diod. 18. 25. 1–3).

⁵⁰ Menander had been initially appointed to this position by Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 7–8 [as emended]; 7. 23. 1; *Syll.*³ 302, 4–5) and was confirmed in his satrapy at Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 6; 1b. 2; Curt. 10. 10. 2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; Just. 13. 4. 15).

⁵¹ On Asander, see *Berve Alexanderreich*, 2187 [#164].

⁵² Briant, *Antigone*, 189, 208, cf. 169. Briant (*ibid.*, 161), however, earlier states that Asander and Menander knew of Antigonus's proposed flight but did nothing to hinder it. H. Hauben ("The First War of the Successors (321 B.C.E.): Chronological and Historical Problems," *Ancient Society* 8 [1977]: 92 n. 36) in light of this state-

that Menander, at least, was deeply involved with Antigonus in the plot to draw Antipater and Craterus to Asia. Diodorus (18. 23. 3) indicates that Antigonus was well informed of the intrigues involving Cleopatra. Menander as satrap of Lydia was ideally situated to know of activities involving Cleopatra, since she was then resident in Sardis. Moreover, when Antigonus returned to Asia early in 320 with but three thousand troops, both Asander and Menander joined him without hesitation (Arrian *Succ.* 25. 1–2, 26). Perhaps, the two satraps also feared Perdiccas's "ambitions" (cf. Diod. 18. 23. 3).⁵³ Perdiccas was often heavy-handed with respect to the satraps. In addition to his actions against Antigonus, prior to his departure for Egypt, he had placed Caria and Lydia under Eumenes' overall authority; indeed, Menander, while remaining in command of the military forces in Lydia, was also apparently made subservient to the authority of Cleopatra (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2).

Questions have been raised about the validity of Perdiccas's reported "ambitions." Fontana argues that Perdiccas was not personally ambitious; everything he did was to preserve the unity of the empire.⁵⁴ Perdiccas, she argues, had to direct a royal army without a real king. The marriage to Cleopatra was then necessary to increase the regent's prestige and enable him to resist the forces of disintegration. Briant, however, is correct that Perdiccas's actions against members of the royal family⁵⁵ and his double-dealing with Antipater are more telling of his goals than his supposed loyalty to the kings.⁵⁶ While it is clear that Ptolemy was disloyal to the central government, Antipater prior to this winter was not. As indicated earlier, Antipater deferred to the regent. Furthermore, Perdiccas's killing of Cynane cannot be explained in any way other than that he wished to maintain his exclusive control of King Philip; his treacherous dealings with the Aetolians and with Demades, likewise, did not serve the interests of

ment finds Briant's denial of a previous alliance "surprising." Fontana (*lotte*, 169 n. 6; cf. Billows, *Antigonus*, 59) correctly argues that both were allied to Antigonus before he fled to Macedonia.

⁵³ See Hauben, "First War," 92–3.

⁵⁴ Fontana, *lotte*, 64–65; cf. A. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* (Münster: Druck und Verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1907) 35–6.

⁵⁵ See note 43.

⁵⁶ Briant, *Antigone*, 178–80. Heckel speaks of Perdiccas's "lofty ideals" but also emphasizes his "excessive ambition" (*Marshals*, 151).

centralization, only Perdiccas's personal ambitions. Diodorus's references to Perdiccas's "plans," therefore, are accurate. Perdiccas planned to marry Cleopatra and invade Macedonia (Diod. 18. 25. 3), and in these plans he was aided and abetted by Eumenes.

Upon his arrival in Macedonia, Antigonus warned Antipater of Perdiccas's designs (Diod. 18. 25. 3; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 24). He stated that Perdiccas would soon divorce Nicaea and marry Cleopatra as a preliminary to proclaiming himself king and invading Macedonia.⁵⁷ Whatever proof Antigonus supplied, it was convincing. Antipater, Craterus, and their commanders unanimously decided to end the on-going campaign in Aetolia on virtually any terms, and to prepare for an invasion of Asia Minor (Diod. 18. 25. 3-5).⁵⁸ It is difficult to believe that anything but the most damning evidence would have brought about this abrupt reversal of policy. While Antigonus was one of Antipater's "friends,"⁵⁹ he had neither been approached for aid in the Lamian War, nor had he voluntarily supplied any. In addition, as shown, Perdiccas did nothing to prevent his flight; Perdiccas certainly did not believe that Antigonus's influence with Antipater was sufficient to cause a war. Indeed, after Antipater and Craterus crossed to Asia, they were prepared to acknowledge Eumenes' control of much of Asia Minor in return for an alliance (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6); certainly, expanded powers for Eumenes would not benefit the then former satrap of Phrygia. Clearly Antigonus had acquired inside information, the veracity of which could not be doubted. The source of this information was most likely someone in Cleopatra's immedi-

⁵⁷ Diod. 18. 25. 3; cf. Diod. 18. 23. 3; Billows (*Antigonos*, 62-3) states that Antipater and Craterus did not decide to invade Asia and attack Perdiccas until Antigonus had returned to Asia and informed them of Eumenes' expedition to Sardis with the marriage proposal for Cleopatra. Diodorus (18. 25. 3), however, makes it very clear that the decision to invade Asia was made immediately upon Antigonus's arrival and warning. There is no reason to believe that Diodorus is simply anticipating the later proposal. The invasion came off promptly in the spring and Antigonus's activities prior to the crossing of Antipater and Craterus would have been foolhardy without the assurance of the coming assault on Asia.

⁵⁸ G. H. Macurdy's (*Hellenistic Queens: A Study of Woman-power in Macedonia, Seleucid Syria, and Ptolemaic Egypt* [Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press; Oxford and London: Oxford University Press, 1932] 47) claim that Antipater had hoped to marry Cleopatra himself or to arrange a marriage between her and one of his sons is unlikely. Olympias had aligned herself squarely against Antipater (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 7. 12. 5-7; Diod. 17. 118. 1; Just. 12. 14. 3; Plut. *Alex.* 39. 7; *Mor.* 180D), and Cleopatra was guided by her mother (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21).

⁵⁹ For the date of the initiation of their association, see Briant, *Antigone*, 232. Briant places a great deal more faith in the friendship than is deserved.

ate circle, who had passed it on to Menander, and though him ultimately to Antigonus. In 320, Menander certainly wasted no time deserting the Perdiccan cause and going over to Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2). Cleopatra obviously knew of the debate surrounding her which was going on in the Perdiccan council. After all, she did not leave Asia and return to her mother, but rather took up residence in Sardis, far enough away so as not to antagonize Nicaea, but certainly close enough if Perdiccas's plans were to change suddenly. From later evidence it seems certain her adviser in these matters was Eumenes (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26). He was closely tied to Olympias, who had probably told her daughter to follow his counsel.

While Perdiccas prepared to march in the spring to Macedonia with the kings and bring Alexander's body to Aegae for burial, events soon to take place in Syria were to alter these plans. During the winter of 321/320, Ptolemy by prearrangement with Arrhidaeus, the commander in charge of the transportation of Alexander's corpse, and, perhaps, also in collusion with Archon, the satrap of Babylonia,⁶⁰ intercepted the funeral cortege and diverted it to Egypt.⁶¹ After two years of construction Alexander's funeral carriage had begun its trek west from Babylon in early September 321 (Diod. 18. 28. 2),⁶² but contrary to Perdiccas's instructions, Arrhidaeus was taking the corpse to a rendezvous in southern Syria with Ptolemy.⁶³ Unfortunately for

⁶⁰ After this incident, Perdiccas sent Docimus to replace Archon in Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 3–5). The reasons for this alteration are not stated, but the assumption concerning Archon's involvement with Arrhidaeus is very plausible. Correspondence between Ptolemy and Arrhidaeus would have been difficult to conceal from the satrap of Babylonia.

⁶¹ Diod. 18. 28. 2–3; Arr. *Succ.* 24–5.

⁶² On the design of the carriage, see S. G. Miller, "Alexander's Funeral Cart," in *Ancient Macedonia IV, Papers read at the Fourth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, September 21–25, 1983* (Thessaloniki, 1986) 401–11.

⁶³ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 25; Diod. 18. 28. 2; Str. 17. 1. 8; Diodorus 18. 28. 2 states that Alexander's funeral carriage took "nearly two years" to complete. This would give a date probably in May/June 321 for the hearse's completion. Bosworth ("Chronology," 79–80) argues that Diodorus has rounded up Hieronymus's original figure. Given Diodorus's difficulties with chronology, dates with any degree of precision are most likely taken from his sources (see Chapter 1 and Anson, "Diodorus and the Date of Triparadeisus," 209–11). To fit Bosworth's chronology, the estimate of "nearly two years" would have to be radically out of line. It was only after Ptolemy's seizure of Alexander's corpse that Perdiccas launched his expedition against the Egyptian satrap (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 25; Diod. 18. 28. 2; Str. 17. 1. 8). Given the ornateness of the carriage (Diod. 18. 26. 5–6; 27. 3–5) and the ceremonial nature of the procession (Diod. 18. 28. 1), it would have taken the funeral cortege at least 90 days to complete the journey from Babylon to Syria where Ptolemy intercepted it (Anson,

Perdiccas, Ptolemy also realized the value in possessing Alexander's body. When Perdiccas discovered Arrhidaeus's intentions, he dispatched a force commanded by Polemon and Attalus to intercept the cortege (Arr. *Succ.* 25; 24. 1–4), but this force was repulsed by Ptolemy and the funeral train continued on to Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 25), where the body in the winter of 321/320 was interred temporarily in Memphis with elaborate rites (Paus. 1. 6. 3). Alexander was subsequently entombed in Alexandria (Diod. 18. 28. 3).

Even with the danger of invasion by the Europeans, Perdiccas's council decided unanimously to change plans and launch an assault on Egypt (Diod. 18. 25. 6). The invasion of Macedonia was predicated on returning both the kings and Alexander's body to their homeland. Decisions now needed to be made quickly with regard to the defense of Asia Minor. While Perdiccas with the bulk of the royal army and most of the officer corps would proceed to Egypt, Eumenes, Alcetas, and Neoptolemus would be left behind to resist Antipater and Craterus. Eumenes was given the overall command for the defense of Asia Minor.⁶⁴ Alcetas and Neoptolemus, and all other satraps in the area, were ordered to obey Eumenes during this current emergency (Diod. 18. 29. 2).⁶⁵ While it might appear curious that Perdiccas would place Eumenes in command of so important a military operation, this decision probably reflects, in part, Eumenes' activities in Armenia. This would explain Diodorus's claim (18. 29. 2) that Eumenes was chosen because of his skill as a general. Eumenes, while probably more engaged in military activities,

"Tripuradeisus," 212–213). Additional time would be spent transporting the body to Egypt. As Bosworth himself notes, this would require the funeral procession to have left Babylon in the previous autumn, i.e. in autumn 322. By this calculation the time from the start of construction to the start of the journey west becomes, in fact, less than eighteen months. Moreover, "nearly two years" refers to the time of construction, not whatever additional period was spent preparing for the body's transportation (cf. Diod. 18. 26. 1). It is likely that the correct time interval was "nearly" two years.

⁶⁴ Diod. 18. 29. 1–3; Just. 13. 6. 14–15; Nepos *Eum.* 3. 2; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2. The listing of satrapies given to Eumenes comes from Justin, who, however, places Lycia in his list, but not Lydia (Just. 13. 6. 14). R. Engel ("Zur Chronologie von Perdikkas' Massnahmen am Vorabend des ersten Koalitionskrieges 321 v. Chr.," *RhM* 115 [1972]: 218–9) argues that Lycia is correct, but see Briant (*Antigone*, 198) and Hauben ("First War," 100) who argue convincingly that the satrapy mentioned in Justin should be Lydia.

⁶⁵ All of these extra responsibilities were meant to last only as long as the current emergency (cf. Fontana, *lotte*, 82 n. 34).

especially with respect to cavalry, during Alexander's reign than has been presented in the sources,⁶⁶ certainly had not developed such a military reputation prior to his involvement in Cappadocia and Armenia.⁶⁷ Moreover, most of the experienced officers were in charge of units in the royal army. Seleucus commanded the companion cavalry (Diod. 18. 3. 4);⁶⁸ Antigenes commanded the argyraspids;⁶⁹ Aristonous accompanied Perdicas and subsequently led the expedition against the Cypriot kings (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6), and Pithon, the son of Crateuas, held a prominent command as well (Diod. 18. 36. 5). Of those left in Asia, Eumenes' selection for overall command was in part dictated by his previous standing with Alexander and his efforts to effect a reconciliation between the infantry and cavalry in Babylon. Perdicas had been sufficiently impressed by the Cynane episode with the residual loyalty of his troops to the Argead family. Moreover, while Neoptolemus could also claim a connection to Alexander,⁷⁰ his earlier difficulties in Armenia undermined the regent's confidence in him (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1). Alcetas's position with the troops had been damaged by his involvement in the Cynane affair. In addition to Eumenes' connection to Alexander, his successes in Armenia, and his proven loyalty to Perdicas, his selection was also influenced by his command of a large force of Cappadocian cavalry (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3-4).

In Asia Minor the first line of defense was to be the Hellespont (Diod. 18. 25. 6, 29. 1-3). Cleitus remained in command of the majority of the royal fleet (Just. 13. 6. 16). While most of the transports

⁶⁶ See Chapter 2.

⁶⁷ K. Rosen ("Political Documents in Hieronymus of Cardia (323-302 B.C.)," *Acta Classica* 10 [1967]: 60) argues that the mention of Eumenes' generalship and faithfulness may be part of the decree formula which Hieronymus quoted and Diodorus included in his history. However, both of these qualities are emphasized throughout Diodorus in contexts which clearly cannot be tied to decrees. It is also improbable that Perdicas would have left in command someone with little actual military experience.

⁶⁸ Seleucus may have been second-in-command of the army (see Mehl, *Seleukos*, 1:23-4; Heckel, *Marshals*, 257).

⁶⁹ The argyraspids were Alexander's hypaspists, Alexander's old elite of the infantry line (see note 3).

⁷⁰ Neoptolemus was a scion of the Molossian royal house and, therefore, a distant relative of Alexander's (see Heckel, *Marshals*, 300-1). From 330 until 323 he had been the commander of the hypaspists (Heckel, *ibid.*, 301; A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988] 104).

sailed for Egypt, most of the battle fleet, which earlier under Cleitus had defeated the Greeks in the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 15. 8–9; Plut. *Demetr.* 11. 5), sailed from Cilicia to the Hellespont,⁷¹ arriving in March or April of 320.⁷² Eumenes in conjunction with the fleet would maintain control of the Asiatic coast of the strait. Perdiccan naval superiority made it virtually impossible for the Macedonians to cross. Cleitus commanded a fleet of approximately 150 warships; his fleet in the Lamian War had numbered 240 (Diod. 18. 15. 8–9). Antipater's fleet would have only included those ships of his new ally, Athens. While nowhere is it mentioned that the Athenians had to disband their fleet after their defeat in the Lamian War, the fleet had suffered at least three defeats during that campaign,⁷³ and after the war's conclusion twelve thousand lower class Athenians emigrated to Thrace at Antipater's urging (Diod. 18. 18. 4–5; Plut. *Phoc.* 28. 7).

⁷¹ See Briant, *Antigone*, 212–15. Errington ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 70 n. 142) believes that Justin's (16. 6. 16) reference to the fleet assignment for Cleitus in 320 is erroneous. Justin is the only source to make reference to this command and given Justin's propensity for confusing names, Errington's suspicion of this reference is understandable. But if Perdiccas meant to block the crossing of the Hellespont, he would need a fleet in the area. With Attalus and Sosigenes commanding fleet contingents elsewhere, Justin's reference to a fleet command for Cleitus appears correct. While Cleitus' earlier service with Craterus in Asia and with both Craterus and Antipater in the Lamian War (Just. 12. 12. 8; Diod. 18. 15. 8; Plut. *Demetr.* 11. 3; see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:209 [#428]) makes it surprising that Perdiccas would trust him with such an important command, Cleitus had returned with the fleet to Cilicia sometime after the war in Greece, and there had undoubtedly established good relations with Perdiccas (Cf. Hauben, "First War," 104–5). An inscription published by J. Keil ("Ephesische Bürgerrechts- und Proxeniendeckrete aus dem vierten und dritten Jahrhundert v. Chr.," *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes in Wien* 16 [1913]: 235 and 241) and dated 322/321 grants Ephesian citizenship jointly to Perdiccas's brother, Alcetas, and to Cleitus. Also, there is no mention of the fleet command being taken from Cleitus after the conclusion of the Lamian War. Given Cleitus' subsequent desertion hindsight certainly indicates that it would have been wiser to have placed the Aegean fleet under the command of another. Of course, such an attempted change might have provoked a desertion. Even though Justin provides few details relating to Cleitus' command, it appears certain that he was to coordinate his activities with Eumenes for the defense of the Hellespont. While it is not always safe to argue on the basis of what would be the most logical strategy, still, it would make a great deal more sense to associate immediately the fleet contingent under Cleitus with Eumenes' command. Preventing a crossing of the Hellespont without control of the strait itself would be impossible (see E. M. Anson, "The Persian Fleet in 334 B.C.," *CP* 84 [1989]: 44–9; surely, Perdiccas and his advisers knew this.

⁷² Cleitus left Cilicia in the late winter and arrived in the Hellespont no later than early April (roughly a journey of 30 days, see Anson, "Persian Fleet," 45 and n. 5).

⁷³ See Heckel, *Marshals*, 373–7.

Many of the emigres would have been those who manned the Athenian fleet. Cleitus operating out of any of the eastern coastal cities of the Hellespont could intercept ships attempting to make the crossing; those that got through could be dealt with by the forces under Eumenes' command, especially given Eumenes' superior cavalry.⁷⁴ Moreover, in accordance with their agreement with Perdiccas the Aetolians were prepared to invade Thessaly as soon as Antipater departed Macedonia (Diod. 18. 38. 1).⁷⁵

If the defense of the Hellespont for some unforeseen reason failed, the land forces would fall back before the forces of the Europeans; preparing ambushes and in general harassing the invaders. However, the Perdiccans had every confidence that the defense of the Hellespont would succeed. While Antipater and Craterus would be stronger in infantry, Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry joined with certain mercenary units from the royal army (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1) would give the edge in mobility to the Perdiccans.⁷⁶ In this second line of defense, the goal would be to slow the Europeans' advance, thus giving Perdiccas and his forces sufficient time to accomplish the conquest of Egypt. If the crossing succeeded, Briant is certainly correct that there was no plan to stage a decisive battle in Asia Minor.⁷⁷ The quality of the forces accompanying Antipater and Craterus was far superior to the forces left in Asia Minor by Perdiccas (cf. Diod. 18. 30. 4-5). The hope was that if the defense of the Hellespont failed, Perdiccas would defeat Ptolemy in time to turn and catch Antipater and Craterus between his victorious army moving north

⁷⁴ On the essentials for a successful blockade of the Hellespont, see Anson, "Persian Fleet," 44-9. In brief, a blockade involved a fleet, not standing off the coast, but beached and ready to row to intercept those attempting a crossing.

⁷⁵ On Antipater's and Craterus's departure, the Aetolians invaded Locris and Thessaly, and defeated and killed Antipater's general Polycles. Later, however, Polyperchon, the general in Macedonia, marched into Thessaly and defeated the Aetolians and recovered Thessaly (Diod. 18. 38. 2-6).

⁷⁶ Antipater and Craterus had taken the field against the Aetolians with thirty thousand infantry and twenty-five hundred cavalry (Diod. 18. 24. 1). Later in Asia Minor these commanders had divided their forces with Craterus's "portion" amounting to twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 29. 6, 30. 4). It is likely that Craterus received the bulk of the forces, since he was to engage Eumenes, while Antipater proceeded to Egypt. Eumenes subsequently in battle with Craterus possessed twenty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 30. 5).

⁷⁷ Briant, *Antigone*, 196.

from Egypt and his forces still intact in Asia Minor. In the eventuality of a crossing Cleitus would interdict supplies, aid the Aetolians, and encourage others in Greece to renounce their allegiance to Antipater. This secondary strategy was predicated on the initial Perdiccan advantage of distance. Eumenes, departing with his forces early in 320, would arrive at the Hellespont before the Macedonian troops could cross to Asia; Perdiccas departed Pisidia probably earlier in the year than Antipater and Craterus left Macedonia. The former would have departed in February or early March;⁷⁸ the latter in March or April.⁷⁹ Perdiccas would arrive in Egypt at least 60 days before the Macedonian forces could rendezvous with Ptolemy. Clearly Perdiccas and his advisers believed that Ptolemy could be dealt with long before Antipater and Craterus could arrive with reinforcements.

Perdiccas would be accompanied to Egypt by part of the fleet, perhaps as many as 90 ships, and a great many merchant vessels, under the command of his brother-in-law, Attalus (Diod. 18. 37. 2–3). The fleet was essential for a successful invasion. Not only would it protect the coastal flank, but it was needed to supply the army. Undoubtedly, Perdiccas had ordered grain and water stockpiled along the line of march, but the decision to invade Egypt had been made well after the Syrian harvest, and the march to Egypt would occur before the next.⁸⁰ The fleet would insure that no supply problems

⁷⁸ Clearly Perdiccas left Pisidia early enough to allow sufficient time to arrive when the Nile was not in flood. The distance from Pisidia to Pelusium is approximately nine hundred miles or a journey of slightly more than three months (calculated on the basis of a marching rate of ten miles per day with one day of rest every seven, or an average daily rate of nine miles per day, the minimal rate for an army with elephants (Engels, *Logistics*, 155–6). Given ideal conditions, such an army might have made an average 12 miles per day (D. Proctor, *Hannibal's March in History* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971] 34). Indications in Diodorus are that the Nile had begun to flood during Perdiccas's invasion (18. 33. 2, 34. 7, 35. 3). This would fix Perdiccas's death fairly precisely in June/July (see note 2).

⁷⁹ Grain in Asia Minor did not ripen until May at the earliest (Engels, *Logistics*, 29). This consideration had influenced the timing of Alexander's invasion of Asia (ibid., 27–9). Moreover, the Macedonian troops were in the midst of a winter campaign in Aetolia when Antigonus arrived with the tale of Perdiccas's ambition. It would take time to conclude, albeit unsatisfactorily, a peace with the Aetolians and to prepare for the new offensive. The march from Macedonia to the Hellespont would take approximately 20 days (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 5), putting the crossing in late April or early May.

⁸⁰ The harvest took place in Syria in May/June (Naval Intelligence Division, Great Britain, *Syria*, in *Geographical Handbook Series* [London: Oxford University Press?, 1943] 257). By leaving early in the spring, Perdiccas could take advantage of the streams and wells of Palestine before the summer heat dried up these sources, but Sinai would still present formidable logistical problems (see Engels, *Logistics*, 57–60).

developed. It, also, must be recalled that Ptolemy did possess a small fleet of warships (cf. Diod. 18. 21. 7).⁸¹ Later, while in Cilicia, Perdiccas dispatched Sosigenes to transport troops to Cyprus where the Cypriot kings had declared for Ptolemy (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6).⁸²

After Eumenes was placed in charge of Asia Minor with both Neoptolemus and Alcetas subordinated to his authority, the Cardian departed to take up the defense of the Hellespont (Diod. 18. 25. 6; 29. 1–3).⁸³ While sending the army on ahead, Eumenes with a small force rode to Sardis with a proposal of marriage for Cleopatra from Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26; 25. 2–6),⁸⁴ a proposal the sister of Alexander chose for the moment to decline.⁸⁵ She would wait for the outcome of the coming conflict. Unknown to the Perdiccans at the same time Eumenes was heading to Sardis with his proposal, Antigonus in

⁸¹ Hauben ("First War," 105–6) argues that Attalus' fleet must have included a considerable number of warships to counter the Ptolemaic fleet. Hauben points out that in 306, Antigonus in his unsuccessful invasion of Egypt had in his fleet 150 warships, "even though the Ptolemaic navy had been reduced to virtually nothing in the preceding spring." Ptolemy probably had at least 30 triremes in 320 (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 3. 5. 5); it is doubtful that at this time he had access to warships from Cyprus (see Hauben, "First War," 114; contra: Briant, *Antigone*, 206). A fleet of 80–90 ships would have been sufficient to forestall any naval operations by Ptolemy's fleet. Certainly there is no record of any naval operations during this campaign. Attalus had remained with the fleet at Pelusium, while Perdiccas marched up river to Memphis (Diod. 18. 37. 3); afterwards the former had retreated to Tyre (*ibid.*), and subsequently launched an unsuccessful attack on Rhodes (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 39).

⁸² Aristonous was in overall command of this expedition against the kings of Cyprus (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6).

⁸³ The size of Eumenes' force on the Hellespont is unclear. Nepos (*Eum.* 3. 3) implies that Eumenes was sent out with a comparatively small infantry force, but Diodorus (18. 29. 1–3) states that Eumenes' forces were "suitable" for his mission. It is unlikely that Eumenes had a large army; a "suitable" force needed to be mobile, but much less numerous than the army coming from Europe. If Cleitus did his job well, only a small part of the Macedonian forces would ever reach the Asiatic shore. If Cleitus failed, no Perdiccan force made up of those left in Asia Minor would be sufficient to stop the crossing. Even though Diodorus (18. 29. 2) states that Neoptolemus and Alcetas were sent with Eumenes to the Hellespont, neither of these commanders actually joined Eumenes either at this time or subsequently. Alcetas flatly refused to obey Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 3), and never left Pisidia (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 4); Neoptolemus later colluded with Craterus and Antipater (Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 5).

⁸⁴ Hauben ("First War," 93–5) places Eumenes in Sardis before the deliberations in Pisidia. However, Billows (*Antigonus*, 63 n. 24) successfully refutes this contention.

⁸⁵ Only the Heidelberg Epitome (*FGrH* 155 F-4) states that the marriage took place. Diodorus (20. 37. 3), recounting the death of Cleopatra, certainly implies that there was no marriage. "She was the sister of Alexander who conquered Persia . . . and had been the wife of the Alexander who made an expedition to Italy."

command of ten Athenian warships and three thousand men had landed in Caria (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 1).⁸⁶ As prearranged, Asander in Caria and Menander in Lydia joined him. The latter arranged the surrender of Ephesus and apparently much of the Ionian coast (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2–6). Indeed, Menander, learning that Eumenes was in Sardis, sent the news to Antigonus in Ephesus. Antigonus counseled him to remain openly friendly and keep Eumenes in the city. Meanwhile, Antigonus hurriedly assembled his three thousand infantry and some cavalry and set out for Sardis. Warned by Cleopatra, Eumenes managed to escape (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2–4, 6–7), but Antigonus had achieved a notable success. Much of western Asia Minor had repudiated the regent. Antigonus himself sailed for the Hellespont to prepare for the Hellespontine crossing of Antipater and Craterus.⁸⁷

The desertion of Asander and Menander were not as serious as other defections that soon followed. Cleitus and the Aegean fleet deserted the Perdiccan cause soon after their arrival in the Hellespont.⁸⁸ Additionally, the long neglect of Hellespontine Phrygia after Leonnatus's departure, now proved costly. The Hellespontine cities in response to overtures from Antipater, perhaps, brought by Antigonus, also

⁸⁶ Briant (*Antigone*, 207) claims that Antipater still had at his disposal the 110 ships left from the Lamian War. Hauben ("First War," 87–8), argues convincingly that this was not the case. As he notes, all indications are that the fleet returned to Asia with Cleitus at the end of the war. Cleitus was the successful admiral of the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 15. 8–9; Plut. *Demetr.* 11. 3), and he maintained a fleet command under Perdiccas (Just. 13. 6. 16). Antigonus's fleet probably consisted of whatever remained of the Athenian navy (see Hauben, "First War," 88–90). Billows (*Antigonos*, 62) may be correct that these were the very ships that carried him to Europe during his flight.

⁸⁷ Briant (*Antigone*, 202, 207–8, 211) argues that Antipater and Antigonus moved together to Asia with Antigonus arriving at Ephesus after Antipater and Craterus had already crossed to Asia. Briant insists that Cleitus only deserted the Perdiccan cause after the crossing (ibid., 195–7; cf. 202–3), and consequently, Antigonus was the fleet commander at the crossing. Photius's epitome of Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 26), however, places Eumenes' mission to Cleopatra and Antigonus's activities in Asia Minor before the crossing of the Hellespont by Antipater and Craterus. Antigonus was following the example of Parmenio and Attalus who in 336 by the command of Philip II advanced to Asia to secure the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont in preparation for a full scale invasion (Diod. 16. 91. 2). As noted, it would be absolutely essential that at least part of the Asiatic coast be secured, if the army was successfully to cross the strait (see Anson, "Persian Fleet," 44–9).

⁸⁸ While the sources are silent on Cleitus' actions, his desertion to Antipater is certain. There is no evidence he ever contested Antipater's passage to Asia. Moreover, after Perdiccas's death in Egypt, Cleitus was rewarded with the satrapy of Lydia (Diod. 18. 39. 6).

went over to the Europeans (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26).⁸⁹ These reverses forced Eumenes to abandon any attempt to block or even to hinder Antipater's crossing; with his troops he retreated into the interior, while reporting the military situation to Perdiccas.⁹⁰ This report reached Perdiccas in Cilicia.⁹¹ In response to the failure on the Hellespont, Perdiccas, in conformance with the plan for the second line of defense agreed to in Pisidia, ordered, this time by letter, Neoptolemus and Alcetas to obey Eumenes' commands for the operations in Asia Minor (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 1-2). That these letters had to be sent is indicative that in all likelihood neither Alcetas, nor Neoptolemus had accompanied Eumenes to the Hellespont. The regent must have been very well aware of the difficulties arising from his appointment of Eumenes to chief command in Asia Minor.⁹² Perdiccas also replaced

⁸⁹ Many of these Greek cities had acquired a special semi-autonomous status under Alexander which in the absence of evidence to the contrary was retained after his death (E. Badian, "Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia," in *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his Seventy-Fifth birthday*, edited by E. Badian [Oxford: Blackwell, 1966] 37-61). A clear example of this status is the case of Cyzicus. In 318 the then satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Arrhidaeus, tried to strengthen his position in his satrapy by placing garrisons in the coastal cities (Diod. 18. 51). Cyzicus successfully resisted and Diodorus (18. 51. 3) states that they did so in order to "maintain their freedom." The long absence of satrapal authority in the region would have heightened this sense of independence. It is also possible that Lysimachus, the ruler of Thrace (Diod. 18. 3. 2, 14. 2-4; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 7), aided the Europeans in subverting these Hellespontine cities (cf. W. W. Tarn, "The Heritage of Alexander," in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, edited by J. B. Bury, S. A. Cook and F. E. Adcock [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969; reprinted Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953] 6:471).

⁹⁰ Briant (*Antigone*, 209) and Hauben ("First War," 108) believe that in Arrian, *Succ.*, 1. 26, "Antipater and Craterus crossed having subverted through emissaries those guarding the strait," the forces subverted were Eumenes' troops. Briant holds that almost all of Eumenes' force, including his Cappadocian cavalry, deserted, while Hauben would preserve for Eumenes his cavalry (ibid., 116-117). Indeed, Briant (*Antigone*, 189-95, 202-3) argues that Eumenes' mission to Cleopatra in Sardis took place after Antipater and Craterus had already crossed to Asia. For Briant, Eumenes arrived in Sardis in full retreat from the Hellespont with only a handful of troops still remaining loyal to him; the majority of his troops having gone over to the enemy. While Photius's summary has no antecedent for "those guarding the strait," Cleitus' fleet was certainly the first line of Hellespontine defense. This ambiguous reference in Photius relates, therefore, to the desertion of the Aegean fleet and various Hellespontine coastal cities to Antipater and Craterus. If Eumenes had a large force desert him on the Hellespont, his subsequent possession of a large army becomes inexplicable (cf. Diod. 18. 29. 4-5).

⁹¹ Cf. Briant, *Antigone*, 196.

⁹² Earlier in Pisidia, Perdiccas had ordered Neoptolemus and Alcetas to accompany Eumenes to the Hellespont (Diod. 18. 29. 2; cf. 18. 25. 6), but they had not gone. That he would have to reconfirm his commands shows his knowledge of these

satraps he believed might emulate their colleagues in Asia Minor, notably in Cilicia and, if he hadn't done so earlier, in Babylon (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 2–3).⁹³ Also, in response to the revolt of most of Cyprus to Ptolemy, Perdiccas sent Sosigenes in charge of a newly raised Phoenician fleet with Aristonous commanding the land forces to meet the threat on the island (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6). After his successes along the Asiatic coast Antigonus sailed to Cyprus and joined the pro-Ptolemaic faction (cf Arr. *Succ.* 1. 30).

With the inevitability of the crossing by the Europeans now albeit assured, Eumenes and his forces fell back before their advance in line with the alternate plan decided upon in Pisidia.⁹⁴ While the

difficulties. J. Hornblower (*Hieronymus of Cardia* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981] 135) doubts the authenticity of these letters, arguing that Plutarch's reference to Eumenes' military skill calls the entire passage into question. However, as noted earlier, Eumenes had successfully campaigned in Armenia. Moreover, if Eumenes had no command experience, why would Perdiccas commit the defense of Asia Minor to him in any case?

⁹³ Archon was possibly removed from Babylonia because of involvement with Arrhidaeus and the diversion of Alexander's body. There is, however, no direct evidence of involvement. Indeed, virtually nothing is known about this individual, certainly nothing that would tie him to any particular faction. He may even have been appointed by Alexander in 324 and only been reassigned by the *principes* in Babylon (see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:86–7 [#163]). Philotas in Cilicia was removed because he was "well-disposed" toward Craterus (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 2). Philoxenos, who replaced Philotas in Cilicia, deserted to Antipater when that commander entered Cilicia (see Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisos," 70).

⁹⁴ Briant (*Antigone*, 192–9) argues that in Cilicia with the news of Eumenes' failure on the Hellespont, Perdiccas changed his strategy. For Briant, while the army was still in winter quarters in Pisidia, the decisions to invade Egypt and block Antipater's passage of the Hellespont were made. He claims further that while on the march to Egypt and in Cilicia, in the absence of Eumenes, Neoptolemus, and Alcetas, a second council was held where Eumenes' powers were expanded. Briant states this view despite his supposition that Eumenes' army had deserted to Antipater and Craterus (*ibid.*, 190–1). According to Briant (*ibid.*, 196–8, 202, 212–5), in this second council Eumenes was given the supreme command, *strategos autocrator*, in Asia Minor, and Cleitus was sent to the Aegean. This new strategy, continues Briant (*ibid.*, 271–2), was dictated by Perdiccas himself and gave rise to much opposition. There is little evidence to suggest that decisions other than the replacement of satraps were made after Perdiccas left Pisidia. Diodorus (18. 29. 1–2) implies but one meeting and attaches both Alcetas and Neoptolemus to Eumenes' command for the defense of the Hellespont; Justin (13. 6. 14–16) associates all of the decisions with one meeting which is mistakenly placed in Cappadocia; Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 26–8) gives no information concerning Perdiccas's planning for the campaigns; Nepos (*Eum.* 3. 2) mentions no deliberations, but speaks of Eumenes' authority over much of Asia Minor. Only Plutarch (*Eum.* 5. 2) could be interpreted as providing support for Briant's reconstruction. Plutarch associates the grant of overall authority in Asia Minor to Eumenes, the sending of letters to Alcetas and Neoptolemus, and the invasion of Cappadocia by Craterus. However, Plutarch is obviously sum-

number of loyal commanders in Asia Minor was dwindling rapidly, the combined forces of Eumenes, Alcetas, and Neoptolemus would be sufficient to carry out successfully their mission. There were, despite Perdiccas's letters, serious problems within Eumenes' command.

The two Macedonian commanders were jealous of Eumenes' authority over them (Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2-3). While Perdiccas's choice of Eumenes to lead the defense of Asia Minor made sense from the standpoint of the common soldiers, neither of the Macedonian aristocrats, Alcetas and Neoptolemus, were willing to be commanded by Eumenes. This reluctance resulted in part from their earlier dealings with Eumenes. Neoptolemus had seen the former chief secretary reorganize and reinvigorate his command in Armenia; Alcetas found his policy of accommodation with Antipater attacked by Eumenes and, subsequently, abandoned by his brother. Indeed, the split over the correct policy to be followed with regard to Antipater was probably very bitter; Photius's summary gives no details (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21). Additionally, prejudice played a role in their dissatisfaction with Eumenes' command. Eumenes was not a member of the hereditary Macedonian nobility, he was a foreigner, a Cardian Greek.⁹⁵ These circumstances made both commanders jealous of Eumenes' preferment. They may also have feared confronting the popular Craterus in their anxiety that he might subvert the loyalty of their Macedonians (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 5. 3).⁹⁶ Further, Errington suggests

marizing a number of events spanning the end of the Lamian War (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 1), through the crossing of the Hellespont (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2), to Neoptolemus's eventual desertion of the Perdiccan cause (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 3). In the absence of any substantive evidence to support Briant's position, it makes much more sense to assume that Eumenes' expanded authority was given to him with the command on the Hellespont.

⁹⁵ On the general pervasiveness of this prejudice on the part of Macedonian nobles, see chapter 8, and E. M. Anson, "Discrimination and Eumenes of Cardia," *AncW.* 3 (1980): 55-9.

⁹⁶ Eumenes' later measures to conceal from his troops the knowledge that Craterus was the opposing commander (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1-3; Nepos *Eum.* 3. 5) show that the problem was indeed a serious one. Moreover, Craterus had been treated virtually as a king by the Macedonians upon his return to his homeland (Arr. *Succ.* frg. 19 = *Suda.* s.v. Krateros). It is unlikely, as claimed by N. G. L. Hammond ("Alexander's Veterans after his Death," *GRBS* 25 [1984]: 56), that the troops serving with Neoptolemus and Alcetas were part of the contingent of veterans brought west by Craterus in 324. If such troops were still present in Asia Minor, Perdiccas would have taken them with him to Egypt (as he did with Alexander's hypaspists (see Anson, "Hypaspists and Argyraspids after 323," 131-3), in preference to leaving them to face their old commander (cf. W. Heckel, "The Career of Antigenes," 60-2). As noted earlier, Craterus had returned to Europe with six thousand veterans

that Alcetas's actions, at least, may have been based on a hoped for a reconciliation with Antipater.⁹⁷ As indicated, Alcetas was opposed to any break with Antipater and this, indeed, might have played a role in his reluctance to serve under Eumenes, the self-proclaimed enemy of Antipater's (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 8; 5. 7).

It is unlikely that the depth of this hostility manifested itself during the meeting in Pisidia where command assignments were made, or assuredly the assignments would have been different. Indeed, it may never have risen beyond the grumbling stage, if the defensive line at the Hellespont had held. But with the circumstances in Asia Minor deteriorating, such jealousies manifested themselves. While the decision to invade Egypt had been approved by consensus, the decision to place Eumenes in charge in Asia Minor must have sparked bitter debate and rancor. Yet, Perdiccas had used his authority to overwhelm the opposition, and if the Hellespontine defensive line had held, it is probable that none of these latent difficulties would have manifested themselves. In the final analysis, it was not due to Eumenes that the desertions of the fleet commander, or of the satraps, occurred, or was he solely responsible for those of Neoptolemus and Alcetas. Clearly Perdiccas lacked the necessary qualities of leadership so obviously demanded by the circumstances. He could not even get his own brother to obey his authority. The definitive weakness with Perdiccas's leadership is reflected in the comments found in Diodorus (18. 33. 3), most likely derived from Hieronymus, about Perdiccas being "a man of blood." His leadership style was clearly that of intimidation. When during the dispute in Babylon he was threatened with death by the agents of Meleager, he taunted and terrified them (Curt. 10. 8. 3). Under the pretext of a reconciliation he had the leaders of the infantry in Babylon killed (Diod. 18. 4. 7; Curt. 10. 9. 18). Meleager was executed shortly thereafter on a charge of "plotting" against the regent (Diod. 18. 4. 7). Perdiccas had ordered his troops to execute all the Greeks who had rebelled in the upper satrapies on the news of Alexander's death (Diod. 18. 7. 8); Ariarathes after capture was tortured and impaled (Diod.

who had crossed to Asia with Alexander and four thousand others who had joined on the subsequent campaign (Diod. 18. 16. 4). With the deletion of the argyraspids, and assuming that most of the remaining four thousand being mercenaries, there would not have been many Macedonians left from Craterus's original force in any case.

⁹⁷ Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisos," 64 n. 108.

18. 16. 3; App. *Mith.* 2. 8);⁹⁸ the male Larandians of fighting age were all killed, the rest of the population enslaved (Diod. 18. 22. 2); Cynane was killed on his orders. Alexander's former chiliarch was not a man to be crossed. Apparently, most acceded to his demands in his presence, rather than incur his wrath.

Upon arriving in Asia, Craterus and Antipater sent appeals to both Eumenes and Neoptolemus (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26; Diod. 18. 29. 4).⁹⁹ Eumenes was promised continued possession of his satrapy with additional lands and troops besides (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6). The clear implication is that he would continue to possess most, if not all, of the territories awarded him most recently by Perdiccas.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, Craterus promised to reconcile him with Antipater (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6). Eumenes, however, refused, stating that Antipater long had been his enemy, but he did offer to reconcile Craterus and Perdiccas (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 7–8). While Eumenes remained loyal, Neoptolemus was won over. Although he tried to conceal his treachery, Eumenes soon discovered it.¹⁰¹ When ordered to comply with Perdiccas's orders,

⁹⁸ Diodorus 31. 19. 3–5 states that Ariarathes died in battle, but the surviving narrative is to be preferred to this extract from Diodorus collected in Photius's *Bibliotheca* (Bibl. 382–388B).

⁹⁹ Briant's (*Antigone*, 222) insistence that Neoptolemus initiated the contact is possible (Diod. 18. 29. 4), but unlikely. Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 26) mentions that after Antipater and Craterus crossed the Hellespont they sent ambassadors to both Neoptolemus and Eumenes. Given the abbreviated nature of Photius's epitome, it is possible that he has omitted a notice of a previous exchange initiated by Neoptolemus. While Plutarch (*Eum.* 5. 2–3) does not state who commenced the exchange, he does later state that an embassy was sent to Eumenes (*Eum.* 5. 4–5). Plutarch, then, would appear to support the Photian epitome of Arrian. Moreover, the language of Diodorus 18. 29. 4 is too ambiguous to conclude from it that Neoptolemus proposed betrayal first. From the evidence it must be concluded that, however ready Neoptolemus might have been to desert the Perdiccan cause, the contact was initiated by the Antipater and Craterus.

¹⁰⁰ Plutarch states that Eumenes was offered continued possession of his "satrapies." While Plutarch may be making reference to the different territories included in Eumenes' satrapy assigned in Babylon, i.e. Cappadocia and Paphlagonia (Diod. 18. 3. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3), the context of the passage suggests that much more was involved. Antipater and Craterus were trying to win over Eumenes. Certainly they would not offer less than he already possessed, especially since Eumenes would be distrustful of Antipater in any case. Eumenes must have been offered control of virtually all of Asia Minor, including Antigonus's satrapy of Phrygia (see Briant, *Antigone*, 185). Perdiccas placed these territories under Eumenes' authority prior to the former's departure for Egypt (Nepos *Eum.* 3. 2; Just. 13. 6. 14–15). Such a promise, if ultimately carried out, would certainly appear to be a betrayal Antigonus, Menander, and Asander. It should be noted that ultimately Antipater did replace Menander in Lydia with Cleitus (Diod. 18. 39. 6).

¹⁰¹ Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 4; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26–27.

Neoptolemus drew up his phalanx in battle array (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 4). It appears, even though our sources have clearly compressed events, that the two armies were in close proximity. Plutarch (*Eum.* 5. 4) states that he not only refused Eumenes' summons but drew up his phalanx for battle.

It is difficult to know the location of the respective forces, but most likely Eumenes and Neoptolemus fought in western Phrygia.¹⁰² In the ensuing battle Eumenes' infantry was defeated, but his cavalry secured the victory.¹⁰³ Neoptolemus had either permitted his infantry to pursue in a disorderly manner or they had followed their own inclinations, allowing Eumenes' cavalry, already victorious over the enemy's cavalry and in possession of Neoptolemus's camp, to attack the scattered soldiers. While many were killed, the majority laid down their weapons and swore an oath to serve Eumenes; only Neoptolemus and three hundred horsemen escaped (Diod. 18. 29. 5–6; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5–6). Eumenes now sent word to Perdiccas of his victory and of his acquisition of most of Neoptolemus's army; the news reached Perdiccas shortly after his arrival in Egypt and before any actual hostilities had commenced.¹⁰⁴ This battle took place in late May or early June of 320.

¹⁰² Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 1) mistakenly places the battle at or near (*apud*) the Hellespont (however, accepted by Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 6 n. 11, 30 n. 43; Billows, *Antigonos*, 65). The crossing occurred in late April or early May (see note 79); these battles "near Cappadocia" (Diod. 18. 37. 1) occurred probably in late May or early June. Ten days is insufficient time to march a large army from the Hellespont to even central Phrygia, let alone to the borders of Cappadocia. Nepos is most likely reflecting the original location of Eumenes' forces (Diod. 18. 29. 3). With the collapse of the defense of the Hellespont, Eumenes had retreated even before the crossing had taken place.

¹⁰³ Diod. 18. 29. 4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5–6; Just. 13. 8. 4; both Briant (*Antigone*, 223–4 n. 13) and Bosworth ("PSI XII 1284," 229–37; maintain that the papyrus fragment PSI 12. 1284, from Arrian, refers to Eumenes' battle with Neoptolemus, not to Eumenes' victory over Craterus and Neoptolemus, which is the ascription of most scholars (for example, see K. Latte, "Ein neues Arrian fragment," *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* [1950]: 23–7; G. Wirth, "Zur grossen Schlacht des Eumenes 322 (PSI 1284)," *Klio* 46 [1965]: 283–8; W. E. Thompson, "PSI 1284: Eumenes of Cardia vs. The Phalanx," *ChEg* 59 [1984]: 113–20). Briant's and Bosworth's claim is refuted, however, by Plutarch's description of the battle between Eumenes and Neoptolemus (*Eum.* 5. 4–5). In the fragment the hostile phalanx is drawn up in a tight battle formation and remained intact, but in Plutarch, Neoptolemus's soldiers are scattered in pursuit of Eumenes' defeated infantrymen. In the later battle between Eumenes and Craterus, it is clear that Craterus's forces are drawn up and remained in formation (Diod. 18. 32. 1).

¹⁰⁴ In Diodorus 18. 33. 1, Perdiccas is informed of Eumenes' victory over an

After his defeat Neoptolemus fled to Craterus and Antipater.¹⁰⁵ While he asked that both come to his aid, he intimated that because of his popularity Craterus would be sufficient (Plut. *Eum.* 6. 1–3). As a result, it was decided that Craterus with the bulk of the Macedonian forces would attack Eumenes; Antipater would continue on to Egypt with the rest.¹⁰⁶ With twenty thousand infantry, primarily Macedonians, and more than two thousand cavalry Craterus advanced into eastern Phrygia or Lycaonia (Diod. 18. 37. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 6. 4). Eumenes now decided to change the agreed upon strategy, which had been to avoid battle. With the forces of the Europeans divided and with his superior cavalry, Eumenes planned on going to the offensive. While the division of the forces of his enemy meant that Eumenes' infantry was now equal in numbers to Craterus's infantry, it was certainly not equivalent in quality. Eumenes did, however, have five thousand Cappadocian cavalry who had proven both loyal and victorious (Diod. 18. 29. 4–5).¹⁰⁷ Because of Craterus's popularity, Eumenes

unspecified opponent. Clearly this is the victory over Neoptolemus (see Vezin, *Eumenes*, 52, and Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisos," 66 n. 127); the news of Eumenes' defeat of Craterus arrived only after Perdiccas's death (Diod. 18. 37. 1). Geer (R. M. Geer, trans. and ed., *Books XVIII and XIX 1–65*, in *Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes*, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1969] 9:104 n. 1), R. Schubert, (*Die Quellen zu Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* [Leipzig: Dietrich, 1914] 196), and Hornblower (*Hieronymus*, 51), however, all believe that this reference is in error. Hornblower argues that this is a reference to the battle against both Craterus and Neoptolemus which Diodorus has misplaced because he is at this point using two sources. Geer holds that Diodorus cannot in this passage mean the victory over Neoptolemus, because it was too "unimportant." Clearly it would be difficult to overestimate the seriousness of Neoptolemus's desertion; he was the commander of the majority of the Perdiccan Macedonian infantrymen in Asia Minor (cf. Diod. 18. 29. 5). By defeating Neoptolemus and recovering most of that commander's forces, Eumenes rectified what might have been a disaster for the Perdiccan cause. The first battle against Neoptolemus occurred 10 days before the second against both Neoptolemus and Craterus (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 1), but the actual time involved in the dispatch and receipt of the news in Egypt of either battle is unknown. Even though Bosworth ("Artifice," 76) states that the fighting in Egypt may have lasted months, Diodorus, although abbreviated, gives the impression that the actual fighting in Egypt was of short duration. The news of Eumenes' victory over Craterus reached Egypt two days after Perdiccas's death (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 3; cf. Diod. 18. 37. 1).

¹⁰⁵ Justin (13. 8. 5) names the allies as Antipater and Polyperchon, rather than Antipater and Craterus. Polyperchon had been left in charge of Macedonia (Diod. 18. 38. 6).

¹⁰⁶ Diod. 18. 29. 6–7; Plut. *Eum.* 6. 4; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27.

¹⁰⁷ In the battle against Craterus, Eumenes had only five thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 30. 5), while earlier he had sixty-three hundred cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3). However, the figure of sixty-three hundred dates from two years prior to the time

concealed from his men the name of their opponent. He announced that Neoptolemus and an otherwise unknown Pigres were coming against them after enrolling new native forces.¹⁰⁸

When the armies were drawn up for battle and Eumenes saw that Craterus was occupying the right wing, he placed two hipparchies of his Cappadocian cavalry, commanded by Pharnabazus, the son of Artabazus, and Phoenix of Tenedos on his left (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1).¹⁰⁹ No Macedonians were to face Craterus. Eumenes also gave these commanders strict orders to launch their attack as soon as the enemy came into view in order to make sure that this deception was not discovered until after the battle. Eumenes himself with his *agema* of three hundred horsemen held the right wing, opposite Neoptolemus (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1–2).¹¹⁰ As soon as Eumenes' army crossed a small

of the five thousand figure. It is, therefore, very possible that both totals are correct. The difference in them may reflect casualties from Eumenes' Armenian campaign and/or internal Cappadocian concerns.

¹⁰⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 6. 7; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27; Nepos *Eum.* 3. 4–5; Pigres is a name apparently of southwestern Asian origin (W. Hoffmann, "Pigres," *RE.* 20: col. 1314). This individual was probably a commander of mercenary cavalry who had been attached to Neoptolemus by Perdiccas when the former was originally sent to western Armenia. In Babylon Alexander had received Carian and Lydian mercenaries (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 23. 1; cf. Bosworth, *Conquest*, 148), perhaps, if he had not done so earlier, Pigres at this time joined the Macedonian forces (see Anson, "Neoptolemus," 127).

¹⁰⁹ Pharnabazus had taken command of the Persian Aegean fleet on the death of Memnon (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 2. 1; Curt. 3. 3. 1). In 332 he was captured at Chios (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 2. 4; Curt. 4. 5. 17), but later that same year he escaped (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 2. 7). Nothing further is heard of him until he shows up as one of Eumenes' cavalry commanders. Most likely he was pardoned as were his brother and father by Alexander (Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:379–80 [#766]). Many Persian troops must have accompanied Perdiccas west in 322; Pharnabazus must have been the commander of Persian cavalry detachment that was attached to Eumenes for the campaign in Asia Minor.

¹¹⁰ Each diadoch would eventually establish his own cavalry companions and his own corps of hypaspists. In 316, at Paraetacene Eumenes is listed as having in his army a personal corps of hypaspists, distinct from Alexander's former hypaspists, the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 28. 1, 40. 3–4), companion cavalry (Diod. 19. 28. 3), and a cavalry *agema* (Diod. 19. 27. 2, 28. 3). Nor is this creation of personal units paralleling the traditional Macedonian royal military organization unique to Eumenes. At Paraetacene, Diodorus (19. 28. 3) speaks of Antigenes and Peucestas having their own cavalry *agemai*. This "*agema*" is clearly distinct from Eumenes' *agema*, since both are mentioned specifically in this passage. Additionally, Alcetas, after his defeat in the Pisidic *Aulon*, fled to Termessus in Pisidia with his "hypaspists and his pages" (Diod. 18. 45. 3), and Antigonus in 318, after Nicanor's defeat by Cleitus in the Hellespont, "renewed the action placing on board the ships the bravest and most resolute of his hypaspists" (Polyaen. 4. 6. 8). Leonnatus, as well, after Alexander's death is reported as having his own personal cavalry *agema* (*Suda* s.v. Leonnatos = Arr. *Succ.* frg. 12).

rise and the opposing force came into view, he launched his attack. This sudden assault caught Craterus by surprise; he had been led to believe by Neoptolemus that Eumenes' Macedonians would desert.¹¹¹ With this prospect in view Craterus had assumed that at the very least Eumenes would be hesitant to force the issue.

Both cavalry forces rode well in advance of their respective infantries. In the first collision of forces Craterus was killed.¹¹² With his death the right wing was quickly crushed and fled back to the phalanx.¹¹³ Eumenes' left was also victorious with Eumenes killing Neoptolemus in single combat.¹¹⁴ As noted earlier, this victory occurred just ten days after his initial defeat of Neoptolemus (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 1). Eumenes now sent Xennias to the surrounded enemy, who were not disheartened and in close array awaited Eumenes' attack. Xennias was to tell the Macedonians that Eumenes would not attack them with his phalanx, but would rather use his cavalry and light-armed troops to prevent them from gathering provisions (*PSI* 12. 1284). Having delivered this ultimatum, the enemy phalanx was now invited to join Eumenes; an invitation they readily accepted (Diod. 18. 32. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 3). With their surrender, Eumenes gave them permission to forage for supplies in the nearby villages. These Macedonians, however, after they had collected sufficient supplies, deserted and by forced marches reached Antipater and continued with him toward Egypt.¹¹⁵ Unlike the Macedonian troops who had long campaigned

¹¹¹ Plutarch (*Eum.* 7. 2) gives the impression that Craterus did not know of Eumenes' movements until Eumenes crossed an intervening hill and launched his attack. However, Plutarch (*Eum.* 7. 1) also mentions that Eumenes arranged his troops for the battle according to the arrangement of Craterus's army. Moreover, Diodorus (18. 30. 2-4) relates that prior to the battle Craterus summoned the army to an assembly and gave a speech. The actual surprise was that Craterus had expected a desertion by Eumenes' Macedonians and, therefore, an easy victory. He had not expected Eumenes to launch an immediate attack (see Vezin, *Eumenes*, 47 n. 2).

¹¹² Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27; Diod. 18. 30. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 7. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 1.

¹¹³ Diod. 18. 31-32. 2; *PSI* 12. 1284; Plut. *Eum.* 7. 4-7; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 2; Just. 13. 8. 8; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 27; several different versions of Craterus's death are preserved in the sources. In Arrian (*Succ.* 27) Craterus is killed by Paphlagonians, but in Plutarch (*Eum.* 7. 5) the deed is done by a Thracian. Indeed, Plutarch's account (*Eum.* 7. 4, 8) of the dying Craterus, first being guarded by Gorgias, then tearfully pitied by Eumenes, is most likely an embellishment Plutarch has acquired from Duris (see chapter 1).

¹¹⁴ Diod. 18. 30. 4-5; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2.

¹¹⁵ Diod. 18. 32. 3-33. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27; Nepos *Eum.* 4. 3.

in Asia, these troops were still loyal to their original commanders and did not readily take up service with their former enemy.¹¹⁶

If the news of Eumenes' victory over Craterus had arrived sooner, Perdiccas might have emerged supreme, the successor of Alexander, but he was slain in a mutiny of his own officers two days before the report of Eumenes' success arrived.¹¹⁷ His death occurred no later than July.¹¹⁸ Perdiccas's campaign in Egypt had been a disaster almost from its inception. Upon entering Egypt the regent had spoken to the assembled troops against Ptolemy (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 28).¹¹⁹ There is nothing in the passage in Arrian which suggests who initiated the assembly, only the clear implication that Perdiccas was addressing them and accusing the Egyptian satrap. Whatever the unspecified charges, the troops were unimpressed. Despite this apparent display of dissatisfaction with the war in Egypt, Perdiccas, as commander-in-chief, decided to continue. It is possible that, as in the case of Cynane, forces outside Perdiccas's control caused him to summon this meeting of the army. Alexander had been in the habit of calling such meetings the further he penetrated into Asia and more distant his soldiers were from home, and the more reluctant they became to take orders. Such meetings were common with forces more mercenary than national.¹²⁰ Ptolemy, then, either personally,¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Such as Neoptolemus's troops had done in that commander's first battle with Eumenes.

¹¹⁷ Diodorus (18. 37. 1) states that the report came immediately after Perdiccas's death.

¹¹⁸ The *Babylonian Chronicle of the Diadochs* (Grayson, *Chronicles*, 115, line 4; Smith, *Texts*, 140, 142, lines 3–4) lists a battle between Ptolemy and Perdiccas in the month of Aiaru or May/June (Parker and Dubberstein, *Chronology*, 34), clearly referring to Perdiccas's invasion of Egypt. The invasion then by the dating of the *Chronicle* occurred between May 11 and June 8, 320 B.C.E. (*ibid.*, 36). See note 2.

¹¹⁹ Fontana (*lotte*, 218–9) and Briant (*Antigone*, 264–5) believe that the passage while referring to an actual incident has been misrepresented in Photius's epitome. The former wishes to place the incident before Perdiccas left for Egypt and the latter sees Photius confusing the call to Ptolemy to answer charges with that commander's subsequent appearance before the army after Perdiccas's assassination. Both reconstructions do great violence to the very clear chronological order of Photius's epitome and neither, therefore, is convincing. This incident is not corroborated in any other source and some scholars have claimed that the entire episode comes from a pro-Ptolemaic source and is, consequently, suspect (Seibert, *Untersuchungen*, 104–5; P. de Francisci, *Arcana imperii* [Milan: A. Giuffrè, 1947] 1:446), but there is no great reason to reject it. In general, see E. M. Anson, "The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330–315 B.C.)," *Historia* 40 (1991): 240–4.

¹²⁰ For the mercenary characteristics of troops long serving in Asia, see chapter 8.

¹²¹ B. Niese, *Geschichte der Griechischen und Makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei*

or, as would appear more likely, through surrogates successfully defended himself against these charges.¹²² Even though the "many" did not accept Perdiccas's rationale for the war, Perdiccas continued the campaign anyway. Perdiccas was not violating any law or custom when he ignored the wishes of his troops.¹²³ He was the regent, and the campaign was technically being carried out by King Philip. The soldiers were willing to follow the orders of their king, and Diodorus (18. 37. 1; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2) states that, if the news of Eumenes' victory over Craterus had only arrived sooner, Perdiccas would have won. Also, while many of the common soldiers had expressed their dissatisfaction with "threatening shouts" after the disaster attempting to cross the Nile (Diod. 18. 36. 4), in the final analysis, it was their commanders who assassinated Perdiccas (Diod. 18. 36. 4-5).

While Perdiccas was certainly risking a reaction similar to that which forced him to accede to the marriage of Philip and Eurydice, it is doubtful that Perdiccas had much choice but to continue. Antipater and Craterus had already landed in Asia (Diod. 18. 29. 4; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26-27), and there was no possibility that Perdiccas could be reconciled with Ptolemy.¹²⁴ Perdiccas in Babylon only very reluctantly accepted the army's choice of Arrhidaeus as king (Curt. 10. 7. 16-9. 21). The situation was similar in the case of the marriage between Philip and Eurydice; it was only after the army rioted that Perdiccas permitted the marriage (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 22; Polyæn. 8. 60). Perdiccas in order to rekindle his commanders' enthusiasm for the Egyptian campaign gave gifts to some and made promises to others (Diod. 18. 33. 5). The army's rejection of the need for war with Ptolemy would explain the reluctance of Perdiccas's commanders to continue the invasion (Diod. 18. 33. 5). Initially his officers had

Chaeronea, Handbücher der alten Geschichte. Ser. 2, abth. 2 (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1893-1903; reprinted Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963) 222; J. G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (Basel: B. Schwabe, 1952) 2:76-7. The presence of Ptolemy at this assembly and his survival are not mutually exclusive. Later at Triparadeisus the army demonstrated its power to protect particular individuals from harm. At this meeting, Attalus, a condemned follower of the former regent Perdiccas, was present and permitted to leave unharmed (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 33; cf. Diod. 18. 41. 7, 50. 1; 19. 16. 1).

¹²² J. P. Mahaffy, *The Empire of the Ptolemies.* London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1895) 30-1; A. Bouche-Leclercq, *Histoire des Lagides.* (Paris: I. E. Leroux, 1903) 1:23; R. M. Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," *Chiron* 8 (1978): 118; Anson, "Evolution," 240-4.

¹²³ Anson, "Evolution," 240-1.

¹²⁴ See Briant, *Antigone*, 264.

unanimously endorsed the Egyptian campaign (Diod. 18. 25. 6); the failure to convince his troops of the crimes of Ptolemy would explain the loss of confidence.

If Perdiccas had enjoyed success in the campaign, the disgruntlement and lack of confidence would have been replaced by enthusiasm. Unfortunately for Perdiccas the campaign was a disaster. Near Memphis his army failed to force a crossing of the Nile, and two thousand men were lost (Diod. 18. 36. 1). Desertions soon began and a conspiracy was formed in which the leading figures were Pithon, Antigenes, and Seleucus.¹²⁵ However, Errington is correct that Ptolemy must have been involved as well.¹²⁶ While Errington's evidence is circumstantial, it is nonetheless convincing. Ptolemy was welcomed in the Perdiccan camp the day after the murder (Diod. 18. 36. 6). Moreover, in an address to the royal army he expressed his "debt of gratitude" to Pithon (Diod. 18. 36. 6); this debt seemingly could only have involved his role in the death of Perdiccas.

The aftermath of Perdiccas's death is unclear in the sources. Diodorus (18. 36. 6–7; 37. 1–2) makes reference to an assembly meeting the day after the regent's murder, in which Ptolemy defended his actions, new regents were selected, and the surviving Perdiccans were condemned.¹²⁷ Photius's epitome of Arrian's *Successors* (1. 30), however, makes no reference to an address to the troops by Ptolemy after Perdiccas's death and has the decisions regarding the regency and the condemnation of the Perdiccans made jointly in a council of *principes*. In this very abbreviated epitome of Arrian there are no references to an assembly after the one regarding Perdiccas's charges

¹²⁵ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 29; Diod. 18. 36. 5; Paus. 1. 6. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 1. Errington ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 66) suggests that Pithon was the leader in the attack on Perdiccas, which is certainly possible given his later reward (Diod. 18. 36. 7). However, Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 35) states that Antigenes was the first to attack the regent, which could be interpreted to mean that Antigenes led the plot. But taken literally the passage only means that Antigenes was the first physically to assault Perdiccas.

¹²⁶ Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisos," 65–6.

¹²⁷ Briant (*Antigone*, 272–4) argues that Ptolemy addressed the Macedonians in a separate meeting of the assembly. There is no reason to presume that there was more than one assembly meeting held in the immediate aftermath of Perdiccas's death. Arrian, *Successors*, 1. 30, while making no reference to an assembly meeting at all, does imply that the decisions regarding the regency and the surviving Perdiccans were made at a single conference. Nor is it necessary to interpret Diodorus 18. 36. 6–37. 2, as recording more than one assembly. Diodorus has interrupted his account of the meeting to report the arrival of the news of Craterus's death, once he has done so, he has then proceeded with the business of the assembly.

against Ptolemy and before that at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 31–33). Diodorus, on the other hand, makes no reference to any councils of the *principes* following Perdiccas's death. Based on these indications in the sources, the following reconstruction appears the most plausible. Soon after the assassination, that evening or the next morning, a meeting of all the conspirators, including Ptolemy, was held in which it was decided to convene the army and present their reasons for the murder.

With the regent dead and the army unruly, the conspirators wished to get the army's endorsement for their actions while the troops were still hostile to the memory of their former commander. The soldiers had been against the invasion of Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 28), and Diodorus (18. 36. 4) makes it clear that by the time of the assassination the entire army had been alienated from Perdiccas. In this same council it was decided that Ptolemy himself would address the troops presenting both a defense of his opposition to the former regent and a justification for the murder (cf. Diod. 18. 36. 7); in short, the assembly was to ratify the assassination.

As earlier in Babylon, the Macedonian troops would be acting in a capacity not part of the traditions of Macedonia; however, unlike in Babylon, this decision-taking assembly would not occur spontaneously, but by the design of the conspirators. The regency would have been one of the issues discussed in the council. Here, the great difficulty was that Ptolemy, while preferred by the army, did not want the position (Diod. 18. 36. 6), and Antipater and Craterus were not present.¹²⁸ It was, therefore, decided at Ptolemy's suggestion that Arrhidaeus, who had brought Alexander's corpse to Egypt, and Pithon, who had apparently led the conspiracy against Perdiccas, would assume the regency. The next day this was the position presented to the troops by Ptolemy, who presided over the assembly (Diod. 18. 36. 6–7; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 30–31). It is unclear if the conspirators planned to charge the former Perdiccan leaders before the assembly, or if this was to be left to the new regents. Perhaps, the conspirators hoped to reach some settlement with these still powerful individuals.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ It was not yet known that Craterus was dead.

¹²⁹ Errington ("Babylon to Triparadeisos," 67) suggests that the violent reaction to the news from Asia Minor represented the propaganda activities of the anti-Perdiccan generals. They hoped, says Errington, to represent Eumenes as a Greek rebel similar to those put down in Asia by Pithon and in Greece by Antipater. The

Antipater had earlier attempted to reach an accommodation with Eumenes.¹³⁰ In any case, while the council's recommendation for the regency was being approved by the assembly, the news of Craterus's and Neoptolemus's deaths in Asia Minor arrived and enraged the troops (Diod. 18. 37. 1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2). The army now passed a sentence of death on all Perdiccans, both those present and absent.¹³¹ Even Perdiccas's sister Atalante, the wife of Attalus, was slain; Eumenes, Alcetas and Attalus were among those condemned in absentia.¹³² Attalus with the Perdiccan fleet had fled to Tyre where he was joined by many other supporters of the former regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 39; Diod. 18. 37. 3).

The army with the kings and new regents proceeded north to rendezvous with Antipater. The troops got as far as Triparadeisus in northern Syria.¹³³ Here by late August or early September, what had

other Perdiccans could then be represented as supporters of Greek rebels. There is no evidence to support this suggestion; the sources make it clear that it is the connection to Perdiccas which condemns them all. Goukowsky (*Essai*, 91) argues that the Macedonians regarded Craterus's death as a case of regicide, so great was their regard for him.

¹³⁰ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 26; Diod. 18. 29. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 6.

¹³¹ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 30; Diod. 18. 37. 2, 59. 4, 62. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 1; App. *Syr.* 53; *Mith.* 8; Just. 13. 8. 10.

¹³² Arr. *Succ.* 1. 30; Diod. 18. 36. 6–37. 2. The condemnation of the Perdiccans was not the result of a formal trial for treason (as F. Granier, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung: Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht* [Munich: Beck, 1931] 70–1; R. Engel, "Zwei Heeresversammlung in Memphis," *Hermes* 102 [1974]: 127–34; cf. K. Rosen, "Die Reichsordnung von Babylon," *Acta Classica* 10 [1967]: 104, and n. 65; Briant, *Antigone*, 273 and n. 4). While the sources do speak of these individuals as "enemies" of the Macedonians (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 30; App. *Syr.* 53; *Mith.* 8; Just. 13. 8. 10), it is clear in Diodorus's description (18. 37. 1–2) of the condemnation that formality did not exist. Moreover, if Diodorus is to be believed, the condemnations occurred almost spontaneously upon the arrival of the news of Craterus's death. Diodorus is the only source who describes anything of the process by which the Perdiccans were condemned; the other sources only note the fact. Even though Diodorus is often guilty of misrepresenting his source through his radical abridgement (in general, see R. H. Simpson, "Abbreviation of Hieronymus in Diodorus," *AJP* 80 [1959] 370–9), with no source evidence to the contrary, it is preferable to accept Diodorus than to reject his information in favor of a preferred legalistic theory. Most likely as part of Ptolemy's and the other conspirators' defense, they had proposed to the assembly a refutation of Perdiccas's acts and, perhaps, the condemnation of the leading Perdiccans. It is highly doubtful that the *principes* sought the death of Perdiccas's sister and Attalus' wife, Atalante, yet, her condemnation is associated by Diodorus (18. 37. 2) with the others. Atalante's condemnation fits more readily into a scenario of spontaneous anger over recent events in Egypt and the report of Craterus's death, than it does into one of legal formality.

¹³³ While Triparadeisus has not been positively identified, it was most likely in the valley of the Orontes river in northern Syria (P. Perdrizet, "Syriaca. I:

been for some time general insubordination in the ranks became mutiny.¹³⁴ Eurydice, the wife of King Philip, was its focus. She had become Philip's wife through the support of these same troops and her influence with them was considerable. Under this pressure Pithon and Arrhidaeus abdicated in favor of Antipater, who was not present but near (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 31–32; Diod. 18. 39. 1–2). The new arrangement worked for a short period of time, but not for long. When Antipater finally arrived, agitation had broken out anew. Eurydice was again at its center, but various Perdiccan elements were also present, notably Attalus recently arrived from Tyre (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 33, 39; cf. Diod. 18. 39. 3–4).¹³⁵ The troops were upset over arrears in pay (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 32; Polyæn. 4. 6. 4). In the rioting Antipater was almost killed, but was saved through the intervention of Antigonos, himself only recently returned from Cyprus, and Seleucus.¹³⁶ Antigonos convinced the soldiers to be patient and that their money would be forthcoming (Polyæn. 4. 6. 4). With order restored an assembly was called in which Antipater's regency was ratified by the army (Diod. 18. 39. 4; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 33). Following his confirmation by the army in assembly, the new regent in concert with the *principes* distributed the satrapies and organized a campaign against the surviving Perdiccans (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 35–38; Diod. 18. 39. 6).¹³⁷ The campaign against Perdiccas's remaining associates was made necessary by their intervention at Triparadeisus and their continued influence with the army. Eumenes' province of Cappadocia was given to Nicanor (Diod.

Triparadeisus," *RA* 32 [1898]: 34–9; F. M. Abel, *Histoire de la Palestine depuis la conquête d'Alexandre jusqu'à l'invasion arabe* [Paris: J. Gabalda, 1952] 1:26; R. Dussaud, "Triparadeisus," *RA* 33 [1899]: 113–21; *Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et médiévale* [Paris: P. Geuthner, 1927] 112; D. Schlumberger, "Triparadisos," *BmusBeyr* 22 [1969]: 147–9).

¹³⁴ Perdiccas's death occurred no later than early July (see note 2). The march from Egypt to Triparadeisus in northern Syria where the royal army rendezvoused with Antipater (Diod. 18. 39. 1), would have taken approximately two months; the distance is roughly 650 miles and the average march-rate for a large army with elephants was minimally 9 miles per day (see note 78).

¹³⁵ While Berve (*Alexanderreich*, 2:95 [#184]) denies that the Attalus mentioned at Triparadeisus is the same as Perdiccas's brother-in-law, the context suggests that the identification is correct (see Briant, *Antigone*, 278 n. 6).

¹³⁶ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 32–33, 39; Diod. 18. 39. 4; Polyæn. 4. 6. 4.

¹³⁷ While Granier (*Heeresversammlung*, 65–6), Fontana (*lotte*, 149) and Seibert (*Untersuchungen*, 32) all see an assembly of soldiers playing a role in this distribution, Briant (*Antigone*, 255) is correct that the evidence indicates that it was the regent and the council who made the distribution.

18. 39. 6; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 37). Antigonus was given the command of the royal army, consisting of most of Perdiccas's old forces,¹³⁸ and was to operate in Asia against Eumenes and the other remaining Perdiccans.¹³⁹

As at Alexander's death Eumenes' position close to the seat of power was destroyed. In many ways he was in worse circumstances than he had been at Alexander's death. He had been declared a criminal by the royal army and a powerful force had been sent against him. He did, however, possess Cappadocia and a loyal army, things he had not possessed in the earlier crisis. It was now up to him to make the most of these resources.

¹³⁸ Certain deletions were made from the royal army before its assignment to Antigonus. Antigones and three thousand "rebellious Macedonians" (clearly the argyraspids, see Anson, "Hypaspists and the Argyraspids," 118–19) separated to convey treasure from Susa to Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38), Arrhidaeus was given one thousand Macedonians (cf. Diod. 18. 51. 1), and presumably certain other commanders received troops as well.

¹³⁹ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38; Diod. 18. 39. 7–40. 1; Just. 14. 1. 1. Many have questioned Antipater's grant of such powers to Antigonus given the latter's later actions, especially in light of Cassander's stated suspicions (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38; cf. Goukowsky, *Essai*, 93). F. Schachermeyr ("Zu Geschichte und Staatsrecht der frühen Diadochenzeit," *Klio* 19 [1925]: 454) even suggested that Antipater was suffering from some sort of mental impairment. However, rational reasons do exist for Antigonus's rewards at Triparadeisus. As Briant (*Antigone*, 230–3) is at pains to point out, Antipater had very little choice but to grant such broad powers to Antigonus. A war needed to be carried on in Asia against the surviving and hostile Perdiccans. Antipater did not wish to conduct it; Craterus was dead; Ptolemy had opted out (Diod. 18. 36. 6–7, 43. 1–2); Lysimachus was not present at Triparadeisus. Cassander was obviously not regarded by his father as either sufficiently experienced for, or capable of, such an assignment; Antipater later left the regency to an old comrade, Polyperchon, not to Cassander (Diod. 18. 48. 4). The other potential candidates were all former Perdiccans. Antigonus had proven to be loyal, capable, and at Triparadeisus, a life saver (Polyaen. 4. 6. 4). He had served Antipater well and had requested the command against Eumenes. However, Antipater initially placed certain checks on Antigonus's authority. Antigonus's friend Menander was not reinstated in Lydia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 37; Diod. 18. 39. 6) and Cassander was made chiliarch and attached to Antigonus as second-in-command (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38, 42; Diod. 18. 39. 7). Billows believes that Antipater wished to designate Antigonus as his successor (*Antigonos*, 69–71), and he may well be correct. Antipater was approximately 80 years of age at this time and did die the very next year (see Heckel, *Marshals*, 38 and n. 109). The thought that a successor would soon be needed must have crossed his mind.

CHAPTER FIVE

“THE FICKLENESS OF FORTUNE”

With Perdiccas's death and his own condemnation by the Macedonian army in Egypt, Eumenes found his position in Asia Minor anything but secure. When he learned of these events, he informed his men. Those wishing to leave were given permission (Just. 14. 1. 1-2). Eumenes, however, maintained that Perdiccas had been murdered and the kings seized by those disloyal to Alexander's family and memory; in short, he and the remaining Perdiccans were the true loyalists to the Argead house (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8. 5, 12). Such a belief was essential if he were to retain the loyalty of his Macedonian troops.¹ Here, as in Babylon, Eumenes convinced the soldiers of the validity of his claim. In the winter following Perdiccas's death, when his opponents sent notices into his camp offering a reward of one hundred talents and other honors to whomever would carry out the sentence enacted by the army in Egypt, the "Macedonians became incensed and made a decree that a thousand of the leading soldiers should serve him continually as a bodyguard" (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11; Just. 14. 1. 9-10).² Eumenes rewarded his loyal Macedonians by distributing to them "purple caps and military cloaks," gifts usually bestowed by kings on their favorites (Plut. *Eum.* 8, 12). To the surviving Perdiccans, the kings were captured, their legitimate regent dead. Obviously, in the minds of his soldiers, Eumenes, as the former regent's second-in-command, became the chief representative of legitimate authority.³

¹ While H. Bengtson's (*Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit: ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht* [Munich: Beck, 1937] 1: 174-5) assertion that loyalty to the royal house was the only criterion the Macedonian soldiers used in choosing their leaders is demonstrably false, it was certainly an important one.

² According to Justin (14. 1. 11) Eumenes came forward and claimed responsibility for the letters. This aspect of the incident is unlikely. If it were correct, why would Eumenes' men still believe there was a need for a bodyguard?

³ K. Rosen ("Political Documents in Hieronymus of Cardia (323-322 B.C.)," *Acta Classica* 10 [1967]: 72-3) believes that Plutarch and Justin have placed in this context details which properly belong to a similar incident which occurred two years later. He argues that the creation of the bodyguard to protect Eumenes and Eumenes'

Eumenes scrupulously maintained at least the fiction of loyalty to the royal house and his position as the lawful power in Asia. In Aeolis, near Mount Ida, he took the horses he needed for his cavalry from the royal herd, but gave the overseers a receipt for the number taken (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 5). Eumenes, however, was careful not to rely exclusively on his legitimist claims; he was well aware that while his Macedonians retained some residual loyalty to their heritage, they also exhibited many of the attributes of professional soldiers. These troops, like the Greek mercenaries with whom they served, were loyal to those who paid them well and regularly.⁴ During the Macedonian army's long service in Asia under Alexander it had evolved from a national force loyal to homeland, its officers, and especially to the king, into a corporate body to whose allegiances was added the fidelity to self-interest so common among mercenary troops.⁵ The military camp had become their home; it contained their families and all their worldly goods.⁶ Even during Alexander's lifetime these troops had shown some of these characteristics. After Darius' death in 330, as Alexander moved east, he increasingly made use of mass meetings both to instill enthusiasm in his troops and to test his authority.⁷ Mercenaries from the Greek world tended to resolve issues involving their interests by assembly. This was certainly true of those who accompanied Cyrus on the *Anabasis* recorded by Xenophon.⁸ It

bestowal of "royal gifts" on these troops should be associated with Antigonos's later attempt to subvert Eumenes' troops in Cilicia (Diod. 18. 62. 3-4). At that later time Eumenes had been appointed by the kings "supreme general" in Asia. For Rosen the "royal gifts" would more likely be given by the "supreme general," than by an individual under sentence of death from the Macedonian army in Egypt (ibid., 73). The context, however, makes it clear that Eumenes was not royal general with the wealth of the empire at his disposal. To pay his troops Eumenes had to confiscate land from the inhabitants (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 9). Justin (14. 1. 6-11) likewise links this incident to events in 320 after the death of Perdiccas.

⁴ E. M. Anson, "The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330-315 B.C.)," *Historia* 40 (1990): 230-47.

⁵ In general on mercenary soldiers, their attitudes and conditions of service, see H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933) esp. 207-8.

⁶ Ibid., 207, and E. M. Anson, "Discrimination and Eumenes of Cardia," *AncW.* 3 (1980): 57, and Chapter 8.

⁷ The latter aspect is emphasized by R. M. Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," *Chiron* 8 (1978): 86-91.

⁸ Xen. *Anab.* 1. 3. 2-6, 9-20, 4. 12-16; 3. 2. 1-39; 5. 1. 1-14, 4. 19-21, 5. 7-24, 6. 1-12, 21-37, 7. 3-26; 6. 1. 14, 25-33, 2. 4-12, 4. 10-14, 17-19, 20-2, 6. 11-19, 29-30, 37; 7. 1. 24-35, 3. 2-6, 10-14, 6. 7-41.

was also the case with the "mercenaries" who accompanied Alexander into Asia. In the revolt of the "Greeks" occupying the settlements in Bactria and Sogdiane in 326/325, there were a number of assemblies in which various leaders attempted to justify their actions to their troops, and in which the troops made decisions (Curt. 9. 7. 5, 8, 10). In 323, the "Greeks" in the "upper satrapies" met, decided on a return to Greece, and elected a leader (Diod. 18. 7. 2). For Alexander, prior to the Persian king's death in 330, the tradition of royal autocracy had been sufficient to ensure obedience, but later the troops had become increasingly restless.⁹ The first recorded mass meeting was called to gain the support of the soldiers for a further advance into Asia. Here Alexander presented the issues in nationalistic terms; territories were not yet secure and further campaigns were necessary to complete their subjugation.¹⁰ But subsequently the king had to resort to more personal appeals to keep his troops' loyalty. Prior to his campaign against the Indian Gandaridae, Alexander had permitted his soldiers to plunder neighboring lands to secure their favor (Diod. 17. 94. 1-3; cf. 104. 5-7). Earlier on the Hyphasis in an attempt to secure their acquiescence to a further advance he had promised among other things riches and booty (Curt. 9. 2. 27; Arr. *Anab.* 5. 26. 8). By 323 these Macedonian troops serving in Asia exhibited a combination of professional and national attributes, for which Alexander was the nexus of both qualities. He was the most successful general ever, an excellent paymaster, and the national leader of Macedonia. Much of the unrest after his death is attributable to the inability of any other commander to emulate the great Alexander (cf. Just. 14. 2. 7). Many were excellent paymasters; many were successful military commanders; none was these and the embodiment of Macedonian authority.

Soon after the news of the disaster in Egypt reached him, Eumenes had moved his troops to the Hellespont where he forced the local population to pay his forces (Just. 14. 1. 6; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8. 5). Later he plundered territories loyal to his enemies to pay his troops.¹¹ If

⁹ Diod. 17. 74. 3-4; Curt. 6. 2. 15-4. 1. Other than addresses to inspire his troops prior to battle, Alexander is not recorded by the sources as addressing his soldiers in a mass meeting prior to 330. Before that date Alexander exclusively made decisions on his own, or after consultation with his commanders.

¹⁰ Diod. 17. 74. 3-4; Curt. 6. 2. 15-4. 1; Just. 12. 3. 1-4.

¹¹ Throughout the Hellenistic Age similar expedients were common (see M. Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques* [Paris: E. de Boccard, 1950] 2:734-5).

he cared to do so, Eumenes could justify his actions by proclaiming that these lands were loyal to traitors to the cause of the kings. It is doubtful that his troops were that interested in the legal niceties when dealing with native populations. Macedonian deserters from Antigonus's army displayed no reluctance in pillaging the countryside about Lycaonia and Phrygia (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6), and there is abundant testimony for Macedonian hostility towards Asians during Alexander's reign.¹² Eumenes' various actions had the desired effect; his army stood by him in the immediate crisis and he now confidently prepared for the coming struggle.

Eumenes even plundered Hellespontine and western Phrygia while Antipater and Antigonus were present, but the latter two remained inactive.¹³ Eumenes' operations here brought him into great esteem even among the soldiers of his enemies, who began to despise their overall commander, Antipater.¹⁴ The regent was reluctant to confront Eumenes.¹⁵ Eumenes, on the other hand, had actively sought a engagement with Antipater on the plains of Lydia where he could use his cavalry to good advantage.¹⁶ As part of his plan Eumenes went to Sardis to try to gain Cleopatra's active support.¹⁷ Her adher-

¹² Curt. 10. 2. 8-12; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 1-2; Plut. *Alex.* 71. 3; see Chapter 8.

¹³ *Gothenbourg Palimpsest* fo. 72^r 14-73^v 11; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 9-11.

¹⁴ *Gothenbourg Palimpsest* 72^r 14-73^v 11.

¹⁵ A. B. Bosworth ("History and Artifice in Plutarch's *Eumenes*," in *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition*, edited by P. A. Stadter [London and New York: Routledge, 1992] 76-7; "Philip III Arrhidaeus and the Chronology of the Successors," *Chiron* 22 [1992]: 60) believes that there was "active campaigning" between Antipater and Eumenes in Asia Minor. The evidence suggests otherwise. The *Gothenbourg Palimpsest* (fo. 72^r 14-73^v 11) implies that Antipater and Antigonus did nothing to interfere with Eumenes' operations in Phrygia.

¹⁶ Antigonus and Antipater followed the southern or Pisidic route west. They would have traveled up the coast from Syria, passing through the Cilician Gates, and turning west at Tyana (basically the same route except in reverse followed east by Cyrus in 401); Antipater proceeded on to Sardis (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 40; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 4; Just. 14. 1. 7), and hence to Hellespontine Phrygia; Antigonus's camp was at some distance "near Phrygia" (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 43). R. A. Billows (*Antigonos the One-eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990] 72) believes that the royal army proceeded north from Tyana to the Royal Road and then turned west. While the exact course is not known, this would have taken them well out of their way. Antipater was interested in avoiding direct conflict with the Perdiccans, but this route would have taken them well into Eumenes' province and onto the plains of Cappadocia, where geography and proximity would have given the Cardian an overwhelming cavalry superiority. It was also a land of marginal agriculture (see D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978] 37).

¹⁷ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 40; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 6; Just. 14. 1. 7-8.

ence would make his role as an avowed legitimist more secure. But with Antipater so near, Cleopatra requested that Eumenes withdraw.¹⁸ While not actively engaging Eumenes, Antipater did detach a force under the command of Asander to invade Pisidia, but this force was defeated by Alcetas and Attalus (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 41). Asander subsequently rejoined Antipater and Antigonus, and continued on to his recently reassigned satrapy of Caria (cf. Diod. 18. 39. 6; 19. 62. 2). This reluctance to face Eumenes was due to two factors: Eumenes' superior cavalry (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 6) and the questionable loyalty of the newly acquired royal army. These troops had rebelled against Antipater at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 32–33, 39), and later at Abydus, just prior to their return to Europe with Antipater, they rebelled again (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 44–45). The trouble at Abydus was, as it had been at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 32; Polyae. 4. 6. 4), over arrearages in pay. While at Triparadeisus there were other issues involved, including devotion to the royal family in the person of Eurydice,¹⁹ and, perhaps, even a lingering loyalty to their previous Perdiccan commanders,²⁰ still the overriding issue in both of these incidents, the unifying theme, was money. During the winter of 320/319, three thousand Macedonians commanded by Holcias deserted Antigonus (Polyae. 4. 6. 6).²¹ These troops from a base in the mountains engaged in pillaging the countryside of Lycaonia and Phrygia, and in light of Antigonus's fear of the possibility, were probably in communication

¹⁸ J. Hornblower (*Hieronimus of Cardia* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981] 162) suggests that Cleopatra did not send Eumenes away empty-handed. She argues that it was Cleopatra who empowered Eumenes to distribute the "special gifts of royalty." This is doubtful. Officially Cleopatra had no such authority. Moreover, she "was afraid to give Antipater any cause for complaint" (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 7). As it was, when Antipater reached Sardis, he reproached Cleopatra for having sided with Perdiccas and Eumenes. She defended her actions and in the end Antipater withdrew, leaving her in peace (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 40). Eumenes based his authority on his appointment as royal general in Asia Minor; a command given him by the then regent Perdiccas (Plut. *Eum.* 5.1; cf. Diod. 18. 29. 3).

¹⁹ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 32–33; Polyae. 4. 6. 4; Diod. 18. 39. 2–4.

²⁰ See R. M. Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos, 323–320," *JHS* 90 (1970): 70.

²¹ While Polyaeus does not indicate the origin of these Macedonians, they must have come from part of the royal army that was chosen to remain in Asia. As Billows notes (*Antigonos*, 74 n. 42), Antigonus still had eight thousand of "Antipater's Macedonians" in 316 (Diod. 19. 29. 3). The incident is not dated by Polyaeus, but it must have occurred in the winter of 320/19 (see R. M. Errington, "Diodorus Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochoi, 320–311 B.C.E.," *Hermes* 105 [1977]: 485 n. 30). On Holcias, see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:283 [#580].

with Alcetas, as well (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). They were subsequently recaptured and escorted to Macedonia.²² Besides, Antpater clearly had no long-term interests in Asia. He was almost eighty years of age.²³ His invasion had been to forestall Perdiccas's contemplated assault on Macedonia. He was apparently in a great hurry to return to Macedonia.²⁴ He left for Europe as soon as he could and did not involve himself further in affairs in Asia.²⁵

In response to Cleopatra's entreaty Eumenes had left Lydia, ultimately retiring to southern Phrygia where he would be in closer proximity to the other Perdiccans in Pisidia. Here, after his campaign of harassment in Hellespontine and western Phrygia,²⁶ Eumenes spent the winter of 320/319 at Celaenae (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 7–9).²⁷ Antigonus

²² Briant ("D'Alexandre le Grand aux diadoques: le cas d'Eumene de Kardia (Suite et fin.)," *REA* 75 [1973]: 66) claims that this episode shows the Macedonians' desire to return to their homeland. Briant (*ibid.*, 61) points out that while Alexander was alive, the troops expressed this desire to return home. His further claim that the unrest at Triparadeisus was, in part, the result of this desire to return to Macedonia (*ibid.*, 68), is very doubtful. Both Photius's epitome of Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 32–3) and Polyaeus (4. 6. 4) are very clear that the overriding cause for the unrest was lack of payment for services; nowhere is the claim made that a longing to return to Macedonia had any impact on the unrest. With respect to Holcias and his forces, their Macedonian homecoming was not their choice; they were returned to Macedonia (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). Prior to their capture there is no evidence that these troops showed any interest in going back to Macedonia. In fact, as noted, there is evidence that they wished to join Alcetas in Pisidia (cf. Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). In any case, after withdrawing from Antigonus's army they spent their time pillaging the countryside (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6), not in attempting to return to Macedonia. The various garrison and treasury commanders repeatedly demonstrated their loyalty to the kings without ever a word on repatriation. The only troops clearly interested in returning to Macedonia were those with Craterus who did return in 322 (on their desire, see E. Badian, "The Struggle for the Succession to Alexander the Great," in *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, edited by E. Badian [Oxford: Blackwell, 1964] 265). However, even with regard to these troops, Alexander's hypaspists were part of the forces dismissed at Opis and in Cilicia with Craterus at the time of Alexander's death, but did not return to Macedonia with the other Macedonians; they remained in Cilicia (see W. Heckel, "The Career of Antigones," *SymbOslo* 57 [1982]: 60–1).

²³ See W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 38 and n. 109.

²⁴ All indications are that Antipater did not wait for spring, but departed for Macedonia before the end of winter (Bosworth, "Chronology," 59).

²⁵ He died in the following year (Diod. 18. 48. 1, 4, 50. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 1)

²⁶ Plut. *Eum.* 8. 9–11; *Gothenbourg Palimpsest* fo. 72^r 14–73^v 11.

²⁷ Celaenae was the capital of Antigonus's satrapy (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 29. 3; Diod. 18. 39. Billows (*Antigonos*, 74) believes that Plutarch's statement placing Eumenes' winter quarters in Celaenae should be rejected. He argues that Diodorus (18. 40. 1) indicates that Eumenes wintered in Cappadocia. However, Diodorus only states that

and Antipater had continued into Hellespontine Phrygia after their stay in Sardis, where they camped separately, but not at too great a distance from one another (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 42-43). There had apparently been growing friction between the two commanders. Even though Antipater showed a great reluctance to engage the remaining Perdiccans in Asia Minor himself,²⁸ Antigonus was apparently criticized for doing likewise. He had, after all, requested the command against the forces still loyal to the former regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38), but had done little against them. Antigonus's major critic was his chiliarch, Antipater's son, Cassander (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 42).²⁹ Antipater summoned Antigonus and after consultation new arrangements were made. The kings and Cassander would accompany Antipater to Macedonia; eighty-five hundred Macedonians from Antipater's force would be exchanged for the bulk of the Macedonian veterans serving Antigonus.³⁰ Antigonus would remain as royal general in Asia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 43).³¹ These revisions strengthened Antigonus militarily. In the first place, the kings, Eurydice, and the soldiers who had

Antigonus left winter quarters seeking Eumenes who at that time was in Cappadocia. Diodorus's use of "διατρίβοντα" only indicates that Eumenes delayed in the sense that after wintering at Celaenae he had moved into Cappadocia where he was then encamped. Plutarch (*Eum.* 8. 8) shows that there was a meeting of the former Perdiccan commanders during this winter. Celaenae would have been a far more convenient location than somewhere in Cappadocia. Polyaeus (4. 6. 6) states that Antigonus spent the winter of 320/319 in Cappadocia (see Errington, "Chronology," 485 n. 30); this is doubtful. Antigonus would have had to have moved back across Phrygia late in the year after his final arrangement with Antipater. In Phrygia he could awaken old ties and recruit for the coming year. It is more reasonable to assume that Antigonus wintered in Phrygia and moved into Cappadocia the following spring.

²⁸ *Gothenbourg Palimpsest* fo. 72^r 14-73^v 1-11.

²⁹ So Billows, *Antigonos*, 72.

³⁰ It is unknown how many of the veterans returned to Macedonia with Antipater. The numbers in the exchange may have been rough equivalents. While it is unclear how many troops remained of the royal army that had accompanied Perdiccas to Egypt, it certainly was not over thirteen thousand, and probably less (see Chapter 3, note 70).

³¹ While Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 43) states that Antipater gave Antigonus eighty-five hundred cavalry as well as eighty-five hundred infantry, the cavalry figure must be an error (Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos," 71 n. 149; P. Goukowsky, trans. and ed. *Diodore de Sicile, bibliothèque historique. Livre XVIII* [Paris: Belles Lettres. 1978] 149). Later, even after acquiring additional horsemen, Antigonus's cavalry total was still only seven thousand (Diod. 18. 45. 1). Clearly some cavalry were given to him, but probably less than two thousand, not eighty-five hundred. Much of his cavalry may have been native. In 315, Antigonus possessed one thousand Phrygian and Lydian cavalry (Diod. 19. 29. 2). These forces were most likely acquired much earlier.

brought them power, would no longer be able to intrigue with the Perdiccans. Secondly, the troops brought in 320 to Asia from Macedonia by Antipater and now given to Antigonus were not the jaded, independently minded, often insubordinate, and occasionally murderous, veterans of Alexander's campaigns. These Macedonians gave Antigonus a considerable advantage over all of his rivals. Many of these soldiers had fought with Craterus, and after their defeat and surrender to Eumenes had nevertheless returned to Antipater, displaying a fidelity to their overall commander absent from the jaded veterans serving in the royal army. Whatever forces remained under Antigonus's command from the former royal army, probably were among the three thousand who joined Holcias in the winter of 320/319 in a revolt against the royal general's authority. As noted earlier, these troops ravaged both Lycaonia and Phrygia, but by a ruse were subsequently captured by Antigonus and escorted to Macedonia (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). With the departure of the royal army, both those forces who returned with Antipater and those with Holcias who were escorted there afterwards, Antigonus was now in a position to pursue his goal of ridding Asia of former Perdiccans without serious concerns regarding the loyalty of his own forces.³² With this final arrangement Antigonus with his new forces moved into Phrygia where he spent the winter of 320/319; Antipater remained in Hellespontine Phrygia (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 42), before crossing to Europe late in the winter of 320/319.³³

³² Antigonus had feared that Holcias would join Alcetas (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6).

³³ A. B. Bosworth argues that it would have been impossible for Antipater to move from northern Syria to Hellespontine Phrygia in 5–6 months ("Artifice," 76). The distance from the probable location of Triparadeisus (see chapter 4, note 133) to the Hellespont would require a journey of three months for an army encumbered with elephants and making only necessary stops (cf. Engels, *Logistics*, 156; see chapter 4, note 78). The conference with Cleopatra and, perhaps, an extended stay in Sardis would not have added more than a month, and probably a good deal less. There were no military operations other than the force separated from the main army and sent with Asander, and no reason to suppose that Antipater and Antigonus could not have entered winter quarters as early as late November. Eumenes had not harassed the royal army along its march, but had planned a battle in Lydia (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 9–11), only after all three forces withdrew from Lydia did Eumenes begin his military operations against Antipater and Antigonus. By this time the latter were very likely already in winter quarters (cf. *Gothenbourg Palimpsest* fo. 73^v 12). Bosworth also dates Perdiccas's death to mid-summer and Triparadeisus to autumn, and puts both in the year 321 ("Artifice," 76). Regardless of the year the two events should be dated respectively in July and August (see chapter 4, notes 2 and 134).

For Eumenes the winter did not bring such welcome results. While in winter quarters, Eumenes had sent envoys to Alcetas and to the other Perdiccan leaders in Pisidia, suggesting strongly that they unite their forces and make war on Antigonus in common.³⁴ Alcetas, when the news of his brother's assassination and his own condemnation in Egypt reached him, was in Pisidia (cf. Diod. 18. 44. 1, 45. 3, 46. 1),³⁵ where he was ultimately joined by most of the other former Perdiccan commanders (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8). Included among these was Attalus, Perdiccas's brother-in-law. After Perdiccas's assassination, Attalus had initially fled to Tyre, which served as a collecting point for many supporters of the former regent (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 39; Diod. 18. 37. 3-4). He joined in the short-lived agitation at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 32-33), and later, with the other Perdiccans who joined him, and with additional forces recruited in Phoenicia, mounted an unsuccessful attack on Rhodes before joining Alcetas.³⁶ Docimus, who was replaced in Babylon by Seleucus,³⁷ and Polemon, Attalus'

³⁴ Gothenbourg *Palimpsest* fo. 73^v 11-F72^v 6; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 41; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8. Billows (*Antigonus*, 75 n. 43, 77 n. 50) places Alcetas in winter quarters in Caria. He bases this conclusion on Appian's (*Syr.* 52) report that Laomedon fled to Alcetas in Caria when the former's satrapy was attacked by Ptolemy. Appian (*Syr.* 52), however, has probably confused Alcetas with Asander, who was the satrap of Caria (Diod. 18. 3. 1, 39. 6). The *Parian Marble* (FGrH 239 B F-12) dates Ptolemy's incursion into Syria and Phoenicia in 319/318, and as J. Seibert (*Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I, Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und Antiken Rechtsgeschichte* 56 [Munich: C. H. Beck, 1969] 130) has pointed out, if the earlier date is accepted, it puts Ptolemy in open rebellion against Antipater, which is unlikely. Alcetas, therefore, wintered in Pisidia, which was his location when, during this same winter, he traveled briefly to Celaenae to negotiate with Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8).

³⁵ A. Vezin's (*Eumenes von Kardia: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* [Münster: Druck und Verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1907] 57 n. 4) suggestion that Alcetas fled from Syria back to Pisidia is possible. After refusing to cooperate with Eumenes and with the defeat of Craterus, he may have wished to aid his brother by trapping Antipater between two hostile armies. No source, however, states that Alcetas attempted to join his brother.

³⁶ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 39; cf. Diod. 18. 45. 3; Attalus' army numbered ten thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 39); he had also acquired eight hundred talents in Tyre (Diod. 18. 37. 4).

³⁷ Bosworth doubts that Seleucus could have moved from Triparadeisus to Babylon and expelled Docimus and that the latter could have arrived in Pisidia by the winter of the same year as Perdiccas's death in Egypt ("Artifice," 77-8). However, an army journeying from northern Syria to Babylon would have taken approximately two months. This would have put Seleucus' entrance into Babylon in late October or early November (A. Mehl, *Seleukos Nikator und sein Reich*, Vol. 1, *Studia Hellenistica* 28, edited by W. Peremans [Louvain, 1986] 40 and n. 42; L. Schober, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Babyloniens und der Oberen Satrapien von 323-303 v. Chr.* [Frankfurt and Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1981] 68). The Babylonian Chronicle (*BM* 34660 rev. l. 11)

brother,³⁸ also joined Alcetas in Pisidia.³⁹ Clearly the Perdiccan forces were still formidable. From Plutarch (*Eum.* 8. 8), it would appear that the various commanders came together in Celaenae to discuss the situation. In the end, however, the negotiations proved fruitless; neither Eumenes, nor Alcetas, was willing to concede the chief command. Apparently Alcetas himself did not exercise authority without difficulties raised by his fellow commanders in Pisidia. Plutarch (*Eum.* 8. 8) reports that in their negotiations with Eumenes in 319, "Alcetas, Polemon, and Docimus" all sought the chief command.⁴⁰ In any case, there would not to be a united Perdiccan force. This jealousy and rivalry had divided the Perdiccans at the time of Antipater's invasion and it now divided them again. This lack of cooperation was, of course, a serious blunder, since Antipater, while having left Antigonus with eighty-five hundred infantry and a contingent of cavalry, had returned to Macedonia in the same winter with his forces (*Arr. Succ.* 1. 43-44; *Diod.* 18. 39. 7). The united Perdiccan armies would have in numbers been much superior to the forces of Antigonus; they would also have been more experienced. In 319, Eumenes possessed twenty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry (*Diod.* 18.

places his arrival on 10 Arahshamnu (Heshvan), or on November, 14 (R. A. Parker and W. H. Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology, 626 B.C.-A.D. 75* [Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1956] 36). The sources do not indicate that there was any resistance to the change in command (see Mehl, *Seleukos*, 40). Docimus had only after a struggle himself occupied the position (*Arr. Succ.* 24. 3-5), and probably had not been able to establish his authority before Seleucus appeared on the scene with the order of the kings and regent. Additionally, Seleucus was likely accompanied by Pithon who may have had a sizable army with him (see chapter 6). Docimus' retreat to Pisidia with whatever meager forces he retained could have taken as little as one month, if these forces were cavalry and/or light-armed troops. It is also very possible that Docimus after replacing Archon in Babylon had returned to the regent and joined him in Egypt (Mehl, *Seleukos*, 39-40), and from there fled to Pisidia (cf. *Diod.* 18. 39. 6, 45. 3; *Plut. Eum.* 8. 8). If this was indeed the case, then he may have brought whatever troops he had back with him, leaving only a small garrison in the citadel.

³⁸ H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Munich: Beck, 1926; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1973) 2:92-3 [#181], 322 [#644].

³⁹ *Arr. Succ.* 24. 3; *Diod.* 18. 39. 6, 45. 3; cf. *Plut. Eum.* 8. 8.

⁴⁰ The hostility towards Eumenes evidenced by Alcetas may not have been shared by the other Perdiccan leaders. In 316 a number of imprisoned Perdiccans, including Attalus, Polemon, and Docimus, overpowered their guards, and while Docimus urged that they escape into the countryside immediately, others counseled that since the fortress was strong and well-supplied, they remain and await aid from Eumenes (*Diod.* 19. 16. 1-3). Indeed, these same commanders spent so much time disputing what action to take in this instance, that the option of escape disappeared, and they were trapped in their former prison by Antigonus's troops (*Diod.* 19. 16. 3).

40. 7; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3), and Alcetas sixteen thousand foot and nine hundred horse (Diod. 18. 45. 1). Antigonus must have had roughly two-thirds as many infantry as his opponents' combined forces, but was much inferior in cavalry.⁴¹

The failure of the Perdiccans to cooperate emboldened Antigonus. He left his winter quarters actively seeking to contest Eumenes. Eumenes had himself already left Celaenae and was encamped in Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 40. 1), since he wished to make full use of his cavalry on the plains of Cappadocia. Although his troops had remained loyal in the wake of the disaster in Egypt, during the winter one of Eumenes' commanders, Perdiccas, deserted with three thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. Eumenes recaptured the deserters, put the leaders to death, and pardoned the common soldiers, redistributing them among the other units (Diod. 18. 40. 1-4). While Eumenes' earlier stratagem of plundering his rivals' satrapies had alleviated his difficulties in paying his forces, this procedure had only delayed the problem. Eumenes was cut off from access to the wealth of Asia. Even though he maintained that he, not Antigonus, represented the legitimate authority in Asia, the various "royal" officials of Asia took their orders from "King Philip." Antigonus could represent himself to his troops as a regular paymaster; Eumenes could not. Attalus and Alcetas presumably still had some financial resources left over from Attalus' acquisition of eight hundred talents at Tyre (Diod. 18. 37. 4), but these commanders were unwilling to cooperate with Eumenes, at least on Eumenes' terms.

While Eumenes' position in the new world order was precarious at best, that of Antigonus was very strong. He was by decree the official satrap of Phrygia and στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ in Asia with access to the royal resources of Asia.⁴² The custodians of the various

⁴¹ Against Eumenes at Orcynia, Antigonus possessed "more than ten thousand infantry" and two thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 40. 7). Approximately forty elephants, ten-fifteen thousand infantry, and, perhaps, two thousand cavalry had been detached from Antigonus's forces to prevent Alcetas from leaving Pisidia and joining Eumenes (see note 45).

⁴² While Antipater assigned the satrapies at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18. 39. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 34-38) and granted Antigonus the title of "royal general" on his own authority (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38; Diod. 18. 39. 7, 40. 1), the official enabling decrees all were issued in Philip's name. While this is not stated by any source, it would appear a reasonable assumption. When later the title of "royal general" was offered to Eumenes it was done in the name of the "kings" (Diod. 18. 57. 3). Antipater at Triparadeisus was most likely named in the official edicts as the executing magistrate, as was

treasuries located throughout the empire remained loyal to the "kings." Eumenes in 318 and 317, on the strength of letters from the "kings," despite his earlier condemnation by the army in Egypt, was granted access to the treasury in Cyinda (Diod. 18. 58. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 2), and to that in Susa as well (Diod. 19. 15. 5), by officials who had previously denied him funds. But in 319, it was Antigonus who had the authority from the "kings," and as a result was able not only to pay his soldiers readily, but was even able to offer the one hundred-talent reward to anyone who would murder Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11).

Antigonus, using his resources, made "great promises" to Apollonides, a commander of Eumenes' mercenary cavalry.⁴³ Apollonides was suborned. He agreed that during the coming battle he would desert Eumenes (Diod. 18. 40. 5-8; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3). Eumenes had moved to a position at Orcynia where the ground was highly suitable for cavalry maneuvers (Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3).⁴⁴ Antigonus advanced against him with more than ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and thirty elephants (Diod. 18. 40. 7); a sizable portion of his forces had been left behind to guard against an attack by the Perdiccans in Pisidia.⁴⁵ Opposed to Antigonus, Eumenes had approximately twenty

Polyperchon with regard to the decree granting the title of royal general to Eumenes (cf. Rosen, "Documents," 47 n. 28).

⁴³ Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry in all likelihood remained loyal; his wife and children remained in Cappadocia throughout Eumenes campaigns (Nepos *Eum.* 13. 4). While Eumenes raised sixty-three hundred Cappadocian and Paphlagonian (a Paphlagonian had killed Craterus [Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27]) cavalry for the Armenian campaign, these troops were not mercenary soldiers. They were land owners who were rewarded for their services by the remission of taxes and gifts of horses and other honors (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3), not with pay (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 8. 9-10). Patronage was the means of securing loyalty. Since most of these individuals, therefore, had their own local concerns, Eumenes could not count on all of these troops serving him on a continual basis (cf. Diod. 18. 41. 3, 53. 7). Eumenes' remaining cavalry were part of the "considerable army" given to him by Perdiccas in 320 (Diod. 18. 25. 6). Mercenary cavalry played a prominent role in Eumenes' battle against Craterus and Neoptolemus; "he arrayed against Craterus not a single Macedonian, but two troops of 'mercenary' horse" (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1).

⁴⁴ The actual site of Orcynia is unknown, but it is likely that it was somewhere on the central plateau (cf. Diod. 18. 40. 6). Eumenes had wintered in Celaenae (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 7) and Antigonus in Phrygia (see note 27). Moreover, Eumenes wanted to make full use of what he believed to be his cavalry superiority.

⁴⁵ While Antigonus is credited with only ten thousand infantry at Orcynia (Diod. 18. 40. 7), he must surely have had at his disposal significantly more troops. He was given eighty-five hundred Macedonian infantry and, perhaps, two thousand cavalry by Antipater before the regent crossed to Europe (see note 31). Additionally, even though the majority of the old royal army returned with Antipater, certain

thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. In the course of the battle Apollonides, as prearranged, deserted; eight thousand of Eumenes' men were killed and his entire supply train captured.⁴⁶ Apollonides, however, did not long survive his treachery. He was later captured by Eumenes' forces and hanged (Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3).⁴⁷

After his defeat Eumenes marched rapidly toward Armenia where he hoped to replenish his army (Diod. 18. 41. 1). Part of Armenia may have remained loyal as a result of his campaigning in that area

elements from Perdikkas's old forces, including cavalry, elephants, and Greek and Asiatic infantry were retained by him as well. Later against Alcetas, Antigonos possessed forty thousand infantry (Diod. 18. 45. 1), and even though Antigonos had acquired many of Eumenes' defeated infantrymen (Diod. 18. 41. 4), Eumenes only had twenty thousand foot (Diod. 18. 40. 7) and his forces had suffered eight thousand casualties, most of whom must have been infantrymen (Diod. 18. 40. 8). The difference in the infantry numbers at Orcynia and in the battle against Alcetas must represent troops who were detached to watch the other Perdikkans while Antigonos dealt with Eumenes (see W. W. Tarn, "The Heritage of Alexander," in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, edited by J. B. Bury, S. A. Cook and F. E. Adcock [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969; reprinted Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953] 6:471; R. Engel, "Anmerkungen zur Schlacht von Orkynia," *MusHelv.* 28 [1971]: 228; Billows, *Antigonos*, 75 n. 43). These likely included forty elephants (in 320, Antigonos had 70 [Arr. *Succ.* 1. 43]), ten-fifteen thousand infantry, and, perhaps, two thousand cavalry.

⁴⁶ Diod. 18. 40. 6-8; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3; Just. 14. 2. 1. Polyaeus 4. 6. 19, in all likelihood referring to this battle (see Billows, *Antigonos*, 75-6), states that Eumenes' phalanx fled before any advance against Antigonos as the result of an Antigonid ruse. According to Polyaeus, Antigonos arranged for a soldier, while envoys from Eumenes were present, to announce, "the allies are here." Antigonos then dismissed the delegation and led out his army the next day drawing up his phalanx with its front twice as long as usual. The passage does, however, present difficulties. Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus mention this stratagem, and, indeed, both state that it was the desertion of Apollonides that caused Eumenes' defeat. Nor are the two descriptions of the battle compatible. Polyaeus has the phalanx in full retreat before the commencement of hostilities, while Diodorus (18. 40. 8) is clear that Eumenes' defeat resulted from Apollonides's desertion to the enemy while the battle was in progress. Plutarch (*Eum.* 9. 3) also refers to treachery. Moreover, Eumenes had cavalry superiority. He could easily ascertain whether the announcement was true; especially since he had a day in which to check the report's veracity. Briant, followed by Billows, on the basis of this passage declares that Eumenes was "out-generated" in this battle. As shown, such a claim is justified only if subversion is "outgeneraling." In all likelihood this particular stratagem derives from Duris or a similar writer and is untrue (see J. Melber, "Über die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensammlung Polyäns," *Jahrbücher für classischen Philologie* suppl. 14 (1885): 625; cf. Chapter 1).

⁴⁷ It is curious that Eumenes should succeed in capturing Apollonides given his defeat, flight, and now inferior cavalry. Engel ("Anmerkungen," 230), however, most plausibly has suggested that Apollonides, while pursuing part of Eumenes' fleeing troops, through some accident, was captured.

in 322 and 321.⁴⁸ He probably also wanted to make contact with Orontes, the satrap of Armenia Major. Antigonos's now superior cavalry, however, made Eumenes' movements difficult. Even though Antigonos's infantry had fallen behind Eumenes' retreating force, his cavalry continually forced the latter to engage in rearguard actions (Nepos *Eum.* 5. 2).⁴⁹ Desertion was also a problem for Eumenes with Antigonos enrolling the deserters in his own army (Diod. 18. 41. 1; Just. 14. 2. 3).⁵⁰ Antigonos had captured Eumenes' baggage train, which for the troops who had spent the past decade in Asia contained their families and their worldly possessions.⁵¹ With escape becoming impossible, Eumenes dismissed most of his remaining forces and with six hundred men retreated into the nearby fortress of Nora in Cappadocia.⁵² Entering the fortress with a larger force would have

⁴⁸ See chapter 4.

⁴⁹ According to Plutarch (*Eum.* 9. 4–5), Eumenes and his entire army eluded Antigonos and returned to the scene of the battle where they collected and burned the dead. Only a force with superior cavalry could have carried out such a movement unnoticed, and Eumenes did not possess this advantage, otherwise he would not have been subsequently overtaken (Diod. 18. 41. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 1). A small party of cavalry, perhaps, could have escaped notice. If there is any truth to Plutarch's report, it must be that Eumenes with a contingent of his cavalry doubled back to Orcynia. Plutarch (*Eum.* 9. 3–6) and Polyaeus (4. 8. 5) also relate that on this retreat Eumenes' scouts reported that Antigonos's supply train was vulnerable to capture. Eumenes wished to overlook this opportunity, since he was afraid that the acquisition of the enemy's baggage would slow his withdrawal. His men, however, who had so recently lost their own possessions when Antigonos had captured Eumenes' camp (Diod. 18. 40. 8), could not resist the temptation. Eumenes, therefore, secretly informed Menander, the commander of Antigonos's supply train, of the danger. Menander quickly withdrew to safety. When Eumenes' scouts reported that the train was no longer vulnerable, Eumenes feigned disappointment. It is difficult to know the veracity of these anecdotes; the corresponding sections of Diodorus are very abbreviated and supply nothing either to confirm or to deny these passages. Engel's ("Anmerkungen," 230) claim that such details could only come from an eyewitness, i.e. Hieronymus, is unconvincing.

⁵⁰ Plutarch (*Eum.* 10. 1) states that after the battle of Orcynia Eumenes persuaded most of his soldiers to leave him. This passage would appear to be in direct conflict with Diodorus (18. 41. 1), where the troops are deserting Eumenes. However, the two sources may be speaking of different contingents of Eumenes' defeated army. In all likelihood, most of Eumenes' surviving infantry surrendered to Antigonos immediately after the defeat. That was the common practice of these old veterans. Many, if not most, of Eumenes' Macedonian infantry had formerly served Neoptolemus and deserted that commander for Eumenes when he was defeated (Diod. 18. 29. 4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5–6; Just. 13. 8. 4; see chapter 4). Eumenes' Cappadocian cavalry would probably have proven loyal, and being mobile able to keep ahead of their pursuers.

⁵¹ On the importance of baggage, see chapter 8, and Anson, "Discrimination," 57.

⁵² Diod. 18. 41. 1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 3; Just. 14. 2. 2–3. While

accelerated and aggravated the hardships of a siege, and Eumenes reasoned that he might under those circumstances be surrendered to the enemy (Just. 14. 2. 3). Eumenes' flight into Nora occurred in the late spring of 319.⁵³ Nora was a small but virtually impregnable fortress; it was little more than twelve hundred feet in circumference, perched on the top of a mountain and well-fortified. In addition, it contained sufficient supplies for Eumenes and his party to endure a long siege (Diod. 18. 41. 2-3). After Antigonus surrounded the fortress and began the construction of double walls, ditches and palisades, he invited Eumenes to a conference (Diod. 18. 41. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 2-11. 3). Antigonus undoubtedly believed that Eumenes was defeated and would be amenable to his demands. While the two renewed their former friendship, Eumenes refused to attach himself to Antigonus as a subordinate. Instead he demanded that he be reinstated in his satrapy and cleared of all charges (Diod. 18. 41. 6-7; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 6).⁵⁴ Antigonus referred Eumenes' demands

Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 3) places Nora in Phrygia, it is clear that this is mistaken. Plutarch (*Eum.* 10. 2) locates the fortress on the border of Cappadocia and Lycaonia; Strabo (12. 2. 5) positions Nora in Cappadocia, and Diodorus (18. 44. 1; cf. 18. 41. 7) implies the same. W. M. Ramsay ("Military Operations on the North Front of Mount Taurus. IV: The Campaigns of 319 and 320 B.C.," *JHS* 43 [1923]: 8) suggests that a castle six miles east of Eregli called Hrakla, near the Cilician Gates, is the site of Nora. This would fit Diodorus's (18. 44. 2) statement that Antigonus marched 287 miles to Pisidia after Eumenes retreat into Nora. However, Diodorus (18. 41. 1) earlier also relates that Eumenes tried to escape to Armenia but was overtaken and forced to retreat into Nora. Suffice it to say that the actual site has yet to be determined.

⁵³ See E. M. Anson, "The Siege of Nora: A Source Conflict," *GRBS* 18 (1977): 251-6. Diodorus (18. 53. 5) states that the siege lasted one year. While Diodorus is often confused with regard to chronology, such precise indications of time usually come from his sources (see E. M. Anson, "Diodorus and the Date of Triparadeisus," *AJP* 107 [1986]: 209-11), in this case Hieronymus of Cardia (see chapter 1). Therefore, since Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 7) has Eumenes leaving Nora at the approach of spring, Eumenes must have retreated into the fortress in the late spring of 319.

⁵⁴ Plutarch's (*Eum.* 10. 3-11. 3) account differs markedly in tone from the corresponding one in Diodorus (18. 41. 6-7). According to Plutarch, when Antigonus demanded that he be addressed as a superior, Eumenes refused stating, "I regard no man as my superior so long as I am master of my sword" (Plut. *Eum.* 10. 4). The basic situation is the same in the two sources, but Plutarch's account is distinctly embellished. It is difficult to know whether Plutarch is here using a different source, i.e. Duris, or Diodorus in his abridgement of Hieronymus has omitted these embellishments; the former is probably the case (see chapter 1). Eumenes' demand that all charges against him be dismissed (Diod. 18. 41. 7) must refer to the condemnation of him by the army in Egypt. Eumenes clearly believed that there was no need for a subsequent assembly of the army to be convened to dismiss these charges; he wanted the kings' representative in Asia to cancel them. Antigonus

to the regent Antipater and proceeded to finish his siegeworks (Diod. 18. 41. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 11. 1).

After leaving sufficient troops to maintain the siege, Antigonos moved in seven days by forced marches into Pisidia to meet the remaining Perdiccans (Diod. 18. 41. 7; 44. 1; Polyae. 4. 6. 7).⁵⁵ Antigonos's forces now numbered forty thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 43. 1; cf. 40. 7; 50. 3), including a sizable part of Eumenes' former force (Diod. 18. 40. 8–41. 1). In the Pisidic *Aulon* the two opposing armies met and the last major Perdiccan force was defeated (Diod. 18. 44–47; Polyae. 4. 6. 7).⁵⁶ Antigonos obtained the surrender of almost the entire enemy army through negotiation and enrolled these units in his forces (Diod. 18. 45. 4). Not long after this battle Antigonos's army had grown to sixty thou-

forwarded this request not to the royal army or to a Macedonian assembly of any kind, but to the regent Antipater (Diod. 18. 41. 7). Plainly both Eumenes and Antigonos believed such decisions were royal prerogatives, as they had traditionally been in Macedonia (see E. M. Anson, "Macedonia's Alleged Constitutionalism," *CJ* 80 [1985]: 303–16).

⁵⁵ According to Diodorus (18. 44. 1), Antigonos completed this march of seven days, 287 miles, with "all" his forces. This would have been a prodigious feat for any army. Even Alexander never achieved such rates for his entire army (see Engels, *Logistics*, 153–4). It is likely that this march must have been carried out by cavalry and light armed troops only (so Billows, *Antigonos*, 78–9). The rest of the army, excluding the elephants, would have taken probably another week to arrive. Since Antigonos had already divided his army before his battle with Eumenes, leaving sizable forces already on the Pisidian border (see note 45), these with the addition of the cavalry and light-armed infantry that had accompanied him, and the element of surprise, were thought sufficient for his purposes.

⁵⁶ Ramsay ("Operations," 1–3; cf. Goukowsky, *Diodore de Sicile*, 151) argues convincingly that the actual battle occurred some distance northeast of Cretopolis (on the location of Cretopolis, see Richard Stillwell, ed., *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976] 410), in the pass which lies just south of the Pisidic or southern route across Asia Minor (Ramsay, "Operations," 6; M. Cary, *The Geographic Background of Greek and Roman History* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949] 151). Polyaeus (4. 6. 7) does not mention Cretopolis, but places the battle in the "Pisidic *Aulon*." Ramsay believes that this pass was specifically known as the Pisidic *Aulon* and was the major point of departure into Pisidia from the main southern route across Asia Minor. Both forces do appear to know that the other must take this route (Ramsay, "Operations," 7). Diodorus's placement of the battle near Cretopolis (18. 44. 2) probably derives from his confusion with regard to the reference to the Pisidic *Aulon*. Diodorus knew that the battle was fought in the vicinity of Cretopolis, but was unable to locate the site with any greater precision (so Ramsay, *ibid.*, 3). Antigonos after the siege of Termessus left Pisidia for Phrygia and passed through Cretopolis (Diod. 18. 47. 4). Billows (*Antigonos*, 78 n. 50) argues for a pass closer to Cretopolis "towards Milyas and Selge." Ramsay's ("Operations," 5) argument that the battle occurred near a major east-west road is preferable.

sand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, reflecting this addition (Diod. 18. 50. 1, 3).

Attalus, Docimus, and Polemon, and many other former allies of Perdiccas were taken captive (Diod. 18. 45. 3). Alcetas, who had long cultivated the Pisidians, escaped into the Pisidic fortress of Termessus (Diod. 18. 45. 3–46. 3),⁵⁷ but was subsequently betrayed and committed suicide (Diod. 18. 46. 7). When the body was turned over to Antigonus, he maltreated it for three days before abandoning it and Pisidia. Alcetas's supporters amongst the Pisidians, then, recovered his corpse and paid it proper rites (Diod. 18. 47. 3).⁵⁸ Antigonus now went into winter quarters at Celaenae in the fall of 319 (Diod. 18. 52. 1).⁵⁹

Eumenes spent the winter under siege in Nora. Even though the fortress was in no danger of falling by assault or through starvation, morale was a problem which Eumenes did his best to alleviate by freely associating with his men (Plut. *Eum.* 11. 2–3). Moreover, the close confines of the stronghold made it impossible to exercise the horses in the usual fashion. To alleviate this problem Eumenes used a training technique to keep the horses in proper physical condition. Employing a pulley system, ropes were suspended from the beams in the ceiling and placed around the horse's neck. The horse was then drawn up into the air until only its hind legs remained in firm contact with the ground. As the horse began to strangle it kicked out seeking a firm footing. The grooms would also prod and shout at the horse to intensify the action. Through this means the horses were kept in good physical condition in spite of their confinement.⁶⁰

Since the siege showed no sign of ending, Eumenes in the late summer of 319 dispatched Hieronymus of Cardia, the historian, to

⁵⁷ For a description of the ancient fortress, see Arr. *Anab.* 1. 27. 5–6 (cf. Str. 14. 3. 9).

⁵⁸ This particular hatred shown by Antigonus towards Alcetas, but not the other Perdiccan commanders is curious. Perhaps, Alcetas had been especially insistent that Antigonus be removed from his satrapy in 322 (see chapter 3).

⁵⁹ It is unclear how much time was spent between Eumenes' defeat and his subsequent flight into Nora. It is unlikely to have been long, a matter of a couple weeks at most. Antigonus then invested Nora (Diod. 18. 41. 6). The defeat of the other Perdiccans in Pisidia (Diod. 18. 44–45. 3; Polyæn. 4. 6. 7) would then have taken place in July/August with the subsequent actions at Termessus (Diod. 18. 45. 3–47. 3) being completed in September. Antigonus left Termessus and probably retired to Celaenae in October, 319 (Diod. 18. 52. 1).

⁶⁰ Diod. 18. 42. 3–4; Plut. *Eum.* 11. 4–8; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 4–6.

Macedonia to negotiate terms of surrender to Antipater (Diod. 18. 42. 1),⁶¹ but the result was unsatisfactory.⁶² That Eumenes sent it at all shows how desperate his situation was becoming. No aid had reached him from any source, nor, after the defeat of Alcetas and Attalus, did it appear that any was likely to be sent to him. Eumenes, however, had earlier avoided an alliance with Antipater, in part, because of their enmity (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 7). Eumenes may have hoped to arouse Antipater's fears of Antigonus; in 320 Antipater had suspected Antigonus's "ambition" (Diod. 18. 39. 7; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38); he may even have threatened, given his present circumstances, to join Antigonus.⁶³ In any case it is doubtful Hieronymus reached Macedonia while Antipater was still alive; he may have been captured as soon as he left the fortress, for he is found with Antigonus very soon after the news of Antipater's death reached Asia (Diod.

⁶¹ While the exact time of the dispatch of the embassy is unknown, it is a fair guess that Eumenes would not have negotiated readily with his old enemy Antipater unless he saw no other alternatives. Nepos (*Eum.* 5. 7) indicates that Eumenes had tried other options. Eumenes certainly would not have sent the mission until the fate of the other Perdiccans had been sealed by Antigonus.

⁶² Justin (14. 2. 4) states that Antipater did send assistance, and that Antigonus immediately raised the siege as a result. This is corroborated, however, by no other source, and Justin is here likely confusing Antipater with Arrhidaeus (see Vezin, *Eumenes*, 75 n. 2), who did later attempt to send aid to Eumenes (Diod. 18. 52. 4), or, perhaps, with Polyperchon (see D. Kanatsulis, "Antipatros als Feldherr und Staatsman nach dem Tode Alexanders des Grossen," *Makedonika* 8 [1968]: 179 n. 3). Certainly, Justin often does confuse names (see chapter 1). Briant ("Eumene (Suite et fin.)," 72-3), however, accepts Justin's evidence in modified form, arguing that Antipater had been informed of Antigonus's ambitions and wished to establish Eumenes as a counterpoise to the "royal general" in Asia (cf. Rosen, "Die Bündnisformen der Diadochen und der Zerfall des Alexanderreiches," *Acta Classica* 11 [1968]: 199). Antipater, continues Briant ("Eumene (Suite et fin.)," 74), died before the aid could be sent, but the central government had been roused to Antigonus's ambitions. This argument has a number of weaknesses. While Diodorus (18. 41. 5) implies that immediately after his defeat of Eumenes Antigonus had decided to revolt from the central government, he also states that Antigonus wished for the moment to maintain good relations with Antipater. The demands made by Eumenes at Nora had been properly forwarded by Antigonus to Antipater (Diod. 18. 41. 7). It was not until the news of Antipater's death arrived in Asia that Antigonus began to consult with his *philoï* on his ambitious new plans (Diod. 18. 50. 5). Moreover, it was Cleitus who early in 318 brought the news of Antigonus's revolt to Europe (Diod. 18. 52. 5-6). Finally, Justin states that aid was sent to Eumenes and the arrival of this assistance caused Antigonus to lift the siege; he does not say that the sending of troops was contemplated (cf. *ibid.*, 74), but that they were sent. With no evidence to support Justin, and with the need to reject part of Justin's own evidence, Briant's argument is unconvincing.

⁶³ See Briant, "Eumene (Suite et fin.)," 74.

18. 50. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 1). Antipater, after a protracted illness, had died in the late summer of the same year as Hieronymus's mission.⁶⁴ Antigonus learned of Antipater's death while at Cretopolis on his way to Celaenae to enter winter quarters (Diod. 18. 47. 4; 52. 1).

The news of the regent's death elated Antigonus; he now saw new vistas opening before him (Diod. 18. 47. 5; 50. 1).⁶⁵ In line with his new expectations in the late fall or winter of 319, he summoned Hieronymus, who had been captured and was being held by the commander of the besieging force at Nora.⁶⁶ Afterwards Hieronymus was sent back to the fortress with new proposals for Eumenes.⁶⁷ These new terms were quite generous. In fact, they were basically the same ones that Eumenes had proposed at the earlier meeting with Antigonus shortly after the former had retreated into Nora (Plut. *Eum.* 10. 6; cf. Diod. 18. 47. 6–7). Eumenes would receive a satrapy, presumably Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 50. 4).⁶⁸ In exchange Eumenes

⁶⁴ Diod. 18. 48. 4; 47. 4; Plut. *Phoc.* 31. 1; *Eum.* 12. 1. Antipater was in his last illness when Demades arrived on a mission from Athens (Diod. 18. 48. 1; Plut. *Phoc.* 30. 4–6; *Dem.* 30. 3–4). Demades did not leave Athens earlier than mid-June 319 (see Errington, "Diodorus Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochoi," 488 and n. 35). Antipater's death then probably occurred in the late summer, with the news reaching Antigonus early in the fall (Billows, *Antigonus*, 80; Bosworth, "Chronology," 80). This dating corresponds to the Parian Marble's (*FGrH* 239 B F-12) date of 319/318 for the death of Antipater.

⁶⁵ Billows (*Antigonus*, 80 n. 52) doubts that Antigonus contemplated such broad ambitions in the winter of 319/318, claiming that these are the product of "Diodoros's hindsight." Diodorus is remarkably consistent in his allegation. Antigonus offers to reconcile himself with Eumenes as part of his plan "to dominate all Asia" without recourse to the new regent, Polyperchon (18. 50. 2–4); Arrhidaeus to counteract Antigonus's "plans" begins to strengthen his position in Hellespontine Phrygia and also to send a force to relieve Eumenes (18. 51. 1, 52. 4); Antigonus launches an unprovoked attack on Lydia (18. 52. 5); he made an alliance with Cassander, because he "wished [the new regent] Polyperchon to be surrounded by many great distractions, so that he himself might proceed against Asia without danger" (18. 54. 4). It would appear that most of these actions had to have been planned in the previous winter. Also, such uniformity probably derives from Diodorus's source here, Hieronymus.

⁶⁶ While this is nowhere stated, Hieronymus is found under Antigonus's control, but has to be summoned to Celaenae from an unspecified location (Diod. 18. 50. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 1). There is no reference to his having returned to Eumenes in Nora, nor to his being sent to Antigonus by Eumenes. That he had been intercepted before he could return to Eumenes appears likely.

⁶⁷ Diod. 18. 50. 4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 2; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7.

⁶⁸ While Diodorus 18. 50. 4 only says a "greater satrapy" than he had controlled, Eumenes, after his release, remained in Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 53. 6). Nicanor, who was appointed satrap of Cappadocia at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18. 39. 6), may never have physically acquired the province. Nothing is known of his activities after

was "to share in (Antigonus's) own undertakings."⁶⁹ With the news of the death of Antipater, there was no apparent alternative to an alliance with Antigonus. Therefore, "at the approach of spring" (Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7) Eumenes swore an oath of loyalty to Antigonus and was released from Nora (Diod. 18. 53. 5).

Plutarch (*Eum.* 12. 2-4; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7; App. *Syr.* 53) paints quite a different picture of the circumstances surrounding Eumenes' release. According to Plutarch, Eumenes changed the wording of the oath of loyalty proposed by Antigonus, so that he swore allegiance to the kings and Olympias as well as to Antigonus, thereby obtaining his release without compromising his independence.⁷⁰ This section of Plutarch's biography most certainly derives from Duris and is false.⁷¹ The arguments against its acceptance are numerous and convincing. In the first place, Diodorus (18. 53. 5; 19. 44. 2) makes no reference to a changed oath. Nor is this the result of careless abridgement on Diodorus's part; the corresponding sections of Plutarch and Diodorus differ markedly in other respects as well. The causes for and the timing of the renewal of hostilities between Eumenes and Antigonus are not the same in the two sources. In Plutarch (*Eum.* 12. 7), Antigonus sends a force against Eumenes as soon as he learns of the altered oath; in Diodorus (18. 58. 4-59. 1), Antigonus moves against Eumenes only after the latter's alliance in the summer with Polyperchon, Antipater's successor as regent in Macedonia.⁷²

his appointment unless this is the same Nicanor who in 312 shows up as an Antigoniid general in Media (Diod. 19. 92. 1), as is claimed by Billows (*Antigonos*, 409). Eumenes had won over the native Cappadocian population with his favors in 322 (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3-4), and in Nora he retained certain Cappadocian hostages (Plut. *Eum.* 12. 5).

⁶⁹ Diod. 18. 53. 5; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 12. 2-3; Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7.

⁷⁰ See Anson, "Nora," 251-6, for a full refutation of the altered oath.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 254-5.

⁷² Diodorus (18. 58. 1) states that "immediately" after Eumenes left Nora he received letters (plural) from Polyperchon. This statement can only be the result of Diodorus's abridgment of his source. According to Diodorus (18. 57. 3), Polyperchon's offer to Eumenes was to counter the "revolt" of Antigonus. However, the news of Antigonus's actions was only brought to Macedonia by Cleitus early in 318 (Diod. 18. 52. 5-6). The letters to Eumenes, then, could not have been sent until the spring. However, Eumenes was released from Nora "at the approach of spring" (Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7). The reference in Diodorus 18. 58. 1 to "letters" suggests that Diodorus may have in 18. 57. 3 condensed a whole series of exchanges into a single occurrence. The best explanation is that the first communication arrived in the spring, as soon as Polyperchon learned that Antigonus was in revolt and that Eumenes was free. The final agreement was not, however, reached until the early summer of 318.

Moreover, Diodorus (18. 58. 4; cf. 19. 44. 2) states that after the receipt of the request for the alliance from the new regent "[Eumenes] decided not to take orders from Antigonus." Strabo (14. 5. 10), additionally, reports that Eumenes "revolted" from Antigonus; and Pompeius Trogus apparently stated that "the war was renewed by Eumenes" ([Pompeius Trogus] *Prol.* 4). These authors, therefore, imply that for a period of time Eumenes was acting as Antigonus's loyal subordinate.

If the oath were altered, it is difficult to imagine what Eumenes hoped to accomplish by obtaining his freedom under these false pretenses. Even if news of the impending war on the Greek mainland had reached Eumenes, it is unlikely Eumenes would have seen much hope in it for him; he was in Asia. Altering the oath would then have secured his release from Nora but only as a desperate fugitive. Besides, the terms offered by Antigonus were basically the same as those he had demanded shortly after the siege began (Diod. 18. 41. 6-7; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 6). Later, in the summer of 319, Eumenes was desperate enough to dispatch Hieronymus to Macedonia to negotiate his surrender to Antipater (Diod. 18. 42. 1). The evidence is, therefore, reasonably clear that Eumenes early in 318 had become one of Antigonus's subordinates; a condition which remained in effect until the acceptance of the offer of an alliance from Polyperchon. Eumenes was probably to join Antigonus in the summer. Diodorus (18. 53. 6) vaguely mentions that Eumenes was, after his release, but before his alliance with Polyperchon, preparing for a campaign. This in all probability refers to Antigonus's proposed offensive; Antigonus planned to reorder the satrapies of Asia, replacing those governors who were not personally loyal to himself (Diod. 18. 50. 5).

During the winter Antigonus received an important fugitive, Antipater's son Cassander (Diod. 18. 54. 3).⁷³ Antipater had not left his

⁷³ Errington, "Chronology," 491; B. Gullath and L. Schober, "Zur Chronologie der frühen Diadochenzeit die Jahre 320 bis 315 v. Chr.," in *Studien zur alten Geschichte. Siegfried Lauffer zum 70. Geburtstag am 4. August 1981 dargebracht von Freunden, Kollegen und Schülern*, edited by H. Kalcyk, B. Gullath, A. Graeber (Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider Editore, 1986) 346, 350). Diodorus's (18. 54. 3-4) language at this point makes it clear that Cassander did not know of Antigonus's ambitions. Indeed, Diodorus (18. 54. 4) states that while Antigonus told Cassander he was aiding him because of his friendship with Antipater, in reality he "wished Polyperchon to be surrounded by a many great distractions, so that he himself might proceed against Asia without danger." Cassander's flight then must have occurred before Cleitus brought the news of Antigonus's "revolt" to Macedonia in 318 (Diod. 18. 52. 5-6). Moreover, the Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B F-12) places Cassander's flight before Arrhidaeus's siege of Cyzicus, which occurred very early in 318.

position as regent to his son, but rather to Craterus's old second-in-command, Polyperchon;⁷⁴ Cassander was made chiliarch, or Polyperchon's official second-in-command (Diod. 18. 48. 4–5). This was the position he had probably held while Antipater lived.⁷⁵ Despite Cassander's fury at being passed over for the regency he had to bide his time; the nobles and the army commanders supported Polyperchon (Diod. 18. 49. 1; 54. 2). While Cassander did not attack Polyperchon openly, there was a certain amount of obvious hostility between the two (Plut. *Phoc.* 31. 1). During the fall Cassander privately gathered support (Diod. 18. 49. 2). Those he had bound to his cause he sent secretly to the Hellespont in preparation for his own flight from Macedonia (Diod. 18. 54. 2). It is unclear, however, how long he remained in Macedonia before fleeing to Antigonus. In addition to securing the loyalty of his friends in Macedonia, Cassander also sought alliances with "other commanders and cities" (Diod. 18. 49. 3). Outside of Greece he sent envoys to Ptolemy to renew their friendship and to secure an alliance (Diod. 18. 49. 3; 54. 3).⁷⁶ When all was arranged, Cassander fled to the Hellespont and then on to Cellaenae, where he joined Antigonus in winter quarters.⁷⁷ He counted on Antigonus's loyalty to his family; his command in Asia had been given to him by Antipater (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38; Diod. 18. 39. 7) and his son Demetrius was married to Phila, one of Cassander's sisters (Diod. 19. 59. 3–6).⁷⁸ Of course, Antigonus would remember that Cassander had denounced him to Antipater before the latter crossed back to Macedonia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 42). But, then, if Cassander had suspected Antigonus's intentions back in 320, he would have realized that Antigonus might welcome a conflict in Macedonia. As it was, Cassander's arrival convinced Antigonus and his advisers that with this development there could not possibly be any interference with their plans from Macedonia. Antigonus and his counselors now

⁷⁴ Diod. 18. 48. 4; Plut. *Phoc.* 31. 1; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 12. 1.

⁷⁵ See P. Goukowsky, *Essai*, 308 n. 89.

⁷⁶ Cassander asked that Ptolemy send a fleet to his aid (Diod. 18. 49. 3), but there is no evidence that Ptolemy complied.

⁷⁷ See Errington, "Chronology," 491, and note 73.

⁷⁸ While the actual date of the marriage is unattested, the available evidence would suggest 320 and probably at Triparadeisus (Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisus," 71–2 and n. 151; Billows, *Antigonus*, 368–9). Antigonus Gonatas, Demetrius and Phila's son died in 240/39 at 80 years of age ([Lucian] *Macrob.* 11).

with confidence continued to prepare for the coming campaigning year.

Before Antigonos could launch his spring offensive, however, Arrhidaeus, the former regent and current satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, learned of Antigonos's intentions and began to secure his satrapy from attack (Diod. 18. 51); cities throughout the province were strengthened with garrisons. When the autonomous Greek city of Cyzicus refused to cooperate with the satrap (Diod. 18. 52. 3), Arrhidaeus without warning launched an attack on the city early in 318.⁷⁹ The attack was poorly executed and proved unsuccessful. When Antigonos heard of the assault, he set out for the coast with twenty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 52. 1). While arriving after the siege had been abandoned, Antigonos still accused Arrhidaeus of attacking an allied city without provocation and preparing to rebel against legitimate authority (Diod. 18. 51. 7–52. 3). Arrhidaeus was ordered to surrender his province and retire to a single city (Diod. 18. 52. 3), but the satrap refused and prepared to resist. Part of his forces he detached and sent to relieve Eumenes in Nora (Diod. 18. 52. 4). There is no indication in the sources as to the fate of this expedition. Eumenes may have already become Antigonos's ally. Most likely Arrhidaeus's army was intercepted by forces loyal to Antigonos before it reached Cappadocia.

Antigonos detached part of his army and left them to carry on the campaign against the recalcitrant satrap; these succeeded in driving the latter into the city of Cius, where they placed him under siege (Diod. 18. 72. 2). Antigonos himself proceeded still early in the year to Lydia where he planned to depose the satrap Cleitus (Diod. 18. 52. 5). His plan had been to replace a number of the satraps in Asia Minor, the only change now was that thanks to the precipitous actions of Arrhidaeus this campaign was begun sooner than Antigonos had contemplated. Prior to Antigonos's arrival, probably during the winter, Cleitus had secured many of his cities with garrisons and then with the royal fleet fled to Macedonia where he

⁷⁹ The assault was even by Hellenistic standards very early in the year. Antigonos and his army were still in winter quarters when news of the attack reached Celaenae (Diod. 18. 52. 1; cf. 18. 50. 1). Arrhidaeus also after his attempt on Cyzicus was thwarted sent troops to relieve Eumenes. Since Eumenes was released in the spring (Nepos *Eum.* 5. 7) and Antigonos had planned an offensive for 318 (Diod. 18. 50. 1–5), the attack on Cyzicus must have occurred well before the start of the regular campaigning season, during the winter of 319/318.

revealed Antigonus's revolt to Polyperchon (Diod. 18. 52. 6). Antigonus captured Ephesus on his first assault, and by the end of spring or early in the summer of 318 he had conquered all of Lydia (Diod. 18. 52. 7–8). It must have been about this time that Antigonus sent Cassander back to Greece with 35 ships and four thousand mercenaries (Diod. 18. 68. 1; cf. 18. 54. 3). With these forces Cassander sailed to Piraeus in May 318 (Diod. 18. 68. 1).⁸⁰

In Macedonia Cassander's flight to Asia was seen by Polyperchon as an imminent threat to his regency. He knew that in addition to possible alliances with Ptolemy and Antigonus many of the Greek cities were either held by garrisons placed there by Antipater or in the control of governments loyal to Antipater's house (Diod. 18. 55. 2). Indeed, soon after his father's death, and before news of his disloyalty to the regent became known outside of Macedonia, Cassander in his capacity as chiliarch replaced Menyllus, the garrison commander in Munychia, with Nicanor, an individual personally loyal to him (Plut. *Phoc.* 31. 1; cf. Diod. 18. 64. 1). After Cassander's departure for Asia, Polyperchon and his advisers discussed various options. It was decided that to meet the threat posed by Cassander's loyalists in Greece, Polyperchon in the name of the kings would issue a decree calling for a restoration of democratic governments and a return of most exiles to the Greek *poleis* (Diod. 18. 55.4–56. 8, 64. 3).⁸¹ This

⁸⁰ Even though Diodorus (18. 54. 3) states that after Cassander's arrival in his camp Antigonus "immediately" gave Cassander an infantry force and a fleet, it is very clear that these forces were not officially turned over to the latter until much later. Cassander did not sail to Athens until after Phocion's death in May 318 (Plut. *Phoc.* 37. 1; see K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* [Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1927] 4.2:239; W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens: An Historical Essay* [New York: Macmillan and Co., 1911] 31–34; J. M. Williams, "A Note on Athenian Chronology, 319/8–318/7 B.C.," *Hermes* 112 [1984]: 300–5; L. A. Tritle, *Phocion the Good* [London: Croom Helm, 1988] 133; Bosworth, "Chronology," 69, 80; C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, translated by D. L. Schneider [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997] 42 n. 20. Errington ("Chronology," 491–2), believes that Cassander did not arrive in Piraeus until 317. The main argument for this position is that the *anagrapheus*, an official who gained prominence during the oligarchy, appears in all surviving decrees from 319/318, thus suggesting that the oligarchy was still in place in this archon year. Williams ("Chronology," 301–2), however, points to the decline in the status of this official in the second half of the year and the moderation of the restored democracy to cast serious doubt on Errington's case.

⁸¹ Polyperchon's decree renewed the relationship which had existed between the Greeks and the Macedonian government prior to the Lamian War (see M. J. Fontana, *Le lotte per la successione di Alessandro Magno dal 323 al 315* [Palermo: Presso l'Accademia, 1960] 92). This arrangement was basically that inaugurated by Philip

decree was issued early in 318. By order of the kings the Greek cities were to return to the forms of government they had possessed prior to the Lamian War with the emphasis being on democratic regimes to counter the oligarchies established by Antipater (Diod. 18. 56. 3). While the cities were given until sometime in late March or early April to complete the restoration of their exiles (Diod. 18. 56. 6).⁸² The cities were not given a great deal of time to comply with this new decree, since the regent's need to counter Cassander was immediate. When the decision was made to issue the decree, representatives from the cities were summoned to be present when the decree was formally proclaimed. They would be carrying the news immediately back to their respective communities (Diod. 18. 55. 4). It was certainly in Polyperchon's interest to have the decree enacted as soon as possible before the full implications of Cassander's flight became clear to the Greeks. Other parts of Polyperchon's offensive were to be enforced immediately. Letters were sent by Polyperchon again in the name of the kings ordering the immediate restoration of democracy in Athens (Plut. *Phoc.* 32. 1) and the exile or execution of specific supporters of Antipater and his family in the various cities (Diod. 18. 57. 1).

After the issuance of this proclamation, Polyperchon also wrote to Olympias, inviting her to return to Macedonia to take charge of her grandson (Diod. 18. 57. 2). He had written to her immediately after his becoming regent (Diod. 18. 49. 4), but she had hesitated as long as Cassander remained in Macedonia (cf. Diod. 18. 57. 2).⁸³ With

II in the League of Corinth in which the cities would retain their traditional governments, i.e. those in existence "when they took the oath concerning the peace" ([Dem.] 17. 10; *IG* II². 329, lines 12-14). Polyperchon was proposing in effect to restore the governments overthrown by Antipater at the conclusion of the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 18. 3-6, 8).

⁸² Diodorus (18. 55. 2) states that when the decree was published it was already known that Antigonus was in "revolt." This information was brought to Macedonia by Cleitus (Diod. 18. 52. 6) who fled to Macedonia either after Antigonus's attack on his satrapy in early March, or, as appears more likely during the winter. Arrhidaeus had anticipated an attack from Antigonus and Cleitus probably did as well (cf. Billows, *Antigonos*, 83). Moreover, in the decree the cities are given until the thirtieth day of Xandicus, late March, early April (see Parker and Dubberstein, *Chronology*, 26, 36; A. E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology: Calendars and Years in Classical Antiquity* [Munich: Beck, 1972] 140-1, 143). Polyperchon wanted immediate results and did not give the cities long to achieve the regent's purpose. When the decree was promulgated it was distributed to envoys "from the cities who were present" so that they "might quickly return to their homelands" (Diod. 18. 55. 4).

⁸³ Diodorus (18. 49. 4) states that the offer to Olympias was initially made

the second request she wrote to Eumenes to seek his advice;⁸⁴ she had long been in correspondence with him either directly or through her daughter Cleopatra. Cleopatra's offer of her hand to the then regent Perdiccas in 321 probably resulted from correspondence between Eumenes and Olympias. Eumenes had remained in contact with Cleopatra after her settling in Sardis, carrying to her Perdiccas's marriage proposal in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 25. 2–6; 26), and himself meeting with her after Perdiccas's death in Egypt (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 6–7).⁸⁵

Finally, to offset Cassander's alliances with Antigonus and Ptolemy, Polyperchon opened communications with Eumenes in Cappadocia.⁸⁶

shortly after Antipater's death and before the flight of Cassander. Both K. Rosen ("Documents," 69) and Briant ("Eumene (Suite et fin.)," 77) argue that Diodorus here has anticipated events and that Polyperchon's offer to Olympias was only made after Cassander's flight (Diod. 18. 57. 2). There is evidence, however, that these references are not part of a doublet. Diodorus 18. 49. 4 speaks of Olympias' departure from Macedonia due to her enmity with Antipater, but in Diodorus 18. 57. 2 it is stated that Olympias remained in Epirus because of her hatred of Cassander. The second passage could be interpreted to mean that she "delayed" her departure from Epirus because of Cassander's presence in Macedonia. In other words, Olympias hesitated to return to Macedonia while Cassander remained and the exact relationship of the regent and his chiliarch was unclear. Prior to Cassander's flight, Polyperchon may have wished her return as a counterpoise to Eurydice.

⁸⁴ Briant ("Eumene (Suite et fin.)," 76–7) argues that the letter from Olympias to Eumenes was a forgery made up by Hieronymus and Eumenes. He finds it difficult to believe that a woman as independent as Olympias would seek advice as to whether to return to Macedonia, or that Alexander IV needed protection when he was in no way menaced by Polyperchon (Diod. 18. 58. 3; Nepos. *Eum.* 6. 1). That Olympias would seek advice regarding her possible return to Macedonia is very understandable, especially when taken in the full context of her letter. Olympias probably asked whether she could trust Polyperchon, Antipater's chosen successor (Diod. 18. 58. 3). Eumenes could provide insights into the character of the new regent, since both men had served with Alexander in Asia until Polyperchon's departure with Craterus in 324 (Heckel, *Marshals*, 189–92). Moreover, Olympias' request that Eumenes return to Europe to aid her (Nepos *Eum.* 6. 3–4) is consistent with her earlier request, issued through her daughter, to Leonnatus (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 9). Eumenes was an old and trusted friend (see chapter 2).

⁸⁵ On Eumenes activities with regard to Cleopatra, see chapter 4.

⁸⁶ Diod. 18. 57. 3–4, 58. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 1. Diodorus's account gives the picture of Polyperchon in the same letter in which he offers the command to Eumenes having already put the argyraspids and the royal treasury at Cyinda into his power. The best explanation is that the first communication arrived in the spring, as soon as Polyperchon learned that Antigonus was in revolt and that Eumenes was free. The final agreement was not, however, reached until the early summer (cf. Rosen, "Documents," 69–71). Against this view, Briant ("Eumene (Suite et fin.)," 75–6), argues that the first letter reported in Diodorus (18. 57. 3–4) is a forgery drawn up by Eumenes and Hieronymus (see note 84 for Briant's doubts about the letter from Olympias). The contents of this letter Briant declares to be incomprehensible. He doubts that Polyperchon would offer to share his regency with Eumenes; and

Letters were written in the names of the kings requesting an alliance. In these letters Eumenes was offered either a share in the guardianship, if he decided to march to Macedonia, or to remain in Asia as στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ (Diod. 18. 58. 1).⁸⁷ This latter title would give Eumenes in effect supreme authority in Asia. The satraps, generals, and treasurers of Asia would as a result be placed under his authority.⁸⁸ Additionally, the argyraspids, then in Cilicia, and the treasury at Cyinda were commanded to place themselves under Eumenes' authority (Diod. 18. 58. 1). The argyraspids were Alexander's former hypaspists, three thousand of the best soldiers serving in Asia.⁸⁹ These troops had been separated from the royal army at Triparadeisus and under the command of Antigenes, their commander under Perdikkas and the newly appointed satrap of Susiane (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 35),⁹⁰ sent

wonders why Polyperchon would press Eumenes to continue his hostility toward Antigonus when Eumenes clearly intended to do so anyway. With regard to the first objection, the offer was simply a way of showing commitment and good faith; Eumenes previously had shown no desire to return to Macedonia and would likely choose to stay in Asia. As to the second complaint, it is based on the false assumption that Eumenes was still at odds with Antigonus when the letter would have arrived. On the contrary, Eumenes had come to terms with Antigonus and had agreed to become his ally. On the basis of this agreement he had been freed from Nora in the spring of 318 (see above and Anson, "Nora," 251-6).

⁸⁷ The title, στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ, was given to Antigonus for his campaign against Eumenes (Diod. 18. 50. 1; cf. 39. 7, 40. 1; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38). Αὐτοκράτωρ was commonly used to indicate supreme overall authority either in the absolute sense or in a particular sphere. Polyperchon became on Antipater's death ἐπιμελητής καὶ στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ (Diod. 18. 48. 4; 49. 4; 55. 1), and in 320 Perdikkas appointed Eumenes "αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός of the forces in Cappadocia and Armenia" (Plut. *Eum.* 5. 1). In the case of Polyperchon this authority corresponded with that claimed by Philip II (Diod. 16. 89. 3) and Alexander (Diod. 17. 4. 9) with regard to the League of Corinth (see A. J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks: The Epigraphic Evidence* [Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1980] 233-4); with Eumenes the authority applied solely to the forces in Asia.

⁸⁸ In the winter of 317/316 Eumenes sent to the satraps of the upper provinces letters from the kings ordering them to obey him (Diod. 19. 13. 7). Seleucus and Pithon were probably sent similar correspondence, since in the same winter Seleucus responded to Eumenes' request for an alliance (Diod. 19. 12. 1) by declaring that "he was willing to be of service to the kings, but that nevertheless he would never consent to carrying out the orders of Eumenes" (Diod. 19. 12. 2). Neither Seleucus nor Pithon questioned Eumenes' claimed authority; they obviously had good evidence that it truly was from the kings and the regent. Clearly, Eumenes was sent in addition to the original a number of official copies of the decree of his appointment as royal general in Asia. Probably only the treasurers in Cyinda and the argyraspids were specifically sent letters by Polyperchon (Diod. 18. 58. 1).

⁸⁹ For the identification of the argyraspids with Alexander's hypaspists, see chapter 4, note 3 and E. M. Anson, "Alexander's Hypaspists and the Argyraspids," *Historia* 30 (1981): 117-20.

⁹⁰ Although appointed satrap of Susiane at Triparadeisus, Antigenes apparently

to transport some of the vast treasure then in Susa to Cyinda in Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38).⁹¹ With the completion of this task, these troops and their commander Antigenes, who in some fashion came to share his command with an otherwise unknown Macedonian named Teutamus, remained in Cilicia.⁹²

All of these efforts show considerable diplomatic skill either on

never governed this province directly (but see note 92), nor is there any evidence to suggest who did (see Heckel, "Antigenes," 62). It is possible that the commanders in Susa may have assumed authority over the satrapy. In 331 Alexander had left Archelaus, the son of Theodorus, as general (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 9; Curt. 5. 2. 16), and either Mazurus (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 9) or Xenophilus as commander of the citadel of Susa (Curt. 5. 2. 16). Indeed, Xenophilus is found in the same command in 316 (Diod. 19. 17. 3). It appears clear that neither Perdicas nor Antipater interfered with these commands, since these individuals would be answerable to the central government and not the local satrap. Another very real possibility is that Peucestas assumed authority over Susiane (see Tam, "Heritage," 477). Antigenes and Peucestas in their meeting in 316 in Susiane exhibited hostility towards one another which might have resulted from Peucestas usurpation of Susiane. However, the sources list a different cause for their differences (Diod. 19. 15. 1–2).

⁹¹ The wealth which was housed in Cyinda was enormous. R. H. Simpson ("A Note on Cyinda," *Historia* 6 [1957]: 504) suggests that when Eumenes gained access to the treasury it may have contained around twenty thousand talents. There were still ten thousand talents left in Cyinda when Antigonus took over the treasury in 315 (Diod. 19. 56. 5). Eumenes had not expended ten thousand talents just on his own needs, but had sent part of the treasure on to Polyperchon (ibid., 503).

⁹² On the career of Antigenes see Heckel, "Antigenes," 57–67, *Marshals*, 308–13; for Teutamus nothing is known of his career prior to 318, but Berve (*Alexanderreich*, 2:372 [#744]) is probably correct that he was a Macedonian nobleman and had been a high ranking officer in Alexander's hypaspists (See Heckel, *Marshals*, 316–7). Bosworth ("Artifice," 66–7, 83 ns. 61–3) argues that Antigenes and Teutamus came from Susa to meet Eumenes, and that the otherwise unknown Teutamus was the satrap of Paraetacene. His evidence comes from two statements in Diodorus and one in Arrian. Diodorus 18. 58. 1 relates that the two came a considerable distance to meet Eumenes, and 18. 62. 7, refers to "satrapies" with respect to both Teutamus and Antigenes. Arrian does report the destination, not as Cilicia, but "the sea" (*Succ.* 1. 38). The problem with this scenario is that Antigenes, Teutamus, and the argyraspids moved to join Eumenes only after receiving the letters from Polyperchon and Olympias (Diod. 18. 58. 1, 59. 3). Given the chronology of the letters (see note 86), it would have been impossible for Antigenes, Teutamus, and the argyraspids to arrive in Cilicia at the same time as Eumenes. Moreover, his choice of Cilicia must have been with full knowledge of the presence of the argyraspids. Antigonus's ally Ptolemy controlled Syria (*FGH* 239B F-12; Diod. 18. 43. 1–2; App. *Syr.* 52). Diodorus's reference to a great distance could mean most anything; it could simply make reference to the fifty or so miles from Cyinda (located somewhere south of Soli [Str. 14. 5. 10]), to northeastern Cilicia, where they rendezvoused with Eumenes. With respect to Teutamus' governorship of Paraetacene, "satrapies" may be an error arising from Diodorus abbreviation of his source. Whether Teutamus had been awarded a satrapy at Triparadeisus, and whether that satrapy was Paraetacene, must remain undetermined.

Polyperchon's part or that of his advisers. His call for a restoration of the Greek exiles was to counter the power Cassander would possess with the oligarchies established by Antipater.⁹³ By associating Olympias in the rule the regent strengthened his connection to the Argead family and thereby his hold on Macedonia; his offer to Eumenes was designed to open a second front in Asia. The proposal of a joint regency was an especially clever touch, since it would show the sincerity of the offer, while not endangering Polyperchon's position in Europe in the slightest. Eumenes had neither the inclination nor the means to march to Europe. To reach Macedonia he would have had to march quite literally through Antigonus's army.

Most importantly for Eumenes, because of Polyperchon's offer, his pursuit of power, seemingly ended by Perdiccas's death and his own defeat in Cappadocia, now opened anew before him. It is no wonder that this surprising turn of events so enchanted Diodorus with his preoccupation with the workings of fate.⁹⁴ If Eumenes accepted the alliance with Polyperchon, he would once again have an army to command in his own right. The argyraspids would be placed under his command and with the resources contained in Cyinda he could hire a great many mercenaries. Olympias in her letters to Eumenes offered to write to the various commanders in Asia on his behalf.⁹⁵ Even though by accepting the alliance with Polyperchon Eumenes would once again come into conflict with Antigonus, he could not refuse. As Plutarch observed nineteen centuries ago, Eumenes was not satisfied with a subordinate role (Plut. *Eum.* 21. 3). These negotiations which started soon after Cleitus's flight culminated in a final agreement in the summer of 318.

⁹³ Diod. 18. 17. 6-18. 6; Plut. *Dem.* 28. 1-4; *Phoc.* 28. 1.

⁹⁴ "All wondered at the incredible fickleness of Fortune . . . for who, taking thought of the inconstancies of human life, would not be astonished by the alternating ebb and flow of fortune?" (Diod. 18. 59. 4-5; translation from Loeb Classical Library edition, R. M. Geer, trans. and ed. *Books XVIII and XIX 1-65*, in *Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes*. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1969] 9:175). For extensive citation of Diodorus's references to fate, see J. Palm, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien: Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der hellenistischen Prosa* [Lund: Gleerup, 1955] 162.

⁹⁵ Diod. 18. 58. 2-4; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 6. 1-2.

CHAPTER SIX

THE RECKONING WITH ANTIGONUS

While the diplomatic exchanges between Eumenes and Polyperchon resulted in Eumenes regaining his independence, they also put him again in conflict with Antigonus. After his release from Nora, Eumenes had been Antigonus's ally. However, in the summer, as soon as Antigonus discovered Eumenes' change of allegiance, he sent an army commanded by Menander to Cappadocia. Eumenes was forced to flee with only five hundred cavalry and two thousand infantry. He did not have time to await others who had promised to join him; until the agreement with Polyperchon there had been no reason to gather forces hastily. Now there was need for great haste. As it was, Menander missed intercepting Eumenes and his meager forces by only three days. Eumenes fled south over the Taurus mountains by forced marches into Cilicia. Menander followed to the mountains, but unable to overtake him, returned to Cappadocia (Diod. 18. 59. 1-2). Fortunately for Eumenes, Antigonus was occupied in Asia Minor. In part, he was outfitting a fleet to seize control of the Hellespont.¹ Such control was necessary if he was to ensure that Polyperchon could not cross to Asia with an army of fresh Macedonians.

In Cilicia, Antigenes and Teutamus, the commanders of the argyraspids, in obedience to the letters from the kings and Olympias, marched northeast to join Eumenes (Diod. 18. 59. 3). It was these very same troops with the other Macedonians present in Egypt who had condemned Eumenes and the other Perdiccans.² This willingness by the argyraspids to support Eumenes is, perhaps, the best argument against the proposition that there existed a traditional Macedonian army assembly with clear powers. Now, with the call from the kings and regent they joined the very individual they had earlier condemned. Neither the regent, nor the king, issued a pardon; the sentence was simply ignored. It is difficult to believe that

¹ Cf. Diod. 18. 72. 3-4; Polyæn. 4. 6. 8.

² See chapter 3.

an assembly possessing the authority to arraign and convict would have its decisions so easily ignored by all parties, including many who had comprised the very assembly that had issued the condemnation in the first place. These assemblies clearly had no constitutional authority.³

Eumenes with the forces that had come with him from Cappadocia and the argyraspids then moved on to Cyinda.⁴ Even though Antigenes and Teutamus promised to cooperate fully with Eumenes, and the argyraspids had as a body greeted Eumenes with friendship and enthusiasm (Diod. 18. 59. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 3–4), these troops and their commanders regarded themselves as an autonomous force. The argyraspids represented a curious blend of Macedonian custom and mercenary characteristics.⁵ They responded to the call from their kings and his regent as loyal Macedonians, yet these troops often displayed a distinct lack of fidelity to any authority other than their own immediate commanders. As noted, Antigenes had participated in the assassination of Perdiccas in Egypt (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 35; Diod. 18. 39. 6; cf. Diod. 18. 36. 4),⁶ and the argyraspids at Triparadeisus had been separated from the army given to Antigonus because of their mutinous behavior (cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 35, 38).⁷ They were charged with transporting part of the royal treasury from Susa to Cyinda (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38). Since the completion of this task, the argyraspids had been operating in virtual independence in Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38).⁸ Their commanders were not pleased with the subordinate

³ The claim of such judicial powers for a Macedonian assembly has been most recently put forward by M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings* (Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity, National Hellenic Research Foundation; Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1996) 271–6. For a refutation of such claims see R. M. Errington, “The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy,” *Chiron* 8 (1978): 87–90; E. M. Anson, “Macedonia’s Alleged Constitutionalism,” *CJ* 80 (1985): 308–10; cf. chapter 2.

⁴ The actual site of Cyinda has not been identified, but it was somewhere between Soli and the mouth of the Cydnus (see R. H. Simpson, “A Note on Cyinda,” *Historia* 6 [1957]: 503; J. D. Bing, “A Further Note on Cyinda/Kundi,” *Historia* 22 [1973]: 346, 348).

⁵ E. M. Anson, “The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330–315 B.C.),” *Historia* 40 (1991): 230–47.

⁶ See chapter 4.

⁷ Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 38) refers to them as “the most rebellious of the Macedonians.” For the identification of these “three thousand” with the argyraspids, see E. M. Anson, “Alexander’s Hypaspists and the Argyraspids,” *Historia* 30 (1981): 118–19.

⁸ In 320, Philoxenus (H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* [Munich: Beck, 1926; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1973] 2:390–1 [#794]) was

role now ordered for them.⁹ Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 4) is especially clear that Eumenes' subsequent difficulties with his new command came principally from the commanders of the argyraspids. Justin's remark (14. 2. 7) that the argyraspids regarded service under anyone other than Alexander as dishonorable and served others unwillingly, is probably not short of the mark. Eumenes was, therefore, immediately faced with a serious threat to his authority. He needed these Macedonians, and, consequently, he had to placate both them and their commanders.

This challenge to his authority was met in part by relying on a tactic which had worked well for him in Babylon. Eumenes told Antigones and Teutamus, both Macedonian aristocrats,¹⁰ that as a Greek his only concern was the defense of the royal family, an interesting claim since he had for more than a year been resisting both the king's regent and his general in Asia. Furthermore, he claimed that no office was in prospect for one who was not a native-born Macedonian (Diod. 18. 60. 3). The truth was quite obviously otherwise. By decree of the kings Eumenes was royal general in Asia and satrap of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia.¹¹ These Macedonians were well aware of these facts. What Eumenes wanted to emphasize was that because of his non-Macedonian aristocratic birth he did not have the ability to usurp their authority. He could not have the ambitions attributed to Perdiccas, and that were now being ascribed to Antigonus.¹² Eumenes thought to assuage their fears of his possible ambitions through this claim of racial inferiority. It was just plausible to the Macedonian nobility who were, indeed, conscious of their birthright, but in post-Alexandrine Asia this birthright was far less

appointed satrap of Cilicia by the then regent Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 2); this appointment was confirmed at Triparadeisus (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 34; Diod. 18. 39. 6; Just. 13. 6. 16). The argyraspids, however, saw themselves answerable only to the kings (cf. Diod. 18. 59. 3), as did the garrison commanders at Cyinda (Diod. 18. 62. 2). Indeed, except for the notice of his appointment and reconfirmation as satrap, Philoxenus disappears from the record.

⁹ Plut. *Eum.* 13. 4; Just. 14. 2. 8-9; cf. Diod. 18. 60.

¹⁰ While little is known concerning Teutamus, he was apparently a Macedonian aristocrat (see W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* [London and New York: Routledge, 1992] 316-19). When bribed to betray Eumenes to Antigonus in 318, he was dissuaded by Antigones who emphasized Eumenes' foreign birth (Diod. 18. 62. 7). For Antigones, see W. Heckel, "The Career of Antigones," *SymbOslo* 57 (1982): 62.

¹¹ Diod. 18. 57. 3-4, 58. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 2.

¹² Diod. 18. 47. 5, 50. 1, 5, 52. 6-7, 57. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 12. 1.

important than it had been when these commanders had left Macedonia. Increasingly mercenary and native forces were being incorporated into the armies of the various contenders. Eumenes in Cappadocia (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 3), Antigonus in Phrygia,¹³ Alcetas in Pisidia (Diod. 18. 46. 1–47. 3), and Peucestas in Persis (Diod. 19. 14. 5), had shown the strength of native forces. Moreover, there was an abundance of mercenaries ready to follow any successful general who also was a reliable paymaster, and common Macedonian troops had shown no reluctance in accepting Eumenes as their commander even after his condemnation in Egypt.¹⁴ For the present, Eumenes found himself in dire need of the veterans commanded by these Macedonian nobles, and needed to convince them of his limited ambitions.

As part of this effort, Eumenes refused to accept the personal gift of five hundred talents offered him by the kings (Diod. 18. 60. 2). He did, however, use the treasury in Cyinda to hire large numbers of mercenaries. While Diodorus (18. 61. 5) states that in “little time” Eumenes collected a considerable army, it is evident that this process took months, continuing until late in the year.¹⁵ His friends (*philoi*) were sent throughout Pisidia, Lycia, Cilicia, Syria, Phoenicia, and Cyprus, recruiting soldiers (Diod. 18. 61. 4). Since Eumenes was offering a high rate of pay, many perspective mercenaries came from the Greek mainland itself (Diod. 18. 61. 5). In a matter of months Eumenes had collected a force, excluding the argyraspid and those who had accompanied him from Cappadocia, of ten thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 61. 4–5).

Eumenes’ attempt to organize his command, however, continued to be hindered by Antigones and Teutamus. To meet this challenge to his authority Eumenes devised a most ingenious stratagem. To control his fellow-commanders he would invoke the vision of Alexander.¹⁶ Eumenes claimed that in a dream he had seen Alexander

¹³ On Antigonus’s use of native forces, see E. M. Anson, “Antigonus, the Satrap of Phrygia,” *Historia* 37 (1988): 30–4; Chapter 3.

¹⁴ See chapter 5.

¹⁵ Eumenes’ alliance with Polyperchon was agreed to in the summer of 318 (see chapter 5). As noted above, soon after, Eumenes was forced to flee to Cilicia where he was joined by the argyraspid (Diod. 18. 59. 1–3).

¹⁶ Nepos (*Eum.* 7. 2) inaccurately places the initiation of the Alexander Tent in Susiane. Diodorus (19. 15. 3), also, repeats this incident in Susiane as if it had not occurred previously. However, Diodorus’s earlier account (18. 61) is replete with

alive, in full regalia, presiding over his council, giving orders and actively administering the empire. Eumenes described this dream as a divine sign. Henceforward, the conclave of commanders would be held in a tent in the presence of a throne, with replicas of Alexander's diadem, scepter and armor, all manufactured from the Cilician gold, placed on it.¹⁷ In the morning before each meeting, the commanders would offer incense and do obeisance as before the shrine of a god. After this ritual the meeting would be held in the tent as if in Alexander's presence. Orders would be issued in Alexander's name, and during the deliberations everyone would be placed symbolically on an equal footing before the throne.¹⁸ Eumenes, however, never

details fixing the location at Cyinda (the use of the royal treasury) and the chronology to 318 (Diod. 18. 61. 3-4). Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 4), also, dates the incident before Eumenes' departure for the upper satrapies.

¹⁷ While Goukowsky (P. Goukowsky, trans. and ed., *Diodore de Sicile, bibliothèque historique, Livre XVIII* [Paris: Belles Lettres. 1978] 163) believes that these were Alexander's actual regalia, R. M. Errington ("Alexander in the Hellenistic World," in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité: 7 exposés suivis de discussions / par A. B. Bosworth . . . [et al.], avec la participation de Denis van Berchem . . . [et al.]; entretiens préparés par E. Badian, présidés par Denis van Berchem, Vanduvres-Genève, 25-30 août 1975*, edited by E. Badian, *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 22 [Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1976] 140-1) rightly holds that they were manufactured for the occasion. The evidence is definitely against Eumenes' regalia being truly that of Alexander's. For it to be so, it must be assumed that the royal objects were not placed with Alexander's body (cf. Curt. 10. 10. 13), but given to the new king, Philip Arrhidaeus, a not unlikely supposition since the regalia was a symbol of royalty (see Anson, "Constitutionalism," 307-8). It is doubtful that Philip Arrhidaeus, if in possession of the regalia, would have left these symbols of authority behind in Asia Minor when he accompanied Perdikkas to Egypt. If he had taken them to Egypt they would have ended up either with Ptolemy in Egypt or been returned with Philip himself to Macedonia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 45; Diod. 18. 39. 7). Moreover, in Diodorus's (18. 60. 3-61. 3) description of the creation of the "Alexander Tent" the availability of the Cilician gold is twice made reference to (18. 60. 6 and 61. 1). In the former reference it could be argued that the gold was to be used solely to create the throne, but in the latter passage "everything" (ἅπαντα) needed was quickly made ready, for the royal treasure was rich in gold." Errington ("Alexander," 140-1) is obviously correct that Eumenes' regalia was created on the spot.

¹⁸ Diod. 18. 60. 5-61. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 5-8; Polyae. 4. 8. 2. Eumenes' cult of Alexander is the only indisputable example of an essentially military cult in the Hellenistic era (M. Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques* [Paris: E. de Boccard, 1950] 2:945-6, 951). Indeed, Eumenes' innovation never caught on in the other Hellenistic armies and died with Eumenes' final defeat (ibid., 947, 950-1). While certainly the cult represented a brilliant solution to an immediate problem, it was not without precedent. Errington ("From Babylon to Tripuradeisus, 323-320 B.C." *JHS* 90 [1970]: 75) may be correct that Ptolemy's proposal made in Babylon shortly after Alexander's death that the empire be ruled by a council meeting in the presence of the royal objects (Curt. 10. 6. 15), gave Eumenes the idea. One wonders

relinquished his command (Diod. 18. 63. 4). By placing himself visually on a par with his fellow commanders, he was able to make them more agreeable and so secured a measure of goodwill from them. Whether the commanders believed in the cult can only be surmised. Certainly amongst the common soldiers the cult was accepted "sans scepticism."¹⁹ Clearly the Macedonian troops were superstitious. There were annual lustrations, and most of the gods were regularly invoked for protection or victory.²⁰ Acceptance of Alexander's cult is especially likely in light of the prestige Ptolemy acquired through the acquisition of Alexander's corpse (Diod. 18. 28. 4-5). With regard to the attitude of the commanders, Diodorus 18. 61. 3 does state, "as their reverence for the king grew stronger, they were all filled with happy expectations, just as if some god were leading them." Such possible reverence notwithstanding, it is unlikely any would have opposed the resultant increase in their own prestige through the use of this new procedure for deliberations. As a result of this arrangement, Eumenes would now have to lobby for the acceptance of his plans, rather than order them to be carried out, but this appears not to have been an insurmountable obstacle. Most often Eumenes' opinions were followed (Nepos *Eum.* 7. 3). Eumenes did have the letters from the kings and the regent, access to the treasuries of Asia, and control of his mercenaries and Cappadocian cavalry. In any case, his earlier commands had often been ignored; this system was obviously superior.

The coalition against Polyperchon, faced with these new circumstances in Asia, began a campaign in the summer of 318 to undermine Eumenes' position especially with his Macedonian troops. Ptolemy sailed to Zephyrion, a port in Cilicia near Cyinda,²¹ from

what would have happened, if Eumenes had inaugurated this cult in 320 during his unsuccessful negotiations with the other Perdiccans in Asia Minor (see chapter 5). The throne and the other royal symbols had long been recognized as signs of sovereignty both in Greece and in the orient (C. Picard, "Le trône vide d'Alexandre dans la cérémonie de Cyinda et le culte du trône vide à travers le monde gréco-romain," *CahArch* 7 [1954]: 1-2, 4). These emblems of authority were well known to Macedonians as well (cf. Diod. 17. 116. 2-3; Plut. *Alex.* 73. 3-4). They were central to the ceremony by which power was symbolically bestowed on a new king (Anson, "Macedonia's Alleged Constitutionalism," 307).

¹⁹ Picard, "Trône," 5.

²⁰ Launey, *Recherches*, 2:882, 921-2, 951.

²¹ Zephyrion is the modern town of Mersin, which is thirty miles west of Adana (R. Stillwell, ed., *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976] 999-1000). The coastal area near Zephyrion (Mersin) broad-

where he continually sent his own commanders to the argyraspids (Diod. 18. 62. 1). Eumenes' presence in this general area threatened Ptolemy's recent acquisition of Syria and Phoenicia.²² The latter's envoys attempted to sabotage Eumenes' authority by reminding Alexander's old guard of their earlier condemnation of him in Egypt. Moreover, Ptolemy had on four occasions during the reign of Alexander commanded all or part of the hypaspists/argyraspids.²³ In addition to his calls for the argyraspids to repudiate Eumenes, Ptolemy also protested to the garrison commanders in Cyinda concerning their giving Eumenes access to the royal funds. Ptolemy promised whoever revolted from Eumenes that he would guarantee their safety. All of these attempts to subvert the loyalty of Eumenes' troops and allies failed. The kings, Olympias, and the regent Polyperchon, had all written that they were to serve Eumenes (Diod. 18. 62. 1-2). For the present the Macedonian traditions of loyalty to royal authority held.

Antigonus also made several attempts to undermine the allegiance of Eumenes' troops (Diod. 18. 62. 3-4). Not only did Eumenes pose a military threat to his plans for Asia, but Eumenes' control of the treasury of Cyinda eliminated Antigonus's major source of funds. Moreover, it is very likely that the transfer of funds from Susa to

ens and is fronted by a sandy beach which would have afforded Ptolemy's fleet a suitable landing (Naval Intelligence Division, Great Britain, *Turkey*, in *Geographical Handbook Series* [London: Oxford University Press?, 1942] 99).

²² Ptolemy likely seized these areas from the lawful satrap Laomedon in the spring of 318. The *Parian Marble* (FGrH 239 B F-12) dates Ptolemy's incursion into Syria and Phoenicia in 319/318. There is some difficulty in accepting the *Marble's* dating, however. Appian (*Syr.* 52) reports that Laomedon fled to Alcetas in Caria when his satrapy was attacked by Ptolemy. Likewise, Diodorus (18. 43. 1) implies that the occupation took place shortly after the failure of Perdiccas's Egyptian expedition, but this section is a self-contained description of Ptolemy's expedition. In similar circumstances where Diodorus is radically abbreviating and summarizing his source, he is often most cavalier with his relative chronology (see E. M. Anson, "Diodorus and the Date of Triparadeisus," *AJP* 107 [1986]: 209-10). Appian's (*Syr.* 52) reference to Alcetas is most likely a mistake for Asander, who was the satrap of Caria (Diod. 18. 39. 6). Moreover, as J. Seibert (*Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I, Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und Antiken Rechtsgeschichte* 56 [Munich: C. H. Beck, 1969] 130) has pointed out, if the earlier date is accepted, it puts Ptolemy in open rebellion against Antipater, which is unlikely. Given these circumstances, the *Parian Marble's* dating is to be preferred, and since the *Marble* places Ptolemy's seizure of Syria after Cassander's flight to Asia and Arrhidaeus's siege of Cyzicus (FGrH 239 B F-12), it is most likely that Ptolemy's expulsion of Laomedon took place in the late spring or possibly very early summer of 318.

²³ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 27. 5; 4. 24. 3, 8-10, 29. 1-2; 5. 23. 7.

Cyinda had been ordered specifically to supply money for the campaign against the surviving Perdiccans, a campaign which had been placed under the direction of Antigonus (*Arr. Succ.* 1. 35, 38). Antigonus, therefore, like Ptolemy attempted to corrupt the allegiance of Eumenes' new allies. He selected one of his companions, Philotas, to carry a letter, which he had written, to the Macedonians in Eumenes' army (*Diod.* 18. 62. 4).²⁴ With Philotas also went thirty "meddling and talkative persons" who were to make contact with Antigenes and Teutamus and organize a plot against Eumenes. They were, also, to seek out former acquaintances among the argyraspids and secure their adherence to Antigonus with promises of great rewards. This operation was, like Ptolemy's, unsuccessful with one important exception. Teutamus was suborned. However, when he attempted to win over his fellow commander, Antigenes pointed out the disadvantages of an alliance with Antigonus. Antigonus was already removing other satraps and replacing them with his personal companions. Antigenes emphasized that what Antigonus was capable of giving, he was equally able and even likely to take away. Eumenes, on the other hand, had need of their support, "since he was a foreigner, and would never dare to advance his own interests" (*Diod.* 18. 62. 5-7). Eumenes' propaganda based on the biases of the aristocratic class had worked.

Having failed in private conversations, Philotas gave the commanders the letter given him by Antigonus to be read to all the Macedonians serving in Eumenes' army. "All the Macedonians" could not have been a great many besides the argyraspids. Eumenes had emerged from Nora with five hundred "friends" (*Diod.* 18. 53. 7), many of whom may have been Macedonians, but his army had surrendered the previous year to Antigonus (*Diod.* 18. 41. 4), and some of these "friends" were undoubtedly Cappadocian aristocrats. He had eluded Antigonus's pursuing troops, and while Diodorus does refer to infantry in Eumenes' retreating force (*Diod.* 18. 41. 3), the majority must have been cavalry. It is unlikely that the two thousand soldiers enrolled in the days immediately after Eumenes' release were Macedonians; these new recruits would undoubtedly be Cappadocians

²⁴ This Philotas is probably to be identified with the former satrap of Cilicia (W. Heckel, *The Last Days and Testament of Alexander the Great: A Prosopographic Study* [Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1988] 336-7; *Marshals*, 330; R. A. Billows, *Antigonus the One-eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990] 423-4).

and mercenaries. For all intents and purposes the Macedonians associated with Eumenes' command with, perhaps, at most a couple of hundred exceptions, were the argyraspids.

Without Eumenes' knowledge the "argyraspids and the other Macedonians" now came together, obviously prompted by Philotas, and demanded that the letter be read (Diod. 18. 63. 1-2). In it Antigonus ordered that they seize Eumenes and put him to death. If this were not done, Antigonus threatened them with war. With the reading of the letter, the Macedonians were thrown into a state of confusion; the soldiers wished to obey the kings, but feared a war with Antigonus (Diod. 18. 63. 3). While the letter was still being discussed, Eumenes arrived on the scene. After he read the letter, he urged the troops to ignore Antigonus, who had rebelled against the kings, and follow the royal decree ordering them to serve him. Eumenes persuaded the Macedonians of their duty to their kings; in fact, he emerged from this confrontation with increased authority (Diod. 18. 63. 3-5). While the Macedonian troops were showing signs of their true mercenary nature, the old traditions of loyalty to the Argead rulers were still strong.

After weathering this crisis, Eumenes ordered his soldiers to break camp, and in the winter of 318/317 he led them into Phoenicia (Diod. 18. 63. 6), where using part of the Cyindan treasure he planned to gather a fleet to help Polyperchon secure control of the Aegean.²⁵ He occupied the northern section easily. Ptolemy, who had

²⁵ For the date, see B. Gullath and L. Schober, "Zur Chronologie der frühen Diadochenzeit: die Jahre 320 bis 315 v. Chr.," in *Studien zur alten Geschichte. Siegfried Lauffer zum 70. Geburtstag am 4. August 1981 dargebracht von Freunden, Kollegen und Schülern*, edited by H. Kalcyk, B. Gullath, A. Graeber (Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider Editore, 1986) 355-6. Bosworth ("Philip III Arrhidaeus and the Chronology of the Successors," *Chiron* 22 [1992]: 68) has Eumenes moving into Phoenicia at the end of summer 318. All indications are that this is much too early. Eumenes did not abandon his alliance with Antigonus until the summer (see chapter 4). Also, while Diodorus (18. 61. 5) states that in "little time" Eumenes collected a considerable army, it is evident that this process took months (see above). F. Reuss (*Hieronymos von Kardia; Studien zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* [Berlin: Weidmann, 1876] 167) mistakenly believes that Eumenes entered Phoenicia twice. This belief arises from Diodorus's carelessness; from Diodorus's (18. 73. 2) account it might appear that Eumenes entered Phoenicia after the defeat of the royal fleet in the Hellespont. Diodorus (18. 63. 6), however, places Eumenes in Phoenicia before the naval battle collecting ships to sail north to aid Cleitus. Polyaeus (4. 6. 8-9), likewise, places Eumenes in Phoenicia before the battle. Neither records Eumenes leaving this region, until his flight to Mesopotamia. Diodorus 18. 73. 2 is a summary of both earlier events (Diod. 18. 63. 6) and a synopsis of later ones as well (Diod. 19. 12-13). Clearly, Diodorus has in summarizing confused his chronology.

seized the area in the spring of 318 did not try to block his advance.²⁶ With the use of his newly acquired war chest, Eumenes assembled a considerable number of Phoenician ships under the command of Sosigenes (Polyaen. 4. 6. 9).²⁷ Since it is doubtful that Ptolemy would have permitted large numbers of warships to be captured by Eumenes, it is likely that the bulk of the Phoenician fleet had sailed with the satrap back to Egypt, making it necessary to construct a fleet from whatever was available.²⁸ As a result, Sosigenes and the newly created fleet only set sail in August 317,²⁹ stopping in Cilicia on its journey north (Polyaen. 4. 6. 9). Unfortunately for Eumenes and his fleet, at about the same time his warships set sail from Phoenicia the royal fleet under the command of Cleitus was defeated by Antigonus in the waters near Byzantium.³⁰ Cassander's fleet commander, Nicanor, who had been placed in overall command of both Cassander's and Antigonus's fleets, had earlier been beaten by Cleitus with heavy losses (Diod. 18. 72. 3-4; Polyaen. 4. 6. 8). Antigonus redeemed this defeat by surprising Cleitus and winning the decisive

²⁶ See note 22.

²⁷ Sosigenes was a Rhodian and had commanded part of the Perdiccan fleet in Aristonous's expedition to Cyprus in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 24. 6; cf. H. Hauben, "The First War of the Successors (321 B.C.): Chronological and Historical Problems," *Ancient Society* 8 [1977]: 104-105).

²⁸ In 314 when Antigonus invaded Phoenicia, he had to build a fleet, since the Phoenician fleet was in Egypt with Ptolemy (Diod. 19. 58. 2). It is likely that Ptolemy had withdrawn the navy in a similar fashion to forestall its falling into Eumenes' hands in 317.

²⁹ Considerable time had to be spent repairing ships, completing construction of those in shipyards, building some from scratch, and assembling crews; quite literally creating a fleet from next to nothing. The actual time spent in this process is unknown. Antigonus apparently built a fleet in the matter of a few months during the spring and summer of 314 (cf. Diod. 19. 58. 6; Billows, *Antigonos*, 112). For the date of the completion of Eumenes' fleet, see note 30.

³⁰ Errington ("Diodorus Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochoi, 320-311 B.C." *Hermes* 105 (1977): 494, 496) places the sea-battles in the Hellespont in July. July is the earliest month in which the battles could have taken place. The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 13) dates the engagements to the archon year 317/16. Both occurred after the spring of 317 when Polyperchon abandoned the siege of Megalopolis (cf. Diod. 18. 72. 2-3; see J. M. Williams, "A Note on Athenian Chronology, 319/8-318/7 B.C.," *Hermes* [1984]: 305), and at about the same time as the Athenian settlement with Cassander and the installment of Demetrius of Phalerum as supervisor of the Athenian government (Diod. 18. 74. 3-75. 1). Demetrius served in this position for "ten years" (Diod. 20. 45. 5; Str. 9. 1. 20) and was deposed in June 307 (*FGrH* 239B F-21; Plut. *Demetr.* 8. 3-5; Diod. 20. 45); the Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 20) places "his legislation" in 317/316. The battles occurred in the summer of 317 (so Gullath and Schober, "Chronologie," 352). Bosworth ("Chronology," 68) places them in 318, but see chapter 4, note 2.

victory (Diod. 18. 72. 5–6; Polyæn. 4. 6. 8); Cleitus was subsequently killed (Diod. 18. 72; Polyæn. 4. 6. 8). While Eumenes' fleet was still in Cilicia, and apparently unaware of the events that had taken place in the north, Antigonus's victorious squadrons appeared. Sosigenes' Phoenician commanders immediately seized much of the fleet treasury and deserted to the enemy (Polyæn. 4. 6. 9). With his naval victory over Cleitus and the acquisition of Eumenes' fleet, Antigonus was now the undisputed master of the sea.³¹ More importantly for Eumenes, Antigonus no longer had to worry about Polyperchon interfering in western Asia. Antigonus was now free to pursue Eumenes. In one sense the naval debacle in Cilicia was fortunate for Eumenes. For as a result he knew that Antigonus was coming.

After his naval victory Antigonus selected from his army twenty thousand light-armed infantry and four thousand cavalry (Diod. 18. 73. 1) and set out rapidly for Phoenicia.³² The rest of his forces were to follow. Eumenes in late August or early September quickly departed Phoenicia. He moved east with the intention of making contact with the governors of the upper satrapies (Diod. 18. 72. 2). This was Eumenes' only option. If he remained where he was, he would risk being caught between the forces of Antigonus and those of Ptolemy. Moreover, Antigonus, while moving towards Phoenicia with only light infantry and cavalry could use these to outmaneuver and harass Eumenes' forces until the rest of his army arrived. Eumenes' fifteen thousand infantry and twenty-five hundred cavalry (Diod. 18. 61. 5) were no match for Antigonus's superior forces. After his defeat of Alcetas in Pisidia, Antigonus's army contained ten thousand cavalry and sixty thousand infantry (Diod. 18. 50. 3), of which the latter may have included close to thirty thousand heavy infantry (cf. Diod. 19. 27. 1, 29. 2–5). Eumenes had no choice but to hope that the satraps of the upper provinces would respond to the letters from the kings and their regent which ordered them to obey Eumenes "in every way" (Diod. 19. 13. 7). Eumenes and his army, therefore, marched rapidly through Coele-Syria and into Mesopotamia (Diod.

³¹ Only one ship of the royal fleet escaped being destroyed or captured in Antigonus's victory (Diod. 18. 72. 8); Sosigenes escaped the desertion of his fleet (Polyæn. 4. 6. 9) and disappears from the record.

³² Diodorus 18. 73. 1 states that Antigonus and these troops were heading for Cilicia, but, as confirmed by this very passage, their goal was Phoenicia and Eumenes.

18. 73. 2–3). In Mesopotamia Eumenes was joined by Amphimachus, the satrap of Mesopotamia and Arbelitis (Diod. 18. 39. 6).³³ The union with Amphimachus eliminated any supply problems Eumenes might have encountered in Mesopotamia. Indeed, prior to this alliance Eumenes may have planned on following Alexander's course, by-passing Mesopotamia proper and traveling along the eastern bank of the Tigris and proceeding directly to Susa.

Eumenes advanced into Babylonia with fifteen thousand infantry and thirty-three hundred cavalry (Diod. 18. 73. 4). Upon his arrival he sent emissaries to Seleucus, the satrap of Babylonia, and to Pithon, the satrap of Media, who was then in Babylon, requesting in the name of the kings that they join him (Diod. 19. 12. 1).³⁴ Both refused. Seleucus replied that, even though he supported the kings, he would never consent to obey someone whom the Macedonians had con-

³³ While it is not definitely stated that Amphimachus joined Eumenes in Mesopotamia, it is a reasonable assumption. Eumenes left Cilicia with fifteen thousand infantry and twenty-five hundred cavalry (Diod. 18. 61. 5), and on his arrival in Persia his army, despite losses incurred on the Tigris (Diod. 18. 73. 3), consisted of fifteen thousand infantry and thirty-three hundred cavalry (Diod. 18. 73. 4). The additional forces must have come from Amphimachus. Later in 316, Amphimachus as one of Eumenes' commanders is mentioned as personally leading a force of six hundred cavalry (Diod. 19. 27. 4), and he may have brought additional troops as well. Nor is Amphimachus mentioned among those satraps joining Eumenes later in Susiane (Diod. 19. 14. 5–8). Moreover, the total given for the forces of the upper satraps joining Eumenes (Diod. 19. 14. 8) is greater by 390 cavalry and two hundred infantry than the sum of the individual additions. Part of the explanation for this discrepancy is that Diodorus had probably misread Hieronymus and mistakenly included Amphimachus' troops in the total of the forces provided by the commanders of the upper satrapies.

³⁴ Diodorus (19. 12. 1) places this exchange after Eumenes entered winter quarters. However, since Eumenes spent the winter in the Carian villages (Diod. 19. 12. 1) and these are northeast of Babylon (see note 37), for Diodorus' account to be correct Eumenes would have had to march past Babylon without contacting or being contacted by Seleucus and Pithon. In addition to the implausibility of this situation, the *Chronicle of the Diadochi* indicates that Eumenes and Babylonian forces clashed before the city of Babylon (*BM* 34660 obv. ll. 14–17, in A. K. Grayson, *Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles* [Locust Valley, N.Y.: J. J. Augustin Publisher, 1975] 116) in the seventh year of Philip III's reign (317/316) in the month Tishri (October; see R. A. Parker and W. H. Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology, 626 B.C.–A.D. 75* [Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1956] 36; cf. E. J. Bickerman, *Chronology of the Ancient World* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969] 20, 22–5). Diodorus in his abridgement has omitted all reference to the encounter with Seleucus in 317 (see Errington, "Chronology," 484 n. 27). Clearly, Eumenes on his authority as στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ ordered that Seleucus and Pithon join him. When they refused, hostilities broke out with no serious outcome, and Eumenes and his forces proceeded northeast to winter quarters.

demned to death (Diod. 19. 12. 2). Eumenes did, however, enjoy a notable success in his operations in Babylonia. The commander of the citadel of Babylon, loyal to the letters from the kings and regent, gave his support to Eumenes.³⁵ For their part Seleucus and Pithon sent an envoy to Antigenes and the argyraspids, requesting that they remove Eumenes from his command, a request that was ignored (Diod. 19. 12. 3). Since it was late in the year and his army was worn out by its journey, Eumenes entered winter quarters for 317/316³⁶ in the area of the Carian villages (Diod. 19. 12. 1), approximately twenty miles northeast of Babylon.³⁷ While in winter quarters Eumenes

³⁵ S. Smith (*Babylonian Historical Texts Relating to the Capture and Downfall of Babylon* [London: Methuen & Company, 1924] 131–2; followed by W.W. Tarn, “The Heritage of Alexander,” in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, eds. J. B. Bury, S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969; reprinted Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953] 6:477; J. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia*, [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981] 112–13; A. Mehl, *Seleukos Nikator und sein Reich*, Vol. 1, *Studia Hellenistica* 28, edited by W. Peremans [Louvain, 1986] 46, 48 n. 57, 49) states on the strength of the Babylonian *Chronicle of the Diadochi* that after Seleucus’ and Pithon’s refusal to join him, Eumenes captured the Babylonian citadel. While the *Chronicle* (BM 34660 obv. ll. 14–15) does make reference to a royal army operating near Babylon in the seventh year of Philip III’s reign (317/316) and to some activity involving the palace of Babylon, Grayson (*Chronicles*, 116, no. 10) has offered a more tentative reconstruction of the *Chronicle* than that proposed by Smith. “In the seventh year of Philip, in the month Tashritu (Teshri) [October 3–31; see Parker and Dubberstein, *Chronology*, 36], the army of the king . . . of the palace of Babylon he took away from them . . .” Moreover, while it is clear that Diodorus has omitted all reference to these events before Babylon, it is doubtful that he would have overlooked an event as important as the capture of the Babylonian citadel (as Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 113). It is more reasonable to assume that the division of authority in the satrapies practiced by the Persians and by Alexander had been continued by the Successors. Alexander had divided the authority in Babylonia between the governor and the commander of the citadel (Curt. 5. 1. 43; Diod. 17. 64. 5). That such arrangements were continued elsewhere is clear from the presence of citadel commanders at Susa (Diod. 19. 17. 3; cf. Curt. 5. 2. 16) and Cyinda (Diod. 18. 62. 2). What may have taken place was that the citadel commander declared for the party of the kings and regent, i.e. Eumenes, but with Seleucus in control of the city he was unable to join forces with Eumenes. The letters from the kings had been sufficient to ensure obedience to Eumenes from the commanders at Cyinda and Susa.

³⁶ Eumenes after the loss of his fleet left Phoenicia and moved east in September. The distance from Coelê Syria (Diod. 18. 73. 2) to Babylon by way of Thapsacus is approximately 650 miles, or a march of about fifty days (see D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978] 66–7, 156). However, additional time would be spent crossing the Euphrates (Alexander took five days [ibid., 66 and n. 65], fending off attacks by natives (Diod. 18. 39. 6), and battling with Seleucus and Pithon. Eumenes entered winter quarters probably in November.

³⁷ Cf. Diod. 17. 110. 3–8, 112. 1; Str. 15. 3. 12. This is the same area Alexander

sent the letters given him by the kings and the regent to the satraps and generals of the upper satrapies (cf. Diod. 19. 13. 7).³⁸

Pithon's presence in Babylon at this time was the result of his failed attempt to gain power over the upper satrapies (Diod. 19. 14. 1–3). Pithon, who had been appointed satrap of Media at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18. 39. 6), had tried to assert his authority over all the provinces east of Babylonia. He probably was attempting to revive the power that had been given to him by the former regent Perdiccas to deal specifically with the Greek revolt which broke out in the upper satrapies soon after Alexander's death (Diod. 18. 7. 3–4). Officially, Pithon's authority had lapsed on the completion of this mission (cf. Diod. 18. 7. 9).³⁹ He may also have claimed certain rights

passed through on his way from Susa back to Babylon (Diod. 17. 110. 3). These villages were occupied by displaced Carians; the time and circumstances of their displacement are unknown (A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980] 1:291). These villages were close to Babylon, since Diodorus (19. 12. 3) states that Eumenes in 316 left his winter quarters and marched one day to a point thirty-four miles north-east of Babylon. Engels (*Logistics*, 156) estimates that the average large army traveled fifteen miles a day with a day's halt every five to seven days.

³⁸ In the spring of 316, Diodorus (19. 13. 7) states that Eumenes "had already sent to the commanders of the upper satrapies the letters from the kings." The obvious time for the dispatch of these letters would have been the previous winter.

³⁹ H. Bengtson (*Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit: Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht* [Munich: Beck, 1937] 1:179–80; followed by L. Schober, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Babyloniens und der Oberen Satrapien von 323–303 v. Chr.* [Frankfurt and Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1981] 74–8), believes that Pithon acquired his "generalship" by usurpation. Diodorus (19. 14. 2) certainly suggests that Pithon was exceeding his authority. However, while Pithon may have exceeded his authority, the text makes it clear that he in some capacity was "general of the upper satrapies." A. Vezin (*Eumenes von Kardia: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* [Münster: Druck und Verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1907] 86 and n. 3) argues that Pithon was appointed to this position by Antigonus some time after Triparadeisus. There is, however, no notice of Antigonus making this appointment in our sources. Moreover, the evidence suggests no such action by Antigonus. In the first place, Antigonus did not have the authority (see Errington, "Babylon to Triparadeisus," 69–71), and secondly, when in pursuit of Eumenes he had reached Babylon, he formed a *κοινοπραγία* with Pithon and Seleucus (Diod. 19. 17. 2). If Pithon had received his command from Antigonus, there would have been no need to create such an alliance with Pithon; he would already have been Antigonus's subordinate. Also, there was little time for Antigonus and Pithon to develop the sort of relationship in which the former would have placed such confidence in the latter. There is no record of a friendship between the two prior to Antigonus's appointment as satrap of Greater Phrygia in 333; from this date until Triparadeisus there was no discernible contact between the two, and at Triparadeisus any possible contact would have been brief. It is possible that Pithon was appointed to this position by Antipater (so Tarn, "Heritage," 470; P. Goukowsky, *Essai sur les origines du mythe d'Alexandre* [Nancy: Université de Nancy, 1978] 307 n. 82). However, as Vezin (*Eumenes*, 86 n. 3) accurately points

as a former regent.⁴⁰ Whatever the basis of this claimed authority, Pithon had put to death Philotas, the general of Parthia, and placed his own brother Eudamus in the latter's place (Diod. 19. 14. 1).⁴¹ To resist this threat to their positions the leaders of the upper satrapies had combined their forces under the overall command of Peucestas, the satrap of Persis (Diod. 19. 14. 4). This combined army had defeated Pithon in Parthia (Diod. 19. 14. 2). Following his defeat, Pithon retreated back to Media and from there, not long before the arrival of Eumenes and his forces, to Babylon where he encouraged Seleucus "to share in his expectations" (Diod. 19. 14. 3).⁴² While it is unclear whether Seleucus would have joined him if events had not intervened, it is telling that Seleucus did offer Pithon sanctuary and that the two did deliberate jointly with regard to Eumenes (Diod. 19. 12. 2). It is probable that they had moved together to the east after Triparadeisus on their way to assume command of their respective satrapies, and it is possible that Pithon had helped Seleucus expel Perdiccan forces from Babylon, even though there is no reference in the sources to any fighting.⁴³ While Seleucus probably was

out, in the fairly complete record of the arrangements made at Triparadeisus there is no account of an overall command of the upper satrapies given to Pithon; only his satrapal appointment is mentioned. The most likely possibility is that Pithon reclaimed the command he had held under Perdiccas in 323 (Heckel, *Testament*, 74 n. 7); a command, which had only been temporary to deal with the immediate emergency of the revolt of the Greeks in the upper satrapies with Pithon returning to the royal army after the rebels' defeat (Diod. 18. 7. 3).

⁴⁰ Cf. Diod. 18. 36. 6-7; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 30-31.

⁴¹ Both Diodorus (18. 39. 6) and Photius's epitome of Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 35) state that at Triparadeisus Philip was named satrap of Parthia. Since Diodorus (19. 14. 1) calls Philotas a στρατηγός, not satrap, the most likely explanation is that Philip had died and the effective control of his satrapy had fallen to a companion. Στρατηγός, like ἡγεμών, was a general title which did not necessarily require formal appointment from the kings. The title of satrap could only be formally conferred by the king or regent acting in the king's name (cf. Diod. 18. 3. 1-3; 39. 5-6; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5-7; 1b. 2-3; 1. 35). By his language Diodorus is very clear that whatever Philotas's title he was in effect legitimately in control of Parthia. Diodorus 19. 14. 2 states that the death of Philotas caused "all the other satraps" to join forces. Moreover, Diodorus is definite (19. 14. 1) that Pithon by supplanting Philotas with Eudamus briefly acquired control of Parthia.

⁴² Pithon's operations and the resulting war with the satraps must have taken place in 317. Diodorus (19. 13. 7, 14. 4, cf. 19. 15. 1) states that when Eumenes arrived in Susiane he found that the forces of the up-country satraps were still united from their previous actions against Pithon. Pithon may have been emboldened by reports of Antigonus's activities in the west; the news of which probably only arrived in the latter part of 318.

⁴³ See Mehl, *Seleukos*, 40.

given few troops from the royal army,⁴⁴ Pithon may have acquired a notable force at Triparadeisus, perhaps, as a solace for the loss of the co-regency (cf. Diod. 18. 39. 1–2). Pithon's position as satrap of Media (Diod. 18. 3. 1) was simply confirmed at Triparadeisus (Diod. 18. 39. 6), while Arrhidaeus, the other former co-regent, was given in addition to the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia (Diod. 18. 39. 6), vacant since the death of Leonnatus, one thousand Macedonians and five hundred Persian archers and slingers.⁴⁵ The addition of such a force is probably what gave Pithon the confidence to attempt to secure the rule of the East. Much of Seleucus and Pithon's hostility towards Eumenes may have derived from their fear that he would hinder their plans regarding the upper satrapies. Eumenes' intentions of allying himself with these territories' leaders probably had become known to them through deserters. Antigonos appeared a less dangerous interloper, because of his stated purpose to suppress Eumenes. His power base was back in Asia Minor; those who supported him now might benefit later with extended satrapies in the east.

The attempted usurpation and subsequent defeat of Pithon were apparently unknown to Eumenes, when in the spring of 316 he departed winter quarters and set out with his army for Susa (Diod. 19. 13. 7). In Susa he planned to summon the forces of the upper satrapies already alerted to his presence the previous winter by the dispatch of the letters, and also collect funds from the royal treasury there (cf. Diod. 19. 15. 5). Although he wished to keep to his present course, thus staying in Babylonia at least long enough to move beyond the effective range of Seleucus, his wintering in the land had exhausted its available resources,⁴⁶ forcing him to cross the

⁴⁴ As noted earlier (see chapter 3), after Alexander's death the then regent Perdiccas was very reluctant to parcel out the royal army; instead he gave to the recently appointed satraps money from the treasury to hire mercenaries. It is likely that Antipater followed a similar policy. With a major campaign facing Antigonos in Asia Minor, it is doubtful that many troops would be separated from the royal army. It was not until later in the year with Antipater ready to cross to Macedonia that the regent exchanged many of his soldiers for Antigonos's disgruntled veterans (see chapter 5). At Triparadeisus it was assumed that Perdiccas's former army would be used to pursue and defeat the Perdiccans in Asia Minor.

⁴⁵ Arrhidaeus is found with these forces in 318 (Diod. 18. 51. 1), and it does not appear that they could have been acquired except from the royal army.

⁴⁶ Seleucus prevented supplies from reaching him from the latter's store-houses where most of the previous year's harvest was kept. Due to the abundance housed in these granaries, in 331, Alexander and his entire army were able to remain in Babylon for 34 days before leaving for Susa (Curt. 5. 1. 36, 39; cf. Diod. 17. 64. 5).

Tigris further west than he had planned. He crossed at a point only about thirty-four miles northeast of Babylon (Diod. 19. 12. 3–5). During this operation Seleucus and Pithon sailed down with ships (Diod. 19. 12. 5) which had survived from those built by Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 19. 4). After putting ashore, they again tried to persuade the argyraspids to remove Eumenes, whom they called a foreigner responsible for many Macedonian deaths, from his command. When they were ignored, Seleucus sailed to an ancient canal, cleared its intake, and flooded the entire area around Eumenes' camp (Diod. 19. 13. 1–4).⁴⁷ Eumenes' entire base was now in danger of being destroyed. While Eumenes and his army reached high ground, they were surrounded by water. Here they remained inactive for the remainder of the day, but on the next the vessels that had been collected for the river crossing were used to transport the army to safety (Diod. 18. 73. 3). Since their forces were greatly inferior to those of Eumenes, neither Seleucus nor Pithon opposed these actions.⁴⁸ Eumenes, however, realized that if he were to evacuate his men by this avenue his baggage might be lost. Consequently, he returned his troops to their former location and abandoned this means of escape. Later with the help of a local inhabitant, who showed Eumenes how the waters could be drained, the land was made passable. With his attempt to prevent Eumenes' passage unsuccessful, Seleucus proposed a truce whereby he would concede the crossing, if Eumenes would evacuate Babylonia. While giving up his own efforts to stop Eumenes,

⁴⁷ In a summary statement Diodorus (18. 73. 3) mistakenly places these operations near the Euphrates, however, he later makes it very clear that they occurred along the Tigris (19. 12. 3).

⁴⁸ The size of Pithon's and Seleucus' forces cannot be known. They did possess some troops, because when Antigonus arrived in Babylon they contributed troops to his army, but how many is not mentioned (Diod. 19. 17. 2). Mehl (*Seleukos*, 49) believes that Seleucus had but few troops. When he was detached from Antigonus' army, made the new Satrap of Susiane, and ordered to besiege Susa, he had to be given forces by Antigonus (Diod. 19. 18. 1). With respect to Pithon, there are indications that he may have had more substantial forces than his colleague. Later, in 316, Pithon is listed as commanding fifteen hundred cavalry, but also present were one thousand "mounted archers and lancers from Media and Parthia" (Diod. 19. 29. 2), who may represent part of Pithon's contribution. Also, when Antigonus with Pithon and Seleucus arrived in Media, Pithon had been sent out to acquire cavalry men and mounts; he brought back to Antigonus two thousand horsemen and an additional one thousand horses (Diod. 19. 20. 2). While defeated in his attempt to extend his authority beyond his own satrapy, Pithon must have salvaged from his defeat some infantry. His initial army was large enough to frighten the up-country satraps into uniting their forces.

Seleucus did send messengers to Antigonus in northern Mesopotamia, where he had wintered (Diod. 19. 15. 6),⁴⁹ informing him that Eumenes had passed through Babylonia. He had earlier informed him of the army of the upper satraps which had gathered in Susiane (cf. Diod. 19. 13. 5).

Once across the Tigris, Eumenes passed into Susiane. Here he sent envoys again to the up-country satraps ordering them to join him with their armies (Diod. 19. 13. 6–7). Unknown to Eumenes, the satraps were mobilized and had left winter quarters themselves in response to his first summons. Even before Eumenes could reach Susa he was joined by these satraps (Diod. 19. 15. 1, 5),⁵⁰ with their forces of eighty-seven hundred infantry, ten thousand Persian archers and slingers, forty-six hundred cavalry, and 120 elephants (Diod. 19. 14. 2–8).⁵¹ While these governors were willing to ally with Eumenes, there was rivalry concerning the overall command of the army (Diod. 19. 15. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 10). Peucestas argued that because of his high standing with Alexander, the large contingent of troops he led,

⁴⁹ The only reference to Antigonus's winter quarters simply mentions Mesopotamia (Diod. 19. 15. 6). However, Vezin's (*Eumenes*, 91) assumption that the camp must have been in northwestern Mesopotamia is the correct one. The sea battles occurred in August 317, and Eumenes left Phoenicia in September (see note 30). If Antigonus left the Hellespont in late August or September and entered winter quarters in November, such a journey with light-armed infantry and cavalry would have covered about fifteen hundred miles (see Engels, *Logistics*, 153–5). Some time may also have been spent pacifying Cilicia and Phoenicia (Billows, *Antigonus*, 88). Eumenes probably went into winter quarters at about the same time as Antigonus.

⁵⁰ The location of the combined army of the up-country satraps in the spring of 316 cannot be exactly determined. All Diodorus (19. 14. 2–3) says is that they had driven Pithon from Parthia into Media from where he had gone on to Babylon. It is not clear whether he was also driven from Media, but it would appear likely. For the up-country satraps to arrive so quickly in western Susiane to rendezvous with Eumenes must mean that they were somewhere in Susiane when the second summons reached them. It is likely that they had wintered in Media and had begun the march into Susiane early in the spring.

⁵¹ Peucestas, the satrap of Persis, commanded ten thousand Persian archers and slingers, three thousand heavy infantry, six hundred Greek and Thracian cavalry, and four hundred Persian horsemen; Tlepolemus, the satrap of Carmania, fifteen hundred infantry and seven hundred cavalry; Sibyrtius, satrap of Arachosia, one thousand infantry and six hundred ten cavalry; Androbazus, general for Oxyartes, the satrap of Paropanisadae, twelve hundred infantry and four hundred cavalry; Stasander, the satrap of Aria and Drangiane, fifteen hundred infantry and one thousand cavalry; and Eudamus from India with three hundred infantry, five hundred cavalry, and one hundred twenty elephants (Diod. 19. 14. 5–8). The total given by Diodorus does not equal the sum of the listed individual commands. Diodorus's total may reflect in some fashion the addition of the forces of Amphimachus, the satrap of Mesopotamia (see note 33).

and his leadership of the forces of the upper satrapies, he deserved the command. Antigenes argued that the right to choose belonged to "his Macedonians" alone, meaning the argyraspsids (Diod. 19. 15. 1–2).⁵² Many of his new allies attempted to usurp Eumenes' authority over the "Macedonians" through gifts and praise, producing what Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 11) describes as an army behaving like a "democracy." Eumenes, who saw that this rivalry would eventually break up their combined forces, making them an easy prey for Antigonus, again had recourse to the Alexander Tent (cf. Diod. 18. 60. 5–61. 3). As before in Cilicia, no single supreme commander would be chosen, but all the satraps and generals would gather in council each day in the Tent to decide on common actions; the proposal met with immediate approval (Diod. 19. 15. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 7. 2).⁵³ While theoretically, as in Cyinda, democracy was to rule the council of the commanders, Eumenes still was the royal general of the kings with access to the royal treasuries (cf. Diod. 19. 15. 5). However, the division in Eumenes' command, which had been troublesome before, was now compounded by the addition of Peucestas and his forces and allies.

The army in late May marched to Susa where, using the royal treasury to which he alone had access, Eumenes paid his troops six months' wages.⁵⁴ He also gave two hundred talents to Eudamus,⁵⁵

⁵² It is unclear whether Antigenes was here speaking in support of Eumenes or putting forth a claim for himself. Given his earlier cooperation and the absence of direct evidence for such a demand, it appears that the former was the case. There may have been additional cause for hostility between Antigenes and Peucestas. It is possible that Peucestas had usurped control of Susiane in Antigenes' absence (see Tam, "Heritage," 477).

⁵³ Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 10–13) implies that the crisis was more severe and drawn out than does Diodorus. However, it appears that Plutarch has summarized the many incidents of command rivalry which occurred during the year in which this polyglot army was in existence and placed them all roughly at this time. His mentioning of "lavish banquets and sacrifices" (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 11) is an obvious reference to Peucestas's famous banquet held later in Persepolis (Diod. 19. 22), and the reference to Eumenes' pretended need to borrow money (Plut. *Eum.* 13. 12–13) is wholly implausible so soon after Eumenes' exit from Susa. It is very clear in Diodorus that the Alexander Tent was reinstituted before the army reached Susa and it alleviated the difficulties for a time (Diod. 19. 15. 1–5).

⁵⁴ Eumenes left camp in the spring of 316 and proceeded to Susa. If he arrived in Susa approximately thirty to forty days later, his arrival would have been in May. This assumes that ten days to two weeks was spent in organizing the new combined army before its arrival in Susa (on this sequence of events see above and Diod. 19. 15. 1–5). Alexander took 20 days to travel from Babylon to Susa (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 7).

⁵⁵ This is not Pithon's brother, Eudamus, the son of Crateuas (see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:154 [#310. 311]).

the satrap of India, ostensibly for the maintenance of his elephants, but in reality to win his favor. Each of the other satraps had to provide for his own troops (Diod. 19. 15. 5). Eumenes, in consequence, was the paymaster for only that part of the army theoretically under the command of the royal general. In Susa, Eumenes remained for a considerable time refreshing his troops.⁵⁶

Antigonus left winter quarters in northwestern Mesopotamia in the spring in hopes of catching Eumenes before he could rendezvous with the forces of the up-country satraps (Diod. 19. 15. 6); this resolve was strengthened with the arrival of the emissaries from Seleucus and Pithon calling for Antigonus to hurry as fast as possible (Diod. 19. 13. 5). However, when he heard that Eumenes had already joined with the satraps, he slowed his pace, rested his troops, and enrolled additional ones for the coming campaign. During the winter the rest of his forces had joined him. Included in these forces were his heavy infantry and his war elephants.⁵⁷ When Antigonus arrived in Babylon in May, he arranged for common action against Eumenes with Seleucus and Pithon. After incorporating their forces into his own, he proceeded to cross into Susiane (Diod. 19. 17. 2). With the overwhelming number of troops under his direct command, Antigonus, unlike Eumenes, did not face any rivalry from his new allies. Pithon and Seleucus in light of their inferior numbers were clearly subordinates. When Eumenes learned of the crossing, he ordered Xenophilus,

⁵⁶ In late July the advance forces for Eumenes and Antigonus engaged in a skirmish on the Coprates River (Diod. 19. 18. 2). The time is fairly well fixed by Diodorus's (19. 18. 3) reference to the "season of the rising of the dog star," which corresponds to the latter part of July (see Bickerman, *Chronology*, 144). Since the Coprates, the modern Dez (Ab-i Diz) (See Vezin, *Eumenes*, 93, 95 n. 5; P. Sykes, *The History of the Persian Empire*, third ed. [New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1930; reprinted New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1969] 1:21, 40; A. T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948] 166) is less than 10 miles from Susa, Eumenes and his forces obviously spent some time in the Persian city. The Dez flows south from the mountains past the modern city of Dizful and joins the Karun about 25 miles north of Ahwaz (J. Hansman, "Charax and the Karkheh," *IrAnt* 7 [1967]: 28; W. Barthold, *An Historical Geography of Iran*, trans. by S. Soucek, ed. by C. E. Bosworth [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984] 185-6; Naval Intelligence Division, Great Britain, *Persia*, in *Geographical Handbook Series* [London: Oxford University Press?, 1945] figure 14, 54-5).

⁵⁷ Since these forces are found later associated with Antigonus's army (Diod. 19. 19. 7, 27. 1), they must have joined Antigonus in winter quarters. Antigonus's war elephants later in 316 numbered 65 (Diod. 19. 27. 1, 40. 1). Arrian (*Succ.* 1. 43) states that Antigonus was given half of the elephants which had accompanied Perdikkas's army to Egypt, or 70 of the animals.

who commanded the citadel of Susa, not to give any of the treasury to Antigonus (Diod. 19. 17. 3). In company with the other commanders he marched four days to the Pasitigris River,⁵⁸ the modern Karun,⁵⁹ where he wished to await the enemy.⁶⁰ The river was not fordable, and, consequently, after Eumenes crossed by means of a pontoon bridge, he was in an ideal position to block Antigonus's advance (cf. Diod. 19. 17. 3, 18. 4). To ensure that his enemy did not cross unnoticed, Eumenes wished to disperse his troops along the river's entire course. However, the Pasitigris stretches some 80 miles from the Zagros mountains to its southern estuary (Diod. 19. 17. 3). To accomplish his goal, Eumenes needed additional troops. Consequently, both he and Antigenes asked Peucestas to summon an additional ten thousand archers from Persia. At first, Peucestas ignored this request; he was still angered over not receiving the chief command. But eventually his fear of Antigonus won out over his pride and the troops were summoned (Diod. 19. 17. 5-7). Diodorus (19. 17. 6) further reports that Peucestas reasoned that the more troops he had directly under his command the stronger his position would become in the combined command structure.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Diodorus (19. 17. 3) says a day's march from Susa, but in Book 17 (67. 1; cf. Curt. 5. 3. 1) correctly refers to the distance as a four-day journey. The Coprates River is but one day's journey from Susa, the distance being less than ten miles (see note 56). The confusion at this point is most likely the result of the attempts by Diodorus to comprehend what must have been a long and complex section of Hieronymus's history.

⁵⁹ For this identification see Barthold, *Geography*, 185.

⁶⁰ The text (Diod. 19. 17. 3) states that Eumenes and his forces moved to the Tigris. It is very clear, however, that Diodorus is confused at this point. The actual river was the Pasitigris, as Diodorus (19. 18. 3) later acknowledges.

⁶¹ Diodorus (19. 17. 7) relates that even though some of the Persians were 30 days' march away, all of the Persian archers received the order on the same day Peucestas issued it. According to Diodorus, "Persia is cut by many narrow valleys and has many lookout posts that are high and close together, on which those of the inhabitants who had the loudest voices had been stationed. Since these posts were separated from each other by the distance at which a man's voice can be heard, those who received the order passed it on in the same way to the next, and then these in turn to others until the message had been delivered at the border of the satrapy" (Loeb Classical Library translation, R. M. Geer, trans. and ed., *Books XVIII and XIX 1-65*, in *Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes*. Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1969] 9:279). While Hornblower (*Hieronymus*, 151) rejects this account as a "tall story," J. M. Cook (*The Persian Empire*, first American edition [New York: Schocken Books, 1983] 109) accepts the practice, and the testimony of an earlier eye-witness would appear to confirm it (Xen. *Anab.* 5. 4. 31). The Persians also used fire signals to transmit information (Diod. 19. 57. 5; cf. Cook, *Empire*, 109).

Antigonus reached Susa in July. He appointed Seleucus satrap of this country in addition to Babylonia, and gave him troops to besiege the citadel, since Xenophilus remained loyal to Eumenes.⁶² Antigonus, however, with the rest of his forces pushed on after the enemy. On this march the heat was so oppressive that Antigonus was forced to travel at night, but he still lost many men (Diod. 19. 18. 2).⁶³ On reaching the Coprates River, the modern Dez, Antigonus made preparations for a crossing.⁶⁴ This river was approximately four hundred feet in width and possessed of a swift current (Diod. 19. 18. 3). As a result it could not be forded but required that the army be ferried across. Antigonus using small boats which he seized in the vicinity sent an advance party of more than three thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry across the river to secure a landing area for the rest of the army. Eumenes' camp, however, was nearby, at a point a little more than nine miles from where the Coprates entered the Pasitigris (Diod. 19. 18. 3; cf. 19. 21. 2), or about 20 miles down river from the modern city of Shushtar.⁶⁵ Therefore, when scouts

⁶² Antigonus, at this point, probably dispensed with formality. This appointment was most likely not made in the name of the kings; Eumenes was the representative of the kings. Antigonus was acting on his own authority, as he had done in Hellespontine Phrygia, in Lydia, and on the Hellespont.

⁶³ The heat in this part of Persia is truly oppressive in July and August. In the valleys of southern Iran the mean temperature is in the mid to high 90s during these months. In Ahwaz the mean in both July and August is 99°F. At this time there is also very little rainfall in this area (see Naval Intelligence Division, *Persia*, 591-2, 595-6; M. H. Ganji, "Climate," in *The Land of Iran*, edited by W. B. Fisher, Vol. 1 of *The Cambridge History of Iran*, edited by A. J. Arberry, H. Bailey, J. A. Boyle, B. Gray, A. K. S. Lambton, L. Lockhart, P. W. Avery [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968] 223-5; T. M. Oberlander, "Hydrography," in *The Land of Iran*, edited by W. B. Fisher, Vol. 1 of *The Cambridge History of Iran*, edited by A. J. Arberry, H. Bailey, J. A. Boyle, B. Gray, A. K. S. Lambton, L. Lockhart, P. W. Avery [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968] 266-267; Sykes, *Persia*, 10-11).

⁶⁴ Plutarch (*Eum.* 14. 3) mistakenly places the battle between Eumenes and Antigonus on the Pasitigris, but it is very clear that it actually occurred on the Coprates (Diod. 19. 18. 3-4).

⁶⁵ The location of Eumenes' camp put him at a point which bisected the Pasitigris in its course from the mountains to the sea, and only about a day's march from the main road to Persepolis (see A.S. Stein, *Old Routes of Western Iran: Narrative of an Archaeological Journey Carried out and Recorded* [London: Macmillan and Co., 1940] 18-27; J. Hansman, "Elamites, Achaemenians and Anshan," *Iran* 10 [1972]: 118-19; Cook, *The Persian Empire*, 107). Eumenes had left Susa for the country of the Uxians (Diod. 19. 17. 3), a people who occupied the plain and mountains of the upper reaches of the Pasitigris (see Bosworth, *Commentary*, 1:321-2), where he had crossed to the eastern bank of the river (Diod. 19. 17. 4). The road from Susa to Persepolis passed through the Uxian plain (Str. 16. 1. 17). Antigonus probably tried to cross the Coprates at a point about 30 to 40 miles from its juncture with the Pasitigris.

reported the enemy's activity to Eumenes, he selected four thousand infantry and thirteen hundred cavalry and recrossed the Pasitigris by means of his pontoon bridge. Eumenes' forces surprised those troops who had crossed to the eastern shore.⁶⁶ In addition to the soldiers sent over on Antigonus's orders, as many as six thousand additional soldiers had crossed over in scattered groups looking for provisions (Diod. 19. 18. 4). Eumenes' forces fell on these unsuspecting troops and routed them easily. Few escaped back to Antigonus; four thousand were taken prisoner. This battle took place in July 316.⁶⁷

With Eumenes firmly entrenched on the opposite shore of the Coprates, Antigonus regarded the crossing as impossible and set out toward the city of Badace (Diod. 19. 18. 5–19. 2), which was situated on the banks of the Eulaeus river.⁶⁸ After another grueling

Antigonus and his forces had been traveling along the river's western bank for some days (cf. Diod. 19. 18. 1–2), perhaps, looking for an easier crossing than that which corresponded with the main road to Persepolis; Eumenes' forces came upon Antigonus's advance party very quickly (cf. Diod. 19. 18. 4), implying that Eumenes' camp was not too distant. Since Eumenes intercepted Antigonus's forces with cavalry and light-armed troops only, Eumenes camp was probably at the most 40 miles away (Alexander's cavalry and light-armed units were capable of daily rates as high as 50 mpd over short periods; see Engels, *Logistics*, 155).

⁶⁶ Diod. 19. 18. 2–4; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14. 3. Plutarch relates that Eumenes was the only commander to participate in this defeat of Antigonus's forces. He implies that this was because the other commanders were hostile to Eumenes and too given to luxury (Plut. *Eum.* 14. 2). While Eumenes did have to deal with the jealousy of Peucestas almost continually, the other commanders were cooperating amiably and effectively at the time of the battle on the Coprates. Even Peucestas after some initial hesitation had summoned the extra soldiers (Diod. 19. 17. 6–7), and Antigenes and the argyraspids appear to have become more supportive of Eumenes in light of Peucestas's demands. In the initial meeting of Eumenes and those who had accompanied him from the west with the satraps of the upper provinces, while Peucestas demanded that he be given over-all command, Antigenes only asserted that the final decision be left to the Macedonians (Diod. 19. 15. 1–2). Moreover, the argyraspids had proven loyal in Babylonia, resisting the entreaties of both Seleucus and Pithon (Diod. 19. 13. 1–2).

⁶⁷ Diod. 19. 17. 3, 18. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 14, 3; see note 56.

⁶⁸ The site of Badace has not been identified, nor is there agreement amongst scholars as to the identity of the Eulaeus. Both Sykes (*Persia*, 1:40) and Bosworth (*Commentary*, 1:321) believe that the Eulaeus was a tributary of the Pasitigris (Karun); Hansman ("Charax and Karkheh," 28–9) identifies the Eulaeus as the modern Karkha. Barthold (*Geography*, 185), however, equates the Choaspes with the modern Karkha. Confusion with regard to the river's identity also exists in the sources. Pliny (*NH* 6. 31. 135) states that the Eulaeus flowed past Susa. This author also comments on the pure qualities of its water, stating that the Persian kings would drink only the waters from this stream; Herodotus (1. 188. 1) gives this same information for the Choaspes. Strabo (13. 3. 4) states that Susa was situated on the Choaspes River, and that "the Choaspes, Eulaeus, and the Tigris meet in a lake" (15. 3. 4).

march in which once again many soldiers were overcome by the heat, Antigonus reached Badace, where he remained for a few days to permit his army to recover from its recent setbacks (Diod. 19. 19. 1–2). When the army had rested, Antigonus decided to proceed north to Ecbatana (modern Hamadan) in Media, Pithon's assigned satrapy (Diod. 19. 19. 2). There were two routes from his current location to his destination. One route was along a royal road, but was a forty-day journey through the hot plain; the other was short and cool, but mountainous and through territory occupied by the hostile Cossaeans. Antigonus chose the more direct route through the mountains (Diod. 19. 19. 2).⁶⁹ It was not easy for an army to follow this route without the consent of the Cossaeans who inhabited this region. These mountaineers extracted payments from the Persian kings whenever they passed between Ecbatana and Babylon.⁷⁰ Because of the tribesmen's bellicosity and the difficulty of the terrain, Pithon advised Antigonus to purchase the right of safe passage (Diod. 19. 19. 8). Antigonus, however, "regarded it as beneath his dignity" to pay tribute to these people. Consequently, he decided to fight his way through (Diod. 19. 19. 4), and soon came to regret his decision.⁷¹ Finally, after suffering heavy casualties, eight days after he had set out, Antigonus and his forces arrived in Ecbatana in August (Diod. 19. 19. 6–8; cf. 19. 19. 2).⁷² Most of Antigonus's

It is very unlikely that the Eulaeus was a branch of the Pasitigris, since Antigonus did not cross the Coprates, which is west of the Pasitigris, and the latter river has its origins high in the Zagros mountains. Moreover, after spending some days in Badace, Antigonus chose to take the more direct route to Ecbatana (Diod. 19. 19. 2), which probably corresponds to the modern road leading from Hamadan to Khuristan (see Barthold, *Geography*, 180). This route would place Antigonus west of the Coprates.

⁶⁹ On this route see previous note.

⁷⁰ *FGrH* 133 F-1g = Str. 11. 13. 6.

⁷¹ Antigonus may have been influenced by Alexander's reaction to the demands for tribute made by the peoples in these regions. Alexander in 324 invaded the land of the Cossaeans and forced them to submit to his commands (Diod. 17. 111. 6; against another group of mountaineers in the same region in 331, Alexander in response to their demands had imposed tribute upon them [Arr. *Anab.* 3. 17. 1–5]). Billows's (*Antigonus*, 92–3) claim that Antigonus's reluctance to pay the tribute was due to financial problems is unlikely. While Antigonus's expenses were great and he hadn't had recourse to a royal treasury since Cyinda, there is no record of dissatisfaction among his troops over arrearages in pay. Moreover, he had taken unspecified funds from Cyinda and had access to whatever resources were possessed by his allies. Diodorus (19. 19. 4), following Hieronymus, states that Antigonus believed "it was beneath his dignity to pay."

⁷² Diodorus (19. 20. 1) relates that in "forty days" Antigonus's army had met

losses here and in Susiane, given the nature of the military operations, were amongst his light-armed troops.⁷³ As a result of these various disasters, the army was disaffected (Diod. 19. 20. 1). Antigonus eliminated the danger by mingling with his troops and making supplies available in abundance. Moreover, in Media he partially offset his losses by sending Pithon out to recruit two thousand additional cavalry; Pithon also acquired more than one thousand horses and a large number of baggage animals whose numbers had been severely diminished by the recent ordeals (Diod. 19. 20. 1–4, cf. 27. 1).

Antigonus's retreat to Media created turmoil in Eumenes' camp. Eumenes and those who had come east with him now saw a great opportunity. If they returned to the west, they could secure Asia Minor and cut Antigonus off from his allies and supplies. But the satraps and generals of the upper satrapies wished to remain in the east; they feared to leave their lands, lands now very much threatened by Antigonus. After it became clear to Eumenes that he was not going to dissuade those who wished to remain in the east, he gave way (Diod. 19. 21. 1–2). He realized that if the army were divided, neither half would be a match for the forces of Antigonus. Once again, the difficulties of divided command affected Eumenes. He now marched twenty-four days to Persepolis, following the same route taken by Alexander in 331/330.⁷⁴ Once in Persis the army,

with three disasters. The first was the march from Babylon to Susa, the second, the battle on the Coprates, and the third, the crossing of the country of the Cossaeans.

⁷³ Antigonus had at least twenty thousand light-armed troops when he entered Susiane (Diod. 18. 73. 1), but by 316 this figure even with additional recruitment (in Mesopotamia [Diod. 19. 15. 6], in Babylonia [Diod. 19. 17. 2], in Media [Diod. 19. 20. 2–3], in the upper satrapies [Diod. 19. 29. 2]) had probably dropped to under fifteen thousand. The nature of the conflicts on the Coprates and with the Cossaeans would dictate very high losses amongst such troops. Against the Cossaeans light-armed troops were almost exclusively employed in the fighting (Diod. 19. 19. 4). Billows (*Antigonus*, 92 n. 20) argues that Diodorus's source, Hieronymus, has exaggerated Antigonus's casualty figures, but, as noted above, most of these losses would have been amongst the light-armed troops, and given the circumstances it is not surprising that casualties would have been high. Once in Media, Antigonus had recruited additional troops and had acquired large numbers of additional horses and baggage animals to replenish his losses (Diod. 19. 20. 1–4, cf. 27. 1). Moreover, the troops became disaffected because of their "continuous misfortunes" (Diod. 19. 20. 1).

⁷⁴ Alexander took thirty days to march the approximately three hundred ninety miles from Susa to Persepolis (Engels, *Logistics*, 73 n. 14), but he was passing through hostile territory (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 17–18. 10; Curt. 5. 2. 16, 3. 1–4. 33). That Eumenes, even though burdened with elephants, took only 24 days is indicative of the distance of his camp from Susa and the helpfulness of Peucestas's hospitality (Diod. 19. 21. 3).

due to Peucestas's attentions, lacked for nothing (Diod. 19. 21. 1-3). After their arrival, Peucestas offered a magnificent sacrifice to the old gods and to Alexander and Philip.⁷⁵ Here the army was feasted in four concentric circles. These four respectively included: generals, hipparchs, and prominent Persians; lower-ranking officers, "friends and generals who were unassigned, and the cavalry"; the argyraspids and other infantry who had fought with Alexander; and finally, mercenaries and allies (Diod. 19. 22. 2). This act of largesse, as intended, greatly increased Peucestas's popularity. (Diod. 19. 23. 1; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14. 4).

To offset Peucestas's new found support, Eumenes fabricated a letter supposedly written by Orontes, the satrap of Armenia, which reported that Olympias with Alexander IV had gained control of Macedonia, Cassander had been slain, and Polyperchon had crossed to Asia with a large army (Diod. 19. 23. 2-3; Polyæn. 4. 8. 3). In part, the letter was believed because it was written in Syrian and Orontes was one of Peucestas's *philoi* (Diod. 19. 23. 3), but also because the fabrication was based on facts known to the army. In the summer of 317, Eurydice had announced that her husband, King Philip III, had dismissed Polyperchon and that she had taken over the regency.⁷⁶ She had also sent emissaries into the Peloponnesus to Cassander requesting that he come to Macedonia as quickly as possible (Diod. 19. 11. 1; Just. 14. 5. 3). Polyperchon, acting in concert with Aeacides, the king of Epirus, invaded Macedonia with Olympias and Alexander IV (Diod. 19. 11. 1; Just. 14. 5. 9). Indeed, Alexander was betrothed to Aeacides' daughter Deidameia (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4. 3). Eurydice and Philip's army in the presence of Alexander the Great's mother and son went over to Polyperchon (Diod. 19. 11. 2-3). Philip was captured immediately; Eurydice shortly thereafter (Diod. 19. 11. 3). Polyperchon had earlier invited Olympias to return to Macedonia as guardian for the young Alexander and to share the regency.⁷⁷ In Macedonia, Olympias now took charge of

⁷⁵ Diod. 19. 22. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 14. 5-6; cf. Polyæn. 4. 8. 3.

⁷⁶ Just. 14. 5. 1-3; Diod. 19. 11. 1. Eurydice's seizure of the regency occurred sometime after Cleitus' defeat in the Hellespont (cf. Diod. 18. 75. 1, 19. 11. 1). While Polyperchon's location at the time she and her husband took power is not precisely known, he was not in Macedonia (Just. 14. 5. 1), but was probably in Epirus. Polyperchon was negotiating with Olympias (Just. 14. 5. 1-2; cf. Diod. 18. 57. 2).

⁷⁷ Diod. 18. 49. 4, 57. 2, 65. 1; in general on the offices held by Olympias and

the kingdom. She appointed generals (Diod. 19. 35. 4), commanded troops (Diod. 19. 35. 4–5, 50. 1), dispatched orders to garrison commanders (Diod. 18. 65. 1), and administered justice (Diod. 19. 11. 8–9). As one of her first acts, she immediately took control of the captured Eurydice and Philip III, and after maltreating them for “many days,” saw to their deaths.⁷⁸ It is very likely that these murders were not immediately revealed.⁷⁹ The *Chronicle of the Diadochi* (BM 34660, obv. ll. 18–19) still lists Philip III as king in the spring of 316, as does a contract from Uruk dated that same summer.⁸⁰ However, these dates may not reflect a lack of knowledge of Philip’s death, but rather the uncertain nature of the political situation after this act.⁸¹ In the following year Cassander had himself invaded Macedonia and by the summer had subverted most of Polyperchon’s army and was besieging Olympias in Pydna (Diod. 19. 35, 36. 5; Just. 14. 6).⁸²

her authority in Macedonia, see E. M. Anson, “Craterus and the Prostaia,” *CP* 87 (1992): 39–43.

⁷⁸ Diod. 19. 11. 5–7; Just. 14. 5. 9–10. Diodorus (19. 11. 5; cf. Just. 14. 5. 10) states that Philip III ruled six years, four months, which would put his death in October or early November 317. See J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, second ed. (Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1927) 4:2, 239; Errington, “Chronology,” 482; Gullath and Schober, “Chronologie,” 377–8.

⁷⁹ Philip’s murder was committed by “certain Thracians” (Diod. 19. 11. 5), perhaps, indicating a desire to keep knowledge of the death from the Macedonians. Also, she would not want to alert “the one hundred prominent Macedonians” (Diod. 19. 11. 8) she planned to slaughter. Bosworth (“Chronology,” 62–3) is correct that Errington’s assumption (“Chronology,” 483) that Eumenes’ forces knew of Philip’s death prior to Eumenes’ own demise is unlikely.

⁸⁰ Errington, “Chronology,” 482–3; T. Boiy, “Dating methods during the early Hellenistic period,” *JCS* 52 (2000): 118 and n. 15.

⁸¹ G. F. Del Monte, *Testi Cronografici*, Vol. 1 of *Testi dalla Babilonia Ellenistica*. (Pisa and Rome: Istituti Editoriali Poligrafici Internazionali, 1997) 186.

⁸² There is disagreement amongst scholars with regard to the date of Cassander’s invasion of Macedonia and the subsequent death of Olympias. Beloch (*Griechische Geschichte*, 4.2:239–41), L. C. Smith (“The Chronology of Books XVIII–XX of Diodorus Siculus,” *AJPh* 82 [1961]: 284–5), Bosworth (“Chronology,” 72–3, 81) place both Cassander’s invasion and Olympias’ death in the winter of 317/316. Manni (“Tre note di cronologia ellenistica,” *Rendiconti (Accademia nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche)* 4. ser. 8 [1949]: 57), Fontana (*Le lotte per la successione di Alessandro Magno dal 323 al 315* [Palermo: Presso l’Accademia, 1960] 116), Errington (“Chronology,” 495), Billows (*Antigonos*, 104–5), Gullath and Schober, “Chronologie,” 377–378), however, correctly place these events in the winter of 316/315. The Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B 14) dates Cassander’s invasion and Olympias’ death in 316/315. While Diodorus (19. 36. 6) and Justin (14. 6. 1) suggest that Olympias’ control of Macedonia had been very brief, there were events that intervened between its inception and the invasion by Cassander that would

Clearly Eumenes' forces knew of Olympias' return, but not of Cassander's subsequent triumph. The reference to Cassander in the letter refers to Cassander's abortive invasion of Macedonia in the summer of 317.⁸³ Eumenes ordered that the forged letter be sent around to all the commanders and that it be shown to as many of the soldiers as possible. Since Orontes and Peucestas had enjoyed a friendship while Alexander still lived,⁸⁴ the letter was instantly believed and changed the sentiment of the entire camp. Eumenes was once again in control of this polyglot army (Diod. 19. 23. 3). With his troops' renewed confidence, Eumenes moved against one of his supposed allies, Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia. Sibyrtius, in part, was a pawn in the struggle between Eumenes and Peucestas; he was one of Peucestas's confidants. Also, Eumenes wished by this action to intimidate the other commanders (cf. Diod. 19. 24. 1). The Cardian charged Sibyrtius with conspiring with Antigonos and sent a cavalry

have occupied considerable time. Diodorus (19. 35. 1; cf. 11. 8) makes it clear that Cassander only acted after the murder of his brother Nicanor and the desecration of his brother Iollas' tomb. It is unknown how long after the royal murders these events took place. Cassander then had to break off his siege of Tegea (Diod. 19. 35. 1) and march his army to Macedonia. While the siege of Pydna was in its infancy, Aeacides had organized a relief force, but was thwarted by the actions of Cassander's general, Atarrhias (Diod. 19. 36. 2-3). After the failure to invade Macedonia, the Epirotes overthrew Aeacides and made an alliance with Cassander (Diod. 19. 36. 4-5). Pydna surrendered after famine had already killed many of the inhabitants and threatened to overwhelm the survivors (Diod. 19. 49. 2-4). Diodorus 19. 50. 1 dates the end of the siege at the "approach of spring." There is general agreement that Philip III died either in October, or in early November 317 (see note 78). Diodorus (19. 11. 5), likely copying his source Hieronymus of Cardia, states that Philip ruled six years, four months. All of these indications point to a longer period of time than the less than five months envisioned by those who would place the deaths of the royal couple and the fall of Pydna in the archon year 317/316. Cassander invaded Macedonia in the spring/summer of 316, and Olympias' death occurred in the spring of 315 (Errington, "Chronology," 495; Gullath and Schober, "Chronologie," 377-8).

⁸³ Diodorus 19. 35. 7 (cf. 18. 75. 1) states that Cassander had acquired part of Polyperchon's war elephants "in his previous expedition into Macedonia." Errington ("Chronology," 494 n. 54), dates this first invasion to the fall of 317. This is too late in the year. By the fall Eurydice had already assumed the regency or would do so shortly. It is likely that Cassander's first invasion was soon after the installation of Demetrius in Athens in August 317 (see note 30). Polyperchon was back in Macedonia, after his breaking off of the siege of Megalopolis (cf. Diod. 18. 72. 1-2). Now, if Cassander's first expedition occurred in the summer of 317 following Polyperchon's failures in the Peloponnese and in the Hellespont, this would explain the presence of both Polyperchon and his elephants. Cassander's invasion, although obviously repulsed, emboldened Eurydice to seize the regency at the first opportunity.

⁸⁴ See Bosworth, *Commentary*, 1:315-6.

contingent into Arachosia that seized the satrap's baggage, forcing Sibyrtius to flee (Diod. 19. 23. 4).⁸⁵ To his troops and their officers Eumenes now presented himself with the trappings of the royal general of Asia (Diod. 19. 24. 1). But behind the scenes he secured the loyalty of his fellow commanders through promises and praise. Also, according to Diodorus (19. 21. 2-3), he borrowed four hundred talents from them in the name of the kings, thus binding them to him as anxious creditors.⁸⁶

While Eumenes was attending to these matters, Antigonus in the late summer or early fall left his camp in Ecbatana and set out for Persis. Antigonus and his forces had spent considerable time there recuperating. When Eumenes learned of Antigonus' advance, he immediately broke camp; with his recent actions having secured the loyalty and enthusiasm of his troops and officers, Eumenes now believed that the time was right for an immediate confrontation with Antigonus. Eumenes' relationship with his forces, however, was still precarious. Consequently, on the march, he entertained them sumptuously. But during the heavy drinking which accompanied these activities Eumenes became ill.⁸⁷ For this reason, Eumenes' now halted his march for some days (Diod. 19. 24. 5). The confidence of his troops was badly shaken; the enemy was expected shortly and their general was handicapped with illness. As soon as the infirmity lessened, to offset the sad deterioration in his army's morale, Eumenes set out once more against Antigonus. His recovery, however, was not complete and he was forced to turn over the active command of the army to Peucestas and Antigenes, while he followed, borne in a litter (Diod. 19. 24. 5-6; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14. 7-9). As soon as Antigonus learned of Eumenes' condition, he hastened to take his army into battle (Plut. *Eum.* 15. 1-2).

⁸⁵ There may have been considerable truth to the charges against Sibyrtius, since he is later confirmed in his satrapy by Antigonus (Diod. 19. 48. 3).

⁸⁶ Plutarch (*Eum.* 13. 12, cf. 16. 3) inaccurately places this incident shortly after Eumenes' arrival in Susiane and before his march to Persis. Plutarch has presented the incidents of Eumenes' life from Susa to the Battle of Gabene thematically with little regard for chronology. In Persis, the need for money was real. It was some time since Eumenes had access to the treasury in Susa.

⁸⁷ Diod. 19. 24. 4-5; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 14. 6; Plutarch (*Eum.* 14. 5-6) places Eumenes' illness "a few days" after Peucestas's banquet, but Diodorus (19. 24. 5) has it beginning after Eumenes heard of Antigonus's breaking of camp in Media and on the second day of his own army's march to Persis, all of which took place considerably after Peucestas's banquet (Diod. 19. 23-4).

The two armies drew within a day's march of one another, in the Median district of Paraetacene (Diod. 19. 34. 7), which was located to the north of Pasargadae between the Zagros and the central desert.⁸⁸ Neither side wished to initiate the action, for both had taken up defensive positions separated by a river and a ravine (Diod. 19. 25. 2). Under these circumstances, even though the armies were encamped a mere six hundred yards from one another, and carried out skirmishing and plundering raids, no large scale offensives were launched by either side. In the midst of this stalemate, on the fifth day after they had first sighted one another, Antigonus sent envoys into Eumenes' camp urging the satraps and the argyraspids to desert Eumenes. He promised the satraps that they would retain their provinces, and to all he offered great rewards. The argyraspids paid no attention to these offers, and, in fact, threatened the emissaries. The now fully recovered Eumenes praised his men for their steadfastness (Diod. 19. 25. 2-7).

That same night deserters reported that Antigonus had given orders to break camp at the second watch (around 9-10 P.M.). While the deserters did not know Antigonus's destination, Eumenes guessed that it had to be the neighboring region of Gabene. Since it was late in the year, he knew that Antigonus would be seeking an unplundered area, rich in provisions, and easily defended for his winter quarters. Gabene was the only such area in the vicinity, and it was but three days distant (Diod. 19. 26. 1-2).⁸⁹ In consequence, Eumenes was

⁸⁸ For the location of Paraetacene, see Bosworth, *Commentary*, 1:334; cf. Cook, *Empire*, 7. The site of the battle was obviously north and west of Persepolis. Antigonus was moving from Ecbatana (cf. Diod. 19. 19. 2) towards Persepolis. Eumenes started his march to intercept Antigonus well after the former had left Ecbatana (Cf. Diod. 19. 24. 4) and was forced to halt his march for some days because of his illness (Diod. 19. 24. 5). Both Antigonus and Eumenes probably followed the ancient road between Ecbatana and Persepolis (M. Cary, *The Geographic Background of Greek and Roman History* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949] 192).

⁸⁹ As suggested by Cook (*Empire*, 35, 186, 235 n. 28), Gabene may well be identified with the region of Isfahan, an area situated on the southern border of the Dasht-i Kavir and noted since antiquity for its comparative fertility (G. Le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate: Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia from the Moslem conquest to the time of Timur* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930] 202-203; cf. Sykes, *Persia*, 1:21, 40). Moreover, a number of rivers flow through the region which corresponds to Diodorus' (19. 43. 3) reference to a river in the region.

anxious to occupy this region before Antigonus. He, therefore, paid certain mercenaries to pretend to desert to the enemy. They were to report that Eumenes was planning a night attack on Antigonus's camp. Since Antigonus believed them, he postponed his departure and drew up his forces for battle. Eumenes immediately sent his baggage and elephants on ahead with the rest of the army to follow after a hastily prepared meal (Diod. 19. 26. 3-4).⁹⁰ When Antigonus discovered from his scouts what had taken place, he hastily broke camp and led his forces after Eumenes in a forced march. Eumenes, however, had a two-watch (nine hour) head start, which Antigonus soon realized was too great to overcome. He, therefore, devised his own strategem (Diod. 19. 26. 5-6). While Antigonus instructed Pithon to continue with the infantry at a regular rate of march, he with his cavalry pursued Eumenes at top speed. At daybreak he overtook Eumenes' rearguard as they were descending from some hill country. Antigonus occupied the now evacuated ridges and made his forces clearly visible to the enemy. When Eumenes saw Antigonus' cavalry on the crest, he believed that the latter's entire army was near. Accordingly, he drew up his army in battle array. While Eumenes and his troops awaited the expected assault, the rest of Antigonus's army was given the chance to join the cavalry (Diod. 19. 26. 7-9).

After his infantry arrived, Antigonus drew up his forces for battle and marched down into the plain against Eumenes.⁹¹ Antigonus' army contained twenty-eight thousand heavy infantry, ten thousand six hundred cavalry, sixty-five elephants (Diod. 19. 27. 1, 29. 2-6), and probably fifteen thousand light infantry.⁹² Eumenes' forces numbered

⁹⁰ While Diodorus does not specifically mention the elephants, it stands to reason that Eumenes would have sent them ahead with the army's belongings. Both the elephants and the baggage moved more slowly than the rest of the army; consequently, Eumenes would want them to have a head start.

⁹¹ Nepos (*Eum.* 8. 1) incorrectly states that at Paraetacene the antagonists fought "non acie instructa, sed in itinere." Diodorus's involved description of the respective generals' dispositions of their armies shows conclusively the two armies did fight in battle order.

⁹² While Diodorus only enumerates the heavy infantry (twenty-eight thousand; Diod. 19. 27. 1) in his description of Antigonus's battle order, it is known that he initially entered Mesopotamia with twenty thousand light infantry (Diod. 18. 73. 1), but by 316, even with additional recruitment, losses on the march (Diod. 19. 18. 3), in the battle on the Coprates (Diod. 19. 18. 7), and on the journey to Badace (Diod. 19. 19. 1, 5), probably by the time of the battle of Paraetacene his light-armed troops numbered less than fifteen thousand (see note 73). With respect to

thirty-five thousand infantry, sixty-three hundred cavalry and one hundred twenty-five elephants (Diod. 19. 28. 4).⁹³ Eumenes' army was arranged with his best troops stationed on the right side of his line. Here were the argyraspids and Eumenes' own hypaspists,⁹⁴ all under the command of Antigenes and Teutamus. The cavalry on the right wing were also elite units, led by Eumenes himself (Diod.

cavalry the total given in Diodorus 19. 27. 1, does not agree with the total of the individual detachments set forth in Diodorus 19. 29. 2-6. Diodorus 19. 27. 1 gives the total as eighty-five hundred, but the individual units listed in Diodorus (19. 29. 1-5) total over ten thousand. The difference in the figures may represent some last minute addition to Antigonus's forces, but it is more likely that Diodorus has in chapter twenty-seven used a total given by his source in an earlier context, which failed to reflect the additional troops acquired by Pithon in Media (Diod. 19. 20. 2).

⁹³ Diodorus's summary figures for Eumenes' forces do not agree with the totals for the enumerated units (Diod. 19. 27. 2-28. 4). Diodorus only mentions seventeen thousand infantry specifically in his listing, but these are clearly heavy infantry; these enumerated units are all part of the phalanx (Diod. 19. 27. 6-28. 1). However, there are references to light-armed troops taking part in the battle (Diod. 19. 27. 5, 28. 2, 30. 4). Peucestas alone prior to the march to Persepolis supplied a total of twenty thousand; he met Eumenes in Susiane with ten thousand (Diod. 19. 14. 5) and summoned ten thousand more prior to the battle on the Coprates (Diod. 19. 17. 6). Therefore, the infantry figures presented by Diodorus can be reconciled by assuming that Eumenes still retained at least eighteen thousand light-armed troops (so A. M. Devine, "Diodorus's Account of the Battle of Paraitacene (317 B.C.)," *AncW* 12 [1985]: 78). The cavalry figures also do not agree; Diodorus's (19. 28. 4) summary of Eumenes' forces gives Eumenes sixty-one hundred horsemen, but the individual units (Diod. 19. 27. 2-28. 4) total sixty-three hundred. The difficulty probably derives from Diodorus's inability to deal with the great detail provided by his source (see chapter 1). The figures he presents as representing the respective forces before the battle may actually be reflective of totals given by Diodorus's source after the battle. The total number of Eumenes' elephants described in Diodorus's (19. 27. 5, 28. 2, 4) description of the battle of Paraitacene is 125 (since Eudamus only supplied 120 [Diod. 19. 14. 8], Eumenes must have acquired 5 additional elephants, perhaps from Peucestas), but Diodorus's (19. 28. 4) summary figure is 114; the same figure is found describing Eumenes' forces before the battle at Gabene (Diod. 19. 40. 4). It is known that the elephants suffered casualties at Paraitacene (Diod. 19. 30. 2), and, perhaps, in an engagement which occurred only a few days prior to Gabene (cf. Diod. 19. 39. 5).

⁹⁴ The term "hypaspists" is used most often in the period after Alexander to refer to the personal guards of various of his successors; with "argyraspids" used exclusively for Alexander's former hypaspists (see E. M. Anson, "Hypaspists and Argyraspids after 323," *AHB* 2 [1988]: 131-3). In 316 in addition to the argyraspids and his personal hypaspists, Eumenes is listed as having companion cavalry (Diod. 19. 28. 3), a cavalry *agema* (Diod. 19. 27. 2, 28. 3), and pages (Diod. 19. 28. 3). At some point after Alexander's death, Leonnatus had a personal cavalry *agema* (Suid. s.v. *Leonnatos*), as did Antigenes and Peucestas in 316 (Diod. 19. 28. 3). Alcetas, after his defeat in the Pisidian *Aulon*, fled to Termessus with his "hypaspists and pages" (Diod. 18. 45. 3), and Antigonus in 318, after Nicanor's defeat by Cleitus in the Hellespont, "renewed the action placing on board the ships the bravest and most resolute of his hypaspists" (Polyaen. 4. 6. 8).

19. 28. 1, 3-4, 29. 1). The entire phalanx was positioned behind a screen of elephants and light-armed troops (Diod. 19. 28. 2), with the right cavalry wing screened by an additional corps of elephants (Diod. 19. 28. 4). When Antigonus saw this arrangement, he stationed his light cavalry on his left under the command of Pithon (Diod. 18. 29. 1-3). These were drawn up in open order and were to avoid any frontal action, but rather attack Eumenes' right flank (Diod. 19. 29. 1-2). Antigonus placed his best cavalry and the eight thousand Macedonian heavy infantry on his own right (Diod. 19. 29. 3-5). Antigonus and his son Demetrius commanded the cavalry on this wing (Diod. 19. 29. 4). Like Eumenes, Antigonus placed his phalanx behind a screen of elephants and kept another corps of the animals with him and his cavalry on his right (Diod. 19. 29. 6). With his army thus disposed, Antigonus advanced downhill on the enemy in an oblique movement, with his right leading.⁹⁵ He counted on this flank crushing Eumenes' left before his own left was destroyed (Diod. 19. 29. 7).

Antigonus's plan was unsuccessful. While Pithon's troops initially caused great confusion on Eumenes' right and inhibited this wing's advance (Diod. 19. 30. 2),⁹⁶ Eumenes reinforced his endangered right with additional lightly equipped cavalry with the result that Pithon and his forces were driven back to the foothills (Diod. 19. 30. 3-4). Elsewhere Eumenes' phalanx, even though inferior in numbers, proved superior in ability. Antigonus's heavy infantry were forced back to the hills as well (Diod. 19. 30. 5, 10). Antigonus now faced defeat, if not annihilation. But, by ignoring those who urged him also to

⁹⁵ Diodorus preserves the only account of this battle; of the other sources only Nepos (*Eum.* 8. 1) even mentions it. Plutarch (*Eum.* 14. 5-15. 3) and Polyaeus (4. 8. 1) make allusions to events which precede the battle, but do not actually describe the battle itself. Polyaeus (4. 6. 10) also describes the negotiations concerning the dead after the battle. On the tactics and course of the battle, see J. Kromayer and E. Kahn, "Drei Diadochenschlachten," in *Antike Schlachtfelder; Bausteine zu einer antiken Kriegsgeschichte*, edited by J. Kromayer and G. Veith (Berlin, Weidmann, 1931) 4:393-424 (followed in the main by Devine, "Paraitacene," 75-86).

⁹⁶ Devine's ("Paraitacene," 81-2; followed by Billows, *Antigonus*, 95) assumption that Pithon did not adhere to Antigonus's tactical plan is incorrect. Diodorus makes no reference to Pithon's "insubordination," and at Gabene, Pithon is again found commanding the left wing (Diod. 19. 40. 1). Moreover, Pithon's maneuver not only halted Eumenes' opposing forces, but even necessitated the transfer of troops from Eumenes' left (Diod. 19. 30. 1-4). Diodorus (19. 29. 1) states that Pithon was to avoid a frontal attack but maintain a battle of wheeling tactics. Pithon did as he was ordered; Eumenes' transfer of troops to his right wing negated these tactics and forced the now significantly weaker force to flee (Diod. 19. 30. 2).

retreat to the hills, Antigonus saved himself and his army from this potential disaster. As Eumenes' phalanx pursued their beaten opponents, a gap opened in the line between the phalanx and the cavalry on Eumenes' left. Antigonus charged through this break easily routing the forces there under Eudamus' command. With his left threatened, Eumenes had to recall his victorious right wing. Antigonus now assembled his defeated forces and formed them up in a line along the foothills (Diod. 19. 30. 9–10). Although it was already growing quite dark, both generals rallied their forces and prepared to renew the struggle. By midnight the two armies were formed into line about three and half miles from the site of the previous battle. However, both armies were too exhausted to continue (Diod. 19. 31. 1–2). Eumenes wished to march back to the site of the previous battle to gain control of the dead and thus claim victory, but his troops were anxious to return to their baggage train and Eumenes acquiesced (Diod. 19. 31. 3). Eumenes was afraid to force the issue for fear that given the rivalry for leadership in his camp, he might jeopardize his hold on the supreme command (Diod. 19. 31. 4). Antigonus, however, had no such fears. None of his subordinates, including Seleucus and Pithon, had the power to challenge his authority; he was not dependent on these commanders for the bulk of his troops. With few exceptions, Antigonus was the commander and paymaster of his soldiers. In the battle Antigonus's forces suffered the loss of thirty-seven hundred infantry and fifty-four cavalry, with four thousand wounded. Eumenes' troops lost only five hundred forty infantry and very few cavalry; his wounded amounted to nine hundred.⁹⁷ The

⁹⁷ Diod. 19. 30. 9–31. 5; cf. 19. 37. 1. Devine ("Paraitacene," 86) believes that the figures given for Antigonus's casualties are the result of "Eumenid partisanship." He argues on the basis of eighteenth and nineteenth century statistics that there are too many dead in proportion to the number of wounded. However, it should be pointed out that the figures given for Antigonus's losses are in accord with the later description of that commander's forces at Gabene. At Gabene, Antigonus possessed twenty-two thousand heavy infantry, nine thousand cavalry and sixty-five elephants (Diod. 19. 40. 1). Both the infantry and cavalry figures are significantly down from what they had been at Paraitacene; the infantry by six thousand, the cavalry by one thousand despite the acquisition of additional cavalry after Paraitacene (Diod. 19. 40. 1). Moreover, Polyaeus (4. 6. 10), while giving no figures, states that Antigonus's losses were greater than those of his enemy. The figures given in Diodorus for both Eumenes' and Antigonus's casualties do not include those for light-armed infantry. In the case of Antigonus, these were probably exceptionally heavy. It should, also, be noted that at the battle of Gabene, Eumenes is listed as having only six thousand cavalry (Diod. 19. 40. 4). Why Eumenes' cavalry should

battle had been fought in late October or early November of 316.⁹⁸

While Eumenes was unable to convince his troops to return to the battlefield, Antigonus marched his forces to the battle site and made his camp by the bodies. With the field of combat now in his possession, he proclaimed himself the victor. His men, however, did not behave like victors.⁹⁹ They were greatly discouraged by the course of the previous battle, and in light of this despondency, Antigonus decided to move as far as possible from the enemy as soon as possible. Before dawn, he sent his wounded and the heaviest part of his baggage ahead; at dawn he began to burn his dead (Diod. 19. 32. 1; cf. Polyae. 4. 6. 10). While the funeral rites continued for his fallen, Antigonus detained the herald who had come from Eumenes to treat for the recovery of their dead. In part, Antigonus delayed the herald in order to give his wounded and baggage sufficient time to get away, but also to hide the full extent of his losses from the enemy (Polyae. 4. 6. 10). At nightfall, after the ashes of his fallen had been interred, Antigonus sent the herald back to Eumenes, assigning the removal of the bodies to the following morning (Diod. 19. 32. 2; Polyae. 4. 6. 10). Antigonus, however, at the beginning of the first watch (about 5 P.M.) broke camp and by forced marches withdrew his army to Gamarga in Media (Diod. 19. 32. 2).¹⁰⁰ When Eumenes learned of Antigonus's departure, he refrained from following

have declined is unknown. Only a few of Eumenes' horsemen were killed in the actual battle (Diod. 19. 31. 5), but, perhaps, they suffered a high proportion of wounded (nine hundred unspecified individuals in Eumenes' army were wounded [Diod. 19. 31. 5]). Part of Peucestas's cavalry contingent may have returned to Persis for the winter, planning to rejoin the army early the next year. Antigonus's attack came after both armies had entered winter quarters (Diod. 19. 37. 1–38. 1), but Eumenes had anticipated the possibility of a winter campaign and had stationed troops along the roads leading to Gabene (Polyae. 4. 6. 11).

⁹⁸ The distance from Ecbatana to Paraetacene (for the location, see Bosworth, *Commentary*, 1: 334) is approximately 360 miles, or about a 40 day march for an army encumbered with elephants. The battle of Paraetacene could not then have been fought earlier than late October, and probably was fought in late November. It had taken place before the winter solstice (December 21) (Diod. 19. 37. 3); both armies entered winter quarters shortly after the battle.

⁹⁹ As Vezin (*Eumenes*, 110) points out, this battle was a defeat for Antigonus. He was forced to retire into Media, while Eumenes occupied the original objective of Gabene (Diod. 19. 34. 7). It was Antigonus's action at the end of the battle and his superior discipline that saved his forces from what could have been a decisive defeat.

¹⁰⁰ Polyaeus (4. 6. 11) calls the location Gadamarta, while Diodorus himself later calls it Gadamala (19. 37. 1). There is no good evidence on either the correct spelling or its exact location.

him; his own soldiers lacked supplies and were exhausted. He instead attended to the dead, arranging a magnificent funeral (Diod. 19. 32. 3). Afterwards, he moved the army from Paraetacene into Gabene (Diod. 19. 34. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 4). Gabene was twenty-five days march from Gamarga, if a route through inhabited country was taken, but through the desert wastes of the Dasht-i Kavir a journey of only nine or ten days.¹⁰¹ The desert way, while shorter, was not traveled because it was without water or grass.¹⁰²

While in winter quarters Antigonus assessed the situation. He realized that as a result of the engagement in Paraetacene his forces were now weaker than those of Eumenes. Therefore, he decided to launch a surprise attack. This move was precipitated by reports that Eumenes was not encamped in a single location, but that his army was scattered as much as six days' apart.¹⁰³ The principal explanation for the separate camps was a resurgence of insubordination in the army (Plut. *Eum.* 15. 4; Nepos, *Eum.* 8. 2-3), but insufficient supplies may also have played a part (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 8. 3).¹⁰⁴ To effect the surprise Antigonus determined to lead a forced march through the desert (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 8. 6). A march along the roads which traversed inhabited country would be easily observed and reported to Eumenes, who had anticipated the possibility of a winter campaign and had stationed troops along the routes leading to Gabene (Polyaen. 4. 6. 11). Eumenes had not, however, considered it necessary to guard the desert approaches. In addition to its dearth of water or grass, in the winter the temperatures were often well below freezing (cf. Diod. 19. 37. 5-6).¹⁰⁵

For this march Antigonus had prepared ten thousand casks of water, collected barley and fodder for the horses, and had the soldiers prepare a ten-day supply of food that would not require cooking.¹⁰⁶ To eliminate the possibility of any advance warning reaching the

¹⁰¹ Diod. 19. 34. 8; Nepos *Eum.* 8. 4; cf. Diod. 19. 37. 3.

¹⁰² Polyaen. 4. 6. 11; Diod. 19. 34. 8; Nepos *Eum.* 8. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 5.

¹⁰³ Diod. 19. 37. 1; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 4-5; Polyaen. 4. 6. 13; Plutarch (*Eum.* 15. 4) gives the distance between the most distant units as approximately 113 miles.

¹⁰⁴ On the supply problems in this part of Iran, see Engels, *Logistics*, 72-3.

¹⁰⁵ The Parthian kings did not dare encamp in the open in winter because of the severity of the cold (Plut. *Ant.* 40. 2); on the desert fringe the mean minimum temperature in December is 29°F (Naval Intelligence Division, *Persia*, 592). It should, however, be noted that Sir Percy Sykes found "the cold seldom trying" even though "the thermometer occasionally sinks below zero" (Sykes, *Persia*, 1: 9-10).

¹⁰⁶ Polyaen. 4. 6. 11; Diod. 19. 37. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 8. 6-7.

enemy, Antigonus gave out word that they were marching to Armenia. When the army was ready, he made known their actual destination, and set out into the desert about the time of the winter solstice (Diod. 19. 37. 3). Antigonus ordered that while fires might be used during the day, they would have to be extinguished at night so that they would not be seen from the hills. But after five days, the bitter cold of the desert night became too severe and the soldiers built fires at night as well. These, as Antigonus had feared, were observed by the mountain villagers and reported to both Eumenes and Peucestas.¹⁰⁷

When Peucestas heard the news, he was afraid that Antigonus would arrive before the whole army could be assembled. Consequently, he decided to withdraw his forces to safety in the most distant part of Gabene. Indeed, in a meeting of the satraps and generals there was general panic (Nepos *Eum.* 9. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 8). Eumenes, however, convinced Peucestas and the others to remain by laying out a plan that would cause Antigonus to delay action three or four days; he pointed out that such a wait would give their forces sufficient time to assemble. He further noted that their troops would be rested while Antigonus's forces would be worn out by the desert crossing (Diod. 19. 38. 1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 9). The satraps and generals were persuaded and messengers were sent to order the troops to assemble (Plut. *Eum.* 15. 10; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 9. 2).¹⁰⁸ Eumenes now directed the commanders of those units directly under his personal command to collect their troops and bring with them fire vessels. These troops then dispersed along the mountains which fringed the desert, setting fires each evening in exposed areas to create the illusion of a camp to those approaching across the desert.¹⁰⁹ The fires were seen by Median shepherds and reported to Pithon, who informed Antigonus. When Antigonus learned of these sightings, he held up his march, since he believed his plan had been betrayed to Eumenes and an army awaited him on the desert's fringe. He now turned aside and went into the inhabited areas bordering the desert to refresh his

¹⁰⁷ Diod. 19. 37. 4–6; Polyæn. 4. 6. 11, 8. 4; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 7; Nepos *Eum.* 9. 1, 3.

¹⁰⁸ Diodorus (19. 39. 1) implies that Eumenes' did not begin to assemble his forces until after his stratagem had proven successful, but subsequently (19. 39. 2) makes it clear that the troops must have been summoned earlier.

¹⁰⁹ Diod. 19. 38. 3–4; Polyæn. 4. 8. 4; Nepos *Eum.* 9. 3–5; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 11.

troops for a day before confronting what he believed to be Eumenes' fully assembled and fresh forces.¹¹⁰ Antigonos soon learned the truth (Plut. *Eum.* 15. 13), but Eumenes' strategem had succeeded in delaying the confrontation with Antigonos's forces until his own troops were assembled.

While Eumenes' plan in the main had permitted the army to assemble, Eudamus and the war elephants had been slow in leaving their camp (Diod. 19. 39. 2). When Antigonos learned that Eudamus had not yet joined Eumenes and, indeed, was not much distant from his own camp, he sent all his light infantry and twenty-two hundred cavalry to intercept that commander and his elephants. Even though Eumenes quickly learned of Antigonos's action and had dispatched a contingent of fifteen hundred cavalry and three thousand light infantry, Antigonos's forces arrived first. Eudamus arranged his elephants in a square with his baggage in the center and his four hundred-man cavalry force in the rear. The enemy attack overwhelmed the cavalry, but the elephant corps, though receiving numerous wounds, resisted successfully. Before they could be worn down by these attacks, Eumenes' force arrived, and joining with the elephants drove Antigonos's troops off (Diod. 19. 39. 2–6).

A few days after this encounter, both armies drew up for battle within four and a half miles of one another (Diod. 19. 39. 6). Antigonos, here as in the earlier battle in Paraetacene placed his cavalry on the wings and extended his elephants across the whole front. His army was smaller than at Paraetacene, with only twenty-two thousand heavy infantry, nine thousand cavalry, sixty-five elephants, and an unknown number of light infantry (Diod. 19. 40. 1). As before, Antigonos strengthened his right. When Eumenes learned that Antigonos had taken his place on the right with his best cavalry, he drew up his army placing his best troops and himself on his left wing, facing Antigonos. In all Eumenes' army consisted of thirty-six thousand seven hundred infantry, of whom probably seventeen thousand were heavy infantry, six thousand cavalry, and one hundred fourteen elephants (Diod. 19. 40. 2–4).¹¹¹ The respective strategies

¹¹⁰ Diod. 19. 38. 5–6; Plut. *Eum.* 15. 11–12; Nepos *Eum.* 9. 5–6; Polyæn. 4. 8. 4.

¹¹¹ Despite Eumenes' losses at Paraetacene, his infantry increased in numbers prior to the battle of Gabene. The explanation probably lies in reinforcements arriving during the winter from Persis. While the number of infantry has increased, the number of cavalry has declined by the time of the later battle. As noted earlier, Eumenes' horsemen may have suffered most in the previous battle (see note 97).

for the battle were designed to take advantage of the strengths in each force. Antigonus planned to use his superior heavy cavalry stationed on the his right to win the victory while the center and left held their ground (cf. Diod. 19. 40. 1); Eumenes drew up his forces to counter Antigonus's dispositions, while putting his emphasis on his phalanx and especially the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 40. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 16. 6).¹¹²

Prior to the battle most of Eumenes' fellow-commanders, led by Antigenes and Teutamus, decided that after defeating Antigonus they would eliminate Eumenes.¹¹³ These commanders were displeased with Eumenes' popularity with the troops (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 1–2; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 18. 1); they believed that after the battle a victorious Eumenes would, at the least, cease to treat them as equals. Certainly, with the probable addition of Antigonus's defeated forces, plus those troops already directly under his authority, Eumenes' power would be preponderant. The plot was formed before all of the units had reassembled (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 16. 3). When Eudamus arrived and discovered the conspiracy, he and an otherwise unknown Phaedimus reported their findings to Eumenes who contemplated flight, but in the end decided to await events (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 3).¹¹⁴ A victorious and wary

¹¹² See A. M. Devine, "Diodorus's Account of the Battle of Gabiene," *AncW.* 12 (1985): 87–96.

¹¹³ Plut. *Eum.* 16. 1–3, 6; cf. Diod. 19. 41. Even though this conspiracy is not mentioned by Diodorus, and Antigenes, listed as one of the main conspirators by Plutarch (*Eum.* 16. 1), was in the main loyal to Eumenes (Diod. 18. 62. 6; 19. 12. 2, 17. 4, 21. 1), the plot appears to be genuine. The desire for chief command by the commanders of the argyraspids is mentioned by Diodorus (18. 60–61. 3) himself when this unit first joined Eumenes in 318. Antigenes' loyalty to Eumenes was based more on fear of Antigonus than on any personal tie to Eumenes (Diod. 18. 62. 6–7). The original purpose of the plot was not to benefit Antigonus. The conspiracy was to take place after Antigonus's defeat (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 3); the plan was to eliminate both Antigonus and Eumenes, leaving the field clear for the conspirators. There clearly was a plot and the likelihood is that Antigenes was one of the participants. The absence of such a plot in Diodorus most probably results from that author's abbreviation of his source.

¹¹⁴ Both Eudamus and Phaedimus are reported by Plutarch (*Eum.* 16. 3) to have brought this information to Eumenes only because they were afraid of losing the money they had loaned him in the event of his death (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 13. 12; Diod. 19. 24. 2–3). It is very doubtful that these commanders would have jeopardized their own lives in this manner, when the success of the conspiracy would have acquired for the conspirators the wealth of Asia. It is more likely that either Eudamus and Phaedimus were personally loyal, or that they did not believe that they would fare well in the new order which would emerge should the conspiracy prove successful. Eudamus was later executed by Antigonus (Diod. 19. 44. 1). It is likely that Hieronymus over time came to believe that none of Eumenes' fellow commanders

Eumenes could turn the tables on the conspirators after the battle. In any case, Eumenes alerted his closest advisers to the danger, made up his will, and destroyed all his papers which might be used against his correspondents (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 4–6).

While Hieronymus's account of the battle of Gabene was probably as detailed as that of Paraetacene, Diodorus had clearly lost interest by this point, for his account of Gabene is unfortunately very abbreviated.¹¹⁵ Despite Diodorus's brevity, the general outline of the battle can be determined. As noted, both commanders placed their cavalries on the wings and used their elephants and light-infantry as a screen across their entire fronts (Diod. 19. 40). As at Paraetacene, Antigonus placed his best cavalry on his right under the command of his son Demetrius (Diod. 19. 40. 1–2), but this time he faced on Eumenes' left that commander's best cavalry, protected by a screen of sixty elephants and light-infantry (Diod. 19. 40. 2–3). Pithon, as at Paraetacene, commanded Antigonus's left. Philip, satrap of Bactria, commanded Eumenes' weaker cavalry on his right wing. It appears from the course of the battle that both Pithon and Philip had been ordered to refrain from any large scale engagement.¹¹⁶

The first to join battle were the elephants, followed by the cavalry stationed with Demetrius and Eumenes (Diod. 19. 42. 1, 7). Since the plain was large and barren because of the high salt content of the soil, these movements raised a cloud of dust which obscured the battlefield. When Antigonus observed these conditions, he sent his Median and Tarentine cavalry to capture Eumenes' camp, while Pithon engaged in some diversionary activity to keep Philip from observing this action. These troops rode around the enemy's flank unnoticed, and easily defeated those guarding Eumenes' camp.¹¹⁷ In the battle itself Antigonus's cavalry on the right defeated Eumenes' left. This victory was achieved primarily because Peucestas retired

was loyal (see chapter 1). When the satraps first joined Eumenes, Eudamus is identified by Diodorus (Diod. 19. 14. 8), who is certainly following Hieronymus, as the individual who had "treacherously" slain King Porus.

¹¹⁵ On the tactics and course of the battle, Devine, "Gabiene," 87–96.

¹¹⁶ Philip was ordered not to engage until the issue had been decided on his left (Diod. 19. 42. 7). Since later, when Eumenes, after the defeat of his left wing, joined Philip that commander had still not engaged, it appears reasonable to assume that Pithon had not directly attacked him.

¹¹⁷ Diod. 19. 42. 3; Polyae. 4. 6. 13; Plut. *Eum.* 16. 10–11; Just. 14. 3. 3.

in panic at the start of Demetrius' onslaught. Because the dust generated by the troop movements obscured the battlefield, fifteen hundred other troops not realizing the circumstances followed Peucestas in his flight (Diod. 19. 42. 4). After these withdrawals, Eumenes' left was overwhelmed. With his defeated forces he retreated behind his phalanx to his right wing (Diod. 19. 42. 4). While defeated on the left wing in the cavalry battle, Eumenes' infantry swept all before it. Once again it was the skill of the argyraspids that brought victory.¹¹⁸ In the course of the infantry battle five thousand of the enemy were slain, while only three hundred of Eumenes' men, and none of the argyraspids, fell.¹¹⁹ After Eumenes' withdrawal to his right wing, Antigonus sent half of his cavalry under Python's command against the argyraspids who were now without cavalry support. With this attack the Macedonians formed a square and withdrew safely from the battlefield (Diod. 19. 43. 4-5).

Eumenes after his defeat tried to collect all of his remaining cavalry and renew the battle, but Peucestas refused to join him and only retreated further. Since night was approaching, Eumenes was forced to withdraw (Diod. 19. 43. 2-3). That evening all of the satraps and commanders took counsel together. The satraps believed it was necessary to retreat into the upper satrapies as rapidly as

¹¹⁸ Diodorus (19. 41. 2; cf. 30. 5) and Plutarch (*Eum.* 16. 7) both state that the argyraspids were all at least 60 years of age, with the majority over 70. While N. G. L. Hammond ("A Cavalry Unit in the Army of Antigonus Monophthalmus. *Asthippoi*," *CQ* 28 [1978]: 133 n. 21) accepts the testimony of these sources, most scholars are very skeptical (for example, R. H. Simpson, "Abbreviation of Hieronymus in Diodorus," *AJP* 80 [1959]: 376; Hornblower, *Hieronymus*, 193). For the corps as a whole this is undoubtedly an exaggeration. After all, veterans of Alexander's expedition need not have been more than in their forties. Gabene was only eighteen years after Alexander crossed to Asia. However, many of the officers may, indeed, have been in their sixties. The hypaspist corps had been created by Philip in 358 (see E. M. Anson, "The Hypaspists: Macedonia's Professional Citizen-Soldiers," *Historia* 34 [1985]: 248); the corps, therefore, could have had men still enrolled in the unit at sixty or seventy years of age, but not as front line combat soldiers.

¹¹⁹ Diod. 19. 43. 1; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13; Just. 14. 3. 5. Devine ("Gabiene," 92) believes that the figure for Antigonus's losses is again too high and that for the argyraspids too low. He, however, presents little argumentation to support his position. It should be noted that after the battle Eumenes argued that they should renew the action as soon as possible because the phalanx of the enemy had been destroyed (Diod. 19. 43. 6). H. H. Scullard (*The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974] 94) points out that the losses of elephants on both sides at Gabene was probably heavy. Less than nine years later Antigonus in his abortive invasion of Egypt had only eighty-three elephants with him (Diod. 20. 73. 2).

possible, but Eumenes declared that they should stay and renew the battle. The phalanx had been victorious inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Moreover, their cavalry had not been significantly reduced (Diod. 19. 43. 6). The argyraspids, however, since their baggage had been taken and with it their children, wives, and relatives,¹²⁰ ignored both suggestions (Diod. 19. 43. 7). As a result, the meeting broke up without a decision being reached as to any future course of action.¹²¹

With the dissolution of the meeting Teutamus immediately sent an embassy to Antigonus to treat for the lost baggage (Plut. *Eum.* 17. 1).¹²² Antigonus responded that he would not only return what he had seized, but would provide additional rewards as well, if the argyraspids would surrender both the elephants and Eumenes to him.¹²³ When Teutamus presented Antigonus's terms to the argyraspids, they agreed to deliver Eumenes. He was seized and placed under guard.¹²⁴

On the third day after his seizure, while he was being led to Antigonus, Eumenes requested an opportunity to speak to the army. Permission was granted and Eumenes berated the argyraspids for their treachery. He also requested that they not turn him over to Antigonus alive, but this plea was ignored despite the general sympathy of the majority of the army.¹²⁵ The actions of the argyraspids were not challenged (Plut. *Eum.* 18. 1-2). With Eumenes' surrender, most of the satraps fled; Tlepolemus to Carmania and Stasanor to

¹²⁰ It should be noted that "baggage" included the families and the loot of a decade's service in Asia (Plut. *Eum.* 9. 6; Just. 14. 3. 3, 6-7, 10; in general, see chapter 8).

¹²¹ Diod. 19. 43. 7; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13; Just. 14. 3. 3, 6-7, 10.

¹²² Justin (14. 3. 11) reports that the argyraspids went to Antigonus and offered to surrender Eumenes without the knowledge of their officers.

¹²³ Just. 14. 3. 11, 4. 18; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 17. 2. As noted by Billows (*Antigonus*, 102 n. 26), Antigonus clearly grasped the importance of the camp in this new era of warfare more readily than did Eumenes. The loss of the argyraspids' possessions doomed Eumenes. It should be noted, however, that after the discovery of the loss, Eumenes tried to organize an attempt to retake it, but was thwarted by the inaction of Peucestas. This time his divided command would cost Eumenes his life.

¹²⁴ Diod. 19. 43. 8-9; Plut. *Eum.* 17. 2-4; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13; Just. 14. 4. 1. Justin (14. 3. 12) relates that Eumenes discovered the plot and tried to flee, but Plutarch (*Eum.* 17. 2-4) states that Eumenes was taken unawares. Diodorus (18. 43. 8) only states that the Macedonians entered into secret negotiations. Given the revealed plot which preceded the battle and the obvious tension in the camp after its conclusion, Eumenes must have been alert to some such machinations. He obviously assumed that his skills were still needed for the coming struggle.

¹²⁵ Plut. *Eum.* 17. 6-18. 1; Just. 14. 4. 1-14.

Bactria (Diod. 19. 48. 1, 5). Peucestas and others surrendered to Antigonus (Polyaen. 4. 6. 13).¹²⁶ Among those who surrendered and henceforward served Antigonus was Eumenes' fellow countryman, Hieronymus (Diod. 19. 44. 2). Neither Eudamus nor Stasander escaped, but were captured and executed by Antigonus (Diod. 19. 44. 1, 48. 2). Antigenes, the commander of the argyraspids, was put into a pit and burned alive (Diod. 19. 44. 1). As for the argyraspids, one thousand of the most troublesome were given to Sibyrtius, the satrap of Anachrosia, who was commanded by Antigonus to see to their destruction. The rest of this infamous unit were divided up and sent to various remote garrisons (Polyaen. 4. 6. 15; Diod. 19. 48. 3).¹²⁷

Eumenes was doomed. While Antigonus might have wished to acquire Eumenes' adherence, he had little faith in the latter's promises, given that Eumenes had violated his oath of allegiance to Antigonus after his release from Nora (Diod. 19. 44. 2; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 10. 3). Besides, Antigonus's own Macedonian troops wanted the death of the man who had caused them so much suffering.¹²⁸ Therefore, even though his own son Demetrius pleaded for Eumenes' life, Antigonus had him put to death in January of 315.¹²⁹ When he had decided

¹²⁶ Peucestas joined Antigonus at this time with ten thousand Persians (Polyaen. 4. 6. 13). Later Antigonus removed him from his satrapy (Diod. 19. 48. 5), but Peucestas survived and later is found as one of Demetrius' "friends" (*FGrH* 81 F-12). While it is not stated, it is apparent that the majority of Eumenes' forces were incorporated into Antigonus's grand army. Certainly this had become standard practice and Antigonus did have losses to rectify. These troops may be the ones to whom Pithon later, when planning to revolt from Antigonus, appealed (cf. Diod. 19. 46. 1).

¹²⁷ Diodorus (19. 48. 4) clearly quoting Hieronymus declares that those one thousand argyraspids sent to Sibyrtius were those most responsible for Eumenes' betrayal.

¹²⁸ Diod. 19. 44. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 10. 4, 12. 2-4; according to Nepos (*Eum.* 12. 1-3) the question of Eumenes' future was given to Antigonus's council. While Plutarch confirms that Antigonus deliberated long with his advisers on Eumenes' fate (Plut. *Eum.* 18. 6), it is certain that the formal decision was taken by Antigonus himself (so Diod. 19. 44. 2-3).

¹²⁹ Diod. 19. 44. 2-4; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 6, 19. 1; cf. Nepos *Eum.* 12. 4; Nepos inaccurately reports that Eumenes was strangled without Antigonus's knowledge, but both Diodorus (19. 44. 2) and Plutarch (*Eum.* 19. 1) state that Antigonus ordered Eumenes' death. The time of Eumenes' death is fixed by the following: Antigonus left his camp to cross the desert to Gabene about the time of the winter solstice (Diod. 19. 37. 3); his march to Gabene took nine days (Diod. 19. 34. 8, 37. 3); Antigonus arrived in Gabene only a few days before the battle (Diod. 19. 39. 2-6); Eumenes was betrayed almost immediately thereafter, with his own death following about ten days later (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 12. 3-4; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 3-19. 1). Nepos (*Eum.* 13. 1) states that Eumenes met his death at the age of forty-five. According to this same biographer, he joined Philip in his "twentieth year" and served that monarch for seven years and Alexander for thirteen (Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6, 13. 1). He

to kill Eumenes, he deprived him of food for two or three days and then sent an agent to strangle him (Plut. *Eum.* 19. 1; Nepos *Eum.* 12. 4). After the execution, Antigonus turned Eumenes' body over to his friends and permitted them to perform the proper funeral rites. After the body was burned, the ashes were collected, placed in a silver urn, and returned to his wife and children in Cappadocia.¹³⁰ With the death of Eumenes, Antigonus returned to the area around Ecbatana and spent the remainder of the winter (Diod. 19. 44. 4).

was then nineteen years old when he joined Philip, twenty-six at Philip's death in 336 B.C., thirty-eight or thirty-nine in 323 B.C., and forty-five at the time of his death in 315.

¹³⁰ Diod. 19. 44. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 19. 2; Nepos *Eum.* 13. 4.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GREEKS AND MACEDONIANS

The generally accepted view from antiquity that Eumenes ultimately failed in the struggle to succeed to at least some part of Alexander's legacy in the main because of his "Greekness," while tempered in the works of most recent historians, is still regarded as a significant factor in Eumenes' final defeat and death. Nowhere today is August Vezin's claim that ethnicity was "entirely" responsible for Eumenes' downfall echoed,¹ but Peter Green is typical of the more modified view. "Eumenes, as a Greek, had to throw in his lot with the kings, since unlike a blue-blooded Macedonian baron he could not, short of emulating Alexander, usurp the throne himself. . . . He was destroyed . . . by the fundamental greed-cum-xenophobia of Macedonian troops."² To assess the validity of the last part of this claim, a number of basic questions must be answered. The first to be resolved is what constituted a "Macedonian," as opposed to a "Greek"? This question revolves around the "ethnicity" of the Macedonians. While arguments have been offered with respect to race, culture, language, and so on, the ultimate basis of ethnicity is perception,³ which typically owes much to historical circumstance.⁴ How did the Macedonians see

¹ A. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* (Münster: Druck und Verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1907) 126.

² P. Green, *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990) 17; cf. E. Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," in *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, edited by B. Barr-Sharrar and E. Borza, *Studies in the History of Art* 10 (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1982) 36–43; E. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: the Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 96, 280.

³ F. Barth, "Introduction," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, edited by F. Barth (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969 (Boston, 1969) 10–15; R. Just, "Triumph of the ethnos," in *History and Ethnicity*, edited by E. Tonkin, M. McDonald, M. Chapman, *ASA Monographs* 27 (London and New York: Routledge, 1989) 74–5; T. H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (Boulder and London: Pluto Press, 1993) 20–2, 38; A. C. Renfrew, "From here to ethnicity," review of *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, J. Hall, *CAJ* 8 (1998): 275–7.

⁴ Cf. A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford and New York: B. Blackwell, 1986); J. Toland, "Dialogue of Self and Other: Ethnicity and the State Building

themselves and conversely how were they perceived by the neighboring "Greeks" or "Hellenes" at different times in their respective histories?⁵ This question is made difficult, because Greek ethnicity developed without the benefit of political unity. Indeed, political unification into one national state was never a goal of the Greeks.⁶ While in certain contexts the concept of a Greek ethnicity was accepted, Greeks politically were typically organized in city-states, to which was owed primary allegiance. Even though certain Greek states were absorbed by force by other *poleis*,⁷ and a number of federations were created in which there was a local citizenship as well as a federal citizenship,⁸ unification in which city-states would willingly submerge their independence totally into a greater polity were very rare.⁹ The issue is complicated further by the acceptance of ethnicities that transcended the *poleis*, but were less than "Greek." In this category were those who identified themselves as Ionians or Dorians; Euboeans, Boeotians, Arcadians, and so on.

While most modern anthropologists see ethnicity as a product of social ascription, and not of any specific genetic qualities or cultural heritage, the ancient Greeks themselves defined ethnicity by both descent and culture. Herodotus (8. 144. 2; cf. 7. 9b. 2) speaks of the kinship of all Greeks in blood, speech, religious institutions and practices, and pattern of living.¹⁰ Despite this listing Herodotus makes it

Process," in *Ethnicity and the State*, edited by J. Toland (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1993) 1–20; M. Banks, *Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions* (London: Routledge, 1996).

⁵ According to myth this people was known initially as Greeks, but were later renamed by Hellen, Hellenes (Apollod. 1. 7. 3). I will use the two terms interchangeably.

⁶ S. Perlman, "Panhellenism, the Polis and Imperialism," *Historia* 25 (1976): 3, 5, 30.

⁷ For example, the Argives increased their population by eliminating the communities of Tiryns, Hysiae, Orneae, Mycenae, Midea, along with other towns in Argolis and removing the people to Argos (Paus. 8. 27. 1).

⁸ In general, see J. A. O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

⁹ Such an exception was the creation of Megalopolis. Here forty-one cities were abandoned and their populations incorporated into the new foundation (Paus. 8. 27. 2–4). Pausanias (8. 27. 2) states that this was possible because of the Arcadians' fear of the Spartans. Even here, however, three repented and were removed to Megalopolis by force; many of the residents of Trapezus left the Peloponnesus entirely and settled in the area of the Black Sea in order to avoid incorporation; many were massacred by other Arcadians (Paus. 8. 27. 5–6).

¹⁰ Josiah Ober even presents an argument for the existence of "Greek rules" of warfare ("Classical Greek Times," in *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the*

clear that Greek ethnicity was far more complicated and less deterministic than he implies in this passage. He believed that the same language could be spoken by people of different ethnicities (Hdts. 1. 171. 6).¹¹ He, further, recognized that ethnicity could change over time. The Athenians were by one tradition originally Pelasgian, the supposed autochthonic inhabitants of the peninsula, but through the adoption of the Greek language and culture became "Hellenes" (Hdts. 1. 57. 3; cf. Hdts. 7. 161. 3).¹² The Arcadians were also believed to be of Pelasgian descent,¹³ and, likewise, to have been assimilated into the Hellenic world.¹⁴ According to myth Pelasgus was an Arcadian (Paus. 8. 4. 1; cf. Paus. 10. 9. 1), and either autochthonous, or the son of Zeus and Niobe (Apollod. 2. 1. 1).¹⁵ As with the Athenians, Herodotus describes the origin of the Ionian branch of the Hellenic "genos" (1. 143. 2), as derived from the Pelasgians (1. 56. 2). This view of the growth of Hellenic ethnicity through assimilation accords well with the general principle enunciated later by Isocrates, who states, "the title Hellenes is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those who share a common blood" (4. 50). Indeed, Herodotus sees the expansion of the Greek nation as a direct result of the absorption of other peoples. "But the Hellenic stock, it seems clear to me, has always had the same language since its beginning; yet being, when separated from the Pelasgians, few in number, they have grown from a small beginning to comprise a multitude of

Western World, edited by M. Howard, G. J. Andreopoulos, and M. R. Shulman [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994] 12-14).

¹¹ In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon describes Apollonides, who spoke in the Boeotian dialect and pretended to be a Greek, but was given away by "his pierced ears" (3. 1 26, 31).

¹² For a full discussion of Herodotus 1. 56-58, and the textual and interpretive issues involved, see R. A. McNeal, "How Did Pelasgians Become Hellenes? Herodotus I. 56-58," *Illinois Classical Studies* 10 (1985): 11-21; cf. "Herodotus 1. 56: A Trio of Textual Notes," *AJP* 102 (1981): 359-61.

¹³ Hdts. 1. 146. 1; 2. 171. 3; Apollod. 3. 8. 1; Paus. 8. 4. 1; Lemnos and Imbros were reputedly still inhabited by Pelasgians in the fifth century (Hdts. 5. 26. 1; 6. 38. 1-4, 136. 2; Paus. 7. 2. 2), until the Lemnians, and, perhaps, the Imbrians, were expelled by the Athenians (Hdts. 6. 140. 1-2; cf. Diod. 10. 19. 6; Paus. 6. 19. 6).

¹⁴ The Arcadians are listed in Homer's catalogue of ships (*Il.* 2. 600), and their Greek ethnicity is never questioned (Hdts. 8. 72. 1; Thuc. 5. 60. 3; 7. 58. 3).

¹⁵ Pausanias (9. 1. 1) also declares the Plataeans to be autochthonic. Plataea is listed by Homer among the Boeotians in his catalogue of ships (*Il.* 2. 490). By one tradition the Achaeans were autochthonic as well (Paus. 5. 1. 1), but more commonly they were believed to have been descended from Hellen (Apollod. 1. 7. 3; Paus. 7. 1. 2-3).

nations (πληθος τῶν ἐθνέων), chiefly because the Pelasgians and many other foreign peoples (ἄλλοι ἐθνέων βαρβάρων) united themselves with them.”¹⁶ This is likewise the view of Thucydides (1. 3. 1–3): “... before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation existed, but the country went by the names of the different tribes, in particular of the Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen and his sons grew strong in Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other cities, that one by one they gradually acquired from the connection the name of Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before that name could fasten itself upon all.”¹⁷ Those who had been Greeks could also fall from that status, as apparently had the Gelonians, of whom Herodotus (4. 108. 2)¹⁸ relates that they were in origin Greeks, still practicing some aspects of Greek culture and speaking a mixed language of Greek and Scythian, but whom he associates with the tribal peoples neighboring the Scythians (4. 102. 2, 119. 1, 136. 1).¹⁹ While emphasizing the importance of culture, these particular Greeks did, however, have a tendency to create genealogical myths to link these various peoples together.²⁰ Hence, even though Herodotus could speak of assimilation, he also emphasizes descent.

The more narrow genetic view of ethnicity was likewise present. Plato (*Menex.* 245d) has Aspasia call the Athenians the only pure Greeks, having not a drop of “barbarian” blood. Other Greeks, those apparently descended from the “Dorians,” who originally according to tradition lived in the northern Greek peninsula (Paus. 5. 1. 2; Str. 9. 4. 10), or those associated with the legendary heroes Pelops, Cadmus, or Aegyptus,²¹ she calls “naturally barbarian and only nominally Greeks.” While this is a decidedly curious work, and may, or

¹⁶ Hdts. 1. 58. 1 (Loeb Classical Library translation, A. D. Godley, trans. and ed., *Herodotus in Four Volumes, with an English Translation*, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1966] 1:65).

¹⁷ A similar view is expressed by Euripides (frg. 228. 7 = Str. 8. 6. 9).

¹⁸ Plutarch (*Lys.* 3. 2), perhaps reflecting his source, likewise implies that Greeks through association with other peoples could be “barbarized.”

¹⁹ While serious doubts have been raised about the Greek origin of the Gelonians (see W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928; reprinted Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975] 1: 340), what is important here is Herodotus’ perception.

²⁰ A point emphasized by J. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 43, 48.

²¹ Respectively the namesake of the Peloponnesus, the founder of Thebes, and the eponymon of Egypt, whose son later ruled over Argos.

may not represent the views of Plato,²² it must reflect in some fashion the views of a large group of Athenians.²³ In general, Greeks divided the world between Hellenes and barbarians.²⁴ The passage from Plato is clearly pointing out the supposed mixed origin of these other "Greeks." In the myths both Pelops and Cadmus arrived in the Greek peninsula from Asia; Aegyptus from Egypt by way of Asia.²⁵ The view of Asians as barbarians was long established in the Greek tradition. While generally ignoring cultural and linguistic differences amongst the various forces on both sides participating in the Trojan War, Homer (*Il.* 2. 867) does make reference to the Carians as speaking a "βαρβαρόφωνος." This view of Asians was heightened by the events of the Persian invasion. What had been seen as difference before the war was now often defined as "natural and hereditary hatred" (Isoc. 4. 184).²⁶ Plato speaks of the Persian defeat as a critical event in Greek history. "If the Persians had conquered Greece, practically all the Greek races (*gené*) would have been confused together by now, and barbarians confused with Greeks and Greeks with barbarians,—just as the races under the Persian empire today are either scattered abroad or jumbled together and live in a miserable plight" (*Leg.* 693A). Both Hornblower and Hall emphasize the importance of the Persian War in defining Greek ethnicity.²⁷ Hornblower, in particular, states that "Persia gave the Greeks their identity."²⁸ This is by far too strong a statement. Greek genealogical-ancestral myths

²² For a general discussion, see C. H. Kahn, "Plato's Funeral Oration," *CP* 58 (1963) 220–34; E. E. Cohen, *The Athenian Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 100–102. It is interesting that in the *Protagoras* (341C) Pittacos' Lesbian dialect is referred to as "*phonē barbaros*."

²³ Herodotus (7. 161. 3) has an Athenian envoy respond to Gelon's demand for Syracusan command of the sea prior to the Persian invasion, "Are we not Athenians—the most ancient of all Greek peoples, the only nation never to have left the soil from which it sprang?"

²⁴ Thuc. 1. 1. 2, 82. 1; 2. 97. 3; 6. 1. 1., 6. 1, 18. 2; Hdts. 1. 1. pref., 3, 9; Isoc. 10. 67.

²⁵ Paus. 5. 1. 6; 7. 21. 13; 9. 12. 2; Isoc. 10. 67–68; Str. 7. 7. 1; Apollod. 2. 1. 4–5, 2. 1; cf. Thuc. 1. 9. 2.

²⁶ This is a relatively common view by the fourth century. Plato (*Rep.* 470C) proclaims, "barbarians and Greeks are enemies by nature." See also, Isoc. 4. 157; 12. 163; Dem. 19. 312.

²⁷ S. Hornblower, *The Greek World 479–323 B.C.* (London and New York: Methuen & Co., 1983; revised ed., London and New York: Routledge, 1991) 11; Hall, *Identity*, 44, 47.

²⁸ Hornblower, *The Greek World*, 11; also, Paul Cartledge, *The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 11–12.

had been recorded by the sixth century B.C.E.²⁹ The concept of a distinct Greek ethnicity was in particular settings even formally determined, perhaps, as early as the eighth century B.C.E.³⁰ The great religious festivals, occurring at regular intervals at Isthmia, Delphi, Nemea, and Olympia, were open only to those who could demonstrate their Greek ethnicity to the satisfaction of individuals commissioned by the festivals to make such determinations.³¹ The panhellenic spirit of the games is clearly reflected in Pindar's odes.³² The Olympic Games had expanded well beyond a local Peloponnesian festival long before the Persian War.³³

Even Hall's claim that Greek ethnicity had moved from "aggregative" to "oppositional," that is from identification based on common cultural traits to that based on cultural differences from some third party, as a direct result of the Persian War, is likewise too dogmatic.³⁴ Hall comments, "since this cumulative aggregation of identity was enacted in the absence of any clear, determinate boundary between Greek and non-Greek, it is inevitable that the definition of Greekness could hardly be as all-encompassing as that which was later to be

²⁹ M. L. West, *The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women: Its Nature, Structure and Origins* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 127–30, 169–71.

³⁰ For a discussion of the date for the origins of these festivals, see Colin Renfrew, "Minoan-Mycenaean Origins of the Panhellenic Games," in *The Archaeology of the Olympics: The Olympics and Other Festivals in Antiquity*, edited by W. J. Raschke (Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988) 22–3.

³¹ While only for the Olympic Games does direct evidence exist for such a body (Hds. 5. 22. 1–2), it is very clear that the Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian Games were also exclusively for Greeks during this period (Dem. 18. 91; 9. 32; Plut. *Thes.* 25. 4; Aeschin. 3. 253–4). The games were viewed as a means of promoting panhellenism (*FGH* 257 F-1; Paus. 5. 4. 5, 8. 5; Lys. 33. 1–2; Ar. *Lys.* 1128–1134), and all of the attested victors were "Greeks."

³² C. Morgan, "The Origins of Pan-Hellenism," in *Greek Sanctuaries: New Approaches*, edited by N. Marinatos and R. Hägg (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) 36.

³³ Already in the seventh century victors are recorded from Megara, Athens, Thebes, Croton, Smyrna, Syracuse; in the sixth, additionally from Miletus, Samos, Sicilian Naxos, Aegina, Corcyra, Chalcis, Thessaly, Delphi, Gela, Taras, and Apollonia. See Luigi Moretti, *Olympionikai, i vincitori negli antichi agoni Olimpici, Memorie (Accademia nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche)* 8, ser. 8, fasc. 2 (Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 1957) 63–79. While the accuracy of the list preserved by Hippias has been questioned, see H. M. Lee, "The 'First' Olympic Games in 776 B.C." in *The Archaeology of the Olympics: the Olympics and Other Festivals in Antiquity*, edited by W. J. Raschke (Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988) 110–18.

³⁴ Hall, *Identity*, 44, 47.

established externally and through opposition.”³⁵ The evidence suggests that much of the definitional process had been accomplished well before the fifth century. Certainly by the sixth century the basic criteria for Hellenic status had been established with a fair amount of unanimity.³⁶ While the exact requirements used to determine eligibility in the games is unknown, it would appear that two determinants were likely used. “Greeks” were seen as the descendants of those who had sent ships on the great Trojan expedition and been recorded in Homer’s catalogue of ships in the *Iliad* (2. 494–759),³⁷ or as those descended from Hellen, the supposed forebear of the Hellenes (Apollod. *Bibl.* 1. 7. 2–3; Pind. *Ol.* 9. 4).³⁸ Even the Athenians, who on the one hand saw themselves as originally Pelasgian, claimed connection to Ion, a grandson of Hellen.³⁹ Ion by tradition migrated to Athens and became their war leader against Eleusis.⁴⁰ Of course, this mythology was reflective of the historical expansion of Greek ethnicity as indicated in Herodotus, and was only created later to validate the results.⁴¹ In short, the general acceptance of this mythic genealogy represents the end of this process of assimilation for the particular group involved. But what must be emphasized is that these connections were not simply of cultural importance. Greeks often cited these myths to make legal and political points. Claims with respect to territory made by Greek communities often hinged on these mythic relationships.⁴²

³⁵ Ibid., 47.

³⁶ The Greeks at Naucratis, founded around 570 B.C.E., while coming from Chios, Teos, Phocaea, Clazomenae, Rhodes, Cnidus, Halicarnassus, Phaselis, and Mytilene, created a common religious sanctuary, the Hellenion (Hdts. 2. 178).

³⁷ Thucydides (1. 3. 4, 12. 2; cf. Hdts. 1. 3. 2) regards the Trojan War as the first “Hellenic enterprise.” On this passage, see the commentary in A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945–1971) 1:99. Even into the Roman period determinations of ethnicity were made based on Homer’s statements (Paus. 8. 22. 1; Str. 8. 3. 3).

³⁸ This genealogy was both contradictory and seemingly incomplete. The Arcadians, as noted earlier, were believed to be the descendants of Pelasgus, not Hellen. Yet, there is never any question concerning their Hellenic status (Hdts. 8. 72. 1; Thuc. 5. 60. 3; 7. 58. 3). They had sent ships to Troy (*Il.* 2. 600). Apparently, to the various creators of genealogical myths no need was seen to create a tie to Hellen in order to bolster their status as Greeks; that status was so generally recognized.

³⁹ Hdts. 8. 44. 2; Apollod. *Bibl.* 1. 7. 3; Paus. 7. 1. 2.

⁴⁰ Paus. 1. 31. 3; 2. 14. 2; 7. 1. 9.

⁴¹ Hall, *Identity*, 43, 48.

⁴² For example, see Hdts 5. 94. 1–2; 7. 161. 3; Plut. *Sol.* 10. 1. During their second invasion of Attica during the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans avoided

These criteria remained relatively static until the conquest of the East by Alexander, when definitions broadened. Clearly the defeat of the Persian invaders had an effect on the "Greek" psyche. A coalition of but thirty-one out of, perhaps, seven hundred *poleis* had defeated the greatest military power in the Western world. Greek ethnicity had become certainly more valued. However, as shown in the writers of the fifth and fourth centuries, the definition was theoretically capable of expansion, and after the conquests of Alexander, as demonstrated by the inclusion of "Greeks" from Lycia (Paus. 5. 8. 11),⁴³ Tralles, Pergamon, Bargylia, Nibis, and Alexandria in the list of Olympic victors,⁴⁴ did expand. What is remarkable is how flexible this definition of Hellenic could be.

Certain ethnic connections did not require mythic explanation. Greek colonies claimed Greek descent based on the ethnicity of their mother cities. These claims were accepted, even though many, if not most, of these colonies were settled only by men from the home city, who consequently married native women (Hdts. 1. 146. 2-3; Paus. 7. 2. 6). Even in those colonies where women migrated as well (cf. Hdts. 1. 164. 3), certain individuals married native women.⁴⁵ Colonies in very limited cases had mixed male populations of Greeks and natives.⁴⁶ Often these non-Greek populations were given a status

devastating the region of Tetrapolis because the mythic Heraclids, Spartan ancestors, had once dwelt there (Diod. 12. 45. 1).

⁴³ Moretti (*Olympionikai*, 138 [#558]) rejects this particular victor.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 133 (#512), 134 (#519), 135 (#538), 136 (#539), 137 (#555), 139 (#569), #572), 140 (#575), 140 (#581), 141 (#586).

⁴⁵ While there is not much evidence regarding the presence or absence of women in the colonizing period, there are certain indications. In the inscription recording the decree for the creation of the Theraean colony of Cyrene (*SEG* 9. 3), it states that "one son be conscripted from each family; that those who sail be in the prime of life, . . ." Miltiades having settled in Cardia married a Thracian princess (Hdts. 6. 39. 2; Plut. *Cim.* 4. 1). These early colonies were typically not military colonies, such as those established by Alexander in his eastern campaigns, where the colonists were almost exclusively soldiers and the women natives (see P. M. Fraser, *Cities of Alexander the Great* [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996] 185-7). Alexander often incorporated natives in his colonies. For example, between Alexandria of the Caucasus and Bactria he founded communities containing seven thousand natives, three thousand camp followers, soldiers unfit for duty, and mercenary volunteers (Diod. 17. 83. 2; Curt. 7. 3. 23). This was apparently a usual mix for Alexander. At Arigaeum, he created a colony from neighboring tribesmen, volunteers, and any soldiers that were ἀπόμαχοι (Arr. *Anab.* 5. 29. 3).

⁴⁶ Hdts. 6. 34-36, cf. 41; Diod. 12. 32. 3; Paus. 5. 26. 7; 7. 3. 6, 7. In the case of Amphipolis, it apparently not only had a mixed population, but one in which the settlers from the mother city were in the minority (Thuc. 4. 106. 1; cf. Thuc. 1. 100. 3; 4. 102; Diod. 12. 32. 3).

less than that of full citizens (Hdts. 4. 159. 4, 161. 3; 7. 155. 2; Str. 12. 3. 4).⁴⁷ But intermarriage and even mixed populations apparently did not change the character of the colony or the general ethnic perception of the community as a Greek settlement.⁴⁸ Colonies, despite their customary political independence from their mother cities, maintained close ties, especially with respect to religion.⁴⁹

This view of the dichotomy of Greeks, the descendants of Hellen and certain assimilated others, and of the rest of the world's peoples, is mirrored by the general Greek division of the world into Hellenes and barbarians.⁵⁰ In addition to classifying the Greeks as a distinct ethnicity, Herodotus also associates Greeks with Europeans and distinguishes both from Asians (7.185.1; cf. 9.31.1–5).⁵¹ Aristotle differentiates between Hellenes, Europeans, and Asians, associating these distinctions with climate (*Pol.* 1327b 23–28). “The nations inhabiting the cold places and those of Europe are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill, so that they continue comparatively free, but lacking in political organization and capacity to rule their neighbors. The peoples of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and skillful in temperament, but lack spirit, so that they are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent; hence it continues to be free and

⁴⁷ Aristotle (*Pol.* 1330A) states that in an “ideal system” slaves or “barbarian *periokoi*” should farm the land.

⁴⁸ For the remarkable ability of even those rare colonies with mixed populations to maintain the culture of their mother city, see A. Gwynn, “The Character of Greek Colonisation,” *JHS* 38 (1918): 102–103; A. J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1964) 211–17. In cases where the colony was a joint foundation of two or more Greek *poleis*, each group of immigrants often maintained their own traditions (*ibid.*, 17–22). While founded in 443 B.C.E. under Athenian leadership, Thurii represented a panhellenic settlement, including Arcadians, Achaeans, Boeotians, Euboeans, and Ionians (Diod. 12. 10. 6–11.1–3, 35. 2–3). Here where many features of the Athenian state were incorporated, including democratic government, the state was very cosmopolitan; the founder of the city was officially Apollo (Diod. 12. 35. 3). Another example of a Greek colony with a mixed population was the Spartan colony of Heracleia at the head of the Malian Gulf, in which four thousand colonists were Spartan and Peloponnesian, but six thousand were “other Greeks” (Diod. 12. 59. 3–5).

⁴⁹ Graham, *Colony*, 159–65, 213.

⁵⁰ For example, Thuc. 1. 1. 2, 82. 1; 2. 97. 3; 6. 1. 1., 6. 1. 18. 2; Hdts. 1. 1. pref., 1. 3; 9. 79. 1, 106. 1; Dem. 19. 312.

⁵¹ Herodotus describes the Persian War, in part, as the continuation of long standing hostility between Europe and Asia (Hdts. 1. 1–5, 25–8, 86, 141, 163–9).

to have very good political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity.”⁵²

Given these perceived divisions where did the Greeks generally place the Macedonians amongst the world's peoples? While Aristotle (*Pol.* 1324b) lists the Macedonians among the barbarians, it is very clear from the earliest Hellenic sources that most “Greeks” perceived the Macedonians as being some sort of hybrid, related to the Hellenes, but distinct. This is seen in the ancestor myth presented in *The Catalogue of Women* attributed in antiquity to Hesiod.⁵³ “The district Macedonia took its name from Macedon, the son of Zeus and Thyia, Deucalion's daughter, and she conceived and bore to Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt two sons, Magnes and Macedon, rejoicing in horses, who dwell round about Pieria and Olympus . . .” The ancestor of the Macedonians is then the nephew of Hellen, the forebear of the Hellenes. By the end of the fifth century B.C.E., in the eyes of some, this mythological distinction between Macedonians and Hellenes was eliminated. Hellanicus makes Macedon the son of Aeolus and hence in the direct line of Hellen (*FGrH* 4 F-74).⁵⁴ The Macedonians were also associated certainly by the Classical Age with the Greek Dorians (Hdts. 8. 43. 1), through the belief that the Dorians had stayed some time in this region prior to their descent into southern Greece (Hdts. 1. 56. 3).⁵⁵

⁵² Translation is from the (Loeb Classical Library translation, H. Rackham, trans. and ed., *Politics*, in *Aristotle in twenty-three volumes, with an English translation* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1944, reprinted Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1972] 21:565, 567.

⁵³ Fragment 3 = Constantinus Porphyrogenitus (3), *de Them.* 2 p. 48B. Homer makes no reference to the Macedonians, only to the Paeonians inhabiting the valley of the Axios (*Il.* 2. 845, 10. 425, 16. 284, 285, 21. 150, 200, 205).

⁵⁴ N. G. L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) 2:47; since these two authors are responsible for different chapters in this volume, often only the responsible author will be listed in the note). Hellanicus was attempting to systematize all of the various genealogical myths and, also, to bring into the Hellenic genealogical camp those left out by the more traditional myths. For example, Hellanicus wished to join the Athenians directly to the family of Hellen through an otherwise unknown daughter, Xenopatra (*FGrH* 4 F-125). It is, therefore, likely that Hellanicus was attempting to incorporate those peoples he believed to be culturally Greek, but who were not included as descendants of Hellen by the older myths. He must then have believed that the Macedonians were true Greeks.

⁵⁵ J. N. Kallérís (*Les anciens Macédoniens. Études linguistique et historique* [Athens: Institut français d'Athènes, 1954] 1:3) believes “les Macédoniens appartenaient à la dernière vague des émigrants grecs.” On the entire question of the “Dorian” invasion, see Hall, *Identity*, 56–65.

Despite these post-Hesiodic mythic connections, throughout the Classical Age most "Greeks" acknowledged the distinction between themselves and the Macedonians.⁵⁶ Isocrates (5. 107–108) compliments the Macedonian king Philip II by saying that Philip "knew full well that the Hellenes were not accustomed to submit to the rule of one man, while the other races were incapable of ordering their lives without the control of some such power. . . . because he alone among the Hellenes did not claim the right to rule over a people of kindred race."⁵⁷ The implication is clear that Macedonians were one of those peoples who needed a king, and hence were not Hellenes. When the Macedonian king Alexander I attempted to participate in the Olympic Games, the Greeks who were to run against him said that the contest was for Greeks and not for foreigners. Alexander by proving to the Hellenodikai that he was an Argive by descent, was judged to be a Greek, and competed in the stade race and tied for first place (Hdts. 5. 22).⁵⁸ Apparently as a Macedonian, he would have been barred. The Argive origin of the Macedonian royal house was generally recognized in the classical period.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Thucydides (4. 124. 1) refers to an army made of Macedonians and "Hellenes domiciled in the country." Aeschines (3. 128) notes that "Philip was not in Macedonia at that time, nor in Hellas, but in Scythia . . ."

⁵⁷ Loeb Classical Library translation, G. Norlin, trans. and ed., in *Isocrates, with an English translation in three volumes*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1928; reprinted Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1966) 1:311.

⁵⁸ Alexander's name, however, does not appear on the victor list (see Moretti, *Olympionikai*). Due to this omission and other problems with the text neither Badian, ("Greeks and Macedonians," 46 n. 19), nor Borza (*Olympus*, 111–112), accept the historicity of Alexander's participation, but believe it was part of Argead philhellenic propaganda. The participation is properly accepted by Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2: 101. While there are problems involving Alexander's appearance; his supposed age, his omission from the victor list, etc., these can be resolved. As Borza himself (page 111) notes, "if one regards the tale of the ill-fated Persian embassy as unhistorical, . . . Alexander might well have been no older than twenty at the time of his accession, nearly prime for competition in the stade race of 496 . . ." The account of Alexander having Persian envoys killed in 510 B.C.E., is generally rejected by scholars (see Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:99, and Borza, *Olympus*, 102). With respect to Alexander's absence from the victor list, as Borza (page 112) notes as a possibility, he probably lost the run-off. It is also possible that he did not do well and the "tie" represents an embellishment. While Herodotus' information owes much to Argead sources (Hdts. 5. 22), he had visited Olympia (cf. Hdts. 7. 170. 4; 8. 34. 1; 9. 81. 1), and his language in 5. 22. 2 (πρὸς δὲ καὶ) suggests that his source for the Olympic incident may have been Elean. Nor is there any hint later of opposition to Philip II's participation in the games (Plut. *Alex.* 3. 8, 4. 9), despite Demosthenes' claim (9. 31) that Philip was neither a "Greek," nor "related to Greeks."

⁵⁹ Herodotus (5. 22; 8. 137–139), Thucydides (2. 99. 3; 5. 80. 2), and Isocrates

While Macedonians were not commonly viewed as Hellenes in the fifth and fourth centuries, a distinction was also seen by most Greeks between Macedonians and “barbarians,”⁶⁰ including those “barbaric” groups living within the Greek peninsula. Illyrians throughout antiquity were regarded as barbarians,⁶¹ as were Paeonians (Diod. 16. 4. 2), and most Thracians.⁶² Nowhere is the tripartite distinction between Greeks, Macedonians, and barbarians made clearer than in Isocrates’ *To Philip* (154): “I assert that it is incumbent upon you to work for the good of the Hellenes, to reign as king over the Macedonians, and to extend your power over the greatest possible number of the barbarians.”⁶³ Nor was this distinction between Greeks and Macedonians altered during the reigns of Philip and Alexander, nor through the period of the Diadochi or Epigoni. Borza has conveniently collected the ancient references relating to these time frames, and typical is the speech in Arrian prior to the battle of Issus, where Alexander refers to his troops as Macedonians, Greeks, and barbarians (*Anab.* 2. 7. 4–5; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 11. 3; 47. 9).⁶⁴ Callisthenes, speaking in opposition to the imposition of prostration in Alexander’s court, refers both to the “Greeks” and “Macedonians” collectively, and as separate entities (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 11. 8). Later in the wars that followed Alexander’s death the Macedonian government, “the kings,” issued a decree in which Greeks and Macedonians were clearly distinguished (Diod. 18. 56. 1–3).

While the perceived differences in the ethnicities of the Greeks

(5. 32, 107), all accept the Argive origin of the Macedonian royal house, probably reflecting general Greek acceptance as well. Moreover, the rulers of the Upper Macedonian district of Lyncestis prided themselves on being descendants of the Corinthian Bacchiads (Str. 7. 7. 8; cf. Thuc. 2. 99. 1). While Borza (*Olympus*, 81–4) argues that any connection between Macedonian families and Greek forebears is more likely mythic than factual, the Argive origin is credited as factual by Hammond (*Macedonia*, 2:3–4).

⁶⁰ Thucydides does, on occasion, appear to list Macedonians separately from barbarians (4. 125. 1, 127. 2), and Diodorus, perhaps, following Ephorus, likewise refers to Macedonians as distinct from barbarians (16. 4. 2, 5, 71. 2). Demosthenes (19. 327) even seems to see some distinction at least in the terms. He is clear, however, that, for him, Macedonians were barbarians (3. 24; 9. 31–32).

⁶¹ Thuc. 4. 125. 1; Diod. 12. 30. 3; 15. 13. 3, 14. 1–2; 16. 4. 5.

⁶² Ar. *Ach.* 168; *Birds* 199; Diod. 15. 36. 4; 16. 71. 2.

⁶³ Loeb Classical Library translation, Norlin, *Isocrates*, 1:337, 339.

⁶⁴ E. Borza, “Greeks and Macedonians in the Age of Alexander. The Source Traditions,” in *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C. in Honor of E. Badian*, edited by R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996) 122–31.

and Macedonians is apparent, their many cultural similarities are striking. Macedonians practiced the same basic Hellenic religion,⁶⁵ and, as noted, the Macedonian kings were regarded as the descendants of an Argive royal exile.⁶⁶ Moreover, while much has been written regarding a possible Macedonian language, distinct from Greek,⁶⁷ Kallérís' conclusion that "Macedonian" was "*un dialecte grec*" seems certain.⁶⁸ Certainly, by the time of the early Roman Empire, Greek was the spoken language of Macedonia.⁶⁹ However, in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E., while the language of the court was apparently Attic Greek,⁷⁰ and the language of the various later Successor kingdoms was as well, it is clear that normal Macedonian speech was not always clearly understood by speakers of other Greek dialects; not an unusual occurrence even in the modern world. A roughly analogous situation exists in present day China, one basic written language, but regional dialectical differences distinct to the point of interregional incomprehensibility. Even Mandarin, the dialect spoken by the vast majority of Chinese, has four widely recognized variations. In a different context, Anna Morpurgo Davies relates how, while a native speaker of Italian, she "cannot read Sicilian or Milanese, two Italian dialects, without the help of a translation."⁷¹

Prior to the nineteenth century the existence of any "national language" was rare, and in the case of Greek, fourth c. B.C.E. *koine* represents the first approximation of such a truly national Greek language.⁷² Prior to the fourth century every Greek-speaking region and community

⁶⁵ Charles Edson, "Early Macedonia," in *Ancient Macedonia I. Papers read at the first international symposium held in Thessaloniki, August 26-29, 1968*, edited by B. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1970) 39; E. Borza, *Olympus*, 95.

⁶⁶ See note 58.

⁶⁷ A. B. Bosworth, "Eumenes, Neoptolemus and PSI XII. 1284," *GRBS* 19 (1978): 236; E. Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," 41.

⁶⁸ Kallérís, *Macédoniens*, 1:288; supported by Hammond (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:46-7) and Borza (*Olympus*, 92); and more recently by Elías Kapetanopoulos ("Χεννίας Μακεδονίζων τῇ φωνῇ," *Αρχαιολογική Εφημερίς* [1993]: 13-30.

⁶⁹ Strabo (7. 7. 1) clearly regarded Macedonians as Greeks, and spoke of the affinity of dialect (διάλεκτος) among the inhabitants of "the Macedonian empire," including most Epirotes, although certain Epirotes even in Strabo's time remained "διγλωσσοί" (7. 7. 8).

⁷⁰ It is generally assumed that Attic was adopted by the Macedonian court sometime shortly after the Persian War (Kallérís, *Macédoniens*, 1:53 n. 7; Borza, *Olympus*, 92).

⁷¹ A. Morpurgo Davies, "The Greek notion of dialect," *Verbum* 10 (1987): 21 n. 4.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 9.

possessed its own characteristic speech.⁷³ Consequently, our sources are correct to refer to “βοιωτιάζων ἢ φωνή,”⁷⁴ Λακωνίζων ἢ φωνή (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26. 25),⁷⁵ “φωνή Δωρίδος” (Thuc. 3. 112. 4; 6. 5. 1), “φωνή Χαλκιδέων” (Thuc. 6. 5. 1), and “φωνή Ἀττικιστί.”⁷⁶ Additionally, there are a number of passages in the sources referring in some fashion to Μακεδονίζων ἢ φωνή.⁷⁷ While it is clear that φωνή in the references to Boeotian, Attic, etc. refer to dialect, there is considerable debate concerning its meaning with respect to Macedonian. The word, φωνή, most often refers to generic speech or voice,⁷⁸ which is almost without exception the case with Homer and Hesiod,⁷⁹ but also to song (Pl. *Leg.* 666d, 673a), as well as to language⁸⁰ and dialect.⁸¹ It is even used to describe the sound of musical instruments (Pl. *Rep.* 397a), or of sounds in general.⁸² While there was in truth no “Greek” language apart from the regional variations, there was a general sense amongst Greeks certainly by the fifth century B.C.E.

⁷³ L. R. Palmer, *The Greek Language* (Atlantic Highlands.: Humanities Press, 1980; reprinted Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1996) 82, 174.

⁷⁴ Xen. *Anab.* 3. 1. 26; Arr. *Anab.* 6. 13. 5; Paus. 9. 34. 2.

⁷⁵ The Messenians apparently spoke the same “φωνή” as their Spartan oppressors (Thuc. 4. 3. 3).

⁷⁶ Dem. 16. 2; cf. Thuc. 7. 57. 1, 63. 3; Athen. 3. 126E; also, γλώσσα Ἀττική (Hdts. 6. 138. 2; Xen. *Mem.* 3. 14. 7).

⁷⁷ Plut. *Alex.* 51. 11; *Eum.* 14. 11; *Ant.* 27. 5; Athen. 3. 122A; *PSI* XII 1284; cf. Curt. 6. 9. 35.

⁷⁸ For example, see Aeschin. 1. 181; 2. 1, 88, 115, 156; 3. 109, 120; Dem. 1. 2; 9. 61; 18. 10, 23, 43, 170, 222, 271, 279, 286–7; 19. 15, 16, 103, 206, 336, 337; 21. 72, 195; 24. 175; 42. 15; 45. 30; 48. 44; 57. 11; Hdts. 1. 85. 4, 159. 3; 2. 2. 2, 55. 2, 71. 1; 4. 129. 1, 3, 141. 1, 155. 3, 4; 5. 58. 1, 93. 2; 8. 65. 1, 4, 6; Isae. 6. 59; 12. 4; Isoc. 5. 26, 27, 81; 8. 3; 12. 10, 142; 15. 20, 22, 189, 296; 19. 28; Lys. 6. 51; Pl. *Leg.* 634e, 653d, 664e, 665a, 672e; *Rep.* 393c, 395d, 568c; *Apol.* 18a, 31d; *Crat.* 383a, 422e, 423b; *Thaet.* 190a, 203b, 206d, 208c, 261e; Plut. *Alc.* 1. 4, 2. 5; *Cim.* 8. 1; *Lys.* 8. 2; *Nic.* 27. 1; *Per.* 7. 1, 8. 3; *Sol.* 14. 1, 28. 2; Xen. *Anab.* 2. 6. 9; 7. 3. 25, 7. 46; *Cyr.* 1. 4. 4; *Hell.* 2. 3. 56; *Mem.* 1. 4. 12; *Cyn.* 6. 20.

⁷⁹ Hes. *Sh.* 11. 383; *Th.* 11. 39, 584, 685, 830; *WD* 79, 104, 448; Hom. *Il.* 2. 11. 490; 3. 161; 13. 11. 45; 14. 11. 400; 15. 11. 686; 17. 11. 111, 555, 696; 18. 11. 220, 221, 571; 20. 11. 81; 22. 11. 227; 23. 11. 67, 397; *Od.* 4. 11. 279, 705; 10. 11. 239; 12. 11. 86, 396; 19. 11. 381, 472, 521, 545; 24. 11. 530.

⁸⁰ Aeschin. 3. 16, 172; Hdts. 2. 2. 3, 32. 6, 42. 4, 57. 1; 4. 23. 2, 111. 1, 114. 1, 117. 1; 7. 85. 1; Hom. *Il.* 2. 867; Isoc. 1. 9. 8; Pl. *Leg.* 777c; *Crat.* 409e, 410a, 418b; *Theaet.* 153b; Plut. *Cim.* 18. 3; *Them.* 6. 2; *Thes.* 16. 2; Thuc. 6. 5. 1; Xen. *Anab.* 4. 8. 4; *Cyn.* 2. 3.

⁸¹ Hts. 7. 70. 1; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2. 8; Pl. *Leg.* 642c; *Crat.* 398b, 398d; Thuc. 7. 57. 2, 67. 3.

⁸² Pl. *Rep.* 475b, 480a, 617b; *Crat.* 419b, 423d, 423e; *Thaet.* 185a; Plut. *Cim.* 1. 6; Xen. *Ages.* 2.12; *Cyn.* 11. 4.

at the latest that all of these regional dialects collectively represented a "Greek" language (cf. Hdts. 2. 154.2). Moreover, certain of these dialects achieved a panhellenic literary status,⁸³ and even though neither Homer nor Hesiod speak of a "Greek language," Herodotus routinely refers to "Ἑλληνῶν γλῶσσα."⁸⁴ Thucydides (2. 68. 5), Xenophon (*Cyn.* 2. 3) and Isocrates (9. 8) also make reference to "Hellenic speech." Clearly, Greeks recognized that their was a commonality in their dialects. However, the various dialects were also seen as distinctive. Aeschylus in *Seven against Thebes* (170) refers to the Argive army surrounding Thebes as "ἑτερόφωνοι." Herodotus, despite his comments on "Greek speech," is, nonetheless, cognizant of the many variations in Greek during the fifth century, for when he speaks of Ionia to refers to four "γλῶσσαί" (Hdts. 1. 142. 3). The nature of the Greek language is best related by the "Old Oligarch" when he speaks of the Athenians: "The Athenians have mingled with various peoples . . . , hearing every kind of speech (φωνή), they have taken something from each; the Greeks individually rather tend to use their own dialect, way of life, and type of dress, but the Athenians use a mixture from all the Greeks and non-Greeks" ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2. 8). Amongst the Greeks of the Classical Age, however, there was apparently a remarkable ability for most Greek speakers to understand other Greeks from varying parts of the diverse Greek world. Even though Herodotus (1. 142. 3-4) describes the "Greeks" of Ionia as not sharing a common language ("γλῶσσα"), but speaking in "four different ways." The speech of Miletus, Myus, and Priene, he describes as entirely different from the speech of Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedos, Teos, Clazomenae, and Phocaea, while the Chians and Erythraeans spoke a common "γλῶσσα," and the Samians "one that is all their own" (Hdts. 1. 142. 4).⁸⁵ However, the differences in language here emphasized by Herodotus did not apparently hinder communication between the various peoples. The Ionians met in common assembly at Panionion, where evidently they encountered no communication problems.⁸⁶ During Cyrus's ill-fated expedition against his brother

⁸³ Palmer, *Language*, 174.

⁸⁴ Hdts. 1. 57. 2, 3, 58. 1, 110. 1; 2. 30. 1, 56. 3, 59. 2, 112. 1, 137. 5, 143. 4, 144. 2, 153. 1, 154. 2; 3. 26. 1; 4. 52. 3, 78. 1, 108. 2, 110. 1, 155. 3, 192. 3; 6. 98. 3; 7. 9b. 3; 8. 135. 3, 144. 2; 9. 16. 2, 110. 2.

⁸⁵ Plato (*Prot.* 341c) implies that Lesbian in the time of Pittacus (second half of the seventh and early sixth century B.C.E.) was a "barbarous speech."

⁸⁶ Cf. Hdts. 1. 170. 1-3; 6. 7. 1, 11. 1-4.

the "Greeks" in his army often met in assembly, and despite coming from areas of the Greek world as geographically disparate as Ionia (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 7), Boeotia (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 11; 5. 6. 21), the Chersonese (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 9), Thessaly (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 10; 2. 5. 31), and the Peloponnesus,⁸⁷ there is never a word about translators or of miscommunication despite this diversity in the Greek military body (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 3. 3–7, 9–20, 4. 12). Xenophon is not here being remiss in omitting such translators, for he often refers to the interpreters used by the Persians or other non-Greeks to communicate with the Greeks.⁸⁸ The Greeks also had interpreters of their own who were used to communicate with Persian-speakers,⁸⁹ and other non-Greek peoples.⁹⁰ From this evidence it would appear that most dialects of Greek had enough in common that those from different regions of the Greek-speaking world could readily comprehend one another. However, those from more remote and less urbanized areas often spoke a dialect that was difficult for other Greeks to understand.⁹¹ The Eurytians, the largest Aetolian tribe, spoke a "γλωσσα" exceedingly difficult for other Greeks to comprehend (Thuc. 3. 94. 5). Yet, Thucydides regards the Aetolians, with the exception of the "majority of the Amphilocheians," as Greeks.⁹²

What is relatively apparent from the sources is that Macedonian speech was not always easily understood by non-Macedonians. In Curtius' account of the trial of Philotas, Alexander asks that commander whether he wishes to address the troops in "*patrio sermone*" (Curt. 6. 9. 34), to which the latter replies that he will address the troops in "*eadem lingua*" used by Alexander so as to be more readily

⁸⁷ Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 6; 2. 5. 31; 3. 1. 34, 47.

⁸⁸ Xen. *Anab.* 1. 2. 17, 8. 12; 2. 3. 17; 4. 4. 5; 7. 6. 8, 43; Cyrus's chief interpreter was Pigres (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 2. 17, 8. 12), and Glus, the son of Tamos, the Egyptian, may have been another used by Cyrus. The latter is sent to the Greeks with a message (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 4. 16) and on another occasion is associated directly with Pigres (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 5. 7).

⁸⁹ Xen. *Anab.* 2. 5. 35; 4. 2. 18, 5. 10, 34.

⁹⁰ Xen. *Anab.* 5. 4. 4; 7. 2. 19, 6. 8.

⁹¹ N. G. L. Hammond ("Literary Evidence for Macedonian Speech," *Historia* 43 [1994]: 138) notes that Vlach pastoral communities still have "a distinct and strong dialect" of Greek.

⁹² Thuc. 1. 5. 3; 2. 68. 5; cf. 3. 112. 7. The Amphilocheian colony of Argos had joined with the Ambraciots and subsequently "became Hellenes and learned their present Hellenic speech, but the rest of the Amphilocheians remained barbarians" (Thuc. 2. 68. 5).

(facilius) understood by the non-Macedonians present (Curt. 6. 9. 35).⁹³ “*Eadem lingua*” was likely the speech of the Macedonian court, which as noted earlier was Attic Greek. Alexander then used Philotas’s choice of language against him, telling the Macedonians that the latter loathed the “*sermo patrius*” (Curt. 6. 9. 36).⁹⁴ Philotas was apparently in the habit of using Attic Greek and on occasion, regarding those who spoke the Macedonian “*lingua*,” as “Phrygians and Paphlagonians,” and even employing an interpreter to address those Macedonians with difficulties comprehending Attic (Curt. 6. 11. 4). Like φωνή amongst the Greek authors, *sermo* is used by Curtius most often to mean conversation or common speech,⁹⁵ while *lingua* is most frequently an indication of a style of speech.⁹⁶ Indeed, in other early Roman imperial writers the terms exhibit the same ambiguity as φωνή.⁹⁷ Tacitus uses *sermo* to indicate conversation (*Agr.* 40. 4; 41. 4; 45. 3), but also to indicate language (*Ger.* 28. 3) and dialect (*Agr.* 11. 3). In Quintilian, amongst other meanings, *sermo* and *lingua* are both used to refer to dialects (*Inst.* 11. 2. 50; 12. 10. 34).

While the words Curtius chooses have ambiguous meanings, his context clearly indicates that he is referring to dialectical differences and not to distinct languages. It is interesting that neither Alexander, nor Philotas, were concerned about the ability of the majority of Macedonians to comprehend “*eadem lingua*”. Alexander had addressed

⁹³ While these statements occur in the midst of speeches and consequently owe something to the flourishes of the author, Curtius most likely elaborated on the material found in his sources, rather than inventing the content (E. Baynham, *Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius* [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998] 50–5). Elias Kapetanopoulos (“Alexander’s ‘Patrius Sermo’ in the Philotas Affair,” *AncW* 30 [1999]: 117–28), however, argues that much of the Curtian account of this episode has been invented as well as amplified by the author.

⁹⁴ Two other speeches are delivered by Amyntas and Coenus respectively (Curt. 6. 9. 28–31), but without any indication of the nature of the speech being used.

⁹⁵ Curt. 6. 7. 16, 19, 20, 8. 11, 12, 11. 12; 7. 1. 21; 8. 2. 7, 4. 27, 5, 14, 21; 9. 1. 5.

⁹⁶ Curt. 4. 6. 6; 6. 9. 20; 7. 2. 37; 8. 1. 45.

⁹⁷ While Curtius’ dates are debated, the consensus is that he wrote in the early Roman imperial period (R. Syme, “The Word *Optimus*—Not Tacitean,” *Eranos* 85 [1987]: 111; Baynham, *Alexander*, 201; J. E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus’ Historiae Alexandri Magni, Books 3 and 4* [Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1980] 19–57; *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus’ Historiae Alexandri Magni, Books 5 to 7,2* [Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1994] 26–8; W. Heckel, “Notes on Q. Curtius Rufus’ *History of Alexander*,” *Acta Classica* 37 [1994]: 67; A. M. Devine, “The Parthi, the tyranny of Tiberius and the date of Q. Curtius Rufus,” *Phoenix* 33 [1979]: 142–59.

the assembled army in Attic without complaint. Philotas makes it clear that it was the non-Macedonians who were more likely not to understand "*sermo patrius*" than the Macedonians not comprehending "*eadem lingua*". However, Philotas doesn't say that he will use "*eadem lingua*" so that he will be understood only by those non Macedonians present, but by the majority of the army, including, apparently, the Macedonians. He will speak in Attic so that these others "*facilius percepturos*" his comments. The implication, then, is that Macedonian speech was not incomprehensible to non Macedonians, only more difficult to comprehend.

The most likely explanation for the situation surrounding Philotas's trial is that Attic Greek was routinely used when officers addressed the army as a whole. With the forces accompanying Xenophon, it is apparent that any number of dialects were readily understood by the assembled Greeks. In the case of the combined force under Alexander's command, Attic was the common dialect most clearly understood by the variety of Greek speakers in the army. Alexander in his comments on Philotas's use of Attic has simply taken advantage of that officer's choice of speech to emphasize his aloofness, his distance from the rank-and-file Macedonian soldiers. Many common soldiers came from the more inland and far less urbanized areas of Upper Macedonia.⁹⁸ Philotas had commanded the Companion Cavalry, and not one of the infantry divisions.⁹⁹ He is one of those specifically listed by Plutarch in his *Life of Alexander* (40), as "having grown luxurious and vulgar in their extravagant living." Curtius (6. 8. 3, 11. 3-4) also emphasizes his elaborate lifestyle and the arrogance he especially displayed towards the "*rustici homines*."

That soldiers might be offended, if addressed in anything other than their "rude patois,"¹⁰⁰ may also be responsible for another text often used to argue for a distinct Macedonian language. PSI XII. 1284, a papyrus fragment from Arrian's *History of the Successors*,¹⁰¹ records

⁹⁸ See N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) 1:88; M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings* (Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity, National Hellenic Research Foundation; Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1996) 1:101-104. When Alexander crossed to Asia, of his five Macedonian infantry divisions three were from Orestis, Lyncestis, Elimiotis, and Tymphaea (Diod. 17. 57. 2).

⁹⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 1. 14. 1; 3. 11. 8; Diod. 17. 17. 4, 57. 1; Curt. 4. 13. 26; 6. 9. 26.

¹⁰⁰ One possibility for the "Macedonian" language suggested by Borza (*Olympus*, 92).

¹⁰¹ On the fragment, see Bosworth, "PSI XII. 1284," 227-37; W. E. Thompson, "PSI 1284: Eumenes of Cardia vs. The Phalanx." *ChrEg* 59 (1984): 113-20.

that a Macedonian named Xennias, ἀνὴρ μακεδονίζων τῇ φωνῇ, was dispatched by Eumenes to address a group of Macedonians. Eumenes was attempting to subvert the troops recently brought from Macedonia by Craterus after the latter's defeat and death. The dispatch of Xennias likely represents Eumenes' concern that his ambassador be as closely identified with these newly arrived troops as possible, i.e. "rusticus homo." In any case, nothing here would indicate the exact nature of this speech.¹⁰² Other passages relating to "Macedonian speech" are even more ambiguous. Alexander summoned his hypaspists in "Macedonian" during the incident that resulted in the death of Cleitus (Plut. *Alex.* 51. 11); Eumenes was greeted by his Macedonians in "Macedonian" (Plut. *Eum.* 14. 5); many kings of the Ptolemaic dynasty had given up their "Macedonian speech" (Plut. *Ant.* 27. 4); Attic speakers had adopted Macedonian idioms (Athen. 3. 122A).

Supporting "Macedonian" as a dialect of Greek and not a separate language is the inscriptional evidence from Macedonia itself. These inscriptions are all in Greek, a number of variations in spellings and the appearance of words of non-Greek origin notwithstanding.¹⁰³ Grave stelai from Vergina, dated by Andronicus to the second half of the fourth century B.C.E., not only reveal that the majority of the names derive from Greek roots, with only one clearly of Thracian origin, but all are recorded in Greek.¹⁰⁴ While Kalléris lists 153 words as peculiarly Macedonian,¹⁰⁵ he emphasizes that they are in the vast

¹⁰² See Kapetanopoulos, "Xεννίας," 13–30. This author not only points out that nothing in the phrasing necessarily indicates a Macedonian language, but simply that his speech was in "the Macedonian fashion" (pages 14 and 19), and that "a Macedonian man in speech" could mean simply a "Macedonian" (16–17, 19). With less conviction, Kapetanopoulos states that the passage may imply that Xennias was not a native Macedonian, but, nonetheless, well versed in the Macedonian dialect (13–14, 25–6).

¹⁰³ See those collected in M. G. Demitsas, ed., *Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum et Latinarum Macedoniae*, an enlarged reissue in two volumes with preface, introduction, bibliography and a guide to the contents by A. N. Oikonomides (1896 Greek edition, enlarged and reissued, Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1980); Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, vol. 2. Neither of these collections is by any means complete. The former is dated; the latter limited by the author's intent to present public documents.

¹⁰⁴ M. Andronicus, *Vergina: The Royal Tombs and the Ancient City*, trans. by L. Turner (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 1984) 83–5. Andronicus also notes that the patronymics also reflect Greek roots, therefore, demonstrating that this use of "Greek" names, or simply those derived from Greek roots, was present at least from the first half of the fourth century B.C. (page 84).

¹⁰⁵ Kalléris, *Macédoniens*, 1:66–277.

majority etymologically Greek.¹⁰⁶ Given that Macedonia was regularly invaded and continuously surrounded by various tribal, non-Greek, speaking peoples, it is likely that the Greek of Macedonia would be replete with words and expressions of non Greek origin. What is then surprising is that so few collected by the lexicographers are not of Greek origin.¹⁰⁷ As with so much of the culture of Macedonia, the evidence would suggest a multifaceted society of a great many variations, but with the major influence, both culturally and linguistically, being Greek.¹⁰⁸

The exact nature of this Macedonian dialect can only be guessed. Hammond's suggestion that it may have been a form of Aeolic, while certainly not incontestable,¹⁰⁹ is a definite possibility.¹¹⁰ Hellanicus (*FGrH* 4 F-74), citing the priestesses of Hera in Argos, declared the Macedonians to be the descendants of Aeolus. Claiming such descent for the Macedonians would apparently serve no particular Argive interest. The Argives were according to Greek tradition Dorians,¹¹¹ and, as noted, there was a tradition that the Dorians had spent time in Macedonia (*Hdts.* 1. 56. 3). The association of the Macedonians and Aeolus may, therefore, have been based on what the priestesses knew of the Macedonian dialect.¹¹² Certain of the words deemed to be "Macedonian" do show Aeolic qualities.¹¹³

¹⁰⁶ "Sur les 153 mots étudiés, il n'y en a que deux ou trois dont la racine puisse être considérée comme non grecque de façon plus ou moins certaine" (Kallérís, *Macédoniens*, 278; cf. Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:48–53). Of the 153, 31 are military terms and twelve are Macedonian months.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Kallérís, *Macédoniens*, 1:281.

¹⁰⁸ Hammond, and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:47–9.

¹⁰⁹ Borza finds his argument unconvincing (*Olympus*, 92). L. Dubois ("Une table de malédiction de Pella: s'agit-il du premier texte macédonien?," *REG* 108 [1995]: 190–7) regards "Macedonian" as a northwestern Greek dialect.

¹¹⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2: 48–49. Hammond postulates that Lower Macedonia and Upper Macedonia actually spoke two different dialects of Greek ("Literary Evidence for Macedonian Speech," 135–136). It is credible that the more urbanized areas of Lower Macedonia spoke a Greek more clearly understood by their southern neighbors, but it is unlikely that the two dialects were as diverse as Hammond postulates (see B. Bosworth, "The Tumult and the Shouting: Two Interpretations of the Cleitus Episode," *AHB* 10 [1996]: 25–26, for a critical examination of Hammond's evidence).

¹¹¹ Paus. 2. 37. 3; 4. 5. 1–2; 7. 1. 5, 7; the Argives also spoke a form of Doric (Palmer, *Language*, 76–7).

¹¹² Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2: 48.

¹¹³ Noted by O. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen, ihre Sprache und ihr Volkstum* (Göttingen: Hildesheim, 1906; reprinted New York: Olms, 1974) and reiterated by Hammond (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:48–9).

The many cultural affinities between the Macedonians and the "Greeks" would certainly help explain the confusion over the "ethnicity" of the Macedonians exhibited in our sources, and hence, their tangential attachment to the Hellenic genealogy. The character of the Macedonian government (cf. Isoc. 5. 107–108) and the rural/tribal nature of much of this region would suggest to many Greeks that the Macedonians could not be true Hellenes.

The Molossians apparently also because of their rural, tribal, monarchical society were not seen as Greeks, even though they were by myth associated with Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles and the slayer of Priam,¹¹⁴ who came to rule the Molossians after the Trojan War (Paus. 1. 11. 1; 2. 23. 6).¹¹⁵ Thucydides includes them amongst the barbarians, along with the other two major Epirote tribal groups, the Chaonians and the Thesprotians (2. 80. 5). Yet, the evidence points to the Molossians, at least, as speaking a form of Greek.¹¹⁶ Another people in many ways like the Macedonians and the Molossians, but whose "Greekness" was only occasionally questioned, were the Aetolians. By one tradition the Aetolians were not the descendants of Hellen, but descended from Endymion, the grandson of Zeus and Protogeneia, a daughter of Deucalion (Paus. 5. 1. 3). Pausanias (5. 1. 4) relates, however, that "others with greater probability" traced Aetolian descent from Hellen through the female line.¹¹⁷ The Aetolians are recorded as having sent ships to Troy (Hom. *Il.* 2. 638), and are according to myth closely related to the Eleans, a people whose "Greekness" was never questioned.¹¹⁸ But Euripides (*Phoen.* 138) implies that the Aetolians were "half-barbarians," and Thucydides (2. 68. 5) states that most of the Aetolian tribe of the Amphilochians, at least, were barbarians.¹¹⁹ As late as the second century B.C.E., Polybius (18.

¹¹⁴ Paus. 4. 17. 4; 10. 26. 4, 27. 2; Apollod. 3. 13. 8; E. 5. 10; Str. 7. 7. 8.

¹¹⁵ Their status along with that of the Thesprotians, Cassopaeians, Amphilochians, and the Athamanes, as barbarians did not change during antiquity (Str. 7. 7. 1).

¹¹⁶ N. G. L. Hammond, *Epirus: The Geography, the Ancient Remains, the History and the Topography of Epirus and Adjacent Areas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) 423, 525–6, and Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:45; Borza, *Olympus*, 78.

¹¹⁷ The link is made through Asterodia, the great grand daughter of Hellen (Apollod. 1. 7. 3; Paus. 5. 1. 4), whose marriage to Endymion produced Aetolus ([Hes.] *Catalogue of Women* Fr. 10[a]. 58–63) and Epeius, the ancestor of the Eleans (Paus. 5. 1. 4).

¹¹⁸ Paus. 5. 1. 3–4, 18. 6; 8. 49. 7; Hdts. 8. 73. 2.

¹¹⁹ Gomme, *Commentary*, 2:401; F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) 2:557.

5. 8), ostensibly quoting Philip V, states that most of the Aetolians were not Greeks. Specifically he mentions the Agraians, the Apodotians, and the Amphilochians as barbarians. While certainly not the most reliable of sources, given that this information is delivered in the form of speech, Polybius is likely having Philip repeat a prejudice shared by many others. In part, any confusion regarding the ethnicity of the Aetolians is explained by the expansion of Aetolia over the centuries.¹²⁰ Those peoples, added to the Aetolian “ethnos” over time, on the whole benefitted from the Homeric tradition respecting the Aetolians. Homer only mentions five Aetolian cities, and all of these are near the coast, bounded on the east by Acarnania and on the west by Western Locris.¹²¹ In the fifth century neither the Amphilochians, nor the Agraeans, were associated with the Aetolians, and, as noted earlier, Thucydides did not regard the majority of the Amphilochians as Greeks. While certain peoples inhabiting the region of fifth and fourth century Aetolia might not have been regarded as “Greeks,” it is clear that throughout their history the Aetolians, in general, were so counted (Thuc. 1. 5. 3). Later in the period after Alexander III’s death, the Aetolians were a major “Greek” force in the Lamian War against Macedonian authority.¹²² It is interesting to note, however, that the first attested Aetolian Olympic victor appears only in 240 B.C.E.¹²³

Part of the reluctance of some to accept the Aetolians as fully Greek relates to their political organization. The Aetolians have been described as “the best example known of a Greek tribal state.”¹²⁴ It is difficult to know the exact nature of Aetolian unity in the fifth century or earlier, but their level of cooperation surprised the Athenian Demosthenes and led to the failure of his expedition into Aetolia in 426 B.C.E. (Thuc. 3. 94–98). Thucydides (3. 96. 3) points out that all the Aetolians united to resist this invasion, “even the most remote Ophionians, Bomiensians, and Calliensians.”¹²⁵ Earlier the Aetolians

¹²⁰ W. J. Woodhouse, *Aetolia; its Geography, Topography, and Antiquities* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1973) 55–87.

¹²¹ For the location of these cities, see Woodhouse, *Aetolia*, 115–41, with map on p. 53.

¹²² The war had begun soon after the news of Alexander’s death reached Greece (Diod. 18. 8. 17; 9. 1), and the Aetolians had been the first to join the alliance against Macedonia sponsored by the Athenians (Diod. 18. 11. 1, 13. 3).

¹²³ See Moretti, *Olympionikai*, 139 (#568).

¹²⁴ Larsen, *Federal States*, 78.

¹²⁵ These tribes are located in northeastern Aetolia (Woodhouse, *Aetolia*, 53).

collectively had sent three ambassadors to Corinth and Sparta. These three representatives are identified as coming from the three main Aetolian tribes, the Ophionians, the Eurytians, and the Apodotians (Thuc. 3. 100. 1). While the importance of the tribal divisions was in some sense maintained,¹²⁶ by the mid-fourth century at the latest the Aetolians had created a sympolity, a league.¹²⁷ Aetolia, like Macedonia, was not an area of city-states in the fifth and early fourth centuries, but rather a land of "unwalled villages" (Thuc. 3. 94. 4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 6. 14).

What is clear from the evidence is that this ambiguous ethnic relationship between the Macedonians and their southern neighbors was evolving over time.¹²⁸ By the second century B.C.E., Macedonians and "Greeks" saw themselves and each other as Greeks.¹²⁹ Polybius, in particular, no friend of Macedonia, associates Macedonians and Greeks.¹³⁰ This is also the evidence of the Olympic Games. Following Alexander I, the only Macedonian participants down to the reign of Alexander the Great were royal.¹³¹ Philip II is the recorded winner of three Olympic competitions, the horse race in 356, the *tethrippon* in 352, and the *synoris* in 348. But in 328 B.C.E., Cliton, the winner of the *stadion*, is listed as from Macedonia, as is Lampus, the winner of the *tethrippon* in 304, and five other non-royal Macedonians

¹²⁶ After the destruction of Thebes, the Aetolians had sent ambassadors, "according to tribe (ἔθνη)," to Alexander to ask to be forgiven for revolting from his authority (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 10. 2).

¹²⁷ This was in existence at least by 367, when an Athenian decree mentions the "κοινόν" of the Aetolians (*GHI* 2:110 [#137, ll. 9, 19]).

¹²⁸ A point strongly emphasized by Lindsay Adams ("Historical Perceptions of Greco-Macedonian Ethnicity in the Hellenistic Age," *BalkSt* 37 [1996]: 205–22).

¹²⁹ See Adams, "Ethnicity," 220–2.

¹³⁰ Polyb. 5. 104. 1; 7. 9. 3, 5, 7; 9. 37. 7; 38. 3. 8 cf. Livy 31. 29. 15; Str. 10. 2. 23. Even certain Thracian tribes became disassociated from the category of "barbarian." Polybius refers on a number of occasions to the "Thracians and the barbarians" (23. 8. 3–4; 10. 4). However, the Odrysians, the Bessi, and the Dentheleti, retained their status as "barbarians" (Polyb. 23. 8. 4; cf. Str. 7. 7. 1), as did most of Macedonia's northern and western neighbors (Polyb. 7. 11. 5; cf. Str. 7. 7. 1). Asians were still regarded as barbarians (Polyb. 10. 30. 2, 31. 2, 48. 8), as were Gauls (Polyb. 9. 30. 3, 35. 1, 2), and Romans (Polyb. 11. 5. 7; 18. 22. 8; cf. Livy 31. 29. 15).

¹³¹ Solinus 9. 16, records that Archelaus competed at Olympia and also at Delphi. He is listed as the winner of the *tethrippon* in 408 B.C.E. (see Moretti, *Olympionikai*, 110–11 [#349]), however, his participation is rejected by both Badian ("Greeks and Macedonians," 35, 46 n. 16) and Borza (*Olympus*, 174), but accepted by Hammond (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:150).

are recorded as victors in the third century B.C.E.¹³² While it might appear obvious that what led to this change was the campaign of Alexander the Great and the subsequent creation of many new "Hellenic" colonies in the East, the actions of Alexander's father may have been equally responsible for this transformation.

Prior to Philip the term Macedonian had not achieved a national status.¹³³ It is even questionable when the appellation Macedonia came to be generally applied to the great plain formed by the Axios and the Haliacmon Rivers and its surrounding plateau.¹³⁴ Certainly by the fifth century Herodotus and Thucydides both speak of the plain as Lower, and the plateau, as Upper Macedonia.¹³⁵ In any case, the region of Upper Macedonia was only permanently joined to Lower Macedonia during the reign of Philip II.¹³⁶ Prior to this time the Orestians, Lyncestians, Tymphaeans, and Elimeians had their own separate governments (Thuc. 2. 99. 2). During these centuries preceding unification the leaders of the various upland Macedonians were often at odds with their lowland cousins. In the late 420s, Arrhabaeus, the king of Lyncestis, was openly hostile to the "Macedonian" kings,¹³⁷ and earlier in 432, Derdas I, king of Elimeia, had allied himself with the Athenians and a pretender to the Macedonian throne (Thuc. 1. 57. 3). Derdas II ruled an independent Elimeia, allied with the Spartans, in 382 B.C.E. (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 38).

Even with political unification certain distinctions between Lower and Upper Macedonia remained during the reigns of Philip and Alexander. The Macedonian army was built on regional recruitment with the command structure of the forces especially from Upper

¹³² See Moretti, *Olympionikai*, 127 (#463), 132 (#498), 134 (#527), 135, (#533), 136 (#543, #549), 137 (#552).

¹³³ R. A. Billows, *Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism*, *Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition* 22 (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1995) 1.

¹³⁴ A point made by Borza (*Olympus*, 99).

¹³⁵ Hdts. 7.173. 1; 8. 137. 1; Thuc. 2. 99. 1-3; cf. Str. 7. frg. 12, 7. 8; 9. 5. 3, 17; Paus. 1. 13. 2.

¹³⁶ See H. Dell, "The Illyrian Frontier to 229 B.C.E." (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1963) 62-99, and "The Western Frontier of the Macedonian Monarchy," in *Ancient Macedonia I. Papers read at the first international symposium held in Thessaloniki, August 26-29, 1968*, edited by B. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1970) 115-26; Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:14-31, 650-6.

¹³⁷ Borza, *Olympus*, 150-1, 163-4.

Macedonia dominated by members of these areas' local, hereditary, nobility. When Alexander crossed to Asia, Perdicas, from Orestis (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 5) and descended from the former kings of that upland region (Curt. 10. 7. 8),¹³⁸ commanded the battalion of heavy infantry from Orestis and Lyncestis (Diod. 17. 57. 2); the Elimeian Coenus, that from Elimeia,¹³⁹ and Polyperchon, that from his native Tymphaea (Diod. 17. 57. 2). Infantry from the plain must then have been led by Meleager, Philip, the son of Balacrus,¹⁴⁰ and Craterus (Diod. 17. 57. 2-3). Of these Meleager was probably from Lower Macedonia,¹⁴¹ Craterus was from Orestis (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 5), and Philip's origin can only be guessed with great uncertainty.

Another distinction between the two regions was the greater urbanization that existed in lowland Macedonia. Macedonians from the plain were often associated with particular cities, not with regional areas. In the listing of the honorary trierarchs for Alexander's voyage down the Indus, most Macedonians associated with Lower Macedonia are listed as from Pella, Pydna, Amphipolis, Mieza, Alcomenae, Aegae, Aloris, or Beroea;¹⁴² those from Upper Macedonia as from Orestis and Tymphaea (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 3-6). The different listing of the individuals from the latter two districts and the close association of troops from these listed regionally with commanders from the same areas, and the seeming absence of such close association for troops and commanders from Lower Macedonia might suggest that those from the latter were more integrated into the Macedonian state, having replaced their regional affiliations with a national one. However, lowland aristocrats are not always associated with communities. Ptolemy, son of Lagus, Pithon, son of Crateuas, and Aristonous, son of Peisaeus, are listed as from Eordaea without any reference to a municipality (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 5); there was also a Bottiaean unit of

¹³⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:396, 427.

¹³⁹ W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 58-9.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 327-8. The commander of this battalion in 333 was Ptolemaeus, the son of Seleucus (*ibid.*, 328), perhaps, a Tymphaian (*ibid.*, 286).

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 165.

¹⁴² Many of those listed as from these lowland cities were originally from Upper Macedonia, and must have received estates from the king near these communities. For example, Leonnatus, son of Eunous, is described in Nearchus's list of the trierarchs of the Indian fleet as a Macedonian from Pella (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 3), but was a member of the Lyncestian royal house (see Heckel, *Marshals*, 91). In general, see Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:352-3, 409-10.

the Companion cavalry (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 2. 5). Moreover, it is clear that throughout Alexander's campaigns, the troops, including new arrivals, were brigaded according to region (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 10–11). A similar sort of division was apparently employed in the Companion cavalry. Against the Triballians, Philotas led the cavalry of Upper Macedonia, and Heracleides and Sopolis led the cavalry from Bottiaea and Amphipolis (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 2. 5).

By one tradition the original Macedonians were a group of related tribes, part of whom moved from the western mountains down into the central plain during the period from ca. 650 to 550 B.C.E.¹⁴³ However, it was also claimed that the tribes that came to inhabit Upper Macedonia were not Macedonian at all, but Epirote.¹⁴⁴ When the "Macedonian" tribes moved into the coastal plain most of those encountered were expelled from their lands and replaced by Macedonian settlers.¹⁴⁵ These included the Pierians, Bottiaeans, Edonians, Almopians, Crestonians, and Bisaltians (Thuc. 2. 99. 2–5).¹⁴⁶ But over the years many others migrated to Macedonia, coming from southern Greece, Illyria, Paeonia, Thrace, and elsewhere. From at least the time of Alexander I, migration of Greeks from the south to Macedonia had been encouraged. Even though many of these refugees came as communities, they are not found subsequently as distinct

¹⁴³ Thuc. 2. 99. 1–3; cf. Thuc. 4. 83. 1; see Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:56–64; Borza, *Olympus*, 87.

¹⁴⁴ Strabo (7. 7. 8–9; 9. 5. 11) is the source for this tradition of the Epirote ethnicity of the tribes of Upper Macedonia, but Hammond believes that this material ultimately derives from Hecataeus (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia* 1:439; 2:63). For Hammond these tribes became Macedonians "in the political sense" by the time of the Peloponnesian War. However, Thucydides (2. 99. 1–3) clearly saw these groups as Macedonians in an ethnic sense. For Thucydides is making a contrast between these groups as being "τῶν Μακεδόνων," yet often having separate rulers.

¹⁴⁵ Early to mid seventh century B.C.E. (Borza, *Olympus*, 84; Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:4).

¹⁴⁶ J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976) 36; with respect to the Bisaltians, and most likely the Crestonians as well, the nature of this conquest is ambiguous. They may have already migrated from Bisaltia and Crestonia into the northern mountains to escape Xerxes' advance into Greece (Hdts. 8. 116. 1). Alexander I then would have moved into evacuated territory. Even though according to Herodotus the Bisaltians fled north, where they maintained their independence into the reign of Perseus (Livy 44. 45. 8; 45. 29. 7, 30. 3), many Bisaltians and Crestonians are later found living in Chalcidice (Thuc. 4. 109. 4), suggesting that the evacuations and expulsions related to the Persians and to the campaign of Alexander I were not as complete as indicated by the sources with many of these peoples, perhaps, remaining in their original homelands.

entities in Macedonia.¹⁴⁷ When Mycenae was destroyed by Argos, over half the population came to Macedonia on Alexander I's invitation (Paus. 7. 25. 6).¹⁴⁸ Similarly in 446, when Pericles captured Histiaea on Euboea, the inhabitants took refuge in Macedonia (*FGrH* 115 F-387). As people coming from *poleis*, it is likely that they were associated with Macedonian urban populations.

Additionally, many Greek cities along the coast became part of the kingdom during Philip II's reign (Diod. 16. 8. 2-3).¹⁴⁹ While Methone was razed to the ground and its land distributed viritane to "Macedonian" settlers,¹⁵⁰ much of the population of Amphipolis remained and was incorporated into the new "Macedonian" community (Diod. 16. 8. 2). This was apparently also the case with Pydna.¹⁵¹ With Philip, conquered cities frequently would be refounded with the incorporation of Macedonians, or with settlers from surrounding areas, into the existing population (Dem. 18. 182). Justin notes that Philip II even augmented city populations with prisoners of war (Just. 6. 8. 1). The clearest documented example of a refounded city is that of the Thasian colony of Crenides (Diod. 16. 3. 7). Philip captured the city in 356, and refounded it as Philippi.¹⁵² Its acquisition is mentioned without a hint of a siege or the expulsion of any of its citizens, but it is noted that Philip increased its population (Diod. 16. 8. 6). Philip is also recorded as dramatically augmenting the population of his capital city, Pella (Str. 7. frg. 20).

¹⁴⁷ N. G. L. Hammond ("Connotations of 'Macedonia' and 'Macedones,'" *CQ* 45 [1995]: 126 n. 20) argues on the basis of Thuc. 4. 124. 1, "Perdiccas meanwhile marched . . . to Lyncus . . . [leading] a force of Macedonians, . . . and a body of Hellenic hoplites domiciled in that country," that these Greeks migrants maintained their identity. Gomme (*Commentary*, 3:612), however, rightly sees these "Hellenic hoplites," referred to by Thucydides, as coming from the Greek coastal cities, such as Pydna.

¹⁴⁸ Others went to Cleonae and Ceryneia (Paus. 7. 25. 6-7).

¹⁴⁹ The relationship between the coastal cities and the Macedonian kings was complicated. Pydna, at least, had been part of the Macedonian king's domains during the first half of the fifth century (Thuc. 1. 137. 1; Plut. *Them.* 25-6).

¹⁵⁰ Diod. 16. 34. 5; Just. 7. 6. 14-16; cf. Dem. 4. 35; see G. T. Griffiths, "The Macedonian Background," *Gar* 12 (1965): 135, and Fanoula Papazoglou, *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine*, *BCH* Supplement 14 (Athens: Ecole française d'Athènes; Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1988), 105-106.

¹⁵¹ See evidence collected by G. T. Griffith (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:356-7; Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 1:180. Pydna is described during the reign of Perseus as a city of numerous nationalities (Livy 44. 45. 6). Pydna had been taken by king Archelaus and refounded two and half miles inland (Diod. 13. 49. 1-2).

¹⁵² See Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:358.

During this same monarch's reign there were numerous forced movements of peoples into and within Macedonia (Just. 8. 5. 7–6. 1; Polyae. 4. 2. 12).¹⁵³ Populations were transferred without consideration for the views of the people involved. Justin (8. 5. 8–13) records the general dissatisfaction of those forced to move from their homes and the “tombs of their ancestors” by order of Philip II, but he also notes that the people accepted these deportations with resignation. More than a century later Philip V transferred the “πολιτικούς ἄνδρας” and their families from the “chief cities” of Macedonia to Emathia and replaced them with Thracians and “barbarians” (Polyb. 23. 10. 4–7). Even though describing the Roman province of Macedonia, which included populations and territories outside traditional Macedonia, it is still noteworthy that the Roman historian Pliny described Macedonia as a land of 150 different peoples (*NH* 4. 10. 33).

These actions with respect to the towns and cities under the monarch's control are testimony not only to the power of the king, but in the case of Philip II, to a policy of creating greater urbanization in Macedonia and the overwhelmingly rural nature of Macedonia prior to the reign of that monarch.¹⁵⁴ This point is emphasized in a speech attributed to his son Alexander by Arrian (*Anab.* 7. 9. 2), in which that commander states, “Philip found you wandering and poor, wearing sheepskins and grazing a few sheep . . . he made you dwellers in cities.” While the speech may be questioned from a number of perspectives, evidence does support a less dramatic view of the effect of Philip's actions. While Xenophon describes Pella in 383 B.C.E., as the largest city in Macedonia (*Hell.* 5. 2. 13), Strabo (7. frg. 20) later comments that prior to Philip II it was a “small city.” There is no mention of the origin of these new settlers, but Griffiths may well be correct that they came from the surrounding area and, perhaps, included numbers of Chalcidians.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ In general, see J. R. Ellis, “Population-transplants under Philip II,” *Makedonika* 9 (1969): 9–16. Bosworth's (“ΑΣΘΕΤΑΙΠΟΙ,” *CQ* 23 [1973]: 250) contention that Justin only refers to “a redistribution within existing settlements” is not borne out by the text (see Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:661 n. 2).

¹⁵⁴ See Ellis, *Philip II*, 34; Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 9–11; N. G. L. Hammond, “The Macedonian imprint on the Hellenistic world,” in *Hellenistic History and Culture*, edited with an introduction by Peter Green (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 19–20. Philip also established cities in conquered territories outside of Macedonia to control these regions (for example in Thrace, Diod. 16. 71. 2).

¹⁵⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:360–1.

The question becomes what was the status of all these different peoples settled in traditional Macedonia? It appears clear that those transported from their homelands and settled with "Macedonians" in Macedonia, became Macedonians. Inscriptional evidence provides no evidence of differentiation. Individuals are most often listed simply by their name, or by their name and patronymic; sometimes by their name, patronymic, and by their city, occasionally by name, patronymic, and by the ethnic "Macedonian"; and less often by name and Macedonian ethnic only.¹⁵⁶ As concluded by J. Gabbert with respect to Antigonid Macedonia, "I see no way to explain it as indicative of different classes of citizenship. The various usages may have no significance. All individuals may equally be Macedonian subjects and the variety of the language employed an example of human diversity."¹⁵⁷ Koen Goudriaan in his analysis of ethnicity in Ptolemaic Egypt concludes that the presence of ethnic categorizations in surviving inscriptions was most often simply the result of an attempt to identify clearly individuals and implied no special citizenship or status.¹⁵⁸ This is apparently the case in the Macedonia of Philip and Alexander as well. The evidence strongly suggests that the common citizenry in Philip II's urban foundations enjoyed complete equality, with no distinction being drawn between the new and old citizens.¹⁵⁹

A similar policy of equality was pursued by Philip and Alexander in the ranks of their *hetairoi*.¹⁶⁰ Much of the administration of the kingdom was in the hands of these close companions of the king. In the reign of Alexander III, roughly ten per cent of these were originally from Greek poleis.¹⁶¹ Foreign *hetairoi* would be given large tracts of land by the king (cf. Athen. 6. 261A), as were numerous of their Macedonian counterparts.¹⁶² Philip granted all of the land north of

¹⁵⁶ J. Gabbert, "The Language of Citizenship in Antigonid Macedonia," *Ancient History Bulletin* 2 (1988): 10–11; Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 2: passim.

¹⁵⁷ Gabbert, "Language," 11.

¹⁵⁸ K. Goudriaan, *Ethnicity in Ptolemaic Egypt* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1988) 14, 119.

¹⁵⁹ Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 1:182.

¹⁶⁰ Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," 39; see chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of *hetairoi*.

¹⁶¹ Twenty-seven have no listed residence; see G. S. Stagakis, *Institutional Aspects of the Hetairoi Relation* Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1962) 79–87.

¹⁶² Arr. *Ind.* 18. 3–6; cf. Diod. 16. 34. 5; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 9. 2. For example, Leonnatus, son of Eunous, is described in Nearchus's list of the trierarchs for the Indian fleet as a Macedonian from Pella (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 3), but he was a member of the Lyncestian royal house.

Agora to one Apollonides of Cardia ([Dem.] 7. 39; cf. 7. 44; Dem. 8. 64). Nearchus, Alexander's fleet commander from Crete, and Laomedon, the Mytilenian, are listed as Macedonians from Amphipolis (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 4). Eumenes, the royal secretary, was, however, listed as a Cardian Greek, despite his long service with the Macedonian court, his *hetairos* status, and his likely acquisition of a large estate in Macedonia.¹⁶³ Clearly in the case of the former Nearchus and Laomedon, they were more closely identified either by their contemporaries or by subsequent historians with their new homes than with their homelands. Eumenes himself emphasized his Cardian birth and it was clearly picked up by historians. There is nothing to suggest that these "Greeks" enjoyed different statuses within Macedonia.

However, certain peoples were conquered by the Macedonian kings, but never listed as Macedonians. The Paeonians were made subject to Philip II and to his son Alexander,¹⁶⁴ but were brigaded separately as foreign ("βάρβαροι") troops in Alexander's army (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 7. 5; cf. 1. 14. 1).¹⁶⁵ Of course, this begs the question, what does it mean to be a "Macedonian" as opposed to a Paeonian? Royal control differed little whether the locality considered itself "Macedonian" or otherwise. Polybius (4. 76. 2) remarks with respect to Thessaly, "although the Thessalians were supposedly governed constitutionally and dealt with more favorably, they were actually treated the same way as the Macedonians, obeying all of the orders from the kings' agents." Philip II imposed a tithe on conquered Thracians (Diod. 16. 71. 2), and Philip V had his possessions in Thrace supervised by a governor (Polyb. 22. 13. 3). Demosthenes referring to Philip II's acquisition of various Greek cities, states that "in the cities he overthrows the constitution, putting a garrison in them, others he razes it to the ground, selling the inhabitants into slavery, others he colonizes with barbarians instead of Greeks" (Dem. 18. 182). Given the evidence of Amphipolis, this is an exaggeration, but non Greeks were clearly added to many of these populations, and kings readily settled members of their *hetairoi* in or near these cities.¹⁶⁶ However, in the case of Paeonia the region retained its king-

¹⁶³ See Chapters 2 and 8.

¹⁶⁴ Diod. 16. 1. 5, 4. 2, 22. 3; 17. 8. 1; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 5. 1.

¹⁶⁵ The Paeonians had by tradition sent aid to Troy (Hom. *Il.* 2. 845); Pliny 4. 17. 2 lists the Eordians as Paeonians.

¹⁶⁶ Philip V likewise gave tracts of land associated with his cities to his *hetairoi* (Polyb. 22. 13. 5).

ship and issued a separate coinage, its king a dependent ally of Philip's and Alexander's.¹⁶⁷ Clearly, the peoples of the traditional lands of Upper and Lower Macedonia perceived of themselves as ethnically Macedonians and were incorporated into the newly formed state as "Macedonians," along with those coming from outside traditional Macedonia but settled within the generally recognized borders of Macedonia. The regions of Paenonia, Illyria, Thrace, and others, conquered by the Macedonian monarchs and their armies, but which retained their peoples, were seen as ethnically distinct both by themselves and by their conquerors. As shown, the power of the monarchy was as all inclusive in Paenonia as it was anywhere in Macedonia.

This monarchical authority, nonetheless, was tempered by the lack of an effective bureaucracy,¹⁶⁸ and hence, most of the government at the community level was in the hands of locals. Hatzopoulos has collected sufficient testimony from inscriptional evidence to demonstrate that settlements in Macedonia, ranging from villages to cities, possessed a great deal of local autonomy.¹⁶⁹ These entities had their own administrations and communicated with the king often through embassies (Livy 42. 53. 2; cf. Diod. 17. 113. 2). This was apparently even the case with conquered cities. Amphipolis continued after its acquisition by Philip with its city government still intact, including its democratic assembly (*GHI* 2:150 [#150]; Diod. 18. 8. 2).¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ See I. Merker, "The Ancient Kingdom of Paenonia," *BalkSt* 6 (1965): 44. Later, during the reign of the Antigonid dynasty, a "praetor" is mentioned in Paenonia (Livy. 40. 21. 9, 23. 2).

¹⁶⁸ Apart from the Macedonian king and his "*hetairoi*," there was no real administrative apparatus in Macedonia, see Chapter 2.

¹⁶⁹ Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 1:66-7, 69. Hatzopoulos claims that this was likewise true of Upper Macedonia, where he sees locally self-governing, federated villages organized on a geographic basis (pp. 101-3).

¹⁷⁰ Hammond and Griffith (*Macedonia*, 2:351-2) argue that this decree occurring so early in Philip's administration may not be a good indication of the later government of Amphipolis. Hatzopoulos through an analysis of deeds of sale has demonstrated that at least the majority of the governmental structure remained the same (*Institutions*, 1:182). There was certainly no reason to change the nature of the government. Philip had either killed in battle or expelled from the city those inimical to his presence (Diod. 16. 8. 2), added new inhabitants, presumably those favorable to himself (cf. Dem. 18. 182; Aes. 3. 27), and probably installed a garrison (cf. Dem. 18. 182; Diod. 17. 3. 3). Moreover, he apparently gave extensive holdings in and around the city to prominent members of the Macedonian aristocracy. Nearchus, Laomedon, and Androstenes are all later associated in Arrian's listing of Alexander's Indus River fleet commanders with Amphipolis (*Ind.* 18. 4), and one of the cavalry squadrons employed by Alexander was listed as from Amphipolis as

But while local affairs were in the hands of the inhabitants, important matters were routinely submitted to the king for his consent.¹⁷¹ When dealing with Greek communities formerly under Persian rule, Alexander III pursued a policy strikingly similar to that of his father's in Greece and Macedonia. Most cities were granted "autonomy" in the exercise of local affairs (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 18. 2; Diod. 17. 24. 1). Most had their tribute remitted, and only in certain key cities were garrisons installed and lands confiscated.¹⁷² While Alexander might change the government if it had supported the Persians enthusiastically, he invariably left it in the charge of locals. Only at strategic points did he replace local government with Macedonian officials. In the case of Chios, Alexander ordered ostensibly in the name of the League of Corinth that exiles be permitted to return, that the constitution should be democratic, that Persian sympathizers be either tried, or having fled, permanently exiled. A garrison was installed, but was to remain only until these goals were accomplished (*GHI* 2:264 [#192, ll. 17–18]), and these results reviewed by Alexander (*Ibid.*, ll. 4–7).¹⁷³ At Eresus, after Alexander had seen to the expulsion of the pro-Persian faction, the people ("δᾶμος") are found passing resolutions and sending ambassadors to Alexander. It is very clear, however, that the sovereignty of the people was limited, for proposals were sent to Alexander for approval (*IG* 12. 2. 526, ll. 33, 41).¹⁷⁴

Such local autonomy was essential given the non bureaucratic nature of the Macedonian government. Moreover, such local administration in no way compromised the authority of the king. As seen,

well (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 2. 5). While this squadron might represent the original Amphipolitan cavalry, it more likely was composed of Macedonians who had been given land in the area by the king (see Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:352). While no cavalry group is listed as from Pydna, prominent Macedonians were given land near that city as well (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 5).

¹⁷¹ For example, in the case involving in some sense the boundaries of Philippi, ambassadors were sent to Alexander for adjudication (for the text, see E. Badian, "History from 'Square Brackets,'" *ZPE* 79 [1989]: 69, and N. G. L. Hammond, "Inscriptions concerning Philippi and Calindoea in the reign of Alexander the Great," *ZPE* 82 [1990]: 167–8).

¹⁷² While the literary sources do not mention any garrisons in the Greek cities of Asia, this is most likely an oversight. Chios had a garrison installed to make certain the changes ordered by Alexander were put into effect (*GHI* 2:264 [#192, ll. 17–19]). That land was occasionally confiscated is clear from Alexander's dealings with Priene (*GHI* 2:243 [#185, ll. 9–13]; A. J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks: The Epigraphic Evidence* [Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1980] 167–8).

¹⁷³ See Heisserer, *Alexander*, 79–95.

¹⁷⁴ For a full discussion, see Heisserer, *Alexander*, 39, 58–78.

Philip had obviously no qualms about directly interfering in the internal affairs of villages, towns, or cities in Macedonia. Earlier Amyntas I had offered the entire region of Anthemus, in western Mygdonia to Hippias as a gift (Hdts. 5. 94. 1). Philip II ceded the same region briefly to the Olynthians (Dem. 6. 20).

This personal aspect of Macedonian government does help explain the difficulties kings often had controlling their own territory. Prior to his death Alexander I may have divided his authority within the kingdom among at least three of his sons.¹⁷⁵ In 383 B.C.E., the Olynthians "freed" numerous Macedonian cities, including Pella from Amyntas III's control (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 12-13). While the context of the passage in Xenophon is a speech, there is still no indication of any resistance, and, in fact, the implication is that neither Amyntas nor the communities themselves offered any opposition. Clearly any sense of nationalism was submerged in other loyalties. This lack of national allegiance could also explain the many contested successions. In the aftermath of the death of Amyntas III, many claimed the throne before Philip II ultimately secured power (Diod. 16. 2. 4-6; Aes. 2. 26-27). Argaeus not only contended for control with Philip, but according to one account for a period of two years ruled in place of Amyntas (Diod. 14. 92. 4).¹⁷⁶ Pausanias is described as one pretender widely favored by the Macedonians, who finally was driven from Macedonia with Athenian help (Aes. 2. 27-29). The loyalty of the people in Macedonia to particular pretenders to the throne again demonstrates the personal nature of this society.¹⁷⁷ When Sitalces invaded Macedonia in 429 B.C.E., he was accompanied by Amyntas, the son of King Perdiccas II's deceased brother, Philip, who had controlled the Axios River valley for a number of years. Many towns in the area once controlled by Philip went over to Sitalces "for love of Amyntas" (Thuc. 2. 100. 3; cf. Diod. 12. 50. 4. 6-7).¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Thuc. 1. 57. 3; Pl. *Grg.* 471B; cf. Ael. *VH* 2. 41. There is considerable disagreement about the circumstances which led to this division of authority. Hammond and Griffith (*Macedonia*, 2:115 and n. 2) believe this arrangement was the result of dissension following the violent death of Alexander; J. W. Cole ("Perdiccas and Athens," *Phoenix* 28 [1974]: 55-7, followed by Borza (*Olympus*, 135), asserts that this division was done by Alexander prior to his death. Only Philip's domain can be ascertained with any certainty as being the Axios valley (Gomme, *Commentary*, 2:248).

¹⁷⁶ On the arguments for and against Argaeus' rule, see Borza, *Olympus*, 296-7.

¹⁷⁷ These claimants apparently all had perceived connections to the royal family.

¹⁷⁸ With Athenian help Philip had maintained his power base until the autumn of 431, when the Athenians and Perdiccas formed an alliance (Thuc. 2. 29. 6), and Philip fled to Thrace (cf. Thuc. 2. 95. 3).

Given this history of civil war and numerous pretenders for the throne, it is curious that after Philip II's annexation of Upper Macedonia (Diod. 16. 8. 1; cf. 16. 1. 5), in the following centuries, right up to the Roman conquest, there is only one attested revolt of an area roughly corresponding to a former Upper Macedonian kingdom, and that, if it occurred at all, took place in 197 B.C.E. (Polyb. 18. 47. 6), one and a half centuries after its annexation.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, if these areas had retained any sense of nationalism, it is very unlikely that Alexander would have brigaded troops from Upper Macedonia according to their canton (Diod. 17. 57. 2), or would have formed a cavalry unit of horsemen from Upper Macedonia (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 2. 5). For Philip the key to annexation was breaking the personal ties between the rulers of these lands and their people, and replacing these bonds with attachments to himself. One advantage that came from his first real campaign against the Illyrians was that with the defeat of Bardyllis in 358, he apparently had destroyed much of the power structure of Upper Macedonia, many of whose rulers and powerful nobles had joined with the Illyrians.¹⁸⁰ These were either killed on the battlefield, or driven from their lands. This "spear-won" land was the king's.¹⁸¹ In the inscription regulating Alexander's relationship with the people at Naulochum, Prienians are declared autonomous and granted the possession of their property;¹⁸² non-Prienians are permitted to live in villages of their choosing, but certain of these are declared to be "royal domain" and these residents are subject to taxation.¹⁸³ All these decisions are Alexander's to make. The king had claimed all of Asia as his personal possession by right of conquest (Diod. 17. 17. 2; Arr. *Anab.* 2. 14. 7).¹⁸⁴ Two points are

¹⁷⁹ A. B. Bosworth ("Philip II and Upper Macedonia," *CQ* 21 [1971]: 105) sees this revolt as one indication that "the incorporation of the mountain kingdoms [Upper Macedonia] proved ultimately unsuccessful." As noted, this conclusion appears to be contrary to the evidence. Hatzopoulos (*Institutions*, 1:103) challenges the existence of the entire revolt, calling it, perhaps, "a pious fiction invented by the Romans."

¹⁸⁰ See Ellis, *Philip II*, 48, 58–9; cf. N. G. L. Hammond, *Philip of Macedon*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) 26–7.

¹⁸¹ In general, see B. Funck, "Zu den Landschenkungen hellenistischer Könige," *Klio* 60 (1978): 45–55; A. Mehl, "Δορίκτητος Χώρα," *Ancient Society* 10/11 (1980/81): 173–212.

¹⁸² *GHI* 2:244–245 [#186, ll. 1–7].

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, ll. 7–8.

¹⁸⁴ This was a concept apparently continued by Alexander's successors as well (Diod. 19. 105. 4).

made in these passages. One is that the land is Alexander's because he will or has won it "by the spear," and two, that these lands are his as a gift from the gods.

Those aristocrats who had joined willingly with Philip at the start of the campaign or who had surrendered to him later were granted land from the king's many conquests apparently in areas distant from their ancestral holdings; they were attached to him as *hetairoi* and through the association of their sons in the court as pages.¹⁸⁵ Apollonia later did supply Alexander with a squadron of companion cavalry (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 12. 7). It is very likely that a similar procedure was followed in the Macedonian plain as well (cf. *FGrH* 115 F-224). But it was not only aristocrats who were to be personally tied to the monarch.

Macedonians prior to Philip were largely a "serf" population controlled by local nobles.¹⁸⁶ Through a combination of land distribution and urbanization, Philip broke these ties. Alexander claimed that Philip had brought the Macedonians "down from the hills to the plains" (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 5. 2), and the evidence, sparse though it may be, is suggestive that Philip, for many, did exactly that. After Philip's acquisition of Amphipolis, in addition to the extensive grants of land to prominent members of the Macedonian aristocracy (cf. Arr. *Ind.* 18. 4), land was also given to a broad range of non-aristocratic Macedonians.¹⁸⁷ When Methone was razed to the ground, Philip distributed its land among the "Macedonians" (Diod. 16. 34. 5; cf. Dem. 18. 182). This was probably also the case with Apollonia, Olynthus, and thirty-two other communities in or near Thrace (Dem. 9. 26; cf. Diod. 16. 53. 3).¹⁸⁸ These towns and villages are associated by Demosthenes with Methone as having been destroyed by Philip, and while he does not state that the land was given to Macedonians, it would, given the example of Methone, appear likely. It is probable that worthy soldiers were rewarded with land as well (cf. Diod. 16. 53. 3). Philip distributed land to Macedonians near Potidaea,¹⁸⁹ and Alexander III also gave to the Macedonians the

¹⁸⁵ See Chapter 8.

¹⁸⁶ Ellis, *Philip II*, 58-9; Billows, *Kings and colonists*, 9-11.

¹⁸⁷ See Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 1:182.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 190-1, 195-6.

¹⁸⁹ See Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:661. Potidaea had been destroyed by Philip in 357 (Diod. 16. 8. 5).

Bottiaean towns of Calindoea, Thamiscia, Camacaea, and Tripoatis.¹⁹⁰ After the battle on the Granicus, and probably as a general practice with regard to war casualties,¹⁹¹ Alexander remitted for the families of the Macedonian dead all property taxes and personal liabilities (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 5; cf. Diod. 17. 21. 6). Berve and most recently Hatzopoulos have pointed out that the remission of tax indicated that the dead and their families held royal land.¹⁹² The practice of granting land in return for military service was certainly a common practice in the Hellenistic period.¹⁹³

Perhaps Philip's greatest tool in cementing a relationship between himself and his people, and, in consequence, destroying that between the lower classes and their landlords, was through the creation of the *pezhetairoi*.¹⁹⁴ Every tribal chief had his own personal armed retinue, troops who attended the monarch on a permanent basis. Langaras, the king of the Agrianians, possessed his own personal guard, "the finest and best armed troops he possessed" (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 5. 2).¹⁹⁵ Philip made three changes in what probably had been a traditional Macedonian royal guard during the winter of 359/358. Whatever its original size, Philip expanded the corps to one thousand men.¹⁹⁶ Secondly, he armed them as heavy infantry with the small shield and the *sarissa*, or long pike.¹⁹⁷ Finally, these troops, as their name implies, were the king's foot companions, his comrades, as those from prominent families were his "horse" companions. This creation of a permanent, and hence professional heavy infantry, on

¹⁹⁰ N. G. L. Hammond, "The King and the Land in the Macedonian Kingdom," *CQ* 38 (1988): 383, 385–6; "Connotations," 126; I. P. Vokotopoulou, "Ἡ ἐπιγραφὴ τῶν Καλινδοίων," in *Ancient Macedonia IV, Papers read at the Fourth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, September 21–25, 1983* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986) 97; Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 1:121–2; 2:84–5 [#62].

¹⁹¹ At Opis, Alexander, referring to those who had died on the long campaign, states that "their parents have been freed from all services and taxes" (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 10. 4).

¹⁹² H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Munich: Beck, 1926; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1973) 1:307; Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 1:437.

¹⁹³ See most recently, Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 146–69.

¹⁹⁴ On the connection between the Macedonian infantry and Macedonian nationalism, see Billows, *Kings and Colonists*, 16–20.

¹⁹⁵ It is as *pezhetairoi* that Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F-348) describes Philip's royal guard.

¹⁹⁶ See E. M. Anson, "The Hypaspists: Macedonia's professional citizen-soldiers," *Historia* 34 (1985): 248.

¹⁹⁷ R. D. Milns, "The Hypaspists of Alexander III—Some Problems," *Historia* 20 (1971): 187–8.

the one hand, mirrored the Sacred Band of Thebes (Plut. *Pelop.* 18–19),¹⁹⁸ and on the other, an expansion of the *hetairos* relationship to the class. Over time, as Philip's successes mounted and his resources increased substantially, the guard was expanded to three thousand men and its name was changed to hypaspists, perhaps, a previous unofficial title reflecting their position as king's guards.¹⁹⁹ This name change was made necessary by the dramatic expansion of the Macedonian heavy infantry. While the hypaspists were state-maintained, professional, Macedonian soldiers, Philip through extensive grants of land to individuals, had created a manpower pool for recruiting heavy infantry. A rural population of tenant farmers and serfs would long remain loyal and grateful to the individual who made them land owners.²⁰⁰ Those Macedonian aristocrats who had joined with the Illyrians would have had their lands confiscated and given as free holds to their former dependents and to others as well. Additionally, to cement the ties between these new land owners and himself, Philip expanded the personal *pezhetairoi* relationship to include these individuals as well.²⁰¹

Many argue, based primarily on a fragment of Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72 F-4), that the expansion of the *hetairos* relationship to the entire Macedonian infantry was accomplished by Alexander III, not by Philip.²⁰² This passage does state that "Alexander" gave the Macedonian infantry the name "*pezhetairoi*," and by so doing made the infantry "royal *hetairoi*." The passage offers a number of problems. It is a citation in the *Suda* from Harpocration, making it twice removed from the original author. The context is a gloss on Demosthenes' reference to the *pezhetairoi*, in which the wrong Demosthenic speech is noted (*Philippic* instead of *Olynthiac*). Additionally, Anaximenes was

¹⁹⁸ Philip had been himself a hostage in Thebes and would have seen the effectiveness of this unit (Plut. *Pel.* 26). The concept of creating a professional-citizen corps within an otherwise usually recruited citizen army, however, did not originate with the Thebans, but rather with the Argives (Diod. 12. 75. 7; Thuc. 5. 67. 2). While the "one thousand" were militarily effective (Diod. 12. 79. 4, 6–7; Thuc. 5. 73. 2–3), they also proved dangerous to the Argive democracy and were eventually put to death (Diod. 12. 80. 2–3).

¹⁹⁹ This was the title applied to Langaras' guard.

²⁰⁰ It was this loyalty that put Philip Arrhidaeus on the Macedonian throne (see chapter 3).

²⁰¹ Anson, "Hypaspists and the Argyraspids," 117–20.

²⁰² Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:395–6, 405–6, 705–9; R. M. Errington, *A History of Macedonia*, translated by C. Errington (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990) 243–4; Hatzopoulos, *Institutions*, 1:269–70.

not celebrated for his accuracy,²⁰³ nor is it clear to which Alexander the passage refers. While most recent commentators hold for Alexander the Great, others have suggested Alexander I, Alexander II, and even Archelaus.²⁰⁴ The citation reportedly comes from Anaximenes' first book of his history of Philip. The context of both the Demosthenic passage (2. 17) and the fragment from Anaximenes would make it less likely that, if the reference to an Alexander is correct, Alexander III, and not one of Philip's predecessors, was being referenced. Griffith, however, argues that Harpocration would only have used the name Alexander without a numerical designation if Alexander the Great were meant.²⁰⁵ In any case, P. A. Brunt has shown that, regardless of the identity of the proposed reformer, the passage cannot be taken as entirely accurate.²⁰⁶ The excerpt states that this "Alexander" created the companion cavalry and the Macedonian infantry. Since it is clear from Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F-348) and Demosthenes (2. 16–17) that the later hypaspists were originally the *pezhetairoi*, it is apparent that at the very least the process of expanding the *hetairos* relationship to infantry soldiers began with Philip.²⁰⁷ Moreover, the companion cavalry were a long-standing Macedonian tradition. While Alexander I, given the scarcity of information on Macedonia before his reign, might have created the companion cavalry, he certainly was not responsible for the creation of the *pezhetairoi*. Just as certainly, Alexander III did not create the companion cavalry. Griffith proposes that while Alexander did not create the companion cavalry, nor the Macedonian infantry, he did broaden the *hetairos* relationship to the entire Macedonian heavy cavalry and infantry.²⁰⁸ He notes that both Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F-348) and Demosthenes (2. 19) regard the *pezhetairoi* as a "*corps d'élite*," and that Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F-225) describes the *hetairoi* as numbering "not more than eight hundred men." Yet, early in Alexander's reign

²⁰³ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:707.

²⁰⁴ R. Lock, *The Army of Alexander the Great* (Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 1974) 18–24; N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great, King, Commander and Statesman* (Park Ridge, N.J.: Noyes Press, 1980) 26; P. A. Brunt, "Anaximenes and King Alexander I of Macedon," *JHS* 96 (1976): 151; R. Develin, "Anaximenes (*FGrH* 72) F4," *Historia* 34 (1985): 493–6.

²⁰⁵ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:707–8.

²⁰⁶ "Anaximenes," 51–3. Griffith (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:707) argues that Anaximenes was guilty in this passage of "embellishment."

²⁰⁷ See Anson, "Citizen-soldiers," 247–8.

²⁰⁸ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:708.

the *pezhetairoi* are the heavy infantry and the cavalry *hetairoi*, all of the Macedonian heavy cavalry.²⁰⁹

It is unclear, however, when this expansion took place. Theopompus attaches to his statement concerning the "eight hundred *hetairoi*" the comment "at that time." While Griffith suggests the year 340, nothing compels such a late date.²¹⁰ Even if Theopompus' statement is accurate and to be dated as late as 340, in the last four years of Philip's life he could easily have broadened the *hetairos* relationship to include the entire phalanx and the heavy cavalry. With respect to Alexander the Great, in the less than two years between his father's assassination and his own departure for Asia, he did not introduce much innovation. He kept most of his father's general staff and adhered to Philip's basic organizational system and tactics.²¹¹ It would appear improbable that he would have initiated so broad a reform.

Regardless of how this passage from Anaximenes is interpreted, the true creator of an expanded personal bond with the heavy cavalrymen and of the extension of the *hetairos* relationship to the infantry was Philip II.²¹² It was under Philip that the Macedonian cavalry grew to more than five times its size under his predecessors, and that the Macedonian infantry appeared virtually out of nowhere (Diod. 16. 3. 1-2).²¹³ Ultimately, Philip created a military force of

²⁰⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 1. 28. 3; six references are to infantry *asthetairoi* (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 23. 2; 4. 23. 1; 5. 22. 6; 6. 6. 1; 6. 21. 3; 7. 11. 3). In the various critical editions *asthetairoi* has been emended to *pezhetairoi*, but Bosworth has shown conclusively that the use of the former term was no mistake (see Bosworth, "Ἀσθῆταιροι," 245-6). The exact meaning of the word and its relationship to *pezhetairoi* is debated (*ibid.*, 245-53; Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:709-13). However, both terms obviously note the companion status of the heavy Macedonian infantry.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ G. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London and Boston: Faber & Faber, 1978) 157-60; Heckel, *Marshals*, 3; A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: the Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 6, 10.

²¹² Without evidence Develin ("Anaximenes," 494 n. 7) dismisses Philip as the "actual reformer." Earlier commentators assumed that Philip was the innovator (J. Kaerst, *Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters* [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1901] 1:194; W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948] 2:141).

²¹³ With respect to cavalry, in 358 Philip had six hundred horsemen (Diod. 16. 4. 3). Alexander crossed to Asia with eighteen hundred Macedonian cavalry (Diod. 17. 17. 4), having left fifteen hundred behind in Macedonia (Diod. 17. 17. 5). While Alexander may have added some numbers to the forces he inherited from his father, it is clear that this was basically the army assembled by his father (see following note).

at least thirty-three hundred cavalry and twenty-four thousand infantry.²¹⁴ It would seem logical to connect this overall military expansion to a similar expansion of the *hetairos* relationship. This is especially true, since Philip had already extended the institution to the infantry guard. Cawkwell, noting the similarities between Diodorus 16. 3. 1–2, describing Philip II's reforms, and the fragment from Anaximenes, suggests that the original passage referred to Philip, and that the "lexicographer may have erred in saying that Anaximenes was talking about Alexander . . ."²¹⁵ Additionally, the troops' loyalty to the Argead family appeared more closely connected to their regard for Philip, than to that for his son. When in difficulties with his soldiers at Opis, Alexander had reminded the Macedonians that Philip had brought them prosperity, safety, and power (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 9. 1–5). In the disturbance in Babylon after the great conqueror's death, the troops turned not to Alexander's offspring, nor to his generals, but rather to Alexander's half-brother, Philip's son Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10. 7. 1–10). At the time of his death Alexander's commanders were hostile to Philip's accession to the throne (Curt. 10. 7. 4–5, 8). These commanders were no longer Philip's old generals, but rather those who had risen to power through Alexander.²¹⁶ Apparently, the common soldiers retained their regard for Alexander's father.

A similar situation is clear in the case of Cynane, a daughter of Philip II, and Alexander's half sister. In 321 she had raised her own Macedonian troops (Polyaen. 8. 60), and led them to Asia, where she demanded a marriage between her daughter Adeia and King Philip.²¹⁷ When Cynane was murdered, the royal army rioted and forced their leaders to acquiesce to the marriage.²¹⁸ Cynane was the widow of Amyntas Perdicca, the son of Philip's brother, the former king Perdiccas. Her connection to Philip is clear, but that to Alexander is ephemeral at best. Amyntas was murdered on Alexander's orders (Curt. 6. 9. 17, 10. 24), and Adeia after her marriage changed her

²¹⁴ At Chaeronea Philip's army contained "not less than two thousand cavalry" and thirty thousand infantry (Diod. 16. 85. 5). Alexander took eighteen hundred Macedonian cavalry and twelve thousand Macedonian infantry with him to Asia (Diod. 17. 17. 3–4), leaving behind in Macedonia fifteen hundred cavalry and twelve thousand infantry with his regent Antipater (Diod. 17. 17. 5).

²¹⁵ Philip, 30–3.

²¹⁶ Heckel, *Marshals*, 3, 57.

²¹⁷ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 22–23; Polyaen. 8. 60; cf. Diod. 19. 52. 5.

²¹⁸ Diod. 19. 52. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 22–23; Polyaen. 8. 60.

name to that of Philip II's mother, Eurydice.²¹⁹ Her personal influence was profound. She sparked riots in the royal army (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 31; Diod. 18. 39. 1–2), and was briefly the regent of Macedonia (Just. 14. 5. 1–3; Diod. 19. 11. 1).

During Philip's reign then large numbers of people became his *hetairoi*, his *pezhetairoi*, the inhabitants of his cities and towns. These individuals enjoyed a status quite different from that of those who remained as serfs, bound to their local aristocrat. These holders of king's land became Macedon's "στρατιωτοὶ πολιτικοί" (Diod. 18. 12. 2), that is free men and soldiers.²²⁰ While ethnic ascription continued both to describe geographic residence or origin, status in Macedon was conferred by the king and cemented with land.

²¹⁹ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 23; Polyæn. 8. 60; Diod. 19. 52. 5.

²²⁰ Hammond (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:153, 161–2) has argued that this status, which he calls "Makednic," involved participation in an assembly, but the reality is that being a land holder freed the individual from serf-like status and tied the individual to the king personally. While the king was to be his "companion," the evidence does not support the existence of constitutional institutions that limited the king's authority. On the powers of Macedonian kings, see chapter 2.

CHAPTER EIGHT

A GREEK AMONG MACEDONIANS

If Philip and Alexander's kingdom was ultimately composed of royal landholders and locally self-governing communities, in which lived mixed populations, and where regionalism was virtually non-existent, and nationalism prior to Philip not discernable; where status was ultimately bestowed by the king, and the basic culture was Greek, then, in what sense could Eumenes be an object of discrimination? Further, Eumenes enjoyed a position of prominence as head of the imperial chancellery, the nerve center of the growing domains under the control of the Macedonian monarchs.¹ Eumenes was also one of both Philip's and Alexander's *hetairoi*.² After Alexander's death, Eumenes became a satrap, a confidant of the regent Perdiccas, and ultimately royal general in Asia. He commanded sizable numbers of Macedonian troops beginning with his appointment as general in Asia Minor by Perdiccas in 320 B.C.E. Yet, Eumenes is recorded as personally referring to his handicap as a Greek,³ and modern scholars often refer to the hostility of Macedonians and Greeks towards one another.⁴

As direct evidence for Macedonian hostility towards Greeks during the reigns of Philip and Alexander, few passages, however, can be cited.⁵ Curtius (8. 1. 24) mentions a *sedition* arising among the Macedonian

¹ In general, see H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Munich: Beck, 1926; reprinted New York: Arno Press, 1973) 1:43.

² See Chapter 2, and G. S. Stagakis, Observations on the *Hetairoi* of Alexander the Great, in *Ancient Macedonia I. Papers read at the first international symposium held in Thessaloniki, August 26–29, 1968*, edited by B. Laourdas and Ch. Makaronas (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1970) 98 n. 40.

³ Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1; cf. Diod. 18. 60. 1, 3–4; Nepos. *Eum.* 7. 1–2.

⁴ Ernst Badian, Greeks and Macedonians, in *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, edited by B. Barr-Sharrar and E. Borza, *Studies in the History of Art* 10 (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1982) 36–43; E. N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 96, 280.

⁵ Those cited for the reign of Alexander are collected and commented on by E. Borza, "Greeks and Macedonians in the Age of Alexander: The Source Traditions," in *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C. in honor of E. Badian*, edited by R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996) 131–2.

soldiers and the Greek mercenaries in which Philip was injured, and was only saved by Alexander's direct intervention. But the cause of the conflict is nowhere stated, and no other source even confirms this incident.⁶ Certainly between native troops and mercenaries any number of reasons for disagreement might have arisen. Arrian (*Anab.* 2. 10. 7) in his description of the battle of Issus relates how between the Greek mercenaries serving Persia and the Macedonians there developed a Greek-Macedonian rivalry.⁷ However, the first explanation for the severity of the fighting offered by Arrian is that the Greeks were attempting to salvage a victory and the Macedonians did not want their reputation for invincibility tarnished (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 10. 5-6). In the case of the latter, it would appear that the Macedonian troops were far more concerned with their military reputation than with any ethnic hostility. Besides, certain Greeks participated fully in the Macedonian victory. The Thessalian and Peloponnesian cavalries in particular fought well holding back the Persian left wing.⁸ While they nowhere appear in any author's account of any of Alexander's three great battles against the Persians, there were seven thousand allied Greek hoplites included in the force that crossed to Asia with Alexander (Diod. 17. 17. 3).⁹ Alexander may

⁶ Curtius' account occurs during his telling of the Cleitus incident, in which he presents numerous differences from what is found in Arrian and Plutarch. Indeed, the related events leading to the death of Cleitus are nowhere the same. Curtius (8. 1. 22-52) states that the quarrel began at "*a convivio*", where Alexander belittled the achievements of his father and Parmenio, and Cleitus reproached Alexander for among other things the death of Attalus. In Arrian (*Anab.* 4. 8. 2-6), the incident is connected to a sacrifice to the Dioscuri during which various of Alexander's courtiers express the opinion that Alexander was greater than Castor, Pollux, or even Heracles. Here, it is Cleitus who brings up Philip, declaring that Alexander owed a lot to his father. To this the courtiers respond, but not Alexander. Plutarch (*Alex.* 50) reports the sacrifice to the Dioscuri, but also relates an interrupted sacrifice being performed by Cleitus. Here the cause of initial complaint was a song composed to ridicule the generals who had recently been defeated in Sogdiane (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 4. 5. 2-9; 6. 1-2; Curt. 8. 1. 35). Curtius' *seditio* is related with another incident for which there is also no direct confirmation (Curt. 8. 1. 25).

⁷ Diodorus (17. 33. 2-34. 9) makes no mention of this rivalry or of the role of the Greek mercenaries in the battle.

⁸ Arr. *Anab.* 2. 8. 9, 11. 2; Curt. 3. 11. 14; Diod. 17. 33. 6; these cavalry units had also acquitted themselves well on the Granicus (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 14. 3, 16. 1-2; Diod. 17. 19. 6, 21. 4, cf. 17. 33. 2), and at Gaugamela (Diod. 17. 57. 3-4; Curt. 4. 13. 29, 16. 1-7; Arr. *Anab.* 3. 11. 10).

⁹ At Gaugamela, they may have been stationed with the seven thousand mercenaries who formed a reserve phalanx (A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980] 1:210-1).

not have wanted to test their loyalty, but it is more likely that they simply have been omitted from our surviving accounts.¹⁰ Prior to the battle of Issus, Alexander had not only singled out Macedonian commanders for encouragement, but also mercenaries who were conspicuous for their rank or some excellence (Arr. *Anab.* 2. 10. 2; Curt. 3. 10. 8).

Given that a sizable number of the Greek mercenaries in Persian employ had probably been exiled from their cities as a direct result of Philip's and Alexander's campaigns, there was probably considerable hostility between these Greeks and Alexander's forces. On the Granicus, Thessalians, Athenians, and Thebans were among those captured by Alexander's forces.¹¹ For Philip's former troops these battles against Greek mercenaries in Asia may have been seen as continuations of Chaeronea,¹² or, following their king's own propaganda, they may have perceived the Persian campaign as a war of Greeks against barbarians, and any Greek fighting on the Persian side as a traitor to all Greeks (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 6–7, 27. 5–6). With respect to the crusade against Persia, Macedonians are on occasion included as Greeks. After his victory on the Granicus, Alexander, along with the offering to Athena that he sent to Athens, included the inscription, "Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, except the Lacedaemonians, these spoils from the barbarians of Asia" (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 7).

One of the most often cited examples of hostility between Greeks and Macedonians comes from the accounts of the combat between the Athenian Dioxippus and the Macedonian Corragus in 326/325 B.C.E.¹³ Corragus, emboldened by drink, during one of Alexander's

¹⁰ Neither Arrian, nor any other source provides an exhaustive review of troop dispositions for any of the battles. The only two references to specific Greek infantry units with Alexander's forces occur in the description of the battle at Gaugamela. Those called the old mercenaries are found on the right wing (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 12. 2; these are, perhaps, veterans of service with Philip, see H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933] 188), and on the left the Achaean mercenaries (Diod. 17. 57. 4; cf. Parke, *Soldiers*, 190).

¹¹ Alexander apparently freed immediately the Thebans he captured, but sent to Macedonia to perform hard labor the surrendered Thessalians and Athenians (Plut. *Mor.* 181B; Arr. *Anab.* 1. 29. 5; 3. 6. 2). After Issus, Alexander discovered prominent Athenians and Spartans in the Persian camp (Curt. 3. 13. 15).

¹² Alexander before the battle at Issus encouraged his Macedonian troops by reminding them of their victory over the Athenians and Boeotians, of their destruction of Thebes, and of their triumph on the Granicus (Curt. 3. 10. 7).

¹³ Diod. 17. 100. 2–101. 2; Curt. 9. 7. 16–23.

famous banquets, had challenged the professional Olympic pancratist, Dioxippus, to single combat.¹⁴ A time was fixed and the contest was held before the entire army. While Diodorus reports that the Macedonians supported Corragus, and the Greeks, Dioxippus (17. 100. 4), Curtius states that the majority of the soldiers, including the Greeks, supported the Athenian (9. 7. 19). It should be noted that most of these Greeks were again mercenaries; the Greek allies having been sent home or enlisted as mercenaries in 330 (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 19. 5–6). The Athenian's victory dismayed the Macedonians and was hailed by the Greeks (Diod. 17. 101. 2; Curt. 9. 7. 23). On closer examination it is apparent that Dioxippus by his victory incurred the wrath of Alexander's friends and all the Macedonians associated with the court, who were jealous of Dioxippus' accomplishment and plotted to destroy him (Diod. 17. 101. 3–4). Alexander, in particular, was upset that the Persians had witnessed this defeat of a vaunted Macedonian (Curt. 9. 7. 23). The victory was hailed by those of the same race (Diod. 17. 101. 2). That the Greeks would rejoice at the victory is not surprising. As noted, many had been defeated by the Macedonian king, and while they now served him, they still felt the stings of the defeats at his hands of their cities, or in certain cases of themselves personally. However, Dioxippus' victory apparently had no lasting effect on the Macedonian soldiers who witnessed the contest. While Curtius states that the Macedonians were saddened by the defeat of their compatriot (9. 7. 23), Diodorus notes the crowd's general enthusiasm over the skill and speed of the Athenian's victory (17. 101. 1). Clearly most of the rank-and-file, whether Greek or Macedonian appreciated the victor's skill.

Other incidents offered to demonstrate the racial antagonism between the Greeks and Macedonians likewise offer but poor evidence. Even in the struggle that resulted in Philip's victory at Chaeronea, only the Athenians, Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and Phocians actively joined the Greek side,¹⁵ the Thessalians, Messenians, and Eleans allied themselves with Philip (Paus. 4. 28. 2; 5. 4. 9), while

¹⁴ Dioxippus won the pancration in 336 (see Luigi Moretti, *Olympionikai, i vincitori negli antichi agoni Olimpici, Memorie (Accademia nazionale dei Lincei. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* 8, ser. 8, fasc. 2 [Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 1957] 125–6 [#458]).

¹⁵ Dem. 18. 237; Paus. 10. 3. 3; *GHI* 2:231–2 [#178].

the Arcadians, Argives, and Spartans, among others, remained neutral.¹⁶ A similar situation arose in the Lamian War. While the coalition here was larger than that which had fought against Philip at Chaeronea, there were still notable exceptions (cf. Diod. 18. 11. 1).¹⁷ The Arcadians and Spartans again remained neutral (Paus. 8. 6. 2), and the Euboeans and Boeotians actively joined the Macedonians (Paus. 1. 25. 4; Hyp. 6. 11). The actions of the latter are especially instructive with respect to the full implications of Greek ethnicity. The Boeotians sided with the Macedonians, because they feared the Athenians would found a colony on the former site of Thebes (Paus. 1. 25. 4). They preferred Macedonian suzerainty to the mere possibility of Athenian domination. Moreover, the war was fought not out of hatred for the Macedonians, but rather for freedom (Hyp. 6. 10, 11, 13, 16). Even Demosthenes rarely attacked the Macedonians as a people, but rather turned his hostility against their king.¹⁸ On occasion, Demosthenes even commiserated with the former on their oppression under Philip's authority (Dem. 2. 16–18).

Other claims of Greek-Macedonian hostility come from incidents involving Alexander's Greek colonists in Asia. On two occasions Greeks from the upper satrapies chose to leave their new homes and attempt to return to Greece. In 325, while Alexander was recovering from a wound, three thousand Greeks, who had been settled in Bactria and Sogdiane, revolted from the Macedonians and began to march home (Diod. 17. 99. 5; Curt. 9. 7. 1–11).¹⁹ Ethnic hostility is nowhere mentioned as the cause for the rebellion, only the desire to return to Greece is offered. Curtius (9. 7. 1) even states that the revolt did not arise because of hostility toward Alexander. While Diodorus describes the action as a revolt against the Macedonians,

¹⁶ Paus. 8. 6. 2; Dem. 18. 64; 19. 261; see J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976) 293 n. 62.

¹⁷ Diod. 18. 9. 4–11. 3; Paus. 1. 25. 4; Hyp. 6. 13.

¹⁸ Dem. 1. 7, 12; 2. 5, 9; 3. 1–2, 14, 16, 20; 4. 4–5; 6. 1, 6; 7. 10; 8. 31, 43, 46, 55, 56; 9. 1, 6, 65, 71, 72; 10. 2, 10, 15, 19, 49, 57, 58, 62, 68; 11. 5, 10; 15. 24; 18. 31, 48, 63, 66, 68, 90, 93, 144, 158, 163, 164, 181, 200, 231, 235, 300; 19. 9, 10, 30, 50, 53, 56, 62, 77, 79, 92, 156, 300, 302, 338; 23. 116, 121; cf. Aes. 1. 67; 2. 14, 58, 79; 3. 54, 66, 73. The Macedonians are only denigrated by Demosthenes on three occasions (17. 20, 22, 26).

¹⁹ On this incident, see L. Schober, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Babyloniens und der Oberen Satrapien von 323–303 v. Chr.* (Frankfurt and Bern: Peter D. Lang, 1981) 27–32; F. L. Holt, *Alexander the Great and Bactria. The Formation of a Greek Frontier in Central Asia*, *Mnemosyne* 104, *Supplementum* (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1988) 84–5.

he further emphasizes that their discontent was with their new homes amongst barbarians, i.e. Bactrians and Sogdians (Diod. 17. 99. 5). Curtius presents the insurrection as a complicated affair. In his account the revolt begins as a disagreement amongst the colonists themselves over returning to Greece, in which there were many Greek casualties (9. 7. 1–9). Greeks even from the same city-state were at odds with one another (Curt. 9. 7. 3–4).²⁰ Moreover, many of these colonists had been separated from the army by Alexander because of their insubordination (Just. 12. 5. 13). While little is known of the origins of these Greek mercenaries, it is probable that they were troops acquired from the defeat of the Persians, and, perhaps, even from the defeated forces of Agis and Sparta as well, and incorporated into Alexander's army.²¹ For the upcoming campaigns Alexander would want to keep with him troops who had proven their loyalty. Justin's reference to malcontents and the strong possibility that Alexander was settling many of his former Greek adversaries in this region would certainly help explain the revolt. This was also a difficult region to pacify, as shown by the rebellion that occurred in 329, which saw the massacre of many of the Graeco-Macedonian settlers (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 1. 4–5; Curt. 7. 6. 13–15).

The other cited incident involving a revolt of Greeks left in Alexander's eastern Asian foundations occurs after Alexander's death in 323 (Diod. 18. 7). Once again the location is the upper satrapies and the cause of the insurrection is the longing to return to Greece. The desire of the Greeks is again understandable; stuck in the middle of nowhere, they missed their old manner of life (Diod. 18. 7. 1), and Alexander was dead and the future of his empire in doubt.²² As in the earlier uprising, there is no indication of pent up antagonism towards the Macedonians. Indeed, these settlements probably contained small numbers of Macedonians.²³ What is remarkable is

²⁰ According to Diodorus (17. 99.6) these Greeks were massacred after Alexander's death, but it is clear that Diodorus is associating this insurrection with the revolt in 323 (Diod. 18. 4. 7; 7. 1–2), for Curtius (9. 7. 11) records that they did eventually return to Greece (accepted by N. G. L. Hammond, in Hammond and F. W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988] 3:84). However, Holt (*Bactria*, 85 and n. 143) accepts Diodorus's testimony and sees a linkage between this massacre and the later rebellion.

²¹ See Holt, *Bactria*, 78–9.

²² The earlier uprising was, as noted, triggered by a false report of Alexander's death.

²³ Justin does not identify the ethnicity of the malcontents, and the repeated ref-

the large number of those who joined this revolt, given that at least three thousand settlers from this general area had already withdrawn in the earlier uprising. Diodorus (18. 7. 2) reports that this rebel force amounted to twenty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry. While Diodorus emphasizes the military nature of these individuals, many may have been former camp followers who had been part of the original settlements and were equally discontented with their situation.²⁴ In this second revolt, Perdiccas, the new regent, decided to stop their march and make an example of the participants (Diod. 18. 7. 3–4). The rebels were defeated by a mixed force of three thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry from the ranks of Perdiccas's Macedonians, and ten thousand infantry and eight thousand horsemen supplied by the satraps of the upper satrapies, all under the command of the regent's lieutenant, Pithon (Diod. 18. 7. 3). The troops from the upper satrapies were likely a mix of Asiatics and Greeks, with the vast majority being Asiatic.²⁵ While Diodorus (18. 7. 8–9) states that all the Greek rebels were executed after their surrender by the Macedonians, this was not done as the result of ethnic animosity.²⁶ Even though, according to Diodorus, Perdiccas had given the order because he did not trust Pithon, the more likely explanation is that he wanted to prevent any further

erences to soldiers ἀπόμαχοι (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 22. 5; 7. 24. 7), suggests that others than Greeks were included. That the revolts are called Greek would not be evidence for the absence of other groups, since the majority of those left in these colonies were former Greek mercenaries.

²⁴ Camp followers had been part of the original settlements (Diod. 17. 83. 2; Curt. 7. 3. 23; Arr. *Anab.* 3.28. 4).

²⁵ No source gives the ethnic or regional breakdown of these troops. One indication of the nature of the forces under the command of the satraps of the upper provinces, comes from a listing of the forces brought by Peucestas when he joined Eumenes' forces in 316. Peucestas brought three thousand infantry of every nationality, six hundred Greek and Thracian cavalry, and more than four hundred Persian horsemen (Diod. 19. 14. 5). Included in his infantry force was probably a contingent of Greek mercenaries, but how many can only be guessed. In 316, Eumenes joined with the satraps of the upper provinces, and, after the amalgamation of their respective forces, had a total force of thirty-five thousand infantry. Of these, six thousand were Greek mercenaries with, perhaps, others contained in five thousand troops with Macedonian equipment of all races (*ethne*) (Diod. 19. 27. 6). Little more than three thousand were Macedonians, the argyraspids (Diod. 19. 28. 1). Most of these Greek mercenaries were those Eumenes had recruited prior to his march to the upper satrapies. Eumenes had enlisted ten thousand Greek mercenaries in Cilicia (Diod. 18. 61. 5).

²⁶ Schober (*Untersuchungen*, 35–6, and n. 2) and Holt (*Bactria*, 88–90) believe that

risings against the authority of the central government.²⁷ Perdiccas was noted for violent reprisals for what he saw as insubordination. After the brief conflict between the cavalry and infantry in Babylon, he had executed the ringleaders (Curt. 10. 9. 18; Diod. 18. 4. 7–8).²⁸ The Macedonians carried out the order, over Pithon's objections, in order to gain the Greeks' possessions (Diod. 18. 7. 9). Perdiccas had promised them the right to the rebels' belongings (Diod. 18. 7. 5).

Modern historians are divided in their estimations of the loyalty of the Greek mercenaries in Macedonian employ. These troops are on

the number of the slain in the massacre is an exaggeration. They argue that there was likely a round up of leaders for execution, but not a wholesale slaughter. While undoubtedly numbers of rebels fled the battle without bothering to surrender, and others died fighting and in the subsequent flight, those who did surrender were executed. The text is very clear. Additionally, the so-called prologue to Trogus's Book Thirteen, states that all the rebels were killed by Pithon. The actual number killed was likely thousands more than the three thousand suggested by both Schober and Holt. Whether killed in battle, in flight, or in the massacre, there apparently was not a great number of Greek mercenaries left in the eastern satrapies afterwards (see the previous note). This may have been an additional motive for the massacre. With his control of the royal army Perdiccas did not need additional troops, and was probably reluctant to leave so many mercenaries available for employment by others.

²⁷ Diodorus's claim that the order to kill the rebels was the result of the regent's distrust of the commander to whom he had given the assignment to crush this rebellion is doubtful. Why would Perdiccas assign to an officer that he did not trust such a sizable force and such an important command? Schober (*Untersuchungen*, 33 n. 2) and Hammond (Hammond and Walbank, *Macedonia*, 3:117) suggest that Pithon was chosen for the command by an army assembly and not by the regent. Diodorus's unemended text makes this a possibility, but the entire context has the regent making the decisions. It is Perdiccas who determines to stop the movement of the Greeks west; it is Perdiccas who chooses the method of selection of the troops for this campaign; it is Perdiccas who decides to execute the rebels. It would be peculiar to leave all decisions to Perdiccas except the selection of the commander. It makes greater sense to emend the passage to bring it into correspondence with the general thrust of the citation. The most likely explanation for Pithon's selection is that at the time Perdiccas was unaware of his ambitions. This claimed desire on his part to become ruler of the upper satrapies (Diod. 18. 7. 4) appears to foreshadow his actual attempt to realize this goal in 317 (Diod. 19. 14. 1–2). Pithon from 320 on was Eumenes' enemy. Hieronymus may here be attempting to blacken Pithon's memory still further, by showing that his infidelity was a character trait (see Holt, *Bactria*, 90 n. 12). It is also possible that Hieronymus heard later rumors about Pithon's early ambitions. In any case it is clear that the origin of this charge is Hieronymus. Diodorus (18. 7. 4) uses the word ἰδιοπραγεῖν to describe Pithon's action. This term is one used by Diodorus only in Book 18, and very rare in Greek literature in general, and almost certainly derived from his source for this book, Hieronymus of Cardia (J. Palm, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien: Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der hellenistischen Prosa* [Lund: Gleerup, 1955] 109).

²⁸ Perdiccas is described in the sources as φονικός (Diod. 18. 33. 3; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27; Nepos *Eum.* 2. 3; Just. 13. 8. 2).

the one hand described as trustworthy,²⁹ but on the other as troublesome and disloyal.³⁰ There may, indeed, be no contradiction in these seemingly conflicting opinions. Many of these mercenaries had come to Asia with Alexander and had proven their loyalty.³¹ Arrian (*Anab.* 5. 27. 4–5, 8) has Coenus on the Hyphasis speak of the shared sufferings of the Greeks and Macedonians. While this speech undoubtedly owes much to the rhetorical embellishments of Arrian himself, it probably reflects a contemporary and eyewitness source, Ptolemy, son of Lagus (*Arr. Anab.* 5. 28. 4).³² In the conflict between the infantry and the cavalry after Alexander's death, Pasius the Thessalian and Amisus of Megalopolis, served as two of the three negotiators for the infantry in the discussions with the cavalry (*Curt.* 10. 8. 15). The prominence of these latter two individuals, who were most likely commanders of mercenaries,³³ indicates that perhaps many Greek mercenaries had joined their Macedonian counterparts and been involved in the initial rioting that followed Alexander's death. Mercenaries coming to the expedition under different circumstances would be understandably less loyal. Ethnicity was a factor, but not in the sense of Greeks versus Macedonians. Those mercenaries, who had resisted Philip and later Alexander, either in Greece or in Asia, would view the Macedonians as paymasters, for they had no other, but would nurture no love for them. During the period of the Successors

²⁹ G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Chicago: Cambridge University Press, 1935; reprinted Chicago: Ares Press, 1975) 15–16, 26.

³⁰ Holt, *Bactria*, 78.

³¹ *Arr. Anab.* 3. 19. 5–6; cf. 6. 13. 5.

³² Arrian in the preface to his *Anabasis* (pref. 1; cf. 6. 2. 4) states that his history is primarily based on the works of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, and wherever he is using a different source, he so indicates as λεγόμενα (pref. 3). No such indication appears for Coenus' speech.

³³ Waldemar Heckel in the penguin translation of Curtius (Introduction, in *Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander*; translated by John Yardley; with an introduction and notes by Waldemar Heckel [Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1984] 299 n. 43) suggests that Amisus may be an error for Damis, who was a Megalopolitan veteran of Alexander's campaigns and who conducted the defense of Megalopolis during Polyperchon's siege in 318 (*Diod.* 18. 71. 2). These two Greek negotiators could be from the ranks of the Greek courtiers, but it would appear unlikely. The courtiers were the individuals most supportive of Alexander's Persianization policies (*Arr. Anab.* 4. 10. 5; *Plut. Alex.* 51. 4; 53. 4–6), the very policies the infantry most abhorred (*Arr. Anab.* 7. 8. 2–3). Mercenary units, however, would be led in most cases by their recruiters (see P. Briant, *D'Alexandre le grand aux Diadoques; le cas d'Eumene de Kardia* (Suite et fin.), *REA* 75 [1973]: 56), and these Greek negotiators were probably mercenary commanders.

even the distinction between Macedonians and mercenaries had become blurred. In 320, Craterus had twenty thousand infantry, mostly Macedonian (Diod. 18. 30. 4), and Eumenes' phalanx was composed of men of many races (Diod. 18. 30. 4). Prior to the battle of Paraetacene, Antigonos's army included eight thousand Macedonians and eight thousand mixed troops in Macedonian equipment (Diod. 19. 29. 3), and at Gabene, Eumenes had in his phalanx five thousand men of many races (*ethnê*) armed with Macedonian equipment (Diod. 19. 27. 6).³⁴

What is surprising is how few incidents can even be suggested as showing ethnic hostility between Greeks and Macedonians. More incidents can be produced for the hostility of the Arcadians and the Achaeans towards the other Greek participants in the aftermath of Cyrus's expedition of 401.³⁵ Poleis on the Greek mainland, formerly free, but now having to follow Macedonian foreign policy would continue to trouble the Macedonians, but Greek cities on the islands and in Asia most often readily joined Alexander. Given the scarcity of evidence for animosity between the Macedonians and the Greeks, it is interesting to note the abundance of testimony for Macedonian hostility towards Asians. At Opis in 324, in response to Alexander's announcement to the assembled army that he was discharging most of his Macedonian veterans, many soldiers voiced their pent up frustrations with Alexander's policies respecting his new Persian subjects. The troops were indignant over Alexander's adoption of Persian dress, the outfitting of a Persian unit in Macedonian equipment, and the incorporation of Persians in the elite companion cavalry. They also believed that they were to be replaced by orientals and the permanent seat of the empire was to be established in Asia.³⁶ In the conclave that followed Alexander's death, the Macedonian soldiers had shown hostility towards all nominees for the succession put for-

³⁴ R. Lock (*The Army of Alexander the Great* (Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 1974) 134-7) argues that Philip and Alexander routinely added Greeks to their infantry units; Philip from the populations of newly acquired territories, Alexander from his mercenaries, and that there was little evidence of hostility amongst these troops. While the integration of Greek and Macedonian infantry is apparent in the immediate period following Alexander's death, unfortunately, there is little evidence that such amalgamation took place during Alexander's lifetime. It is, however, likely, given how rapidly such integration occurred after his death.

³⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 5. 6. 27; 6. 2. 4-12, 16; 7. 6. 8-10.

³⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 1-2; Plut. *Alex.* 71; Curt. 10. 2. 8-12; in Babylon, Asiatic troops were incorporated into Macedonian units (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 23. 3).

ward who were of partial Asiatic ancestry (cf. Curt. 10. 6. 13–14). The candidacy of Alexander's three or four-year old son, Heracles, the result of an informal liaison with Barsine, had been rejected by the soldiers with a clashing of spears on shields (Curt. 10. 6. 10–12), and the proposal that a final decision await the birth of Alexander's child by his Sogdian wife Roxane was likewise rejected (Curt. 10. 6. 13; Just. 13. 2. 6).³⁷ In the civil strife that followed this meeting, it was not only the cavalry who opposed the infantry, but the Asian troops, who numbered over fifty thousand, were also arrayed against them.³⁸ While the sources only speak of Macedonian anger at the increasing Persianization of Alexander's court and the incorporation of Asiatic forces in Alexander's army (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 2–3, 11. 1, 3), the Greek mercenaries certainly shared their views. While many Greeks had long served in Persian armies, they had always done so in exclusively Greek units, and while on occasion formally under a Persian commander, their actual captains were Greek officers, usually their recruiters.³⁹ Unfortunately, there is little material treating the attitudes of the common Greek mercenary in Persian employ other

³⁷ Subsequently, Roxane did give birth to a son who became Alexander IV and ruled in a joint monarchy with his father's half brother, Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10. 1; Just. 13. 2. 5; Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 8; see R. M. Errington, *From Babylon to Tripuradeisos: 323–320 B.C.*, *JHS* 90 [1970]: 56).

³⁸ In 330, twenty-six hundred Lydian infantry had joined Alexander's forces (Curt. 6. 6. 35). At Susa in 324, thirty thousand Iranians were added (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 6. 1; Diod. 17. 108. 1; Plut. *Alex.* 71), and an additional Persian force of twenty thousand, plus large numbers of Cossaeans and Tapurians were brought to Babylon in 323 by Peucestas (Arr. *Anab.* 7. 23. 1–4; Diod. 17. 110. 2). While it is not definitely stated that these troops joined the cavalry and withdrew from Babylon, all indications suggest that they must have done so. The twenty thousand Persians were under the command of the noble Peucestas and had only recently arrived. Further, the hostility demonstrated by the Macedonians at Opis towards Asiatic troops (Curt. 10. 2. 12–4. 3; Arr. *Anab.* 7. 8. 1–11. 9; Diod. 17. 109. 1–3; Just. 12. 11. 1–12. 12; Plut. *Alex.* 71) would tell against their active cooperation with the Asians during this crisis.

³⁹ At the siege of Perinthus, the Persian mercenary contingent was commanded by Apollodorus, an Athenian (Paus. 1. 29. 10); Memnon of Rhodes commanded the mercenaries against Philip's advance force in Asia in 336 (Polyaen. 5. 44. 4; Diod. 17. 9. 10); at Issus, the Greek mercenaries are under the command of Thymondas of Rhodes (Curt. 3. 9. 2); at Gaugamela, the Greeks were led by Paron of Phocis and Glaucus of Aetolia (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 2; cf. 3. 11. 7). The apparent exception to the rule is the Persian Omars' command of the Greek mercenaries on the Granicus (Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 3; Diod. 17. 19. 6), instead of their previous commander Memnon. In any case, Omars was only in overall command, the individual units were in all probability under Greek officers (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1. 7. 1; 2. 2. 3–5). In general, see Parke, *Soldiers*, 23–43, 105–13, 165–70, 177–85.

than Xenophon's *Anabasis*. Yet, here the general feeling of ethnic superiority is clear,⁴⁰ echoing the words of Euripides, Hellenes should rule barbarians, but not barbarians Hellenes, those being slaves, while these are free (*IA*, 1400).⁴¹

Alexander's limited use of Greeks in the administration of his empire is also seen as reflective of a general hostility towards Greeks by Macedonians.⁴² This bias then assured that after Alexander's death only native Macedonians would succeed to his legacy. In truth, neither group was as monolithic as the dichotomy implies and the relationship between those native to Macedonia and those from the Greek *poleis* was strongly influenced by internal class and political divisions. It is generally taken as a given that Philip did not use Greek officers to command troops; only six individuals, all Macedonians, are directly identified as leading the king's forces during his reign.⁴³ While this is hardly conclusive evidence for the exclusive use of Macedonians as battalion commanders, the army that Alexander led to Asia, still very much the army of his father, likewise had a dearth of non-Macedonian commanders.

Later in his expedition Alexander did employ Greeks as military leaders. Erigyius, a Mytilenian (Diod. 17. 57. 3), commanded the allied cavalry,⁴⁴ and occasionally, infantry allies and mercenaries;⁴⁵ Nearchus, a native of the island of Crete,⁴⁶ commanded light infantry (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 30. 5–6) and the fleet;⁴⁷ Eumenes was a commander of the Companions, the aristocratic cavalry of Macedonia.⁴⁸ While Erigyius had commanded allied cavalry and non-Macedonian infantry, and Nearchus had led light-armed troops in India, the commands of Macedonian infantry were all held during Alexander's reign by native Macedonian aristocrats. Of the fifty-two persons listed as satraps in Alexander's reign, only three were indisputably Greeks, and none of

⁴⁰ Xen. *Anab.* 1. 3. 5, 7. 3; 2. 6. 26–31.

⁴¹ As noted in Chapter 7, certain fourth-century Greeks speak of the natural and hereditary hatred between Greeks and barbarians (Isoc. 4. 157, 184; 12. 163; Pl. *Rep.* 470C; Dem. 19. 312).

⁴² Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians", 39.

⁴³ See E. M. Anson, "Discrimination and Eumenes of Cardia", *AncW* 3 (1980): 55–9.

⁴⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 6, 11. 10; cf. Diod. 17. 17. 4.

⁴⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 1. 14. 3; 3. 6. 6, 28. 2; Curt. 7. 3. 2–3. Curtius (8. 2. 40) refers to Erigyius as "*inter claros duces*" at his death in 328/7.

⁴⁶ Arr. *Ind.* 18. 10; Diod. 19. 69. 1; Polyæn. 5. 35.

⁴⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 6. 2. 3; *Ind.* 18. 10.

⁴⁸ Plut. *Eum.* 1. 1, 5; Nepos *Eum.* 1. 1.

these was a mainland Greek. Nearchus was governor of Lycia and Pamphylia,⁴⁹ Stasanor, governor of Aria and Drangiane (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 29. 5), and Cleomenes, governor of Arabia (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 5. 4), and probably Egypt.⁵⁰ Greek *hetairoi* were apparently limited to responsibilities at the royal court, or, in the military sphere, mostly to the command of non-Macedonian units. This policy of regional recruitment and command changes dramatically during Alexander's long campaign in Asia, when commanders were often reassigned without regard to regional origin. The further Alexander moved both actually and conceptually from Macedonia the less he relied on the old-line Macedonian aristocracy. Few Greeks, however, benefitted from the changes brought with Alexander's conquests. This was the result of a combination of factors. Alexander's army was until the victory at Gaugamela still primarily the traditional Macedonian levy with Macedonian aristocratic officers. Alexander's army of invasion included relatively few Greek military commanders, and in 330, when the allied contingents of the League of Corinth were dismissed, most of these returned to Greece (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 19. 5–6). Few accompanying Greek *hetairoi* had military expertise. Nor was this their traditional role in Macedonia. Of the 834 persons listed in H. Berve's *Das Alexanderreich*, only 149 Greeks are associated with Alexander's train.⁵¹ Of these, 69 are court figures not associated with administration in any capacity. They include philosophers, actors, athletes, etc. Only 53 are directly associated with the military; 22 of whom are connected with the forces of the Greek allies dismissed in 330 B.C.E., 14 others held naval appointments.⁵² Eumenes of Cardia is the single Greek who commands a Macedonian unit during Alexander's reign.⁵³

The limited use of Greeks was not the result of prejudice on the part of the Macedonian monarchs. Neither Philip, nor Alexander, made any social distinction between native Macedonian and Greek

⁴⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 6; Just. 13. 4. 15.

⁵⁰ See Chapter 3, note 49.

⁵¹ Berve, *Alexanderreich*, vol. 2.

⁵² These data were collected and shared by E. Borza in "Ethnicity and Career Tracks at Alexander's Court", paper delivered at the AHA-PCB meeting (Salt Lake City, Utah, July 14, 1986) and subsequently published in a revised version as "Ethnicity and Cultural Policy at Alexander's Court", *AncW* 22 (1991): 21–5.

⁵³ Against Berve's (*Alexanderreich*, 2:269–272 [#544]) and R. A. Billows's (*Antigonos the One-eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990], 407) claim that Nearchus on one occasion commanded the hypaspists, see E. Badian, Nearchus the Cretan, *JCS* 24 (1975): 152–3.

hetairoi.⁵⁴ While Alexander only employed Greeks in a limited manner in his administration, he was restricted in their use by his need to assuage the native nobility.⁵⁵ As noted, the military structure of the army that Alexander inherited from his father was the traditional one of Macedonia, i.e. with the exception of the hypaspists, the king's personal guard,⁵⁶ and while the regular infantry, the *pezhetairoi*, were the king's companions, these infantry units were recruited territorially and most often under the command of local, albeit loyal, aristocrats.⁵⁷ This was a situation not unlike that seen in the recruiting of mercenary forces. In 401 B.C.E., the Persian Cyrus's Greek forces were made up of units under the command of their Greek recruiters (Xen. *Anab.* 1. 1. 9–2. 1). Alexander was bent on conquest, he had no intention of Hellenizing the East. He would use the resources available for his purpose without taking any risk for the sake of broader aims. As so many scholars have now demonstrated, Alexander pursued no sweeping ideals.⁵⁸

What is most curious concerning the entire argument for Macedonian prejudice against Greeks is that the career of Eumenes of Cardia is its centerpiece.⁵⁹ I would turn this argument around and say that Eumenes is the proof that such an all encompassing prejudice did not exist. In Alexander's lifetime, Eumenes was appointed as commander of Perdikkas's former hipparchy of the elite Companion Cavalry, when that officer was promoted chiliarch (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 5;

⁵⁴ Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians", 39.

⁵⁵ As Borza (*Olympus*, 238–9) points out, while the king's power was unrestrained by constitutional restrictions, he was limited by the presence of potential rivals within his family and especially by the power of the nobility.

⁵⁶ See E. M. Anson, "The Hypaspists: Macedonia's professional citizen-soldiers", *Historia* 34 (1985): 246–8.

⁵⁷ R. Milns, "The Army of Alexander the Great", in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité: 7 exposés suivis de discussions/par A. B. Bosworth... [et al.], avec la participation de Denis van Berchem... [et al.]; entretiens préparés par E. Badian, présidés par Denis van Berchem*, Vandœuvres-Genève, 25–30 août 1975 (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1976) 101, 103–4.

⁵⁸ E. Badian, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind", *Historia* 7 (1958): 425–44; B. Bosworth, Alexander and the Iranians, *JHS* 100 (1980): 1–21; Borza, "Ethnicity", 21–5.

⁵⁹ E. Borza states that ethnic prejudice against Eumenes is manifest (*Olympus*, 263 n. 31, cf. 280). See also A. Vezin, *Eumenes von Kardia: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit* (Münster: Druck und Verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1907) 125–6; H. D. Westlake, Eumenes of Cardia, in *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History*, edited by H. D. Westlake (Manchester: Manchester University Press; New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969) 321; E. Badian, "A King's Notebooks", *HSCP* 72 (1967): 203; J. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 9.

Nepos *Eum.* 1. 6). In 323, he was assigned the satrapy of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia;⁶⁰ in 320, this satrapy was extended to include general supervision of all of Asia Minor.⁶¹ In 320, having defeated the forces of the Macedonian aristocrat, Neoptolemus, that commander's Macedonians readily enrolled for service with Eumenes.⁶² While the Macedonians in Egypt after the regent Perdiccas's assassination sentenced Eumenes to death, they also condemned other prominent and very Macedonian supporters of the former leader. Moreover, Eumenes' own Macedonian troops in Asia Minor were incensed by the actions of the forces in Egypt and voted him a personal bodyguard (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11; Just. 14. 1. 9–10). These same troops also ignored the offers from prominent Macedonian commanders of a substantial reward for Eumenes' murder (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11). Eumenes was later offered a share in the Macedonian regency for Alexander's heirs (Diod. 18. 57. 3), and he did become royal general in Asia (Diod. 18. 58. 1). Eumenes was certainly different from the majority of Alexander's commanders in his success. Very few native Macedonian aristocrats acquired the position and power that Eumenes achieved. In the final analysis, this Greek came very close to dominating all of Alexander's Asian conquests.⁶³

In one respect Eumenes was very different from the native Macedonian nobility. His position in Macedonia was dictated entirely by his relationship to the king. He was one of the king's *hetairoi*. While Eumenes was certainly one of Philip's *hetairoi*,⁶⁴ his administrative position at court, as opposed to a military or a purely advisory one, limited his prestige among the other companions. These aristocrats preferred their relationship with the king to be entirely personal, akin to familial relations, and their services to him to be primarily military and only secondarily administrative. Eumenes did not possess hereditary lands and the family powers which went with such possession.⁶⁵ He had come to Macedonia as an exile from his home city.⁶⁶ The

⁶⁰ Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5; 1b. 2; Diod. 18. 3. 1; Curt. 10. 10. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 3. 3; Just. 13. 4. 16.

⁶¹ Diod. 18. 29. 1–3; Just. 13. 6. 14–15; Nepos *Eum.* 3. 2; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2.

⁶² Diod. 18. 29. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5; cf. Arr. *Succ.* 1. 27.

⁶³ Anson, "Discrimination", 55–9.

⁶⁴ See Chapter 2, note 40.

⁶⁵ Cf. W. K. Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968) 25–32, 47–8, 53–68.

⁶⁶ See Chapter 2.

residual power of the family in Macedonian society was strong; the blood-feud was still in evidence in the late fourth century (Curt. 6. 11. 20; cf. Diod. 19. 51). Antigonus Monophthalmus made extensive use of his extended family.⁶⁷ Even though many of these Upper Macedonian nobles were given land in Lower Macedonia by Philip (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 4), these men still retained strong ties to their previous domains,⁶⁸ and while Philip had given land to many common Macedonians living in these Macedonian cantons assuring their loyalty to the monarchy, still many would have retained their traditional ties to the local aristocracy. Eumenes had been given land in Lower Macedonia by Philip, but that monarch could not manufacture blood ties for him.⁶⁹ Moreover, many of these native-born nobles were related to each other and to the royal family.⁷⁰ Marriage alliances between the royal family and the noble houses of Macedonia were frequent; at least, dating from the reign of Alexander I.⁷¹ These nobles were *hetairoi* because of their position and power; Greeks became powerful in Macedonia because of their being made *hetairoi*. Consequently, even though Eumenes' position was one of great responsibility, it was not highly regarded by the Macedonian nobility (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6, 20. 6). This prejudice against the position of secretary is echoed in the comments attributed to Neoptolemus, the one-time commander of the hypaspists,⁷² concerning Eumenes: "He (Neoptolemus) had followed the King with shield and spear, but Eumenes with pen and paper . . ." (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6).

Amongst the native Macedonian nobility there was clearly a sense of superiority over all others whatever their origin or position. In

⁶⁷ P. Wheatley, "The Young Demetrius Poliorcetes", *AHB* 13 (1999): 4.

⁶⁸ Perdikkas was from Orestis (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 5) and descended from the former kings of Orestis (Curt. 10. 7. 8; N. G. L. Hammond, in Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979] 2:396. 427); he even commanded a battalion of the *pezhetairoi* recruited from Orestis and Lyncestis (Diod. 17. 57. 2). Both Coenus (J. E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: Books 3 and 4* [Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1980] 209) and Polyperchon (*ibid.*, 423) may have commanded battalions from their home regions.

⁶⁹ The *hetairoi* were typically endowed with large tracts of land in Lower Macedonia (Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:352–3, 409–10). While this is not specifically stated with regard to Eumenes, it is likely.

⁷⁰ Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:14–22; Ellis, *Philip II*, 59–60.

⁷¹ Schol. Thuc. 1. 57. 3; cf. Ellis, *Philip II*, 37. Philip II's wife, Phila, was from Upper Macedonia (*ibid.*, 211–12; Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:19).

⁷² Neoptolemus succeeded Nicanor in 330 (see Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:273, 275 [#548, 554]).

320, the aristocratic Macedonian officers Neoptolemus and Alcetas, although ordered by Perdiccas to obey Eumenes, ignored the latter's commands (Diod. 18. 29. 2-4; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 2-4). Even though Neoptolemus is said to have been jealous of Eumenes, and Alcetas afraid that his Macedonians would not fight against Antipater, undoubtedly part of their reluctance was that Eumenes was not truly one of them. After Perdiccas's murder in Egypt, most of the Macedonian aristocratic followers of that commander fled to Alcetas, not to Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8). Included among these were Attalus, Perdiccas's brother-in-law (Diod. 18. 37. 2), Polemon, Attalus' brother,⁷³ and Docimus, the former satrap of Babylon.⁷⁴ In 319, Eumenes was unable to forge a coalition out of the very considerable forces still in Asia Minor loyal to the party of the former regent Perdiccas (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8-9). Subsequently, despite being the royal general in Asia he still suffered from the jealousy and rivalry of a new set of Macedonian aristocratic allies.⁷⁵ Antigenes in 317 (Diod. 18. 62. 7), and Seleucus in 316, called Eumenes a foreigner (Diod. 19. 13. 1). Nor was it foreign-born *hetairoi* alone who were viewed as inferior by Macedonian aristocrats. Philotas, the son of Parmenio, even demonstrated his contempt for backward Macedonians (Curt. 6. 11. 4). In Macedonia there was a clear class separation between the cavalry and the infantry. The cavalry was composed of those from upper class families and a few foreign *hetairoi* (*FGH* 72 F-4; Curt. 10. 7. 20). To fight on foot, except in the most extreme of circumstances, was considered beneath these aristocrats.⁷⁶

While Eumenes' association with Alexander grew close during the years of campaigning, it had initially begun as a professional relationship. Many of Eumenes' younger contemporaries had entered the royal household as pages.⁷⁷ These young men attended the king,

⁷³ Berve, *Alexanderreich*, 2:92-3 [#181], 322 [#644].

⁷⁴ Arr. *Succ.* 24. 3; cf. Diod. 18. 39. 6, 45. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8.

⁷⁵ Plut. *Eum.* 13. 4-8; cf. Diod. 18. 60. 1-61. 3; 19. 15. 3; Nepos *Eum.* 7. 2.

⁷⁶ For killing a boar in the hunt before the king could take his opportunity, Alexander III punished Hermolaus by having the young man whipped in the presence of the other pages and additionally by having his horse taken away (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 13. 2). In Amyntas' (son of Andromenes) defense of his involvement in a plot against the life of Alexander, he claimed that he retained his horses when ordered to give them up, because, if he hadn't, he would have had to fight on foot (Curt. 7. 1. 34).

⁷⁷ Pages, a secretariat and an archive, the elite infantry unit, the Royal Bodyguards, appear to have been adopted from similar institutions long employed in Persia (see

guarded him while he slept (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 13. 1–2), and grew up with the royal prince.⁷⁸ In most cases pages were the sons of the leading nobles of Macedonia, men such as the future army commanders Craterus, Perdikkas, Seleucus and Hephaestion.⁷⁹ However, pages could also be the sons of non-Macedonians. Philotas, the son of the Thracian Carsis, was one of Alexander's pages (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 13. 4).⁸⁰ While pages could come from the ranks of prominent non-Macedonians, it is certain that Eumenes was not a page. First, he was in his twentieth year when he entered Philip's service,⁸¹ older than the typical page, who was an adolescent (Arr. *Anab.* 4. 13. 1). Second, the implication in the sources is that Eumenes left Cardia to become Philip's secretary (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 1. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 4). Eumenes, therefore, entered the court as an adult and in the capacity of secretary. He did not share the same experiences or camaraderie as these pages, who later dominated the inner circle of Alexander's court. Eumenes was in a position similar to that of many native Macedonian nobles who were older and had not grown up with Alexander. Antigonus, for instance, the future satrap of Greater Phrygia, enjoyed a close relationship with Philip, but not with Alexander or that monarch's closest companions.⁸²

It should be noted, however, that much of the difficulty Eumenes faced was of his own creation. As Plutarch (*Ser. et Eum.* 2. 4) noted so many centuries ago, "if Eumenes had not contended for the primacy and been contented with a secondary position . . .", he would have survived. Part of the reason a united command of the surviving Perdikkans was not created during the winter of 320/319 was

D. Kienast, *Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden* [Munich: Wilhem Fink Publisher, 1973] 7–37).

⁷⁸ W. Heckel, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 238–44; N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great, King, Commander and Statesman* (Park Ridge, N.J.: Noyes Press, 1980) 16.

⁷⁹ Heckel, *Marshals*, 237–284; *Somatophylakia*: A Macedonian *Cursus Honorum*, *Phoenix* 40 (1986): 280; Hammond and Griffith, *Macedonia*, 2:164, 401–2.

⁸⁰ Not to be confused with Philotas, the son of Parmenio (see Heckel, *Marshals*, 23–33, 295).

⁸¹ See Chapter 2.

⁸² Pierre Briant (*Antigone le Borgne: Les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'Assemblée macédonienne*, *Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon* 152, *Centre de recherches d'histoire ancienne* 10 [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973] 130–1) believes that Antigonus's lack of a close connection to Alexander was for him an almost insurmountable obstacle. Later, when Antigonus had reversed his earlier weakness he removed from command those who had been close to Alexander (Diod. 19. 46. 2; 48. 5; 56. 1).

that Eumenes was not willing to relinquish the chief command to another (Plut. *Eum.* 8. 8). While various Macedonian aristocrats may have resented serving the Cardian Greek, Eumenes apparently was unwilling to accept a position less than what he had held under Perdiccas. After Antigonus trapped him in Nora in the spring of 319, that commander offered to release Eumenes as his subordinate, but Eumenes initially refused (Diod. 18. 41. 6; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 2–11. 3). As the siege grew prolonged, he did offer to serve the regent Antipater (Diod. 18. 42. 1), and finally in 318 he did agree to Antigonus's terms (Diod. 18. 53. 5).⁸³ This commander became less objectionable and service as a subordinate less humiliating when the circumstances absolutely demanded compromise. But at the first opportunity to regain his independence Eumenes deserted Antigonus in spite of his oath to serve him (Diod. 18. 58. 4).⁸⁴

Perhaps, the most surprising aspect of Eumenes' supposed ethnic handicap is that it may have been first mentioned by Eumenes himself. In the disturbance that broke out between the infantry and the cavalry after Alexander's death, Eumenes, unlike the other cavalry officers, stayed in Babylon and pretended to be neutral in the dispute, but in truth used his influence to undermine the infantry's support for Meleager.⁸⁵ Eumenes verbally based his proclaimed neutrality on his Cardian birth: it was not his business, since he was a foreigner, to meddle in disputes of Macedonians (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 1). This was a peculiar position to take, since many others of Greek origin thought nothing of involving themselves in the quarrel over the succession. Nearchus, as indicated, had proposed to the assembled army that Heracles be recognized as Alexander's successor (Curt. 10. 6. 11). Moreover, after the conclusion of the conflict, other Greeks were awarded satrapies. Laomedon of Mytilene received Syria,⁸⁶ and

⁸³ See Chapter 5, and E. M. Anson, *The Siege of Nora: A Source Conflict*, *GRBS* 18 (1977): 251–6.

⁸⁴ See the previous note.

⁸⁵ It has been claimed (see Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians", 41) that Eumenes could not directly communicate with Macedonian soldiers, since he did not speak Macedonian. However, Plutarch (*Eum.* 3. 1–2, 17. 4–18. 1) and Diodorus (18. 63. 1–5; 19. 25. 2–7) show Eumenes on many different occasions addressing Macedonian troops and being clearly understood by them. Even if there was such a thing as a Macedonian language, distinct from a Macedonian dialect of Greek, Eumenes was obviously fluent in it. (On the virtual certainty that Macedonian speech was a Greek dialect, see chapter 7.

⁸⁶ Arr. *Succ.* 1a. 5, 1b. 2; *FGrH* 100 F-8.2; Diod. 18. 13. 10; Curt. 10. 10. 2.

Stasanor of Soli, Aria and Drangiane.⁸⁷ Eumenes' statement was an argument that was just plausible enough to permit him to maintain his supposed and very precarious neutrality. After all the leaders of the two opposing camps, Perdiccas and Meleager, were members of the native Macedonian aristocracy.

Eumenes' claim of inferiority was generally accepted by the native Macedonian nobility on the grounds that he neither shared their birth nor their military expertise and experience.⁸⁸ The regular infantrymen, however, saw these supposed handicaps as without significance when compared with Eumenes' former standing with both Philip II and Alexander III.⁸⁹ The power of the Argead mystique for the Macedonian soldiers also accounts for Arrhidaeus's kingship, and for the attempts by many of the contenders for power after Alexander's death to marry his sister, Cleopatra.⁹⁰ Antigonos, indeed, eventually had her murdered to prevent her union with his rival Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 37. 5-6). In particular, the talisman of the first years after the great conqueror's death was the name Alexander.⁹¹ Eumenes quickly realized this and directed his subsequent policies with full cognizance of this fact.

Eumenes throughout his career was well-liked by his Macedonian troops.⁹² Indeed, prior to the battle of Gabene many of Eumenes'

⁸⁷ Arr. *Succ.* 1b. 6; *FGH* 100 F-8.6; Diod. 18. 13. 1; cf. Curt. 8. 3. 17.

⁸⁸ This point is made by Nepos, "*neque aliud huic defuit quam generosa stirps*" (*Eum.* 1. 2).

⁸⁹ This attitude is best expressed in Plutarch, *Eumenes*, 1. 6. As indicated earlier, after Alexander's death Neoptolemus ridiculed Eumenes' lack of military experience. The troops were unimpressed for they knew that Eumenes had been deemed by Alexander worthy of being related to him by marriage.

⁹⁰ Leonnatus (Plut. *Eum.* 3. 5), Perdiccas (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 21; Diod. 18. 23. 1-3, 25. 3; Just. 13. 6. 4-7), Cassander, Lysimachus, Antigonos and Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 37. 4), all sought her hand in marriage. Eumenes himself had appealed for her assistance in the immediate aftermath of Perdiccas's failed expedition to Egypt in 320 (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 40; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 6; Just. 14. 1. 7-8).

⁹¹ The political effectiveness of the use of Alexander's name, however, lasted less than a generation (R. M. Errington, Alexander in the Hellenistic World, in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité: 7 exposés suivis de discussions*/par A. B. Bosworth... [et al.], avec la participation de Denis van Berchem... [et al.]; entretiens préparés par E. Badian, présidés par Denis van Berchem, Vandoures-Genève, 25-30 août 1975, edited by E. Badian, *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* 22 [Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1976] 157-8). In fact, it may have arisen only after Alexander's death. Justin (13. 1. 7) mentions that the Macedonians were initially relieved at Alexander's death, remembering his excessive severity and the endless risks to which he had subjected them.

⁹² Diod. 18. 59. 4, 63. 5; 19. 24. 3-5; Plut. *Eum.* 1. 3, 4. 1, 4-5, 6. 1; Just. 14. 8. 5.

officers had decided that after defeating the enemy they would kill Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 1–3, 6; cf. Diod. 19. 41). These commanders were displeased with Eumenes' popularity with the infantry (Plut. *Eum.* 16. 1–2; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 18. 1); they believed that after the battle a victorious Eumenes might no longer need them. On those occasions where Eumenes encounters hostility from Macedonian forces, his Cardian birth is not at issue. Many Macedonians held him responsible for the death of the popular Craterus (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 12. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 7–8). At the time of his death those Macedonians serving Antigonos saw him as the cause for their own misfortunes suffered at his hands in combat (cf. Nepos *Eum.* 12. 2; Diod. 19. 44. 2). Indeed, only once in Eumenes' entire career is his Cardian origin held up to ridicule by common soldiers, and then the circumstances minimize the significance of the taunt. After Eumenes' baggage train was captured during the battle of Gabene, the argyraspids, the renamed former royal guard of both Philip and Alexander,⁹³ and the core unit of Eumenes' infantry, to regain their possessions, seized and delivered Eumenes to his opponent Antigonos.⁹⁴ As Eumenes was being led away against the wishes of the majority of his forces (Plut. *Eum.* 18. 1), the argyraspids referred to him as a pest from the Chersonese (Plut. *Eum.* 18. 2). For these troops baggage included their families and the loot of a decade's service in Asia.⁹⁵ The sources are very clear that the argyraspids only concern is for their possessions and their families (Diod. 19. 43. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 18. 2; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13). With the armies in Asia their camp had become their home, and was always an important component of every campaign, both to protect,⁹⁶ and as an incentive to encourage one's own troops with the hopes of capturing the enemy's possessions (Diod. 18. 7. 5, 9, 30. 2).

The importance of baggage is one of the attributes of mercenaries.⁹⁷ Even during Alexander's lifetime many of his Macedonians had

⁹³ For the identification, see E. M. Anson, "Alexander's Hypaspists and the Argyraspids", *Historia* 30 (1981): 117–20; "Hypaspists and Argyraspids after 323", *AHB* 2 (1988): 131–3.

⁹⁴ Diod. 19. 43. 8–9; Polyæn. 4. 6. 13; Just. 14. 3. 11, 4. 1, 18. According to Plutarch (*Eum.* 17. 1), Teutamus, one of the commanders of the argyraspids opened negotiations with Antigonos.

⁹⁵ Diod. 19. 43. 7; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 6; Just. 14. 3. 3, 6–7, 10.

⁹⁶ Diod. 19. 13. 4, 23. 4, 32. 1; Polyæn. 4. 6. 10.

⁹⁷ In general on mercenary soldiers, their attitudes and conditions of service, see Parke, *Soldiers*, esp. 207–8.

shown certain mercenary characteristics. That monarch often in the latter stages of his campaign had to resort to promises of riches and booty and more personal appeals to keep his troops' loyalty.⁹⁸ Earlier in his expedition Alexander had encouraged his troops in national terms: territories were not secure and further campaigns were necessary to complete the conquest.⁹⁹ Even though no commander in this period was so harmed by the loss of baggage as was Eumenes, he was not the only leader to suffer difficulties because of it. In 307 B.C.E., Demetrius defeated the Ptolemaic general Menelaus and captured three thousand of his troops. As was customary, Demetrius enrolled the defeated into his own army, but these deserted back to their former commander, because their baggage had been left behind in Egypt with Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 47. 4).¹⁰⁰ After this same Demetrius had captured the belongings of five thousand Illyrian mercenaries, these troops' commander Lysimachus had them executed for fear that they would mutiny to regain their possessions (Polyaen. 4. 12. 1).

Certainly, Eumenes' problems with the argyraspids were not unique. These troops had a long history of insubordination and independent action.¹⁰¹ They had participated in the murder of Perdikkas in Egypt and the sedition at Triparadeisus in which the new regent Antipater was himself almost killed.¹⁰² One mark of their unruliness is that after Triparadeisus they were separated from the rest of the royal army given to Antigonus and sent with Antigenes to bring part of the royal treasure from Susa to Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38).¹⁰³ This was the case, even though Antigonus was to face considerable armies in Asia Minor still loyal to the Perdikkan cause. Despite their obvious military abilities they were seen as too dangerous to be incorporated into the royal army. Indeed, after their surrender of Eumenes, while

⁹⁸ Curt. 9. 2. 27; Arr. *Anab.* 5. 26. 8; Diod. 17. 94. 1-3; cf. 104. 5-7.

⁹⁹ Curt. 6. 3; Plut. *Alex.* 47. 1-4; Just. 12. 3. 4.

¹⁰⁰ In 312 B.C., Demetrius lost the city of Gaza because of his soldiers desire to save their possessions (Diod. 19. 84. 7-8).

¹⁰¹ Justin (14. 2. 7) states that after Alexander they had little respect for any other leader.

¹⁰² Just. 14. 4. 11; Arr. *Succ.* 1. 35, 38; cf. Diod. 18. 39. 6.

¹⁰³ While it is not stated specifically that the argyraspids were among the rioters at Triparadeisus, three thousand rebellious soldiers were separated from the main army and sent ultimately to Cilicia with Antigenes (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38). Antigenes commanded the argyraspids during the invasion of Egypt (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 35) and later in Cilicia, he joins Eumenes with the three thousand argyraspids (Diod. 18. 59. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 13. 3-4; cf. Just. 14. 2. 6-12).

absorbing most of that commander's forces into his own army, Antigonus had no wish to invite the same difficulties the argyraspids had visited upon so many others. One of the commanders, Antigenes, was put into a pit and burned alive (Diod. 19. 44. 1), one thousand of the most troublesome argyraspids were given to Sibyrtius, the satrap of Anachrosia, who was commanded to see to their destruction, and the rest were divided up and sent to various remote garrisons (Polyaen. 4. 6. 15; Diod. 19. 48. 3). Antigonus thereby dismantled the best fighting unit in the Western world, but also its most dangerous.

While Eumenes' enemies often attempted to subvert his troops, they seldom made reference to his foreign birth. Seleucus in 316, did call on Eumenes' soldiers to cease preferring a foreigner (Diod. 19. 13. 1), but his request was ignored. Most often the troops were reminded that Eumenes and the other supporters of the former regent Perdiccas had been condemned by the troops in Egypt;¹⁰⁴ previous commanders of units within Eumenes' forces recalled for these soldiers their former loyalty;¹⁰⁵ threats were issued (Diod. 18. 63. 3), and bribes were frequently offered.¹⁰⁶ Of the various inducements to treachery, only the last enjoyed a measure of success. In the spring of 319, one of Eumenes' commanders, Perdiccas, deserted with three thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry (Diod. 18. 40. 2), and later during the course of the battle near Orcynia, Apollonides and his cavalry contingent deserted Eumenes (Diod. 18. 40. 5-8; Plut. *Eum.* 9. 3). While the cause of Perdiccas's treachery is unknown, in the case of Apollonides the desertion was the result of great promises (Diod. 18. 40. 5). Of course, in 315, the argyraspids surrendered Eumenes to gain the return of their families and property, the ultimate bribe.

Difficulties controlling Macedonian soldiers were not unknown to other commanders. In the army mutiny at Triparadeisus in 320, Antipater, the new regent, was almost killed in a riot of the soldiers.¹⁰⁷ Many of these same troops later at Abydus, just prior to their return to Europe with Antipater, rebelled again (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 44-45). The overriding issue in both of these incidents, the unifying theme, was money (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 32; Polyaen. 4. 6. 4). Moreover, in the winter

¹⁰⁴ Diod. 18. 62. 1; 19. 12. 2, 5-13. 2; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11, 10. 7-8; Just. 14. 1. 9-10.

¹⁰⁵ Diod. 19. 12. 2; 13. 1; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 3. 27. 5; 4. 24. 3, 8-10, 29. 1-2; 5. 23. 7.

¹⁰⁶ Diod. 18. 62. 1; 19. 25. 3; Plut. *Eum.* 8. 11; Just. 14. 1. 9-10.

¹⁰⁷ See Chapter 4.

of 320/319, three thousand Macedonians deserted Antigonos, and began to pillage the countryside of Lycaonia and Phrygia (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). While they were later returned to Macedonia, this does not appear to have been their initial intention.¹⁰⁸

In these incidents, in addition to the concern for pay, it is interesting to note the influence of unit commanders over the troops under their authority. The Macedonian soldiers who deserted Antigonos, the royal general in Asia, in the winter of 320/319, were more loyal to their immediate commander, Holcias, than to the royal general (cf. Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). The thirty-five hundred troops who deserted Eumenes readily followed Perdikkas, one of Eumenes' distinguished commanders (Diod. 18. 40. 2). When Eumenes recaptured the deserters, he put the leaders to death, and pardoned the common soldiers, redistributing them among the other units (Diod. 18. 40. 4). This quality of giving greater loyalty to a subordinate commander than to the overall leader is, like concern for remuneration, a basic characteristic of a mercenary army.¹⁰⁹ Prior to Triparadeisus, Alexander's former army was united and often acted with great uniformity; it was only with the break-up of this force that these particular mercenary qualities appeared in full force. In Babylon after the death of Alexander, in Asia Minor after the murder of Cynane, and in Egypt during and after the Perdikkian invasion, the troops acted as a corporate entity, using individuals when it suited the army's interest and discarding them when those interests were no longer served. After Triparadeisus, the Macedonian core was divided amongst different commanders. While the bulk of the Macedonians were initially assigned to Antigonos for his campaign against the surviving Perdikkians,¹¹⁰ the three thousand argyraspids were assigned to Antigones (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38),¹¹¹ one thousand Macedonians went off with Arrhidaios the

¹⁰⁸ In fact, there is evidence they wished to join Alcetas in Pisidia (cf. Polyaen. 4. 6. 6). In any case after withdrawing from Antigonos's army they spent their time pillaging the countryside (Polyaen. 4. 6. 6), not in attempting to return to Macedonia.

¹⁰⁹ Parke, *Soldiers*, 25–7; Briant, "Eumene (Suite et fin.)", 54. For the increasing mercenary quality of Alexander's and his successors' armies, see, E. M. Anson, "The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330–315 B.C.)", *Historia* 40 (1991): 230–47.

¹¹⁰ Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38; Diod. 18. 39. 7–40. 1. However, as noted in Chapter 5, eighty-five hundred Macedonians from Antipater's force were later exchanged for the bulk of the Macedonian veterans serving Antigonos prior to the regent's return to Macedonia.

¹¹¹ While Antigones was assigned the satrapy of Susiane, he and the argyraspids

new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and there were probably other deletions as well.¹¹² With this division the remaining units became increasingly more mercenary in their characteristics. Like mercenaries these Macedonians demonstrated special loyalty to their immediate commanders. These unit captains served as their spokesmen, as well as their officers.¹¹³ Soldiers also showed a predilection after defeat to enroll with the commander of the victorious army and to shun poor pay masters.¹¹⁴

The evidence then supports the existence of prejudice, but only as exhibited by the native Macedonian aristocracy. Moreover, this was not ethnic prejudice, but primarily one of class. Eumenes, before becoming one of the premier commanders of the Successor period, directed the chancellery of both Philip and Alexander, and was later scorned as one who followed the king with pen and paper (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6). The lower classes of Macedonia apparently were not motivated by ethnic or class considerations with respect to Greeks. The army, especially during Alexander's reign, proved itself loyal to the monarchy, and to those directly connected to the king. The common Macedonians supported Eumenes because of the confidence Alexander had shown in him, because of his perceived loyalty to Alexander's family, and because of his command abilities and his skill as a paymaster. Indicative of the general attitude of the rank-and-file is their reported response to the gibe about Eumenes following the king with pen and paper. The Macedonian troops ridiculed the individual who made this pronouncement (Plut. *Eum.* 1. 6). Demetrius, the son of Antigonus the One-eyed, in 288, believed that his Macedonian troops, fighting on their home soil, would readily resist Pyrrhus, because he was both a foreigner and not directly connected to the great Alexander (Plut. *Demetr.* 44. 8). He was proven wrong. His troops deserted readily to Pyrrhus (Plut. *Demetr.* 44. 10). To put Eumenes' career into proper perspective, that is into a Greek context, it needs

were there only briefly. Late in 320 they had conveyed the treasury in Susa to Cyinda in Cilicia (Arr. *Succ.* 1. 38).

¹¹² See Anson, "Evolution", 245-6 and n. 60.


¹¹³ Parke, *Soldiers*, 2-27; Briant, "Eumène (Suite et fin.)", 54.

¹¹⁴ The majority of Neoptolemus's defeated forces laid down their weapons and swore an oath to serve Eumenes (Diod. 18. 29. 5-6; Plut. *Eum.* 5. 5-6). Antigonus had acquired many of Eumenes' defeated infantrymen (Diod. 18. 41. 4), and others from subsequent desertions (Diod. 18. 41. 1; Just. 14. 2. 3); he obtained the surrender of almost the entire army formerly led by Alcetas through negotiation and enrolled these units in his forces (Diod. 18. 45. 4).


to be recalled that even after Xenophon's success in helping to organize the successful retreat from the heart of the Persian Empire, the Arcadians and the Achaeans refused to follow him further, because he was an Athenian (Arr. *Anab.* 6. 2. 10). Eumenes' Macedonian soldiers exhibited far less ethnic consciousness than that exhibited by the average Greek.

Eumenes' difficulties were not then ethnic in origin. Nationality, if anything, through Eumenes' consummate diplomatic skill, was turned to his advantage. Eumenes repeatedly claimed that his non-Macedonian birth denied him either the temptation, or the power to emulate Perdikkas's and Antigonus's ambitions. Seleucus, another possessed of acute political acumen, attempted to use Eumenes' own ploy against him, but Eumenes' commanders accepted it as limiting Eumenes and in no way demeaning themselves. Nationality had little to do with Eumenes' failure. Divided command and the skill of his principle opponent Antigonus were responsible for Eumenes' ultimate defeat. Judging from the prominence of the failure due to ethnicity theme in the surviving sources, its origin must have been Hieronymus. Eumenes' fellow countryman may have over time come to believe that Eumenes was doomed to failure from the beginning. Certainly, in the years following that commander's death, there had been a dearth of politically prominent Greeks. Hieronymus himself never achieved any high office. Those who did succeed were invariably Macedonian aristocrats. Hieronymus came to emphasize Eumenes' handicap as a Greek over Eumenes' skillful use of this theme. He also came to regard Eumenes' final stand with the forces of the kings as overshadowing any earlier dealings he may have had opposed to their best interests. These emphases presented a romantic picture that proved very attractive to later historians and biographers. Eumenes, however, was in the final analysis just another ambitious contender for power on the stage created by Alexander's death, and like Meleager, Craterus, Neoptolemus, Perdikkas, Alcetas, Attalus, Antigones, and many others, he left the stage early; his failure due to ill luck, bad alliances, and one very capable opponent.


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
Map of Greece and the Aegean Area



Map of Macedonia



Map of Near East



Map of Western Persia

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